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This thesis provides an overall picture of global governance in public services (also referred to 
as global social governance). It maps global aspects of welfare change: governance 
mechanisms, social policies and service provision developed at the global level. As it maps the 
relocation of social services from national to global, the research discusses the consequences 
for traditional and new understandings of publicness. Publicness has been slow to make its 
way into global forms of social policy-making and service provision, even if social services 
have been historically considered public, and vital for the governing of social life. A new form 
of publicness, global publicness, therefore, rises as an alternative political frame for more 
effective governance frameworks to come forward. Developing global publicness, however, 
requires profound economic, legal, cultural and political changes. Because these changes will 
not happen overnight, a maturity approach is suggested, instead of a purely outcomes-based 
approach. In order to map global social governance and suggest a maturity approach, I draw 
from international law and materials, multi-disciplinary theory and three case studies. The case 
studies introduce and compare global social governance within the United Nations family, in 
global health and in the contested field of global education.  
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This thesis brings forward two main arguments: that the global level has been 
increasingly used to design and provide public services in a range of policy-
fields, from education to health, from food distribution to popular housing; and 




New considerations of publicness refer to the content of publicness within 
governance and not government and requires at this point in time, I argue, a 
change of consciousness, which, in turn, requires society to engage in an 
exercise of developing “maturity for governance”. The concept and the 
elements of maturity are constructed in chapter 6. They represent a creative, 
rather than a proposal for the adoption of a specific framework or outcome-
focused approach to more effectively developing global governance in the 
future. 
The traditional literature on governance is concerned with nonstate actors 
performing “the kind of jobs governments used to do” by relying on 
“transnational social norms” rather than exclusively on laws and regulations.2 
Similarly, this thesis is concerned with public services that have been 
developed supranationally by hybrid partnerships, within a framework of 
                                                 
1
For more on global publicness considerations, see Chapter 1 below. See also Craig Calhoun 
“Rethinking the Public Sphere” (lecture to the Ford Foundation, New York, 2005).  
2
 Amitai Etzioni From Empire to Community: A New Approach to International Relations 
(Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2004).   
 [2] 
 
global governance, and not of government.
 3
 More specifically, this thesis is 
concerned with transnational partnerships and international organisations 
making important decisions about the wellbeing of peoples and about public 
services. These decisions include: the Organisation for Economic Co-
Operation and Development (OECD) assessing students’ competencies in 
more than 70 countries; the Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and 
Malaria financing the great majority of drugs to control malaria and 
tuberculosis; the UN Department of Social and Economic Affairs (UNDESA) 
debating the establishment of universal pensions to assist the world elderly 
population.
4
 This thesis is also concerned with the increasing number of 
initiatives similar to these. The main arguments of this thesis are not against 
these initiatives, but they suggest that initiatives to provide social services 
continue to be public, even if more and more of them are now provided 
supranationally.  It is also suggested that a better, values-based political 
context is urgently needed to effectively host these initiatives. In this fashion, 
the governance literature does not sufficiently explore issues of publicness 
                                                 
3
 Two main scholars studying governance without government are James Rosenau and Rod 
Rhodes. The first writes mainly from an international relations and normative perspective. The 
second prefers to assess governance practices at the domestic level. I drew heavily upon their 
work, and discussions of their work, to write this thesis. Their seminal writings include: JN 
Rosenau "Governance, Order, and Change in World Politics" in James N. Rosenau and EO 
Czempiel (eds) Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics 
(Cambridge University, Cambridge, 1992) ["Governance Without Government"]; and  RAW 
Rhodes “The New Governance: Governing without Government” (1996) XLIV Political 
Studies 652. 
4
 For an account of how global actors, including transnational NGOs, private service 
organisations, and International Government Organisations (IGOs), provide worldwide 
immunization see the example of the Global Polio Eradication Campaign (GPEI) “Polio and 
Prevention” (2010) Global Polio Eradication Initiative <http://www.polioeradication.org >. For 
an account of how the OECD joins private corporations and national governments to evaluate 
the reading, math and science competencies of 15-year old pupils across 76 countries, see 




within supranational partnerships that end up, in fact, designing and providing 
public services. This thesis begins to fill this gap. 
Besides mapping initiatives that illustrate the relocation of public services 
from the government to the global level – represented by hybrid alliances and 
transnational partnerships – this thesis is concerned with what happens to 
publicness once public services are relocated. Publicness is especially 
important when global governance is used to design and deliver welfare 
services that have been for decades considered public, staple welfare State 
services. Some aspects of public services have been relocated based on 
decision-making made by hybrid alliances or because delivery has been 
increasingly executed by a range of actors, from international organisations to 
local faith-based organisations. Even if some of these services are now used to 
address global social challenges that otherwise would remain unattended, these 
services still require a broader discussion about their publicness and about the 
public roles that new enablers and providers have played.  
The field of public health provides clear examples of services that have been 
historically public, considered a governmental job, and that are now being 
designed and or delivered supranationally. Health services related to the 
control of communicable diseases, such as mass vaccination to eradicate polio, 
distribution of drugs to control Tuberculosis and the spread of HIV/Aids are 
also part of this new way of working. There are other public health services, 
which are not related to communicable diseases, which have been addressed 
through global governance, especially after the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs). Examples range from the provision of pre-natal care to food 
 [4] 
 




But not all policy-fields provide as many and as solid examples of global 
governance in public services. Education services, for instance, have been 
provided supranationally, but generally within a frame of international 
governance and development, relying heavily upon inter-state organisations 
and funding deriving from international aid. These services have spread 
worldwide, but have fallen short of including nonstate actors, especially at the 
local level, to give input and help in delivery.  
The contrast between global health and global education demonstrates that 
policy-fields do not deal with relocation of services the same way; and not all 
policy-fields will be able to enhance publicness in global social policy the 
same way. Many agencies have already understood that global social policy 
organises around policy-fields. For instance, the G8, the UN, and the OECD: 
they all engage with global governance in more than one policy-field. They 
exercise governance roles in areas as diverse as education, health, housing and 
food provision. Many agencies of the UN have engaged with a range of 
policy-fields and services simultaneously, like education and health, especially 
after the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). After the MDGs, the UN 
has engaged more bluntly and more frequently with public services. Therefore, 
the way the UN engages with public services provides good insight about who 
are the actors engaging with global social governance.  
                                                 
5
 Specific services like pre-natal care, food distribution and vouchers are discussed in Chapters 
2 and 5 in the context of services provided by the Partnership for Maternal, Newborn and 
Child Health and by the World Food Programme.  
 [5] 
 
The UN and other international and transnational actors begun to make 
important welfare decisions that actually refer to global social challenges, 
which are those that concern all of us and that no organisation alone can 
address. As such, global governance has been chosen as the right 
administrative methodology to address these challenges. Yet the use of global 
governance in public services, understood as the formation and functioning of 
hybrid alliances to achieve specific social goals, has virtually ignored the 
public component of public services and also the public nature of making 
social policy and delivering public services.  
The nature of public services when provided as global services to address 
global social challenges continues to be public. Yet publicness changes, since 
it loses the nation-state as centre of authority. Publicness changes as it 
develops within governance and, as a result, as public services are designed 
and provided by different forms of organisations. 
A concern with publicness without government and within governance 
considers how supranational forms of organisation can reclaim social 
ownership and be vested with political and legal responsibility for their 
engagement in global governance acts. Once transnational actors start 
performing social jobs, publicness without government becomes very 
important. Thus the study of Global Governance in Public Services wants to 
highlight two great challenges that, arguably, is upon society in the 21st 
century. Firstly, the need to recognise that social jobs are no longer under the 
domain of governments. Secondly, the need to face the contemporary 





 Consequently, this thesis provides a map of global 
governance in public services (what is happening with welfare services as 
objects of international and global social policy). It also provides a critique 
concerning the overall lack of publicness considerations in global governance. 
Finally, the thesis suggests that enhancing much-needed publicness in global 
social governance acts is a grand, overwhelming task. For instance, a 
movement towards reframing publicness in a non-exclusive statist way 
requires the conjecture of political, economic, and social transformations, 
similar to those that enabled the statist discourse to flourish in the beginning of 
the 20th century.
7
 Therefore, an outcomes-approach to constructing publicness 
will likely fail; instead, constructing publicness to build a better context for 
global social governance to take place requires a maturity approach.
 8
  A 
maturity approach recognises the long-term processes, the fundamental 
debates that are yet to take place to promote and consolidate publicness in 
global governance.  
I suggest that the advanced use of global governance to design and provide 
staple public services, like provision of popular housing, distribution of food 
                                                 
6
 The choice for the title Global Governance in Public Services, instead of the more-
consolidated term global social governance aims at highlighting the need to better understand 
and revitalise the meaning of publicness, by using the global level.
 
Throughout the thesis, 
nevertheless, I use the two terms interchangeably, even if conscious that global social 
governance is a broader endeavour. 
7
 Richard Falk “Reimagining the Governance of Globalisation” (2003) The Transnational 
Foundation for Peace and Future Research <http://www.transnational.org/SAJT/forum 
/meet/2003/Falk_GlobalisationImagine.html> [“Reimagining Governance”]. 
8
 Bob Deacon, one of the founders of the field of Global Social Policy (GSP), has recently 
employed the term global social governance. From Bob Deacon’s theorising, it is possible to 
infer that it is adequate to use the term interchangeably with global governance in public 
services. See generally Bob Deacon “Shifting the Global Social Policy Discourse: The Impact 
of the Global Economic Crisis on Ideas about Social Protection, Social Development Policy 
and Global Social Governance” (paper presented to United Nations Research Institute for 
Social Development, Geneva, 12 November 2008).  
 [7] 
 
vouchers, and distribution of essential medicines, makes the pursuit of 
publicness in global governance necessary. Hurrying to create more new 
mechanisms and policies will likely not promote publicness in global social 
governance. Hurrying to start developing a better political context for these 
mechanisms and policies to operate, which I see as an exercise to develop 
maturity might eventually pay off, making global social governance more 
effective on the ground.  
1. Thesis Structure   
In short, this thesis starts with theoretical background about global governance 
and publicness, drawing the most relevant relationships between the two 
concepts (Chapter 1). Then, it engages with mapping global governance in 
public services through the use of three-case studies (Chapter 2, Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 4). Next, the thesis provides an assessment of the current state of 
global social governance (Chapter 5). Lastly, based on the evidence gathered 
through the revision of specialised literature, I suggest a new approach to go 
about improving global social governance (Chapter 6). This approach aims at 
enhancing global publicness, strengthening the global public domain as the 
ideal context in which global social governance should be embedded, and, as a 
result, promoting more effective frameworks. As this approach recognises the 
long-term processes involved in building publicness at the global level, it is 
called a maturity approach.  
Each chapter has been designed with two overarching purposes in mind:  
 to guide the reader through a map, an overall picture of the 
transnational aspects of welfare change in the last twenty years;  
 [8] 
 
 and to demonstrate how effectiveness in global governance in public 
services seems to be linked with the capacity to revitalise publicness 
by reframing its political and legal meaning, via the global level. 
Virtually all critiques of global governance in public services today 
boil down to issues of lack of publicness, although they are not 
articulated as such.    
The mapping (which includes the case-studies), the analysis of current state of 
global social governance, and the suggestion of a new approach, required 
multi-disciplinary research and deep thinking about how to structure the thesis, 
and the rather complex arguments that follow. I opted for a simple structure 
that follows this sequence: theoretical background; case-studies; analysis of 
current state of global governance in public services; locating  its main 
challenge, which boils down to issues of publicness; and, then, suggesting a 
new approach to construct more publicness.  
Specifically, Chapter 1 analyses theories of governance and global governance 
ethics clarifying key concepts and drawing relationships between global 
governance and global publicness. The first chapter differentiates global 
governance from international governance and domestic governance, arguing 
that global governance in the social realm should be the most public of them 
all. For instance, in Chapter 1, I take advantage of an emerging philosophy of 
global governance and critical legal theories to reinforce the idea that there is 
an original public ethics behind the theory of global governance.
 9
 Realising 
                                                 
9 
For more on the emergence of a global governance philosophy see generally Jean-Francois 
Thibault “As if the World Were a Virtual Global Polity: The Political Philosophy of Global 




this global public ethics in the actual provision of public services is not an easy 
task. Yet it is paramount to realising the potential of the global level to 
effectively exercise functions, such as the provision of health care, whose 
public character has been defended by advocates around the world.    
Chapter 2 provides a case-study of global governance in public services in the 
UN family of institutions. It analyses the desired and actual role of the United 
Nations in exercising social governance leadership, especially after the 
Millennium Declaration and the launching of the Millennium Development 
Goals. In sum, Chapter 2 sketches an overview of public service governance at 
the UN.  I anticipate that Chapter 2 configures a valid case-study, despite 
being different from the cases that deal with policy-fields, Chapters 3 and 4. It 
is valid because it illustrates how international institutions are organising 
themselves to design and provide a range of public services. In fact, Chapters 
2,3 and 4 together represent the two-ways in which, arguably, global social 
governance has manifested itself: 1- through international institutions; 2- 
through policy-fields. By using Chapter 2 as one example of how institutions 
go about global governance in public services, the first part of the structural 
framework is illustrated.  
Chapters 3 and 4 represent experiences of governance (global, international 
and national) embodied in traditional policy-fields, rather than inside of a 
given international institution. Chapters 3 and 4 explore sectors in which the 
UN, other international actors, and non state actors have been very active. 
These chapters are context-specific; they deal with global education and global 
health.  
Specifically, Chapter 3 is a picture of the main themes surrounding education 
governance in the 21st century. It ponders that education has been a contested 
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terrain when discussed outside of the realm of national provision. Chapter 3 
suggests that education has less possibility to transform itself into a sector that 
is legitimated as part of the global public sector than health; it seems that 
publicness in education is still very much attached to a traditional, statist 
understanding.  I argue that the very nature of education services, ingrained in 
and mediated by local cultures, depends upon the national apparatus for 
legitimation and effectiveness. This is not necessarily a bad thing. At the same 
time, one needs to critically understand that supranational mechanisms are 
being created in education without a preoccupation for publicness, which is 
assumed to be always situated at the national level, when it comes to public 
education. Education scholars have overlooked the global level as an avenue to 
revitalise publicness in education services. Finally, Chapter 3 offers a critique 
of this reluctant position.  
In contrast, Chapter 4, on global health, offers a more promising view of the 
health sector as a fitting environment for global governance mechanisms to 
develop effectively. The analysis of mechanisms of Global Health Governance 
(GHG), such as the Global Fund to Fight Malaria, Tuberculosis, and 
HIV/AIDS, and also of the well-established academic discipline of GHG, 
demonstrates that in the context of public health there is a larger potential for 
global governance to realise its theoretical promise.  
The contrast between education and health provides an useful sketch of the 
conditions that either facilitate or impair global social governance. These 
conditions are further explored in Chapter 5. Chapter 5 also draws from the 
experiences at the UN level to complement the analysis about current 
practices, trends and challenges in public service governance.  
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Based on the evidence provided and summarised in Chapter 5, I argue that, in 
the welfare context, there are very few examples of global governance 
mechanisms with potential to be socially effective. The lack of effectiveness is 
associated with lack of publicness in governance. Departing from this 
observation, in Chapter 6, I engage with theory building to suggest that 
constructing global publicness starts from constructing a stronger context for it 
to develop. This context refers to a better-understood, more politically open 
and ethically-driven global public domain. The global public domain as the 
ideal context for global publicness and effective global social governance to 
develop will not materialise overnight. The global public domain will have to 
be nurtured and matured.  
In Chapter 6, I develop the elements of the concept of “maturity for global 
governance,” an analytical tool that aims at advancing the study and practice 
of elements that are considered conditions of effectiveness to global social 
governance. Finally, I conclude by arguing that encouraging the study and the 
realisation of these elements, as part of a quest for maturity for global 
governance, assists in the construction of more global publicness. This vision 
should facilitate an assessment of  which and how global public services 
should be developed. It may advance global governance as the methodology 
capable of revitalising some aspects of public service provision, and hence 
better address world social challenges, especially those related to world 
inequality. Yet today the use of global governance, which inevitably 
transforms public services, has frequently worked to the detriment of the 
public infra-structure.  
The elements to enhance maturity for global governance identified in the 
context of this thesis’s case studies are not intended to form an exhaustive list. 
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Instead, they are designed to call attention to conditions of effectiveness to 
global social governance, which relate to the make-up of the global public 
domain as the ideal context for global governance to take place. These 
elements represent points of departure to guide further research about the 
democratic and operational challenges that emerge with the use of global 
governance in public services. For instance, along with a large-scale migration 
of public services from the national to the global sphere, further research, 
public education, and policy debates are needed to identify and nurture global 
publicness. In fact, further debating global constitutive themes is part of the 
search for maturity in itself, and it is a sign that this process has already 





In terms of a general research paradigm, this is a multi-disciplinary, qualitative 
study.  
From a theoretical perspective, I used governance theory and an emerging 
ethics of global governance, which is informed by global justice theory 
(especially the work of contemporary philosophers such as Richard Falk, 
Thomas Pogge and Amartya Sen). I also used critical legal realism and Critical 
Race Theory (CRT), as well as socio-political constructivism (largely based on 
the work of John G. Ruggie,) offering an innovative mix.   
From a data perspective, I conducted both documental and specialised-
literature research in respect of the UN family, global health and global 
education, since these areas functioned as my case studies. For the purposes of 
Chapter 2, my first case study, I analysed official United Nations documents.  
For Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, I looked at reports, policy papers, and 
regulations of international organisations, such as the World Health 
Organisation. I also read published studies conducted by health and education 
scholars. Finally, I reviewed theoretical treatises in the areas mentioned above 
and conducted detailed analyses of concepts such as global public domain and 
global publicness as well as their relationship to an increasing use of global 
governance in public services.  
In terms of research scope, while in the last thirty years, analysis of 
governance has been either actor-centred (concentrating on actors and their 
activities) or focussed on policy-field, this analysis used both. It took a 
combined approach by considering the global arena a common, public space 
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for policy-making and delivery that can be shared by a range of important 
actors working in the context of specific policy-fields.
10
 As such, this project is 
able to fit within more than one disciplinary context.  
For instance, from a traditional legal methodology perspective this study 
would generally fit within Terry Hutchinson’s “additional legal research 
frameworks” (which do not fall within the ‘norm’ of doctrinal legal 
research).
11
 Within the frameworks Hutchinson enumerates, this is a 
theoretical study because it uses both jurisprudential and critical methods.
12
  
From a legal-realist methodology, on the other hand, this thesis fits well with 
the main inquiries about public law. Not only it informs one of the most 
traditional debates in legal scholarship, that is the public and private divide, 
but it deals with the officials of the 21st century and their activities.
 13
 These 
officials are transforming the framework of the nation-state, the main concern 
of traditional public law research.  
Besides the disciplines mentioned above, this research also fits within the 
political sciences because of its focus on governance from an international 
relations perspective and focus on the UN. The research also carries methods 
of the social sciences in order to establish sectoral analyses of health 
governance and education governance, which function as case-studies. In other 
words, as it follows a theoretical tradition, this research is “philosophical in its 
                                                 
10
 AJ Jakobi International Organisations and Lifelong Learning: From Global Agendas to 
Policy Diffusion (Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2009) at 17.  
11
 Terry C. M. Hutchinson Researching and Writing in Law (N.S.W. Lawbook, Sydney, 2002) 
at 43.  
12
 Ibid, at 52-53.  
13
 This term paraphrases the reference made by  Karl Llewellyn to the officials of the law in the 
20th century. Karl N Llewellyn The Bramble Bush: On Our Law and Its Duty (Oceana 
Publications, New York, 1951) at 21.  
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basis … and extend[s] to interdisciplinary methodologies …” when applied to 
examining governance in action (mapping).  
By drawing from this multi-disciplinary pool of resources, this thesis sheds 
light onto inter-disciplinary questions about how global publicness is 
important for global governance, especially once global governance has been 
increasingly used to design and provide social services that have been 
historically considered public.  In fact, mapping this increasing use is a 
primary objective of this thesis. Yet the mapping exercise is accompanied by a 
normative analysis as well.  
The following empirical and normative questions guided the research process: 
 Is global governance in public services a reality? How does it 
happen?  
 Should this type of governance always be considered a public 
endeavour? What type of public? And what are the 
implications of a new public type of classification?  
 What may be the possible relationships between the 
enhancement of global publicness and the effectiveness of 
global social governance?  
 What are the elements of global publicness? From which 
disciplinary and theoretical contexts can one build a more 
accurate description of the global public domain, arguably, the 
context in which global governance should be embedded? 
 Can one (already) spot these global public elements in the 
practice of global governance? Does the presence of these 
global public elements promote effective global governance? 
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 Are the current global social governance mechanisms adequate 
to perform the public functions they end up performing 
(especially those mechanisms that transform the design and 
provision of public services)?  
With these broader questions in mind, I also explore the following, more 
narrow questions about global governance actors and their activities:  
 What types of initiatives (actual activities and projects) 
undertaken by officials of the 21st century influence the design 
or provision of public services?  
 Are they public or private initiatives? Should they be 
considered public or private initiatives?   
And, acknowledging the limitations of a thesis of this nature and of such 
broadness, I finalise the project by thinking about whether world’s society is 
ready to embrace global publicness as a necessary condition of effectiveness in 
global social governance. Within these considerations, I suggest how a process 
of getting-ready to embrace a reconstituted public domain can be transformed 
into an exercise, in which we, as a society, may achieve maturity for enjoying 
the benefits of global publicness and, consequently, of more effective global 
governance. In this regard, the thesis deliberately strays away from an 





Chapter 1: GOVERNANCE, PUBLICNESS, AND PUBLIC SERVICES: 
TRADITIONAL AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES   
…Cowardice asks the question, ‘Is it safe?’ Expediency asks the 
question, ‘Is it politic?’ But conscience asks the question, ‘Is it 
right?’…”   
Martin Luther King Junior 
I Introduction  
Arguably, the future of global governance requires re-thinking not only 
notions of publicness that could better correspond to and support global public 
service delivery, but also rethinking the murky environment in which global 
governance is taking place. The shift in the way public services have been 
provided in the last two decades urgently demand a stronger global political 
space; a space that is driven by values and by a notion of collective ownership 
of administration of global resources and interests that is much different from 
what we have today.  
In the next three chapters, I set out to demonstrate the shift in public services 
as it is happening on the ground. In this first chapter, I start constructing a 
conceptual framework that could help us understand how a stronger global 
public domain should look like. This exercise comes to a close only in Chapter 
5. From chapters 1 to 5, I attempt to demonstrate and summarise the shifts on 
the ground and the conceptual transformations regarding to public services 
today. I consider that the five chapters, including the three case studies, were 
fundamental to the construction of the conceptual architecture proposed for 
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global publicness throughout the thesis and for the approach chosen and 
presented in Chapter 6, the maturity approach. It was chosen as a way to move 
towards rebuilding publicness and an environment where structures of 
governance, and not of government, can be more effectively steered and 
rowed. 
The first step towards rethinking publicness from a global governance 
perspective is to separate the notion of publicness and all-things-public from 
the nation-state. Global publicness is in the realm of governance and not of 
government; it is about a sense of collective ownership in, and access to, 
administration processes that are decentralised and that cut across borders. 
Nevertheless, most of the literature on global governance still operates under 
the national frame, adopting, for example, the nation-state as one main unit of 
analysis. As the study will show, and especially Chapter 5 will later clarify, I 
chose to stray away from this traditional format, and construct an approach 
that understands global governance in public services as a truly transnational 
phenomenon. As such studying global governance in public services means 
looking for the ‘transnational dimensions” of the shifts and changes occurring 
in social policy and service delivery.
1
 The main drivers of these changes have 
been public private partnerships. Consequently, most governance scholars 
would likely agree with the definition of global governance in public services 
as: forming, enabling, and regulating hybrid alliances for public-services 
specific goals.
2
 Public services goals include health, education, housing, 
                                                 
1
 Karen Mundy "Global Governance, Educational Change" (2007) 43 Comparative Education  
340. 
2
 This conceptual construction broadens the concept of Global Health Governance articulated  
by Ilona Kickbusch, Wolfgang Hein, and Gaudenz Silberschmidt “Governance Challenges 
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nutrition-specific goals, and are pursued by providing or enabling staple 
welfare services 
 In this study, a non-territorial, but rather functional approach to public 
services is adopted. Public services are used as a “medium of publicness.”3 In 
other words, ingrained in the process of provision, there is yet another 
characteristic of public services: they are capable of shaping the public 
domain. Thus they are a medium of publicness. As a result, public services 
relocated to the global level are pillars of the global public domain and its 
contents. The contents of the global public domain should respond to the 
social objectives that have recently developed beyond the state.  
When I refer to public services as a medium of global publicness I refer to, 
firstly, services traditionally perceived as part of national welfare systems, 
which now enjoy low to high levels of transnationality (such as health, 
education, social security (pensions) and housing). Secondly, I refer to other 
services that are related to the protection and distribution of goods that “extend 
across borders, population groups and generations” (global public goods).4  
Public services do not necessarily need to be originated via any government. 
Global social policy may respond to the needs and interests of several 
constituencies, which integrate the local, national, regional and global levels, 
                                                                                                                             
through a New Mechanism: The Proposal for a Committee C of the World Health Assembly” 
[2010 Symposium Global health Governance] Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 550. 
3
 I borrow from new public theorists Janet Newman and John Clarke when I use public 
services as mediums of publicness. Newman and Clarke, nevertheless, focus on remaking 
publicness in public services in the British context. Janet Newman and John Clarke Publics, 
Politics and Power: Remaking the Public in Public Services (SAGE, the University of 
Michigan, 2009).  
4
 Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg and Marc Stern (eds) Global Public Goods: International 
Cooperation in the 21st Century (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999) at Introduction.  
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When multilateral agencies, transnational Non Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs), transnational companies decide to form hybrid alliances and take on 
these jobs, they engage on global social governance; not necessarily there is a 
concern with preserving publicness, the attribute of collective interest and 
ownership, in the performing of these activities. If there were a concern with 
publicness, we would see more of, and more writings about what has been 
called by early governance theorists as “self-steering”. 
Self-steering is a public form of steering (it is open, it is visible, is collectively 
owned) that does not suit representative forms of governing. Self-steering is 
not for government, but for governance.  
Higher levels of self-steering happen when actors join each other to do 
something together, to collectively achieve a common goal or to collectively 
address a common challenge and, in fact, are able to work as partners. This 
ability could be fostered by models of participation and accountability that 
highlighted the importance of self-management, instead of traditional means of 
control and centralised oversight. These models and mechanisms, as we will 
later explain in Chapter 5, are still rare to find among the initiatives that today 
impact public services and among important theoretical postulations, such as 
Global Administrative Law (GAL). In general, the models reflect a 
multilateral, governmentally driven culture, both in terms of theory-building 
and in how things work in practice. 
                                                 
5
 Bob Deacon, Michelle Hulse and Paul Stubbs Global Social Policy, International 
Organisations and the Future of Welfare (Sage, London, 2007) at 19-20. 
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For example, the transnational distribution of drugs, the large-scale evaluation 
of students, the worldwide provision of food security and cash vouchers for 
food – programs that will be later identified and explored in the case-studies – 
require more self-steering and less centralised control in the hands of 
international institutions or hybrid alliances. They require more coordination 
and fewer top-down strategies; they require more governance and less 
government. At the same time (and here lies a great challenge) they also 
require more publicness, because their objectives refer to achieving shared 
social goals.  
Below, I compare and contrast traditional and non-traditional theoretical 
perspectives on governance that are relevant to how hybrid alliances (or public 
private partnerships) have worked in practice to achieve social goals. I also 
demonstrate that the traditional understandings of publicness are not enough to 
frame global governance types of initiatives.
6
     
Although this thesis is multidisciplinary and broad in its coverage of 
governance and public service theory, issues and concepts that are more 
closely associated with business management and economics were placed 
beyond its scope. Therefore, approaches to governance that relate to trade law 
and sustainable development, for instance, were not covered, but only 
referenced to.   
                                                 
6
 For a summary of the theoretical prescriptions for global governance, see generally Samuel 
Makinda “Recasting Global Governance” in RC Thakur and E Newman New Millennium, New 
Perspectives: the United Nations, Security, and Governance (United Nations University Press, 
2003) 163 at 181. Contrast with Jean-Francois Thibault “As if the World Were a Virtual 




With the reestablishment of the theme eradication of poverty within the 
international, sustainable development agenda, in the last chapter, I resort to 
some of the initiatives that have recently flourished that can be useful for the 
future of global social governance. Yet the sustainable development literature 
was not generally used to inform the conceptual analysis that follows.   
II Notions of Governance And Public Services 
Despite the fact that governance has been a multi-disciplinary theme, inter-
disciplinary debates about governance are less prominent. For instance, 
scholar Anne Mette Kjær explains:
7
 
governance theories have developed out of different theoretical 
debates, and they remain quite insulated. With a few exceptions 
(especially between Rosenau and Rhodes), there are not many cross-
references between governance literature in different sub-fields. 
In general, I accept James Rosenau’s concept of global governance 
paraphrased as regular systems of steering mechanisms enforced by either 
formal or informal channels organised through networked hybrid alliances.
8
 
But  I also consider it limited to properly address global governance as it 
applies to the social and public administration realms. 
Ideal, successful forms of global governance in public services represent forms 
of steering that are, at the same time, operationally-viable and just. Just global 
governance ensures that “duties of redistributive justice are fulfilled and 
[counts with] global and regional institutions to protect other interests of 
                                                 
7
 Anne Mette Kjær Governance: Key Concepts (Polity Press, Cambridge, 2004) at 196. 
8
 JN Rosenau Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent 
World (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997) at 15 and 95.  
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persons in case of State failure.”9 It also, nonetheless, as pointed out by Nancy 
Fraser, considers that there are additional issues that can only be accessed and 
carried forward outside of the national space.
10
 These are not only residual 
issues (i.e. injustices deriving from State-failure), but issues that 
fundamentally impact on the building of a just global society and that are 
transnational in their own right. Thus, when I refer to successful or effective 
global social governance I refer to how transnational demands for justice 
should be addressed by hybrid alliances taking on jobs that, until a few years 
ago, were in great part managed within national borders.  
By the end of this thesis, the study will have demonstrated that, there is a long 
way to practice global governance in a socially effective way. There are only a 
few examples of global social governance in operation. Mostly, hybrid 
alliances function more as a result of the, somewhat frail, international system 
of governance, mainly as a result of United Nations (UN) programmes, than as 
genuinely self-steered partnerships.   
For this reason, and to better situate the reader about which types of 
governance models we use the most, I find it important to dissect 
characteristics of governance across levels (international, global and domestic) 
as studied through different disciplinary contexts (e.g. International Relations 
and Public Administration).  In many occasions, scholars, public officials and 
the lay man and woman mention global governance actually referring to 
international governance. This is more than a terminological issue, since, at a 
minimum, the misuse of the term global governance conveys a larger 
                                                 
9
 D Moellendorf Cosmopolitan Justice (Westview Press, Boulder (Colorado), 2009) at 148.  
10
 Nancy Fraser Scales of Justice: Reimagining Political Space in a Globalizing World 
(Columbia University Press, New York City, 2010), at 83. 
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participation of transnational civil society than it actually occurs. Relevant 
implications such this and a basic taxonomy of governance theories are 
mapped below.  
2.1 International Relations Perspective 
Global governance “is conceived to include systems of rules at all levels of 
human activity – from the family to the international organisation;” it is a way 
of working that allows society to “steer itself, and the dynamic of 
communication and control are central to that process.” 11 In addition, Rosenau 
stresses that global governance:
 12
   
involves not only the absence of highest authority but that also 
encompasses such an extensive disaggregation of authority as to 
allow for much greater flexibility, innovation, an experimentation in 
the development and application of new control mechanisms. 
These new control mechanisms need to take into consideration, therefore, that 
the figure of the highest centralised authority does not longer exist; self-
steering takes that place. Self-steering relates to the ability of a multi-level 
(from the transnational to the household) group to determine the directions 
they want to take in order to achieve objectives that are of shared concern and 
may be of social and economic character. Thus self-steering in global 
governance refers to a type of transnational ownership of social processes that 
is not traditionally contracted but glued together under bonds of solidarity.   
                                                 
11
 JN Rosenau “Governance in the 21st Century” (1995) 1 Global Governance 13 at 13. 
12
 Ibid, at 17. 
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These bonds of solidarities that bring people together into networks and make 
possible the idea of self-steering should shape what analysts call “the emergent 
structures of world politics.”13  
The political world that Rosenau envisions with his colleagues, IR scholars, is 
one where “authority is undergoing continuous relocation – both outward 
toward supranational entities and inward toward sub national groups.”14 It is a 
world where a decentralised governing style is taking multiple directions. 
Within this vision there is great confusion between what traditional 
international governance is (and the type of upward decentralisation it entails) 
and what global governance is.  
International governance in comparison with global governance is:
15
 
… the output of a non-hierarchical network of interlocking 
international (mostly, but not exclusively, governmental) institutions 
which regulate the behaviour of States and other international actors 
in different issue areas of world politics … Global governance is the 
output of a non-hierarchical network of international and 
transnational institutions. … Whereas, in international governance, 
the addressees and the makers of norms and rules are States and other 
intergovernmental institutions, nonstate actors (in addition to States 
and intergovernmental institutions) are both the addressees and the 
makers of norms and rules in global governance.  
The role in governance that the UN exercises, for example, is a product of the 
international system and of international law-making. However, UN’s attempt 
                                                 
13
 JN Rosenau "Governance, Order, and Change in World Politics" in JN Rosenau and Ernst 
Otto  Czempiel (eds) Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics 
(Cambridge University, Cambridge, 1992) ["Governance Without Government"].  
14
 Ibid.  
15
 Tanja Bruhl and Volker  Rittberger "From International to Global Governance: Actors, 
Collective Decision-Making, and the United Nations in the World of the 21st Century" in 
Volker  Rittberger (ed) Global Governance and the United Nations System (United Nations 
University Press, Tokyo, 2002) at 2.  
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to expand its work into areas that are considered global social challenges has 
provoked higher levels of cooperation between the UN and nonstate actors. 




In summary, Rosenau’s project links its concept of global governance to an 
idea of self-steering networks; or to the ability of a group of people and 
organisations, including the State, to get together to do more of steering. From 
the element of self-steering present in the vision of global governance, one can 
infer important ethical considerations. It is from the concept of self-steering 
that one can construct the concept of global publicness, as of today, when there 
is neither one global government nor consensus about the need of having one. 
Self-steering, I argue, is the backbone of global governance, and what makes it 
different from other forms of governing. Self-steering is also the backbone of 
global publicness. It is what makes publicness new and suitable to the 
emergent structures of world politics.  
Newness in global cooperation, however, has been associated with technical 
and administrative innovations, rather than with more fundamental reasons for 
supranational actors to get together. The interpretation that actors engage in 
global governance with self-interested political goals, or because of strictly 
operational factors such as availability of funding and human resources,  rather 
than global bonds of solidarity, prevails. Not every engagement among private 
and public, national and transnational actors configures a step towards 
                                                 
16
 Millennium Declaration, see Chapter 2. United Nations Millennium Declaration GA Res 
55/2, A/55/L.2 (2000). 
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achieving common goals, enhanced levels of self-steering and better  
governance.  
The term global governance has been used overwhelmingly and in a simplistic 
manner; it is often associated with most types of nonstate actor participation 
and any type of transnational alliance. It is mostly articulated as ethically-
neutral. In contrast, I understand that ethical content (for example, whether 
self-steering is being promoted within alliances and whether the scope of the 
partnership refers to a transnationally shared goal in which stakes would be 
high for all parties involved) should be taken into consideration to qualify 
initiatives as of global governance.   
For practical reasons, however, I will refer to global governance in the same 
simplistic manner: calling mechanisms of global social governance as such, 
even if they are ethically-neutral and do not enjoy higher levels of self-
steering. I will call the mechanisms that do enjoy higher levels of self-steering 
as global governance initiatives that enjoy higher levels of global publicness.  
Higher levels of self-steering, for example, can be found in community 
projects that harness support from a range of international and transnational 
organisations to deliver global public goods, such as the provision of water, 
basic health care, popular housing, etc. The realisation of self-steering relies 
upon the existence of previously agreed social goals. While there are some 
social goals that have acquired a kind of global public status, many do not. 
Precisely because of the difficulties in reaching global public status and 
agreeing upon what common interests are, self-steering may be an 
overwhelming task.  
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Global governance will never be about absolute self-steering. Rather, 
conceptually, and for the sake of its effectiveness, it  requires a certain degree 
of self-steering. Self-steering in global social policy-making refers to the 
ability of those affected by (or interested in) specific social policies to self-
organise into networks in order to shape policy direction. Self-steering in 
global governance may manifest itself in alternative ways by which civil 
society expresses choice or consent.  
Self-steering, despite the challenges, is of particular importance for global 
governance in public services, because it enables greater participation of 
beneficiaries in the steering and rowing processes. In other words, encouraging 
frameworks of global governance in public services may open new 
opportunities for beneficiaries to have a voice in the policy and delivery 
processes. Encouraging these frameworks means enhancing levels of 
publicness, since one way of assessing publicness is to measure when 
decision-making processes are being shared among stakeholders.
17
 Better 
frameworks may be facilitated by the strengthening of a vision of global 
publicness as depending upon higher-levels of self-steering.  
Visions of global publicness include ethical, operational, and political 
components. Each component depends upon the existence of the other in order 
to enable greater self-steering, and more successful global governance. The 
components include: 
                                                 
17
 Derrick W. Brinkerhoff and Jennifer M. Brinkerhoff “Public-Private Partnerships: 
Perspectives on Purposes, Publicness, and Good Governance” (2011) 31 Public Administration 
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 [29] 
 
 performance should be grounded upon ethical, solidarity-type of 
commitments that allow for the building of compelling social 
objectives; 
 steering performances should be open for input and scrutiny at the 
global level (where international and transnational actors devise 
mechanisms of steering); 
 political responsibility for performance should be constructed and 
gradually attached to global networks.  
Note that these criteria do not place at the core of the argument  principles that 
have been traditionally associated with global publicness, such as transparency 
and accountability. These alone do not represent global publicness and are 
grounded upon traditional mechanisms of control, associated with 
government-ran institutions.  
Chapter 5 will situate as inadequate, by looking into the lessons learned in the 
case studies, the terms of the debate about accountability as they are currently 
deployed. Mostly, the terms of the debate are inadequate because they do not 
engage with self-steering; authors seldom realize that global governance 
theory relies upon self-steering. The higher the levels of self-steering, the 
fewer mechanisms of accountability should be needed. Yet very few scholars 
realize the centrality of self-steering to the theory and practice of global 
governance. Missing the centrality of self-steering is missing the point about 
how global governance is legitimised, made transparent and made 
accountable.  
In general, International Relations scholars have also overlooked the richness 
of studying public private partnerships (PPP or PPPs) from a global social 
governance perspective.  
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As it currently takes shape, global social governance, or global governance in 
public services, refer to a range of international and transnational, sectoral 
(health, education, pensions, housing …) interventions that increasingly 
influence people’s wellbeing around the world. In practice, it refers to 
governing a range of social services through hybrid alliances that operate 
across borders.  
Global governance in public services should not be confused with neither 
philanthropy nor international development. Philanthropy and international 
development may be tools of global governance. I argue, however, that (in the 
context of public service governance) preference should be given to tools that 
enhance the global publicness of global governance mechanisms and their 
programmes. Philanthropy and international development may or may not do 
that.   
By requiring higher  levels of global publicness in global governance in public 
services, the global overlayer that designs and provides public services 
acquires an ethical dimension that seems fundamental for the successful 
relocation of public services to the global level. This ethical dimension relates 
to themes such as beneficiary-centrality, wealth redistribution and the 
reduction of inequalities. Global governance in public services, however, has 
happened without these types of global public considerations.  
Ethically- neutral or not, global social governance is limited in scope (it only 
applies in specific situations and in reference to a few goods and services.) 
From an international relations perspective, the jurisdiction of global 
governance in public services should always be narrow, but deep (fewer 
issues, but large responsibility), while the jurisdiction of the State, for 
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example, is wide, but becoming more shallow in certain policy areas, like 
global health and global food security.   
2.1.1 Global Governance and globalisations 
From an international relations perspective, global governance is seen as a 
relatively new phenomenon made possible through the formation of many 
hybrid alliances fuelled by globalisation. Global governance in public services 
involves several dimensions, such as economic, legal, cultural, sociological, 
and ethical.
18
 For example, if not for the globalisation of human rights 
discourse and the standardisation of certain health and environmental models 
of governance, global governance in public services would likely not be 
happening at the level it is already happening.  
The provision of public services through the use of global governance is one 
important consequence of multiple forms of globalisation.
 19
 The emergence of 
ideas such as the transnational public sphere, international human rights, the 
global commons and global public goods require a rapid change in perspective 
in respect of the jurisdiction of a limited number of public services.
 
 
Many public services, however, continue to be dealt with within a traditional, 
public administration perspective. It continues to be just as important and 
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2.2 Public Administration Perspective 
In the domestic context, Rod Rhodes starts by explaining “governance as the 
minimal State”, that is governance as the “use of markets and quasi-markets to 
deliver public services.”21 Domestic governance practices have disrupted the 
traditional public sector and traditional modes of steering. 
Even within this disrupted context, domestic governance relies upon the 
government to choose and organise how public services will be outsourced. 
While decentralisation practices are widely used in domestic governance 
frameworks, decentralisation does not presuppose the disappearance of a 
centre of authority.
22
 It relies upon the government, as it relies in 
representative democracy to assess the needs of the governed and to take up 
political responsibility. In domestic governance, governments represent 
publicness and have a significant role to play in enabling and constraining 
networks. However, governments have not always been able to define the 
directions of governance; global governance as a practice has often 
transcended government’s ability to dictate how the public sector should be 
steered. For instance, a range of international and transnational actors now 
complicate the government’s job of enabling or constraining service provision. 
According to Rhodes, governance is a “new process of governing; or a 
changed condition of ordered rule; or the new method by which society is 
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governed.”23 With these words, Rhodes tells us what governance is within an 
ordered domestic context. He expands his argument by saying that such new 




As used in the analysis of British government, the term policy 
network refers to sets of formal and informal institutional linkages 
between governmental and other actors structured around shared 
interests in public policymaking and implementation.  
The difference between Rhode’s account of the role played by networks in 
domestic governance and the role of networks in global governance refers to 
who performs, who exercises specific tasks of public administration and where 
these tasks take place.  




… the people are able to give and to withhold their consent to being 
governed – their consent to what the government asks of them, 
proposes to them, and has done in the conduct of their affairs. They 
can elect the government. They can remove it. They can approve or 
disapprove its performance. They cannot themselves perform. 
Walter Lippmann’s classic articulation of the boundaries of the power of the 
people is clearly at odds with the theory of global governance, where people 
are attributed to perform several of the activities, and make decisions, that are 
vital to the organisation of society in self-steering format. However, 
Lippmann’s account is not completely at odds with Rhodes description of 
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domestic governance. This difference is significant for an emerging theory of 
global publicness, which (if consolidated) will coexist with and reshape other 
understandings of State administration.  
The understanding that public service provision is a tradition that pertains 
exclusively to the State is in steady decline. However,  the broadening of 
public administration towards the global level has been detected via domestic 
governance scholars and studied within public administration schools.  
At the global level, the emergence of Global Administrative Law (GAL) has 
indicated that government traditions related to administrative justice can 
develop outside national bureaucracies.
26
 The concern of GAL however is 
narrower, mainly with oversight of compliance mechanisms within 
international organisations (including principles of accountability and 
transparency) and with the promotion of rights.
27
 Disciplines such as New 
Public Management (NPM) in the domestic level and GAL at the global do not 
sufficiently address the issue of disruption and relocation of publicness, once 
mechanisms of public administration are taken out of the natural public space 
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For instance, NPM concentrates on a traditional view of governance, derived 
from the vision of the discipline of public administration. According to this 
vision, the welfare State is observed to be in steady decline, but a more 
managerial, business-like State is emerging as a strategy to be used by 
governments wanting to be more efficient. The State still represents a tangible, 
formal centre of authority with which other actors need to necessarily 
negotiate.  
Mechanisms in global governance in public services are not all the same. For 
instance, NGOs do not work in the same way. In general, state and private 
actors partner under what could be called as the application of the managerial 
aspect of NPM. The wave, which was mentioned earlier, towards adopting 
NPM principles in governance at the domestic level has influenced 
supranational mechanisms as well.  
NPM principles were first developed as a response to what was considered 
governmental inefficiency.
29
 In theory, NPM principles include the idea that 
governments should be responsible for enabling service provision, but not for 
delivery, because they are not efficient at it. NPM suggests that in the process 
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of enabling, governments should empower citizens to own the processes of 
governance, clarifying the purposes of services and the goal of public 
provision. Other NPM remedies, by contrast, include practical advice on how 
to make government more business-like and more economically efficient by 
adopting a strategy of privatisations and treating beneficiaries as consumers.  
Public administrators and International Governmental Organisations (IGOs) 
officials have chosen to apply the last remedies (the managerial types) in the 
day-to-day crafting of governance strategies while the first remedies, which 
are more political in nature, and associated with new forms of self-steering, 
have been underdeveloped. As applied from a vision of the beneficiary as a 
consumer, NPM becomes incompatible with higher-levels of publicness in 
global governance, since publicness requires political openness and visibility 
in decision-making. Political openness and visibility requires that public ends, 
differently from business-types of efficiencies and consumer satisfaction, be 
tenants of the policy responses. NPM when used from a managerial 
perspective is not enough to address the extent of publicness needed when 
transnational NGOs and IGOs become service enablers. For example, Dunn 
and Miller explain more clearly how the application of NPM in domestic 
practice does not contribute to democratic governance either:
30
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…economic efficiency in its various forms (employee productivity, 
budgetary discipline, optimal staffing) is the main justification of 
NPM interventions such as privatisation, contracting out, and new 
personnel appraisal systems. Frequently, even discussions of 
employee and citizen participation, which at first glance seem to be 
associated with democratic governance, reduce to purely 
instrumental arguments about the effects of participation in enabling 
or constraining productivity and economic growth—this is pure 
instrumental rationality, with no consideration of other public ends. 
Economic efficiency as the core principle of NPM has reflected in the work of 
IGOs as new enablers of public service provision. 
GAL adopts an approach to global publicness that is, for our purposes, 
insufficient, because it is associated with publicness as derived from the 
legitimacy of international law.
31
 Because GAL relies almost exclusively upon 
the administrative bodies established by international treaty regimes, it does 
not have to consider alternative expressions of publicness. The analysis of 
global governance in public services is a broader undertaking that generally 
does not rely on the available international legal regimes. Global governance 
as it takes place in public services may benefit from GAL’s mechanisms in 
specific global policy areas that enjoy treaty regimes and that use them to 
guide public service action (that is potentially the case of the human rights 
framework). GAL’s tools will always be just one set of tools among many 
others. 
Publicness without government and within global governance requires broader 
and creative ways of reimagining and building administrative mechanisms. In 
fact, publicness within global governance represents more than creating 
international mechanisms of administrative justice, like new treaty bodies to 
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develop modes of transparency, accountability and participation. Publicness 
within governance has broader meanings; it is about new political horizons 
and new avenues for social justice.   
 
2.3 Global Ethics Perspectives on Governance 
The study of transnational networks is more about their ability to influence 
State behaviour than about deep-rooted moral reasons to self-organise, or 
about networks’ abilities to take part in governance as actors in their own 
right.
32
 For instance, two types of networks have been considered most 
relevant in different global policy areas. Epistemic networks (communities of 
knowledge-based experts) have been framing the debate about environmental 
policy.
33
 Transnational advocacy networks have been associated with the 
expansion of international human rights.
34
 In large part, the effects of these 
networks have been investigated in the context of how they help frame 
national policy choices about these themes. While this is important, this 
approach only looks at one aspect of network action that, arguably, is not the 
most important in a frame of global governance. A frame of global governance 
advances network action in its own right. Global governance in public services 
advances networks that take upon their responsibility provision and delivery of 
services, even if the State plays an active role as a member of the network 
itself. Moreover, global governance in public services should be about 
managing social objectives that are common to transnational constituencies.  
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It was not by chance that the now extinguished Global Governance 
Commission (GGC) made reference in the title of its report to the word 
“neighbourhood”.35 As suggested in Evan Luard’s writings, the global level 
has the possibility of reclaiming community values that were lost with 
modernity.
36
 The GGC, following the same line of thought, suggests a three-
fold approach to global ethics to guide global governance actions. This 
approach directly relates to an emerging ethic for global governance, and to a 
public nature that should be more naturally attached to it:
37
   
Enunciate and encourage commitment to core values concerned with 
the quality of life and relationships, and strengthen the sense of 
common responsibility for the global neighbourhood. 
Express these values trough a global civic ethic of all actors, public 
and private, collective and individual.  
Embody this ethic in the evolving system of international norms, 
adapting, where necessary, existing norms of sovereignty and self-
determination to changing realities.  
Public service reformers remain oblivious to these emerging ethics. Whether 
by ignorance, negligence or design, this indifference interferes with the quality 
and quantity of public services.
38
 For instance, in traditional public sector 
                                                 
35
Commission on Global Governance Our Global Neighborhood: the Report of the 
Commission on Global Governance (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995) [“Commission 
Report”]. 
36
 Evan Luard Socialism Without the State (Macmillan, London, 1979). 
37
 Commission Report, above n 35, at 48. 
38
 For example, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) have narrowed the relationship 
between goals to be achieved at the global level and the necessity for more public services in 
quantities that are often impossible to provide at the national level. The little interaction 
between public administration and global governance theories exacerbate the difficulties in 
actually addressing this gap.  
 [40] 
 






…national civil services in Western countries lost their way in the 
1980s. …  
The political leaderships of the 1980s became openly hostile to their 
public services, hurling all kinds of accusations at them, notably of 
being ‘flat, bloated, inefficient, uncreative and too powerful;’ and 
fiscal imperatives pushed governments to reform the machinery of 
government with a consequent enthusiasm for privatization and other 
ways of commercializing  government activities. The public services 
have remained on the defensive ever since … (citation omitted).  
Today, the values guiding public service administration have been 
fragmentation by execution, State minimalism, and corporate measures of 
efficiency. These are private values generally observed in the practice of 
governance. This elected set of values has been object of criticism, fuelling 
much of the governance debate within national boundaries, regardless of 
policy area.
41
 The debate has neither succeeded in discouraging a private 
orientation in domestic governance nor in preventing it from spreading. Hence, 
corporate values, rather than global ethical values, have transformed the ways 
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in which public services are provided. This fact has influenced recent theories, 
which are at odds with the discursive revival of publicness as a result of an 
emerging ethics for global governance. Despite of how difficult it is to change 
public administration cultures, it is important to note, however, that 
transformation of public administration has been possible at the domestic 
level, but perhaps not towards the direction desired.  
Global governance in public services implies another layer of transformation. 
It represents a shift that aims at responding to Donald Kettl’s critique about 
governance’s inability to address needs that are far beyond a government’s 
capacities, structures, and processes (corporate-like or not).
42
 However, 
effective global governance in public services is not only suggested as a 
response to new demands generated by globalisation, but also as one response 
to the limitations of current domestic public administration frameworks, which 
remain little concerned with transnational events. It also engages little with 
potential linkages between the wellbeing of peoples and enhancing global 
forms of publicness.  
Some of the new predicaments cited by Kettl in his The Transformation of 
Governance, include “global warming, terrorism, migration and immigration, 
income inequality, intellectual property, and sectarian conflicts.” (citation 
omitted)
43
 These pose direct and indirect challenges to public services as 
provided within the State and as currently provided by most partnerships 
formed to address social goals. These and other global challenges, especially 
in the social realm, demand new approaches to publicness.  
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III Global Publicness  
Publicness is the “combination of things, ideas, issues, people, practices, 
relationships and sites that are understood as public.” 44 Global publicness is a 
relatively new term, which does not enjoy yet a clear definition.  
In Chapter 5, I propose an approach to global publicness, based on conclusions 
from the three case studies, which highlight that the main critiques concerning 
social services provided by global actors boil down to lack of publicness. It 
does not lack publicness as we know it; it lacks publicness when it is 
interpreted broadly, beyond its modern amalgamation with the nation-state. 
Until the mid twenty century, as I will argue below, publicness was associated 
with social ownership of administrative processes.    
Arguably, many of the problems with global governance in public services 
detected today could be diminished if we were to make global processes less 
centralized and more open to higher levels of self-steering and social 
ownership of global social-policy making and delivery processes. Social 
ownership of global processes, through networks that are able to bridge the 
local and the global, the international and the transnational is at the centre of a, 
still rather rough, understanding of what global publicness means.  
Accessing global publicness today is very much an academic exercise, which 
signals potential pathways to overcoming challenges to global social 
governance. In order to overcome the challenges faith in publicness needs to 
be restored.  
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The argument in favour of making global processes more public, even if 
outside of the governmental realm, is not mere speculation. In fact, this thesis’ 
case studies show that the single common thread, through which it is possible 
to weave the critiques and the detected problems in social governance today 
relates to lack of publicness, as traditionally conceived (nor as an attribute of 
State activity and neither as a synonym of more accountability and 
transparency in supranational activity).    
The disruption of the traditional, state-ran public sector model has taken the 
concept of publicness to a sort of a crisis. For the last fifty years, publicness 
has been associated with the nation-state. With the displacement of publicness, 
the language of the public has been considered tarnished, tainted with a heavy 
coat of negative associations, such as inefficiency, waste, corruption, and 
exclusion.  
Global education scholars, for example, suggest that education, in order to be 
accessible, inclusive and high-quality should be considered a general good or 
a social good, rather than a public good.  New attempts to remake the public– 
including those that are not at the national-level but elsewhere – may 
encourage education scholars to adopt the language of publicness and use it to 
reach goals of free and quality education worldwide.  
It is through the term public that we, as a society, have historically understood 
what should be accessible by all, and what is collectively owned. It is through 
the language of publicness that we deposit our trust, even if ineffective or 
corrupt practices have tainted the image of national bureaucracies. Therefore, 
even among contemporary critiques that resemble modern ideas of the public 
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as a mere phantom,
45
 the culture of depositing the collective interest at the 
hands of something public is still very strong. 
As an overall trend and partially because of the reasons above, we are not 
ready “…to cut off the head of the king” (as Michael Foucault referred to the 
ambivalence of political theorists to diminish the role of the nation-state).
46
 
Thus theorists (along with high-level officers and public administrators) 
refrain from classifying subjects and objects of global governance as global 
public, even if the function that global actors are now exercising are clearly 
public functions.   
As public services represented the power of the king in the 20
th
 century, to 
globalise them could mean that the integrity of the king is in jeopardy. This 
suspicion can be historically debunked. First, history has shown that the king 
alone may not be the best representative of its people’s multiple interests.47 
Second, global governance – understood as organisational systems with high-
levels of self-steering and, hence, publicness–may be able to revitalise some 
ability of the people to organise and claim for their interests, which is, in fact, 
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the reason why many theorists pay allegiance to the king and, in simpler terms, 
to national publicness.
48
   
Publicness and public maters are not natural to global governance, but rather 
battled for, “historically and socially variable”, involving “political struggles 
to make them so.”49 As a global era of publicness is inaugurated by the 
relocation of public services beyond the state, so are new battles to constitute it 
and to make it so.  The relocation of public services perhaps should not have 
happened in the way it did: randomly, without an overarching governance 
vision, and without an understanding of the political space necessary to host 
global social policy effectively. But it is a reality and it is upon us the necessity 
to construct a viable environment for them to flourish in a just and responsible 
way. In this fashion, a brief review about the concept of publicness is helpful.  
The concept of publicness has acquired different meanings with time. First, the 
concept of publicness served to organise social life at the local level (defining, 
for example, the work of the local family doctor and of the parish’s school). 
Then, publicness migrated to the State level; in modern times the State has 
represented the socially owned and has organised social life (organising, for 
example, health provision through the building of public hospitals and 
education through mass-schooling). More recently, social life has found 
expression and organisation beyond the State. The State is one out of many 
publics gravitating the public sphere, hence new articulations of publicness 
have emerged.   
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Following this historical line, global publicness rises as an attribute of  the acts 
of governance that refer to issues that cross borders (such as epidemics, hunger 
and the need for qualified workforces). Ideally, global public challenges 
should be owned and addressed by a global overlayer and its global subjects 
organised in hybrid partnerships and enjoying high levels of self-steering. 
Global publicness as an attribute of global governance has potential to 
transform the ethics, the sociology, the politics, and the operation of global 
governance as generally deployed in discourse and practice.  
For example, Marta Minow, who studies the State of education reform, 
observes that “… lines between public and private, non-profit and profit, 
secular and religious – are newly up for grabs … .”50 She furthers her 
observations by providing an account that there is a shifting of lines in 
“welfare reform, health care, universities, social services, media, the arts, and 
justice.”51 By surveying these shifting lines, Minow confesses that:52  
… it is disturbing to watch things that we think should be separate 
come in contact and converge. Yet we are not likely to succeed in 
reasserting the old borders between public/private, profit/non-profit, 
and secular/religious. The federal and State government will not 
extend or reassume all duties of direct provision … Yet no one 
committed to the public values of freedom, equality, and fairness can 
simply watch these trends without concern. 
Better understanding the relationship between these shifting lines and the 
global level is invaluable. A deeper analysis of this relationship may, for 
example, define the reasons why a new global jurisdiction to provide a limited 
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number of public services offers a great opportunity to both formalise and 
improve practices that are already taking place (some of these practices will be 
showcased in chapters 2, 3 and 4).  
3.1 The State and Statist Publicness Vis-à-Vis Global Publicness 
A conventional approach to global publicness considers the “national 
populations and transnational nonstate, nonprofit actors” as elements of the 
public domain, together with the State itself.
53
 A conventional approach 
always attributes the public’s “visible hand” to the national government.  
Differently, the visible hand of the global public (which could actually be 
termed the visible hands of many publics) lies not only in the exercise of 
public functions by networked actors, but in the common reason why they 
engage with such activities. As such, the global level needs to be vested with 
interests and procedures that have the capacity to sort out and systematise the 
activities being undertaken by networks working for the public, attributing to 
them a differentiated treatment, and forming a visible public sector that is 
represented by a web of networks (a network of networks,) albeit a fluid one. 
In this respect, individuals will have to let go of an obsession with tangible 
structures and government buildings, as they did, for example, by accepting 
internet banking into their daily lives and letting go of actual bills and receipts. 
They will also have to learn how to recognise new actors as public. As global 
actors become public, they acquire new prerogatives and new responsibilities.   
Global actors performing public functions are as varied as human rights 
enforcement networks and international providers. They are also as local as 
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grassroots community groups and as transnational as the NGO Doctors 
without Borders. As Doctors without Borders, there are a range of other 
organisations that could be considered global providers, including: 
international agencies such as the UN Habitat, which provides, among other 
things, financing solutions to affordable housing in many countries;  
partnerships created for policy-guidance and financing such as the Partnership 
to Stop TB; and straightforward delivery mechanisms  such as the Global 
Drugs Facility.
54
 Yet there is little guidance, in academia and within networks 
themselves, about how global actors should organise vis-à-vis each other; 
which position they believe they occupy, actually occupy, or should occupy; 
and which responsibilities they have in regards to their clients or 
beneficiaries.
55
                                                  
3.2 Global Actors and Their Environment  
In 1990, Evan Luard defended the transition of publicness between political 
units, from State to the global, as it pertains to the promotion of welfare:
 56
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Thus, just as, a century so earlier, social problems which had 
previously been confronted only at the local level, within the family 
and the local community, had increasingly been made the 
responsibility of national governments, so now some of those 
problems had to be confronted on a still wider basis. Many had 
become global rather than national problems. Crime, drugs, 
terrorism, disease, refugees, national disasters, had become matters 
which individual governments acting in isolation could no longer 
effectively cope with. They were incapable, above all, of dealing 
with the most serious social problem of all: relieving the situation of 
the most disadvantaged – the totally destitute – since in most cases 
these lived within those States which were themselves most 
disadvantaged and least capable of helping them. If such problems 
were to be confronted at all, this had to be done at a level above that 
of the State.  
In 1979, Luard had already explained in his book “Socialism Without the 
State”57 that a single political unit, the nation-state, had been misinterpreted as 
the exclusive custodian of the national social realm. In other words, everything 
public, everything socially owned, was confused with everything owned by 
the State. Luard also clarified that this fusion between social ownership and 
State ownership generated negative effects, such as amplified world 
inequality.
58
 In the same book, he suggested that one way to reclaim 
publicness, and attend to the needs of society, is to devolve power to the 
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grassroots level, while relinquishing State power to, what he called, the 
“stratosphere” level.59 Thus, both the stratosphere and the local level were 
engaged in a vision of governance first proposed by Luard in the late 1970s.  
 In 1979, as noted by Adam Roberts, this word, “stratosphere” was somehow 
deprecating.
60
 Roberts argue that Luard himself could not fathom when States 
would agree to transfer jurisdiction over some public matters to a 
supranational level. In the 21st century, the stratosphere is closer to home and 
is represented by a global project that Luard himself developed in his 1990’s 
theory of globalised politics.
 61
 Yet deserved attention has not been paid to 
perspectives on governance that highlight the relevance of the global public 
domain and global publicness. Theoretical considerations of this sort have 
been only at the margins, and they are not clearly linked to the beginning of a 
global public sector in particular, and the consolidation of the global public 
domain in general. In fact, international and transnational community’s efforts 
that signal a transformed public sector are generally analysed from an 
economic or developmentalist perspective. I argue that the efforts of global 
actors in re-shaping public services are vital not only for a better 
understanding of the global public domain and global publicness, but also for 
better understanding and use of global governance.  
As discussed above, global publicness strays away from a traditional political 
public theory perspective  (that is publicness associated with the acts of an 
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 from an economic perspective (publicness measured by 
non-rivalry and non-excludability in the availability of a good or service;) and 
from more recent conceptual attempts, such as Benedict Kingsbury’s concept 
of publicness for global administrative law (directly associated with 
international law and regulation).
63
 At the same time, global publicness in 
public services as a characteristic of a new governing form is timid, 
contentious, and applicable to very few policy-fields.  
Constructing a type of publicness that is global and non-territorial sounds, at 
the outset, counter-intuitive. A concept of global publicness that merely 
transfers basic pillars of the traditional concept of publicness and public goods 
to the supranational level is, at a minimum, incomplete. It could be labelled 
inaccurate. Considering the many differences existent between the national 
context and the global context,  refashioning publicness to fit contemporary 
needs means, at the outset, a) researching about transnational actors and 
international institutions. It also entails researching about b) values, themes 
and goods that are of transnational concerns.   
These two realms, the first institutional and the second ethical, make up the 
global public domain. The first realm is material; it relates to networked actors 
and institutions hosted by a supranational overlayer that produces and delivers 
social services.  
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Therefore, I select the transnational public sphere as one of the material 
elements of the global public domain. Guidry, Kennedy and Zald explain that 
the transnational public sphere is:
 64
  
…a space in which both residents of distinct places (States or 
localities) and members of transnational entities (organisations or 
firms) elabourate [sic] discourses and practices whose consumption 
moves beyond national boundaries. The consequence of this 
transnational public sphere is not simply its own development. Like 
globalisation, it involves “action at a distance” that must be 
understood in terms of its consequences for real actors, all of whom 
occupy specific places and communities. 
Global justice scholars have attributed to the transnational public sphere a 
larger role in reinforcing and engendering protective regimes that represent the 
needs of global civil society often voiced by transnational NGOs.
65
  
Protective regimes are also part of the other material component of the global 
public structure: international and transnational institutions. Brühl and 
Rittberger underpin the importance of establishing and protecting a stable 
order via institutions. They argue that without them there would be 
underproduction of global public goods. They also claim that “the output of 
international norms and regulations to ensure the provision of these public 
goods on a global scale has not kept pace with the rising demand for them.”66  
In terms of institutions, some institutionalist positions are at odds with the idea 
of global publicness in global governance, while others are not. It will depend 
upon one’s concept of institutions. This study, for instance, does not share the 
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general view that more traditional, international institutions are absolutely 
needed for networked actions to work for the public. In fact, international 
institutions may facilitate or disrupt global publicness (since they may see their 
role as superior in a hierarchy of global actors and harm self-steering.) Yet 
their roles as global actors are wide. They include administrative coordination, 
mediation of claims (political coordination), recognition and validation of 
local claims (translation), enforcement of laws and social norms, and gathering 
and distribution of funding. These are all part of the material component of the 
global public domain, therefore very tangible and easy to visualise.  
The second realm (besides the institutionalist) of the global public domain is 
normative. In part it relies upon an aspirational vision of the global commons. 
Arguably, the challenge resides in this ethical realm. The greatest challenge, I 
argue, is to promote a change of consciousness that promotes the global level 
as a suitable space for people to get together to discuss, preserve and produce 
goods that are of interest for all, regardless of their nationality. The challenge 
for the global public domain is to be enshrined with values that allow 
transnational, hybrid partnerships to design and manage collective projects, 
regardless of the different economic and political roles each partner might 
play. We are still far from having these values.  
Richard Falk explains that a values-bases approach to global society, as 
occupying what he termed the global commons, has engendered positive 
effects in environmental preservation:
67
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In essence, affirming the existence of a global commons 
acknowledges the growing insufficiency of relying on States to 
achieve an acceptable form of global governance by acting on their 
own. With reference to oceans, polar regions, ozone depletion, 
climate and biodiversity, there is the awareness that only global 
cooperative regimes with longer-run perspectives can avoid disaster 
befalling the global commons. Impressive results have been achieved 
through the medium of ‘lawmaking treaties’ that seek to bind the 
entire world to act within an agreed framework of rights and duties. 
Advocates for the global commons recognise the threat posed by, what can be 
considered, patronising politics. Grounding the legitimacy of his theory on a 
humanist perspective, Falk explains that:
68
 
Delimiting the idea of humane governance on behalf of the peoples 
of the world is itself a daunting and inconclusive undertaking. The 
unevenness of material circumstance, cultural orientation and 
resource endowment makes it especially difficult and even suspect, 
to universalize aspirations, and set forth some image of human 
governance that can be affirmed by all. It seems appropriate to be 
tentative, inviting dialogue across civilizational and class boundaries 
as to the nature of governance. From such a bottom-up process, areas 
of overlapping consensus can begin to be identified, and the 
negotiation of differences in values and priorities facilitated. If 
successful, this interactive dynamic could in time produce a coherent 
project, democratically conceived, to establish humane governance 
for all peoples.  
The global commons as a normative project, however, should encompass 
much more than the environment, but other social goals somehow deliberated 
and agreed upon as common. The global commons should be considered the 
outer layer that holds together several vital goods, necessary to human 
wellbeing, regardless of cultural and economic differences. It is unsettled 
which vital goods should be included as objects of the common overlayer. At 
this point, the overlayer lacks political force to host deliberations about 
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common social goals and how these goals can be steered through frameworks 
enjoying  higher levels of self-steering.  They want for new politicisation more 
than for new institutions. This argument is further developed in Chapter 6, 
where I propose how this sense of commonness might be fostered and might 
help global society to elect top priorities to debate about, preserve and 
produce.  
Humane governance, among other things, depends on the adequate protection 
of those goods that are globally shared, and upon their fair distribution through 
public services. In a report published by the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), editors Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg, and Marc A. Stern 
develop an anthology of global public goods. Among other things, they 
created a typology, and they explain the vital role played by global public 




Up to now, global public goods consisted primarily of “traffic rules” 
between countries and such at-the-border issues as tariffs. But 
increasingly, the initiatives for international cooperation reach behind 
national borders. Global concerns are penetrating national agendas, 
and national concerns are becoming the subject of international 
debate and policy coordination and harmonization. Today, concrete 
outcomes and targets – such as disease control, pollution reduction, 
crisis prevention, and harmonized norms and standards – matter. 
As the UNDP commissioned report explains, “… global public goods present 
an added rationale for international cooperation as well as for aid.”70 Actually, 
international cooperation seems not to be enough, but rather global 
cooperation, which involves the several localities, communities, and their 
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demands as articulated at the transnational public sphere. Global public goods 
are goods that have “nonexcludable, nonrival benefits that cut across borders, 
generations and populations. At a minimum, the benefits of a global public 
good would extend to more than just one group of countries and not 




… Civil Society is an important part of it [of the global public 
domain and production of global public goods]. Many studies have 
analysed the growth and strength of civil society at the national, 
transnational, and international levels. Civil society is sometimes 
defined as the sphere through which people, individually or 
collectively, in groups or partnerships, influence, pressure, and resist 
the State and, increasingly, corporations. But definitions vary. The 
public is wider than civil society organisations, the nonprofit, 
nonstate actors that tend to take centre stage in these discussions. It 
also includes individuals, households, and families when they act in 
public on matters of shared concern. Moreover, the public, as 
perceived here, includes business. Although firms mostly act as 
market participants, they sometimes assume public roles when acting 
as corporate citizens. (citation omitted) 
In addition, at the global level:
 73
 
 A number of diverse actors define the public and contribute to the 
provision of public goods. These goods are public not in their 
consumption but in their provision, and they are no longer what they 
are often depicted as being in theory – State-provided goods. The 
State continues to hold the main coercive and legislative powers.  
John G. Ruggie, pioneer social constructivist scholar in International 
Relations, provides a straightforward concept of the global public domain, 
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which he suggests needs to be “reconstituted”. By reconstituted, he means that 
the global public domain should be envisioned as:
 74
 
…away from one that for more than three centuries equated ‘the 
public’ in international politics with sovereign States and the 
interstate realm to one in which the very system of States is 
becoming embedded in a broader and deepening transnational arena 
concerned with the production of global public goods. 
What Ruggie points out is a concern with the practice of global governance 
within an emerging, and generally ignored, new political and social context: a 
global public domain that is progressively arriving – “thinner, more partial, 
and more fragile than its domestic counterpart, to be sure, but existing and 
taking root apart of the sphere of interstate relations.”75 He warns:76   
… that political leaders and international relations theorists alike 
ignore the emergence of the new global public domain at their peril. 
Without it, one cannot fully understand recent developments… how 
profoundly the processes and practices of transnationalisation are 
transforming governance by embedding the very system of States in 
a broader framework of sociality. 
As previously mentioned, despite the absence of dialogue about a broader 
constitution for the global public domain, the role of international law and 
transnational actors in the promotion of welfare has been enlarged.
 77
  Hence, 
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new governance mechanisms have been put in place without having an 
adequate political environment or a conducive environment for effective 
hybrid partnerships to develop.  
The global public context has been largely ignored by policy-makers, scholars, 
public administrators: key actors in the practice of global governance. Also, he 
argues that “no shared pragmatic understanding at all exists” about the weight 
that the institutions of global governance occupy in this landscape.
78
 Yet a 
global public domain is emerging as a powerful reality; and within it, there is a 
global public sector formed by international and transnational actors working 
with public goods and public services. This emerging global public sector is, 
for example, concerned with providing services that secure the control of 
epidemics and researching and strategising the provision of clean energy and 
the access to potable water for all.  
Part of the problem is that scholars know little and research little about the 
global public sector while many types of services and social policy-types of 
activities take place. In fact, high activity related to public services at the 
global domain requires more clarity about global law, ethics and politics. 
Nevertheless, governance scholars and practitioners alike have invested more 
time and attention looking at how to increase activity than at how to build a 
favourable context for these activities to take place.   
More and more global governance policies and programmes are developed 
worldwide, affecting rich and poor countries, and little is done to instil global 
ethics and global public values in global social governance. It is almost a 
backwards movement, which often happens: policies and programmes are 
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implemented before an adequate legal and political context is built to host 
these policies.  
Constructing the global public domain requires, at first, that global publicness 
be understood beyond a global justice aspiration and beyond an international 
provision of social goods and services, as a result of international 
development. For example, when I refer (throughout the thesis) to the terms 
global public status, enhanced global publicness, or under global public 
terms, I refer to:  
 increasing awareness about the fact that certain public services have 
been provided at the global level; 
 increasing awareness about the fact that certain public services 
urgently need to be made available worldwide (in rich and poor 
countries); 
 nurturing global ethical principles of interconnectedness, solidarity, 
human rights, and social justice forms of redistribution as reasons for 
joint action; 
 availability of operational processes that help networks to do more of 
self-steering – making these processes more ethically, politically, and 
operationally open;  




                                                 
79
 In Chapter 6, I talk further about global publicness and the need to find alternative ways to 
validate the expression of choice of global constituencies, as those who are connected through 
the creation and recognition of political capacities outside territoriality and around multiple 
affiliations (i.e. feminist, by race, by sexual orientation, by religion). The affiliations that I am 
most concerned with are those which have a bearing in public services, for instance, the global 
homeless who are in need of a home; racial minority students who have fewer opportunities to 
 [60] 
 
 creating forms of assessing political responsibility of global actors, 
enhancing how much they work for the public. 
These proposed ways of enhancing publicness in global governance are 
organized and synthesized in 5 groups of recommendations in the last chapter, 
Chapter 6. These recommendations are key elements of the choice made in 
favour of maturity approach, which is a creative, values-based approach to 
advancing global governance.  
IV Linking Concepts: Global Publicness and Global Governance  
Generally, alleged positive relationship between global social governance and 
global publicness has been overlooked in the governance literature. The 
relationship has recently received more attention, given attempts to promote 
global governance as the means to deal with world social problems. Both the 
language of global publicness and the language of public services, however, 
continue to be underused in global governance theory and practice.  
For example, can elements of global publicness be inferred from James 
Rosenau’s  normative writings of the early 1990s?80  
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Three past events can be associated with new theory that emerged in the 
1990s. They are the increasing visibility of world inequality and a new global 
ethical discourse that partially emerged from such visibility, as pointed by 
Luard and Falk; the increasing inter-dependencies among States, rich and 
poor, concerning their prosperity or hardship; and increasing awareness about 
this fact. The vision that Rosenau advanced of global governance in the early 
1990s in large part materialised itself and expanded through the work of 
transnational networks. This practical expansion now requires further 
consideration about consequences for publicness.  
The lack of a central authority in global governance (which is materialised 
through networks and partnerships) should not prevent publicness from being 
constructed in global governance. In fact, lack of central authority reinforces 
the argument in favour of publicness in governance. As a process that is 
steered from within, global governance has the likelihood of being more open 
and socially owned than those processes that are in the hands of central cells of 
authority. The theoretical postulation of acts of global governance as global 
public interprets publicness as openness. Openness relates to access to the 
truth, or appearance (in the sense of capacity to come forward) of the truth. 
Hanna Arendt explains that things public can be “seen and heard by everybody 
and has the widest possible publicity.” 81 Self-steering provides an outlet for 
things to be better seen and heard by those directly involved with social policy 
and service provision. Doing more self-steering is one step towards enhancing 
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global publicness, and towards effectuating the vision that theorists portrayed 
for global governance in the 21st century. Global publicness is associated, in 
part, with the capacity of networks to do better and more self-steering . Self-
steering is a key feature of Rosenau’s scholarship. Rosenau advocates that 




Global publicness, paraphrasing Arendt, may help society to feed a need for 
reality. For this to happen  the success of self-steering networks depends upon 
the existence of a “public realm into which things can appear out of the 
darkness of sheltered existence …”83 Thus the existence of self-steering 
mechanisms at the global level may only benefit from the consolidation of a 
global public domain, and vice-versa.  
 A reconstituted global public domain (one which is made by actors working 
for the public and that are not only interstate organisations) facilitates, at a 
minimum, that action related to the global social realm can appear out of the 
shadows of the State and of international decision-making. In other words, the 
creation of global publicness enables the ‘social’ to find its political form 
outside the nation-state, enabling a richer, more genuine self-steering 
experience. Self-steering seems more meaningful when it refers to a diverse 
social realm (i.e. a diverse transnational network that counts with State and 
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nonstate actors, for instance) in which the objective of the group is to do and 
achieve something necessarily together. Thus it is a public objective.
84
  
Although Rosenau does not develop or adopt the language of global 
publicness, his ideas on self-steering as a constitutive element of global 
governance helps me think about it. First, one knows that Rosenau’s global 
public domain does not have a centre of authority (a government). Second,  
that global governance does not refer to rules made in traditional ways (i.e. 
national or international legislative processes.) Thus, it is possible to infer that 
global governance is propelled by facts and values that have emerged with 
globalisation processes, for better or worse. These inferences, at a minimum, 
question the position of publicness as associated with statehood. Besides, these 
inferences signal that Rosenau also situates aspects of publicness through the 
many levels of global governance.  
Relocating aspects of publicness advances, rather than disrupts, the vision put 
forward by Rosenau. It is relevant therefore to highlight three criteria for the 
materialisation of global governance chosen by Rosenau. They shed light into 
the question of how systems of rule are maintained without one public 
authority, but with many sources of publicness, and they are:
 85
  
[(1)] intersubjective consensus based on shared fates and common 
histories,  
[(2)] the possession of information and knowledge,  
[(3)] the pressure of active or mobilisable publics. 
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These three criteria become relevant since they tie together the heterogeneous 
groups that populate the global public domain.
86
 Rosenau’s analysis is 
concerned with the exponential rise of control outlets; with the scaling up of 
organisations (in number and scope); and with how to maintain the original 
characteristics of global governance amidst so many new actors. This concern, 
in a sense, is a concern with building global publicness.  
In terms of the relationship between enhancing self-steering,  global publicness 
and global governance, Rosenau only touches upon it. He suggests that global 
governance mechanisms are more likely to succeed if bottom-up, as a means 
to “evoke the consent of the governed” and respect the “shared needs of 
groups.”87 In this fashion, the author connects effectiveness in global 
governance with the honouring of public objectives. 
Global public objects have been more frequently debated after the creation of 
MDGs. There has been a need to advance shared needs of larger groups to 
respond to world inequality, which grows faster than domestic wealth 
gaps.
88
This demand has opened opportunities for a range of actors to work 
with public services. However, the creation of demand for more public 
services has not been enough to address fundamental matters that dwell on 
when, or under which political and legal terms, nonstate actors should make 
global social policy. Questions about which policy issues and services should 
be made global public, going beyond the individual jurisdiction of 
governments or any single IGO, also remain unanswered.  
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Even if representative democracy were a perfect governing system, the State 
and inter-state systems would not suffice. The new social and economic 
demands generated by globalisations indicate that new political solutions are 
needed, even when and if nation States performed excellently. The lack of 
systems of representation at the global level should not be seen, therefore, as a 
reason for the de-legitimation of global governance activities, especially in the 
context of public services. For instance, the reason why I clarified the concept 
of global governance with emphasis on the element of self-steering was 
precisely to show that legitimation in global governance resides upon the 
bonds that bring people together to work for a common objective. Doing more 
of self-steering both shapes and constructs the political, ethical and operational 
elements of global publicness.  Yet attributes of global publicness (those that 
make more of self-steering available in global governance in public services) 
need to be further identified, spotted in action, and attached more often to 
global governance processes, in hopes that “the existing global weak public 
can be optimistically interpreted as a ‘strong public in the making.’” 89   
V Global Publicness in Governance: Forces that Advance it or 
Reduce it 
In addition to clarifying and linking concepts of global governance and global 
publicness, this chapter discusses aspects of the global level that have 
transformed acts of governance in the social realm.
90
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forces, help shape the ethics of the global overlayer and also the operational 
strategies that global actors adopt when making social policy. Consequently, 
these forces are intimately related to the extent of global publicness that 
mechanisms of global governance enjoy or may enjoy.  
Only a few attempts have been made to understand the actors working with 
public services at different levels of an enlarged scale of organisation, the 
multi-level global domain. In addition, little is known about whether actors 
should be considered always private, public – including global public – or 
hybrid (which is the case in public private partnerships or PPP). More 
knowledge is needed about these actors and, I argue, about the types of forces 
that may enhance or reduce the global publicness of their acts.   
There are several forces interfering with publicness in the 21st century. These 
inexorably affect global governance. In fact most of the forces that are 
generally associated with the study of global governance are actually forces 
that disrupt publicness, and because they disrupt publicness, they impact upon 
public services. These forces range from ideological matters, to legal 
frameworks, to implementation issues.  
I highlight these forces, which are often discussed by theorists or observed by 
researchers, who investigate global social policy or sectoral global 
governance: 
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5.1 Multiples Forms of  Globalisations  
World integrated systems go back as far as the 1800s. On the other hand, 
globalisation as we know it, including its very terminology, is a complex and 
contemporaneous manifestation.
91
 Most disciplines consider specific aspects 
of globalisation, especially economic globalisation, which refers to the 
facilitated cross-border movement of capital, goods and services via the 
integration of national economies. In Global Social Policy (GSP) studies, for 
example, globalisation is rather seen as a “shrinking of time and space”, which 
can embrace any of the many dimensions that commentators attribute to 
globalisation.
 92
 GSP is concerned with the effects of globalisation in the 
creation of social policies, which are of public nature.
93
  
Globalisation is also referred to as a phenomenon of economic 
interdependence, which creates several challenges to civil society, such as “the 
continued impoverishment of much of the world and the unused human 
potential that entails, and the increased realisation of the threats to the 
environment and thus to planetary survival.”94 This view of globalisation 
generally refers to the globalisation of economies and the potentially harmful 
interdependencies that this globalised economic system imposes in smaller 
countries, markets, the working class and the poor. In fact, economic 
globalisation critiques have been so widespread that they engender a counter-
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globalisation movement that highlights other forms of globalisations, which 
are supposed to tame the negative social effects of economic globalisation.  
Independently of whether the collective outcomes of globalisations are 
negative or positive, multiple forms of globalisations have changed some of 
the key challenges governments face and the environment in which 
governments govern, thus transforming the way certain public services are 
designed and delivered.
95
 In large part, scholars working in specific sectors, 
such as global education, analyse the effects of economic and cultural 
globalisations, rather than other forms, such as the globalisation of human 
rights discourses.   
The globalisation of human rights discourses has reinforced the need to 
universalise services such as primary education, which is now widely accepted 
as a right of every child, around the world. Another example relates to the 
globalisation of technologies. The internet has helped to expose the lack of 
quality and unevenness of health services in different neighbourhoods, 
countries, and regions of the world. This has provoked a need for 
implementing global quality standards and high-tech health services. These 
examples are just a sample of the impact that multiple forms of globalisations 
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have had on policy-making, on service delivery and on the role of international 
and transnational actors, which have become active organisations in creating 
new forms of governing the globalised social realm.   
Yet these changes are generally described as a continuation of 1980s and 
1990s public sector reform led by national governments. I argue that global 
actors have had more impact upon public services than what has been 
accounted for in the literature. Little we know about the impact of IGOs and 
transnational NGOs in national public sectors; much less is known about the 
aggregate impact of global actors upon global public services such as global 




As a consequence, the late 20th century methods of domestic governance, 
which recommended efficiency through outsourcing and fixed benchmarks, 
are no longer suitable for specific policy areas.
97
 This viewpoint resembles the 
normative project expressed by the report entitled Our Global Neighborhood, 
written by the UN GGC in 1995. The Commission, even if following a 
western-liberal view of the world, made clear that the current view of public 
administration is no longer adequate.
98
 Not surprisingly, the Commission’s 
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propositions gained momentum with the accentuation of the environmental 
crisis and the rise of pandemics, such as HIV/Aids, Ebola virus, and the bird 
flu. These challenges cannot be dealt with outside of an international 




To control these globalised risks and increase the welfare of a gradually more 
mobile population, the report suggests that in health and environmental 
sectors, among others, governance values that derive from a private 
orientation, or are business-like as New Public Management, should not 
prevail.
100
 In certain policy areas, public values and global processes should 
take precedence, and be prioritised via cooperative governance schemes at the 
global and domestic levels. At least discursively, this orientation has been 
increasingly supported at the global level and exacerbated by forms of 
globalisations that are understudied when compared to economic globalisation, 
such as the globalisation of human rights discourses and of culture. 
In terms of globalisation of culture, there are two different normative 
transformations happening. If and how these transformations change social 
behaviour and influence social policy is unknown. For instance, Mohamed 
Wahab explains that: 
101
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Culture has interacted with all other globalisation trends and reacted 
in two contrasting ways: (a) acceptance of a new global culture, and 
(b) rejection of a total loss of cultural identity as an expression of a 
distinctive group of individuals which thus strengthens localization. 
Several of the inclusion policies we have or do not have today may be a result 
of the tension between globalisation and localisation, but we do not actually 
know the extent of the effects of this tension. The global-local dimension is 
discussed in academic analyses of globalisation and governance and in high-
level talks about current and future global social policy.
102
 
Specifically, the impact of the global-local divide upon social policy may be 
even less visible to the general public. The State’s discourse about the 
monopoly of social policy-making is still predominant, and many of the 
reforms, even if decided supranationally, have happened behind closed doors. 
For instance, high-level talks about the implementation of a global social floor 
to provide basic services to the most vulnerable is taking place among the 
organisations part of the United Nations Development Group (UNDG).
103
 The 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which have impacted on basic 
services around the world, have been accused of representing benchmarks set 
behind closed doors. Barbara Crossette reporting on the MDGs and 
reproductive health explains that “The Millennium Development Goals 
evolved through a series of steps taken first by the Secretariat and then by 
diplomats.” She also explains that:104 
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 …more streamlined procedures also meant, however, that those 
delegations who would have fought hard to include reproductive 
rights and services had limited input. More important, 
nongovernmental organisations and even government experts were 
barred entirely from the process of drafting the Declaration.  
It is important to remember that the Millennium Declaration (MD), 
nonetheless, is said to have engendered a deeper social commitment in the 
minds of heads of State upon the time of signature.
105
 And it has also changed 
the discourse within the UN about how to go about their development work, 
which since the signature of the MD has been following principles of 
devolution to the local level. Yet the process of the MD in itself has felt short 
from being inclusive, leaving out small official delegations of weaker States 
and nonstate actors.  
Although the MDGs project has reproduced old institutional habits, MDGs 
have helped to define the global public sector, provoking important policy and 
technical changes. In fact, MDGs-related changes reflect similar welfare 
changes that have been observed in the late 1990s, as a result of multiple 
globalisations. Globalisations provoked changes that range from having other 
nonstate players making social policy and debating guidelines and regulations 
in regional and global settings to territorial-base obligation and entitlements 
challenged and/or extended at the global level.
 106
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Glocalisation refers to internal globalisations that transform people’s everyday 
lives.
107
 Glocalisation was a concept designed to address the effects of 
globalisations upon people’s identity, which can shape as both global and 
local.
108
 Similarly, I am most concerned with glocalisation as a tool to shape 
the characteristics of social services as both global public and locally-driven. I 
am also interested in glocalisation because, as it influences identities, it 
influences relationships and dialogues taking place between supranational 
organisations and communities situated at the lowest level of the global 
spectrum.  
It is important to draw a relationship between glocalisation and global 
publicness. These two concepts are closely associated because local 
communities are supposed to be agents of global governance, not mere 
beneficiaries. Glocalisation as an analytical concept can help to make sense of 
local agency as part of global governance.  
From a global governance perspective, communities are seen as important 
agents in the steering of policies and practices that affect them directly 
(referring, thus, to self-steering.) In addition, glocalisation refers to the 
potential ability of communities to engage in global governance along with 
international and transnational institutions. Glocalisation, thus, refers not only 
to the relationships between local and global, but also to how gaps that exist 
between local and global may be bridged, engendering real experiences of 
self-steering.  
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Addressing the problem of organisation scale is one of the biggest challenges 
in building global publicness and strengthening global social governance. 
Glocalisation can be useful in the understanding of why local action matters, 
hence, contributing to enhancing self-steering and to creating frameworks that 
can bridge actions across levels of governance.   
5.3 Liberalisation of Services 
Tendencies to liberalise the State continue to inform public service reforms. 
Savoie, in the context of domestic governance, explains that:
 109
 
Without doubt, national civil services in most Western countries have 
been subjected to more reform measures during the past twenty years 
than any comparable political or administrative institutions. This is 
new. …  
The signs of real change, however, are now everywhere. Many 
national civil services are – at least as traditionally defined – smaller 
than in the past; appointments to senior positions no longer go to 
those who have come up through the ranks of a department; new 
organisations to deliver services have been established. The list goes 
on. 
Effects of liberalisation at the global level are even more complex and multi-
layered than the effects of in-state liberalisation. Economically liberal practices 
have been expanded through economic globalisation, which is associated with 
both losses in quality and quantity of public services around the world and 
with the exacerbation of “world inequality.”110   
Liberalism has also been associated with the emergence of PPPs, which have 
worked with international organisations and national bureaucracies to provide 
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public services, ranging from basic health care to popular housing. Many 
researchers, however, have showed that PPPs may not be a product of 
liberalising practices, such as the adoption of NPM practices. PPPs may or 
may not work as service-provider working for profit; they may or may not 
work to meet efficiency benchmarks; and they may or may not be associated 
with political and legal changes, such as the globalisation of human rights and 
the popularisation of social and economic rights in industrialized 
democracies.
111
 In any event, PPPs have absorbed a good portion of the 
services that have been contracted out by the nation-state, contributing to 
liberalisation in public services.    
The use of NPM by PPPs or other actors working in global social governance 
should raise concerns.
112
 NPM has been used beyond national governments 
fuelling regional or global strategies.
113
 I argue that NPM is rather 
operationally inadequate for global governance in public services.  
Since the 1980s, NPM has been responsible for much of the public sector 
transformation at the domestic level. With NPM, private sector’s values and 
methods, such as competition and measures of performance, have changed the 
way by which public services are delivered (rowing) and the way that policy 
decisions are made (steering) at the national level.
114
 These values and 
methods are each day more ingrained in the public sector of developed 
countries and, slowly, make their way to influence the work of international 
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actors, which, in turn, heavily influence public sector reforms in the 
developing world. NPM, thus, adversely interacts with the ethos highlighted, 
for example, by the Commission on Global Governance (CGG) by artificially 
exporting business values and domestic modes of governance to countries that 
are economically, politically and culturally different, and to issues that are by-
definition public.   
Despite its two decades of prominence among practitioners, NPM as a mode 
of global governance (or liberalisation of services as a general trend in public 
administration) may face intensified challenges in years to come. Encouraged 
by the 2008 economic crisis, and picking up upon counter-globalisation 
movements, there is a renewed interest in reinforcing public values, policy and 
publicity of affairs that concern social life. This was made clear by the United 
Nations Chief Executives Board (CEB), which has suggested new policy 
around creating an universal global social floor to respond to the social 
challenges created or exacerbated by the 2008 global economic crisis.
115
 The 
type of debate about a global social floor that was initiated in 2008 by the 
United Nations Chief Executives Board is unprecedented at high-level 
international talks. 
It is wise to build upon this momentum to revitalise publicness at the domestic 
level and to argue for more publicness at the global level. Arguing for 
publicness in global governance is to argue for a values-based outlook that 
requires “an appropriate political language, as well as an explicit rejection of 
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inappropriate language”116 to guide policy-making related to public services. 
Liberalisation, especially through the popularisation and wide use of NPM, is 
likely inappropriate language and guidance for global social governance.     
5.4 International Development and “Good Governance” 
In the field of international development, especially after the establishment of 
the MDGs, the concept of good governance started to be attached to the 
performance of global social policies.
117
 Good governance does not contribute 
to enhancing global publicness in global governance because it focusses 
almost exclusively on how states perform and achieving development 
benchmarks. 
Governance as good governance is indigenously related to projectisation 
discourses that emerged at the international level to facilitate reforms within 
developing countries. In other words, good governance is the criteria used by 
IGOs making social policy through development policies. For the World Bank 
(WB) good governance involves:
118
 
…an efficient public service, and independent judicial system and 
legal framework to enforce contracts; the accountable administration 
of public funds; and independent public auditor, responsible to a 
representative legislature; respect for the law and human rights at all 
levels of government; a pluralistic institutional structure, and a free 
press. (citation omitted) 
Whether good governance always acquires the same meaning is debatable. 
Good governance can be achieved through different methods. As previously 
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mentioned, it can also be associated with humane governance. Humane 
governance wants to advance communitarian and global values, such as 
environmental preservation of the global commons and end of wars.
119
 
However, when commentators and policy-makers refer to good governance 
they primarily refer to principles similar to those put forward by the World 
Bank, which follows NPM. For this reason, I avoid using good governance as 
related to global governance frameworks.  
By using good governance standards, states are forced to focus on fixed targets 
and benchmarks, rather than on the causes of  social problems (many of global 
scope) that make supranational help necessary in the first place. In addition, 
the responsibilities of nonstate and international actors engaging with public 
services and helping to meet benchmarks are overshadowed by a focus on 
monitoring and improving Sate performance. In this sense, good governance 
criteria shadow realities that should be brought into the global public domain. 
They also reinforce a belief that States are still responsible to run all things 
public, and that they can do so within its borders.  
Scholars and practitioners have engaged little with questions about if and how 
good governance standards help to derail attention from the global dimension 
of social challenges to exclusive country-level responsibilities. In fact, a robust 
body of critical analyses on the use of good governance in global social policy 
is yet to develop. I discuss more about the overuse of the development and 
good governance frames to hold supranational social governance strategies in 
Chapters 2 and 5.  
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5.5 International Human Rights 
The global level has experienced a normative transition propelled by the UN 
summits and conferences of the 1990s and 2000s,
120
 based upon which the 
Millennium Declaration (or MD, or “the Declaration”) was drafted. The 
Declaration emphasises social and economic human rights. The Declaration, 
when signed, was considered a ground-breaking document towards reducing 
world inequality (instead of focussing on intra-state inequalities).
121
 While the 
Declaration is a limited instrument (it does not bind the parties and its 
language is general and vague), it should be regarded as one of the symbols of 
a normative transition detected at the UN, at least, at the discourse level. This 
normative transition was advanced by a prior movement in favour of the 
justiciability of international human rights claims, especially economic and 
social rights at the international and national levels. In addition, reasons for 
drafting the Millennium Declaration can be linked with  recognition of the 
universality of human rights, which can be inferred from the text of the 
Declaration itself.
122
   
Globalisation of human rights discourses has propelled further changes across 
the global level: it has been transformative within the UN, and more timid, but 
rather significant at the UN-System, which includes specialised agencies and 
financial institutions.
123
 Without resolving the question of whether a rights-
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based approach to global governance in public services is or is not the best, it 
is  helpful to ask: has the human rights framework influenced relocation of 
social services from the national to the global level? Has human rights 
discourses promoted more publicness in global governance?
124
 These 
questions will be furthered analysed in Chapter 2.  For now, it is important to 
highlight that human rights discourses in general, and the Millennium 
Declaration in particular, have not been investigated enough from the 
perspective of their potential to change values, influence the work of policy 
networks, of national governments and of other institutions working with 
global social governance.  
Human rights and global justice scholars have previously prescribed global 
public values, similar to those enshrined in the MD, as vital to an ideal vision 
of global public domain, as the context for global governance to operate. For 
instance, Falk, following a cosmopolitan tradition, proposes that a better 
society can only be achieved if the opportunities created by globalisation be 
used in favour of a type of governance that is “humane.”  He explains that:125   
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the focus on humane governance emphasizes the importance of 
governance for the entire planet and its people. As such, it relies on 
global constitutionalism both to overcome the negative features of 
geopolitics as currently operational and to construct a positive form 
of world order. The stress on global constitutionalism encompasses 
both the democratising agenda of bringing law and popular 
participation to bear upon policies that control the exercise of 
economic and political power, and the extension of regional and 
global institutional capabilities to address functional problems of 
environment and equity.  
It is hard to think about a global public domain without including in its 
constitution international human rights. International human rights have started 
as a product of the interstate system and as of hegemonies inside of this 
system. Currently, it serves as a platform for mobilisation of many 
transnational actors, in the Global South and in the Global North.  
International human rights have played an important role in the building of an 
improved world order. In fact, it has materially advanced quality of life by 
propelling the development of global services that are able to make possible 
the realisation of, especially, social and economic rights. This is true even if 
the provision of services supranationally has not been linked with human 
rights obligations or with specific human rights frameworks (for example, the 
right to food framework).  
5.6 2005 and 2008 Economic Crises 
In the aftermath of the 2005 economic crisis, philosopher Milton Fisk called 
for strengthening public goods. In his words the goal should be “reinvigorate 
and expand public goods as the negative reaction to neoliberal globalism 
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deepens. The opportunities offered for pursuing this goal by the collapse of 
Enron and of the Argentine economy needs to be seized.”126  
The opportunities to reinvigorate public goods both at the global and national 
levels did not have much traction until the even larger economic crisis of 2008, 
which propelled a deeper debate about social governance and a renewed 
conversation about the need for a global social floor, universal pensions and a 
global redistributive tax, such as the Tobin Tax.
127
  
The severity of the 2008 crisis, which did not spare the middle classes of the 
US or Brazil or Europe, created an opportunity to discuss a global public 
sector that would attend to people’s needs, regardless of their nationalities and 
of their countries’ stages of development. The 2005 and 2008 economic crises 
challenged countries’ status as developed or developing, exposing a wider 
scenario of underprovision of public services, from lack of health care to lack 
of jobs to lack of housing. This exposure served as an unprecedented 
opportunity to discuss public provision beyond the state.  
5.7 Transnational Civil Society  
Transnational civil society – often represented by networks of a range of 
organisations from civil society, such as grassroots, faith-based, transnational 
NGOs – has recently been recognised as a powerful force shaping acts of 
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 The ways these actors exercise authority and their relationship 
to publicness, nonetheless, are not clear. Specifically, the extent of their impact 
upon specific global governance mechanisms working with public services is 
also poorly understood.  
The spread of  social constructivist theories and from-below approaches to 
governance helps to advance research about the role played by transnational 
civil society in global governance. In addition, mechanisms of participation 
have been implemented inside of traditional institutions such as the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) and World Health Organisation (WHO).
129
 
However, transnational civil organisations working with public services are far 
from being recognised on a par with international organisations. They are not 
regarded as constitutive actors of the global public domain, even if they are 
already vested in activities that are of a public nature, like provision of welfare 
services.  
Ignoring or downplaying the public role exercised by transnational civil 
society in the global public domain may increase the challenges of global 
governance in public services. Recognising the public role undertaken (or that 
should have been undertaken) by transnational networks may facilitate acts of 
governance.   
Participation of transnational civil society in global governance does not 
guarantee successful results. While the presence of nonstate actors in acts of 
governance is at the core of global governance theory, it is neither necessarily 
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a sign of success nor what makes global governance innovative. Newness in 
global governance is too often attributed to the presence of nonstate actors in 
acts of governance, whereas historical analyses have already demonstrated that 
participation of nonstate actors in social governance dates from centuries 
ago.
130
 While this participation has taken place for centuries under the rubric 
of philanthropy, a broader debate about how, and by whom, public services 
should be provided was initiated by public administration scholars in the 




A different type of engagement with transnational civil society – engagement 
in global public terms – is a key factor for increasing the chances of having 
successful global governance in the public service context. The issue here is 
that most global governance mechanisms engage, at some level, with 
transnational civil society, but not in the most productive way. The lack of 
recognition of organisations such as networks of grassroots movements as 
global public actors may discourage transnational networks from fulfilling 
their missions, as it opens up opportunities for fraudulent networks to emerge, 
given that there are no political responsibilities attached to the work of 
transnational networks. This type of lack of recognition and scepticism about 
the global publicness of networks, which is sometimes shared by the networks 
themselves, is a symptom of the fact that transnational networks and other 
NGOs are still classed and understood under a model of private rules and 
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behaviour. Although this fact represents a barrier for global governance 
projects that want to successfully deliver public services, the growth of 
transnational civil society is undeniable and it helps shape the global public 
domain. It is now the time to take advantage of the momentum, the energy, 
and the infra-structure that emerged with the rise of transnational civil society 
in the 1990s, making it public.   
Constructivist scholars claim that the dynamics of international relations are 
socially and historically dependant, consequently, international relations are 
also contingent upon social norms and demands from below.
132
 However, even 
constructivists fail to offer constructivist solutions to global governance 
challenges that are inclusive of transnational civil society. This is especially 
the case when it comes to recognising the contribution of transitional civil 
society in fulfilling basic rights and providing public services. Accepting a 
more traditional view based on the premise that the States make what they 
want of the international domain, constructivist scholars suggest as solutions to 
governance challenges new legal frameworks passed by national legislators, 
UN strengthening, and the democratising of the Bretton Woods and other 
international institutions already consolidated within a view of the global 
public domain that is traditional.
133
 Acts of governance that aim at 
democratising and improving effectiveness at the international level are 
invaluable contributions, but they are just a piece of the puzzle that reinforces 
reliance upon international institutions, which follow a statist view of the 
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world. It remains as important, for example, to find ways of granting political 
meaning to large-scale social problems by encouraging and recognising social 
messages and demands in a sphere that goes beyond the interstate. Political 
frameworks that are capable of promoting this type of integration are lacking 
in the literature and high-level international debates.    
It is undeniable that the constructivist approach considers ubiquitous the social 
dynamic taking place at the global environment. In this sense, social 
constructivists when analysing governance recognise to a large extent the 
impact of transnational networks and grassroots organizing, as well as their 
difficulties in getting their voices heard.  Yet innovative mechanisms that can 
promote the idea that social mobilisation has to be politically acknowledged 
and validated outside of the framework of consultation or participation rights 
taking place inside of international institutions are not frequently developed; 
they have been considered virtually impossible to implement, even by social 
constructivists.
134
 In this fashion, transnational civil society often mobilises 
outside the public domain, without scrutiny and without the theoretical and 
political backing necessary to ground their work and safeguard the collective 
interest.  
At the global level, a politic of capturing (identifying, recognising, monitoring 
and encouraging) those transnational organisations that are voicing or working 
towards implementing projects around well-established transnational claims 
could contribute to creating more effective responses. Again, this does not 
suggest that any participation of transnational civil society is good or 
guarantees success. Rather, it suggests that participation of networks under 
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global public terms may engender better global social policy than what has 
been achieved thus far.  
VI Building Knowledge: Key Concepts  
As argued above, it is necessary to build basic knowledge about a new 
available space for publicness, the global public domain, and about a new way 
of governing in and from this space, global social governance.
135
 
In summary, this Chapter attempted to build a conceptual frame around both 
terms: global publicness and global social governance. It works with the 
premise that global social governance refers to an emerging global overlayer 
from where public services are increasingly being designed and provided. The 
existence of an overlayer that is able to steer and row services that were 
historically considered staple functions of the welfare State disrupts the idea of 
publicness as representative of a unitary public (the State). At the same time, 
the existence of this overlayer relocates specific public functions (such as 
social policy-making and public service provision) to the hands of hybrid 
alliances that populate the global public domain, and that may not have a 
defined political identity or physical headquarters. In fact, these actors are 
generally represented by networks, some of which currently exercise public 
functions under weak, legal and political frameworks.   
As I will demonstrate in the next chapters, enhanced levels of global 
publicness may be able to address these and other challenges to global social 
governance. For instance, I will analyse levels of publicness within hybrid 
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partnerships that have successfully delivered social services from the 
supranational level.
 136
 In the health field, one helpful example is the 
Partnership to Stop Tuberculosis (TB). 
When the UN launched the Campaign to Stop TB, it relied upon a public 
private partnership of actors working at different levels of governance to 
provide a type of treatment that nation-states were not able to provide alone. 
Where the Partnership has been active, case detection grew in 25% and 
success rates have been maintained.
137
 It took decades for TB to receive the 
type of attention it demanded, and many attribute the success of the current 
partnership to ethical and operational transformations that occurred inside the 
UN after the world summits of the 1990s and 2000s.
138
  These summits were 
able to call the attention of the world to so-called ‘neglected diseases’ and to 
the structural reasons why they were neglected in first place. In addition, these 
summits portrayed diseases like TB as systemic risks for all, showcasing that a 
highly inter-connected world requires different forms of governing, and 
relocations of jurisdiction, from the national to the global.
139
 
These relocations might or might not be mediated by governments. 
Relocations can be understood as decision-making or delivery conducted by 
international organisations, networks of non-profit organisations, public-
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private partnerships, transnational NGOs, transnational activist networks, 
transnational Faith-Based Organisations (FBOs), a combination of those, and 
other assemblages that are yet to emerge. However, until recently, multiple 
publics were only articulated as part of national politics.
140
  
Previously, Nancy Fraser had advanced the argument that “the proliferation of 
subaltern counterpublics (organizations that perform public functions but that 
question or counter governmental action) could enhance the participation of 
subordinate strata in stratified societies,” with the caveat that “this critique 
presupposed the national-territorial understanding of publicity.”141 In her 
recent book, Scales of Justice, she claimed in the chapter on 
Transnationalizing the Public Sphere that her critique did not go far enough, 
because it failed to interrogate “let alone modified, the social-theoretical 
underpinnings of the Structural Transformation, which situated the public 
sphere in a Westphalian frame.”142 The increased numbers of global hybrid 
partnerships created for social governance goals only exacerbate the urgency 
for a better understanding of the transnationalisation of the public sphere. With 
the relocation of social services to the global level, much of what we think we 
know about publicness and governance frameworks needs to be revisited.
143
  
In the next three chapters, I use two kinds of case studies to start this exercise 
of revisiting publicness and our traditional notion of public services.  
                                                 
140
 Nancy Fraser Scales of Justice: Reimagining Political Space in a Globalizing World 






 Examples of relocations, from the control of Polio and other communicable diseases to the 
establishment of food distribution facilities around the world by the World Food Programme,  
will be dealt with in Chapters 4 and 2, respectively.  
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Chapter 2: BETWEEN TRADITION AND INNOVATION: THE UN’S 
ROLE IN GLOBAL SOCIAL GOVERNANCE  
I Introduction  
This chapter carries the first of this thesis’s three case-studies. The three case-
studies demonstrate that:  
1) governance in public services is robust at the international and global 
levels; 2) is organised mainly by international or transnational 
organisations; 3) is organised around specific policy-fields.  
The case studies will also show that 4) global social governance varies greatly 
depending a) upon which institution takes the lead; and b) upon which social 
service needs to be provided (like health, education, food, and housing 
services). Finally, the main conclusion of the case-studies is that publicness 
considerations lack in current global social governance frameworks, be these 
analysed through the frame of international institutions or through the frame of 
policy-fields. Although publicness lacks in all cases, it varies greatly 
depending upon which policy field is under analysis and which organisation 
takes leadership.   
The analysis of the United Nations is valid as a case-study because it provides 
a point of comparison with other organisations that are involved with global 
social governance. In addition, the UN is our first case study because the way 
global social governance currently works requires both an institutional 
investigation and a policy-field investigation.  
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Today, the global social governance context organises itself in two ways: the 
first is by taking advantage of multilateral structures. Multilateral 
organisations, like the UN and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD), have helped to structure global governance in 
public services. The second way by which global social governance is 
organised is by policy-field. There are significant differences, for instance, if 
one analyses global governance in education, or in health, or in housing.  
Specifically, this chapter is a case study of the UN’s role in global social 
governance. It brings together examples of how the world organisation 
engages with social policy and, more recently, with service provision. The 
work of the UN illustrates how multilateral cooperation has heavily influenced 
global social governance.  
In the context of elected governments (at all levels of jurisdiction), the “public 
service is not the province of one indivisible organisation with ministerial 
responsibility at the top. Rather it needs to represent the process of agreement 
between separate aspects of the public interest.”144 At the international level it 
is the same: global governance in public services is not the province of 
agencies and offices part of the UN family. Although the UN may (and 
should) occupy a leadership role in a diffuse global public domain, the choice 
for it as a case-study does not mean that agencies of the UN family are the 
only hosts of global social governance.  
Global social policy does not come exclusively from the UN. There are other 
networks, international organisations, transnational corporations and 
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foundations that play an important role in key policy areas. The work of the 
UN family, nevertheless, overlaps or complements the work of most other 
organisations working towards meeting millennium goals; achieving broader 
development objectives; or facing global challenges especially as a result of 
the ongoing world economic crisis. In this fashion, the UN is an important 
reference and trend-setter.  
Adopting a global public perspective, Chapter 2 demonstrates that the UN has 
interacted more with a range of other actors to expand its social policy work, 
as a consequence of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
145
 
Especially because of the MDGs, the UN is a good place to start mapping 
global governance in public services. Moreover, UN social policies, especially 
the MDGs, signal which policy-fields have been targeted for global action.  
This chapter does not aim to examine the work of every agency of the world 
organisation that has worked with MDGs or impacted on public service and 
national welfare systems. These aims would require a whole thesis in itself. 
This chapter offers a large-scale vision, sufficient to signal which patterns are 
constructed when the UN engages with public service governance. As a 
consequence, this chapter explores whether the world organisation contributes 
to enhancing global publicness in global governance. 
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In summary, the research looks within the UN with the simple objective of 
revealing projects that can serve as evidence of UN’s direct involvement with 
the global and international aspects of transformation of public services and 
with non-traditional forms of publicness. The research concentrates on 
practical efforts resulting from the UN summits of the 1990s and from the 
commitment made by head of states to the Millennium Declaration (MD, or 
“Declaration”). 
II Categories to Guide Analyses  
After the  MD, it is possible to identify three discrete  UN spheres of action 
that influence public services, namely global delivery of service, global social 
policy-making, and public administration interventions (see Figure 1 in 
footnote).
146
 For my purposes, these spheres of action become analytical 
categories that have helped me to better sort through the diverse work of UN 
specialised agencies and UN main bodies. Even when I do not directly refer to 
them, it is implied that, methodologically, I have used these analytical 
categories to classify the types of public service work, and the types of 
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Sphere 1: UN's Work in Public Administration assists national 
bureaucracies  (traditional technical assistance now being revisited in 
light of the MDGs). 
Sphere 2: UN's Work in Policy: 
From aid to assistance; from Development to Development for All; 
from Development for All , expanding to create global governance 
mechanisms to address global challenges.  
 
Sphere 3: UN's Work in Delivery: 
Reconciliation of from-below and devolution strategies with 
fortification of the global level to provide services that can achieve 
MDGs or tackle global problems. 
 
 
Millennium Declaration and MDGs 
 [94] 
 
governance methods (whether international or global) championed by the UN 
family.   
The three spheres of action do not evenly interact with a kind of millennium 
mindset, derived from the momentum created by the Declaration. UN-led 
governance projects with a bearing in public services have demonstrated 
varying levels of engagement with the discourse of systemic egalitarianism 
that most agencies have acknowledged since the 1990s and that, for some, 




For instance, the UN’s governance in the sphere of public administration 
remains very traditional, characterising international governance interventions, 
rather than global governance. Innovative global governance frameworks, on 
the other hand, have emerged in the sphere of global delivery. Ironically, this 
sphere has been highly contested, given the historical association between 
public-service delivery and the nation-state. This diversity between traditional 
(international public administration work) and non-traditional (global social 
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The UN family as a whole is a difficult analytical unit to explore. The UN 
family brings together diverse organisations. Depending on the agency there 
will be more or less power, more or less money, more or less expertise to 
devote to social policies. Because agencies and offices that constitute the UN 




At the outset, it is important to keep in mind that the UN is comprised of 
diverse organisations, working with different mandates and different views of 
the world. For example, while some UN agencies engage more than others in 
global partnerships, these agencies are often labelled “discordant voices in the 
global arena.”150 Because of such diversity, which generally casts UN offices 
and agencies as more or less mainstream and more or less engaged with social 
affairs, the three categories of analysis presented above are useful (public 
administration types of action, policy-making and delivery). The categories 
serve as guidance and help to keep focus on the type of activities and actors, 
among hundreds,  that matter the most for this thesis. 
III Governing the Social: UN Policies and Practices in Public 
Services  
The UN has experienced a profound change in the way it engages with public 
service governance in the last 10 years. The 2008 global economic crisis, and 
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the MDGs are just two of the factors that have helped reshape UN’s 
involvement in public services and, hence, public services themselves. The 
change in UN engagement and UN effect upon services, however, have not 
been homogenous, varying significantly depending on policy-areas and also 
on the economic and political position of each agency or department. The 
recent discourse among high-level officers, however, has argued for global 
governance frameworks to be used to address global challenges, in lieu of 
international development frameworks, such as technical assistance.
151
   
To a great extent, the UN follows a state-centrist orientation which promotes 
technical assistance and capacity building at the State level.
152
 Technical 
assistance is generally understood as a mechanism by which developed nations 




Global governance frameworks have been increasingly welcomed, in lieu of 
technical assistance and international development frameworks. These 
frameworks have used best practices developed by transnational communities 
and global south governments, for example. The richness of approaches is an 
important aspect of UN’s involvement in public service governance. Some 
approaches follow global governance theory prescriptions, but many do not.   
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3.1 The Public Administration Sphere: Technical Assistance as 
Traditional International Governance  
A reformist discourse about the future of social policy and social development 
has spread inside the UN family.
154
 It has gained momentum with the 
Millennium mind-set, the latest global economic crises, and the counter-
globalisation forces highlighted in Chapter 1. For instance, UN agencies have 
included nonstate actors in consulting, policy-making, and delivery processes, 
but this fact alone does not necessarily override principled and practical 
traditions that contribute to the UN’s reputation as an insulated interstate 




... there has emerged a global intra- and inter-agency discourse on the 
future for social policy and social development and certain UN 
agencies have been very active in this discourse.  
… The WHO and UNESCO are not so prominent here. Rather the 
agencies that spring to mind, that advertise their publications in the 
same places that the World Bank sells its World Development 
Reports, are UNICEF, the UNDP (United Nations Development 
Programme), … and the semi-autonomous research institute 
UNRISD (United Nations Research Institute for Social 
Development). 
To a great extent, the UN continues to engage with public services by 
providing technical assistance to countries. The UN prefers international 
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development schemes, which favour international vertical policies, conditional 
requirements, rather than the formation of global partnerships that act as full-
fledged participants of global governance processes.   
The historical background of technical assistance sheds light on the question of 
why the UN faces so many difficulties in engaging more fully with global 
governance today. It also provides the historical background for why it is hard 
for the UN to accept multiple, often multi-level, sources of decision making 
and project execution. The history of technical assistance reveals political and 
operational barriers to UN’s use of global governance as advised in theory.    
3.1.1 History of technical assistance: origins of public service 
governance from outside the State 
The UN’s involvement in reforming public administration started in 1948, 
when the ECOSOC recommended that the Secretary-General, in consultation 
with other international organisations, prepared “a study concerning the 
development of international facilities for the promotion of the science of 
administration.”156 This request was in accordance with the general interest of 
the UN in technical assistance programmes, which evolved to generate, among 
other things, today’s UN Division of Public Administration and Development 
Management (DPADM). The concerns that generated the creation of a 
technical assistance programme in public administration are still current in the 
era of global governance. Originally, the ECOSOC requested the Secretary-
General to focus on “the feasibility and character of international measures and 
organisational arrangements designed to develop and spread the science of 
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administration for the benefit of all nations.”157 It also requested clarifications 
about “the ways of ensuring steady and orderly development and propagation 
of the science of administration throughout the world.”158  
Following a proposal of American president Harry Truman, in 1948, the 
General Assembly (GA) agreed upon the creation of the International Centre 
for Training in Public Administration.
159
 In 1950, the Secretary-General, with 
the approval of the ECOSOC, began putting in practice its first action plan 
expanding assistance to, at first, developing countries to train their 
personnel.
160
 According to the DAPDM’s 60th anniversary report, GA’s 
resolution 246(III) was “the first broad legislative authority” granting to 
technical assistance the status of “a specific field of the United Nations 
activity.”161 
In the 1950s, the programme underwent several changes. Its capabilities were 
expanded in order to extrapolate its original scope, which was confined to 
aspects of training personnel. In Resolution 492 (XVI) the ECOSOC revised 
the programme by renaming it “Regular Programme of Technical Assistance,” 
and by authorizing a range of assistance services that could both, upon request 
of nation-states, advance social and economic development and be coordinated 
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by the UN system.
162
 The same resolution also took note of the “Expanded 
Programme of Technical Assistance” (EPTA), which was designed to host 
“coordinated country technical assistance programmes.”163 During the life of 
EPTA, the minimum involvement of UN’s deliberative and oversight bodies 
raised concern. Oversight bodies such as the Technical Assistance Committee 
(TAC) had little or nothing to say in the day-to-day of the assistance process. 
The Committee used to meet just a few times in the year, operating relatively 
far from where the decisions were made.
164
  
Since the UN initiated its programmes that intervened in public services, 
specialised agencies had a lot of discretionary power in their hands. Mostly, 
specialised agencies wrote EPTA’s technical assistance plans that shaped 
social and economic policies in the developing world. They had wide 
mandates from budgeting to choosing personnel, impacting significantly upon 
public services. It is well documented that, since the report sent by the 
Secretary General to the Assembly in 1948, specialised agencies designed 
social projects, were given liberty with money, and represented the interests of 
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 Hence historical power imbalances in international 




Following what was happening in domestic environments in the late 1960s and 
1970s, technical assistance expanded to represent more than consultancy and 
hands-on technical advice to weak governments. Post-colonial States 
struggling for democratisation, especially in Latin America, introduced new 
political and economic dynamics in international relations, and opened up new 
geopolitical opportunities. The era of development was launched in the UN. 
Economic development has guided the social work of the UN since, while the 
demands from countries and their ability to request fairer processes have 
changed over time, both politically and in terms of what kinds of services and 
goods are needed. UN interactions with national bureaucracies up to the early 
1970s and again in the late 1980s generated scholarly critiques and political 
movements that began to be addressed only a decade after, paving the way to 
UN Summits on social issues, substantial policy reviews, to changing 
development frameworks and, eventually, to the MD. It is important to note, 
therefore, that no matter in what frame, the work of the UN has shaped the 
traditional public sector for decades especially in developing countries; it 
continues to do so.
167
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Today the ECOSOC’s Committee of Experts in Public Administration 
(CEPA’s) is interested in knowing more about the feasibility of having 
mechanisms by which public administration can be improved in both 
developing and developed countries.
168
 The history of the DPADM not only 
shows its expansion, since it started as an international technical assistance and 
training centre (the same root as the general project of development) but it also 
signals that little has changed at the DPADM in terms of its perspective on 
publicness and public administration. DPADM perceives public administration 
as an exclusive statist affair; as an exclusive statist realm. Therefore, the work 
of the UN in public administration has little to do with global publicness, but 
rather with traditional publicness, vertical interventions, and good governance. 
The Millennium Project, commissioned by the Secretary-General and executed 
by an independent group of experts, reinforced these focal points. Specifically, 
UN work in public administration looks at strengthening national strategies; 
rapidly scaling-up initiatives that are often chosen at the international level as 
best practices; and eliminating corruption, training personnel and making 
funds available (sometimes with stringent conditions attached).
169
 In this 
fashion, the UN public administration work matters and changes significantly 
country-level social policies. However, even after the MDGs, its impacts are 
underestimated.   
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The ECOSOC’s CEPA recommended that the world organisation enhanced 
“the dissemination of information concerning activities related to the United 
Nations Programme in Public Administration and Finance [currently the 
DAPDM], including United Nations Public Service Day, by engaging in a 
more effective public information campaign.”170 The Committee concluded 
that “although the United Nations was carrying out a number of significant 
initiatives in the field of public administration and governance, these had not 
been sufficiently publicized throughout the world.”171  
By studying the documents made available by the DAPDM in its 60
th
 
anniversary, important inferences can be made about the UN’s technical 
assistance strategies today. First, DAPDM’s discourse and practice remain 
loyal to a traditional view of State sovereignty, which is represented by nation-
states formally asking for assistance and consenting to it. Throughout the 
Division’s publications, the fact that States need to request assistance to be 
helped is often affirmed, signalling resistance to the idea that a relatively 
autonomous contribution of the global level to the public sector exists, even if 
to address very limited issues. In other words, the strengthening of a global 
overlayer,  which has been ever more responsible for public services, has been 
blemished by a traditional view of State sovereignty that is particularly 
important in public administration as a field. On the other hand, CEPA’s 
reports find the need to allude to universalist discourses, and to millennium-
related projects. 
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...governance and public administration play a vital role in an 
integrated follow-up strategy to United Nations conferences and 
summits that share similar concerns, such as providing economic 
opportunities to the poor and improving their access to basic services, 
including education, health, water and sanitation. These concerns 
were clearly highlighted at the Millennium Summit. … the 
Millennium Development Goals have universal legitimacy since they 
have been accepted by government leaders worldwide and are the 
culmination of a series of international initiatives and conferences, 
which, since the 1970s, have paid increasing attention to social 
objectives.    
The tension faced by CEPA today is profound, and it partially relates to the 
roots of social development work as grounded upon technical assistance 
methods. Broader social programmes require changes in focus and practices, 
going beyond technical assistance. The expert committee seems not ready to 
recommend such changes. 
While CEPA recognises the supranational, unifying character of the 
Millennium Declaration by attributing to it “universal legitimacy”, it deems 
national institutions responsible for achieving the millennium goals.
173
 While 
the principles of sovereignty and self-determination signal the propriety of 
such position, national implementation has shown to be slow. One reason, 
among many others, is systemic and speaks to the lack of capacity of national 
bureaucracies. Countries are in different economic, social, and political 
positions due to different, more or less oppressive, historical backgrounds, and 
cannot be equally responsible for fulfilling supranationally established 
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benchmarks. The MD takes this systemic view into consideration throughout 
its text. The MD states:
174
 
…we have a collective responsibility to uphold the principles of 
human dignity, equality and equity at the global level. As leaders we 
have a duty therefore to all the world’s people, especially the most 
vulnerable ... 
For while globalisation offers great opportunities, at present its 
benefits are very unevenly shared, while its costs are unevenly 
distributed. We recognise that developing countries and countries 
with economies in transition face special difficulties in responding to 
this central challenge. Thus, only through broad and sustained efforts 
to create a shared future, based upon our common humanity in all its 
diversity, can globalisation be made fully inclusive and equitable. 
Unlike the Declaration, the millennium goals, as well as CEPA, fail to 
understand that global social goals refer to our common humanity and to 
building a shared future. They fail to find a productive way to deal with the 
tension between a narrow interpretation of non-intervention in national matters 
and the need for the global level to take broader and bold acts to help national 
governments and the vulnerable populations of the world; today, vulnerable 
populations often organise transnationally. The question boils down to how 
international and national actors can make broader and sustained efforts 
towards creating a shared future, if implementation plans operate mostly under 
the principle that inefficient governments are the main causes of problems and 
efficient governments the main solution.  
In the words of CEPA:
175
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The implementation of the United Nations development agenda, 
including the Millennium Development Goals, required a governance 
system that was more engaging, transparent and accountable. Such 
an arrangement called for citizen participation in policy-decision 
making, service delivery, and public accountability. … many 
governments recognised those challenges and were introducing 
measures to establish institutions and processes that addressed the 
challenges of participatory governance. 
CEPA recognises that “there is a gap between goals, which are usually set 
internationally, and processes for their implementation, which are nationally 
driven.” Therefore, it is important to notice that while the most recent 
discourse of DAPDM (which is endorsed by CEPA) has further connected 
with ideas of revitalising the public sector and inserting public values into 
governance in public services (like participation), it ignores that a global layer 
has legitimately absorbed activities from the State, hence of publicness, in 
order to address global social challenges. For example, CEPA’s report 
understands the MD as an international set of principles, guidelines, and calls 
for action affecting domestic governance and domestic bureaucracies. CEPA 
does not mention shared ownership of social governance processes, deferring 
to national governments political and operational responsibilities for 
internationally-set development projects. Often this posture provokes a 
capacity deficit at the nation-state end, letting national officers deal alone with 
the administration of a global service-agenda that is, for many nation-states, 
out of reach.  
In contradiction to the highly-deferential CEPA’s discourse to nation-states as 
sovereigns, the Division sometimes engages with international technical 
assistance through isolated vertical interventions. Vertical technical assistance 
questions the use of request and consent as expression of sovereignty and as 
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securing the project’s publicness, understood as state-owned projects.176 
Request and consent are pillars of international relations that will require 
further thought and broader forms of expression within a frame of cooperation 
for global social governance.  
3.1.2 Technical assistance today: mostly traditional vertical interventions  
The present-day DAPDM’s e-government projects are good examples of 
international governance and of traditional approaches to the “science of 
public administration.”177 Specifically, the project on implementing e-
government in the Caribbean, which has been responsible for conceptualising 
and implementing e-government systems in the region, demonstrates that the 
DAPDM has been responsible for implementation, directly changing the way 
national bureaucracies provide services, and directly affecting matters of 
access.  




…involved integrating the information systems of the Government’s 
agencies. A feasibility study has defined operational solutions and 
guidelines for upgrading current procedures, integrating operations 
and simplifying processes across government agencies, and aiming at 
transforming the way government agencies interact with citizens and 
provide services built around citizen’s needs. The study has provided 
the government with a scenario and operative guidelines to enhance 
the efficiency and effectiveness of public services. 
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The Division took the lead in designing and implementing e-government 
schemes around the Caribbean region.
179
 It is suggested that, even if 
attempting to defer implementation to States, the Division has the capacity to 
define characteristics of public services in developing countries (especially 
small ones). Specifically, the initiatives of the Division in the Caribbean have 
focussed on upgrading technology, reaching all policies and sectors of many 
Caribbean national governments.
180
 These efforts include enabling and 
supporting governments to formulate e-government policy and legislative 
frameworks, adjust supply-side in different areas like tourism and education, 
and reach the demand-side by conducting surveys with beneficiaries and 
brining awareness about e-government schemes.
181
 All of these services have 
been conducted as e-government projects.
182
  
The make-up of e-government projects in the Caribbean has been marked by  
strong influence exercised by donor-countries. For example, during a meeting 
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 The use of bi-lateral projects intermediated by the UN is common to development, but not 
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…the future of such [e-government] activities in the Caribbean, 
[which] would involve the Department [UN Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs] as an executing agency, the Italian 
Government as a donor and possibly the two countries [Saint 
Vincent and Saint Lucia] as champions, assisting the Department in 
transferring the outcomes of the projects to other Caribbean 
countries. (emphasis added)  
While many countries, especially developing, may benefit from e-government 
initiatives, these are seldom publicised forms of technical assistance. They 
may represent an enlargement of the Division’s scope of work, going from 
requested country-to-country assistance to devising a regional strategy. 
Although, the Caribbean project is based on State request and on country-level 
action, which is fundamental to technical assistance projects, the Division 
executes projects from above following a regional strategy. By following 
patterns established by the executing agency and donors, the Division 
transforms a whole regional bureaucratic culture. This position does not fit 
well with the more recent orientation of the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP)  to finance projects in a manner that facilitates devolution 
to the local level.
 184
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The apparent lack of cohesion within the UN reflects a wider pattern of 
misinterpretation apparently caused by an anxiety to frame programmes as 
local as possible, following, for example, the European concept of 
subsidiarity.
185
 Whether local or global action is appropriate seems to demand 
a larger-debate about system-wide inequalities and capacities. A system-wide 
approach will likely highlight the necessity of local action most of the time, 
but it should flag the rare occasions in which global social governance 
frameworks are required.  
The work of the UN DPADM underuse global governance tools that could be 
made available to relieve States in their overwhelming task to respond to 
welfare demands produced by the various facets of globalisation.  The 
Division, maintaining its allegiance to technical assistance frameworks, fails to 
embrace the global overlayer and innovative global governance tools that 
could improve the quality of public services provided on the ground.
186
   
Although the Division studied here is specialised in Technical Assistance,  
there are other agencies, such as the UNDP, using technical assistance to meet 
their objectives, including MDGs. The UNDP, nevertheless, has also made use 
of other strategies to reach MDGs and its broader agenda. This broader agenda 
has recently included a bolder approach to tackle global challenges by using 
global partnerships. 
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3.2 Beyond Technical Assistance: Innovative Global Governance 
Mechanisms  
On the eve of the 21st century many things changed. In particular, the 
Extensive Programme on Technical Assistance (EPTA) was extinguished and 
gave way to the UNDP.
187
 Politically, many developing countries consolidated 
themselves as social-democratic regimes, and South-South alliances became 
political realities, granting to developing countries elevated political status. 
Relatedly, the Millennium Declaration was crafted, helping to both politicise 
and universalise claims for a more egalitarian world. These are some of the 
historical developments that contributed to the creation of new layers of public 
service governance. These new layers are generally represented by new 
partnerships and more active spheres of action in public services (global social 
policy and delivery), within and beyond the UN. These layers are further 
discussed below.    
3.2.1 Global social policy making  
3.2.1[a] Overview 
Bob Deacon conceptualises the social policy made by a range of supranational 
actors as a practice that “embodies global social redistribution, global social 
regulation, and global social provision and/or empowerment, and includes the 
way in which supranational organisations shape national policy.”188 UN 
specialised agencies under the ECOSOC have engaged with many other 
actors, in pursuit of innovative global social policies (GSP) that may more 
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effectively address global social challenges and push for more global 
governance in the context of public services. 
There are distinguishable UN agencies and commissions that promote global 
social policy.  For example, the work of the Commission on Social 
Development has established a frame of social integration to guide innovative 
policy-making as their priority theme. At the heart of the idea of social 
integration is the removal of obstacles that can bring inclusion to society 
through better delivery of public services. Among social integration strategies, 
there is the provision of truly global services, such as the World Food 
Programme transferring cash for food, and the establishment of a global social 
floor to meet basic needs transnationally. Preliminary ideas on the universal 
social floor deal with basic education and health services, cash transfers to be 
organised by global partners, and universal pensions for the elderly.
189
  
In terms of advancing social integration, the role of the ECOSOC has been 
vital. Even if it has been constrained by geopolitics and overshadowed by the 
activities of the Security Council (SC), the ECOSOC, supported by the 
international civil service and working under the Secretariat’s Department for 
Economic and Social Affairs, has found ways to promote global social policy 
by working with regional commissions and Ad Hoc groups, especially after 
the creation of the MDGs.
190
 Agencies responding to the ECOSOC, via the 
administrative coordination role played by UN Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs (DESA), have not only engaged in global social policy to 
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achieve development goals by 2015, but they have also started efforts to 
specifically create global partnerships for delivery in the areas of children’s 
education, children and women’s health (reproductive and maternal,) and also 
jobs for all.
191
 More recently, the ECOSOC and member-countries, especially 
the government of Spain, have created the MDG Achievement Fund 
(hereinafter MDG Fund) which is, arguably, the most clear mechanism 
directed towards funding service delivery ever created at the UN.
192
  
Below, I discuss social integration as a transversal frame influencing global 
social policy, including the MDGs. By exploring the UN’s social integration 
strategy, I discuss the following policies: the MDG Fund, the pact in favour of 
jobs for all, and the global social floor.  
3.2.1[b] Social integration as an example of meta-GSP   
I consider social integration a multi-faceted principle that guides policy action 
and transversally reaches UN agencies and their policies. In this regard, social 
integration is a type of meta global social policy, which is vital to fostering 
both the ethical and the operational aspects desirable in global governance 
frameworks.   
Two prominent agencies that work with social integration more bluntly are the 
World Health Organisation (WHO) and the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO). The United Nations Population Fund (or Population Fund) has also 
engaged with the frame of social integration. It has been responsible for 
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coordinating many of the efforts that include expansion of social services, 
which started to be more widely planned via the work of its Task Force on 
Social Services for All. The task force was established by the Administrative 
Coordination Committee (ACC) and placed under the auspices of the 
Population Fund. The task force ended its work in 1998. As an end product, it 
provided a compendium that lists the sectors where there is a need for global 




Although the task force did not succeed in becoming a permanent body of the 
ECOSOC, it did influence the efforts of the Population Fund and other 
agencies. It is suggested that there are political reasons why the Task Force did 
not grow to be a standing committee. For example, the Task Force referred to 
“social services” rather than “public services.” The choice for social services 
and complete avoidance of the term public services signals the necessity of the 
UN to be deferential, and to place at the hands of the State the exclusive 
control over public functions. The work of the Task Force on Social Services 
for All, nevertheless, impacted on the work of the Commission for Social 
Development, which started to use the frame of social integration across 
policy-making efforts. The Commission for Social Development has provided 
important advisory services to the ECOSOC. Together with the specialised 
agencies, the Commission constitutes an important institutional apparatus that 
supports and crafts global social policies in a range of policy areas, sometimes 
(but not always) pushing for social integration.   
                                                 
193
 Follow-Up Actions to the Recommendations of the International Conference on Population 
and Development: International Migration UN ESCOR, Report of the ACC Task Force on 
Basic Social Services for All. Un Doc E/CN.9/1997/4 (1997).  
 [115] 
 
For example, the ILO has used to frame of social integration to develop 
mechanisms to pursue Work For All (WFA). WFA discourse has survived 
statist challenges and, since 2008, has evolved into an important agenda item 
of the Population Fund, the UNDP and the ILO.
194
 In turn, the Population 
Fund has elected the area of reproductive health as one of global public 
concern. In this area it has worked together with the WHO.  
There are clear links between the work of the Task Force on Basic Social 
Services for All with the elected frame of social integration within agencies 
promoting “Development for All.” Both the Task Force and the frame of 
social integration demonstrate the necessity to go beyond development to fulfil 




According to Deacon, Hulse and Stubbs, who wrote their first book on Global 
Social Policy in 1997: 
196
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… the Social Summit of the UN held in Copenhagen in 1995 was 
only the latest, but was the most significant, in a line of recent 
summits. In 1990 there had been the World Conference on Education 
for All, and the World Summit for Children. In 1992 there was the 
Rio Summit on Development. In 1993 in Vienna there was the World 
Conference on Human Rights and in 1994 the International 
Conference on Population and Development. The all-encompassing 
theme, however, of the 1995 Social Summit represented the most 
significant global accord on the need to tackle issues of poverty, 
social exclusion and social development, North and South.  
As mentioned earlier, Copenhagen’s claim for social integration was first tied 
to the “Development For All” Programme. Today, it has been increasingly 
used to guide other, broader projects in the social realm. According to the 
Commission for Social Development Draft Resolution 48 concerning the topic 
of mainstreaming disability into development:
 197
   
 … the Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development and the 
Programme of Action of the World Summit for Social Development 
and the further initiatives for social development adopted by the 
General Assembly at its twenty-fourth special session, … constitute 
the basic framework for the promotion of social development for all 
at the national and international levels.
 
 
In addition to the potential benefit of “Development for All” projects and of 
the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) on the 
ground, development frames may be useful to showcase the limitation of 
development in itself and which policy area development projects are 
ineffective or insufficient. Social integration, for instance, seen as meta-policy 
has helped to guide UN policy makers in the daunting task of identifying 
issues that should be addressed through frameworks that are different from 
development.   
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In February of 2010, the Commission for Social Development promoted a 
panel discussion on its priority theme, social integration, in order to assess 
what can be done to approximate the outcomes of UN’s efforts to the ultimate 
goal of creating a more egalitarian society. Panellists were critical of how 
timid the UN has been in implementing the frame of social integration in a 
way that would go beyond its traditional goals. Recommending global 
concerted efforts, panellist J. Piet Hein Donner offers his support to:
 198
  
… the ILO’s “social justice for a fair globalisation” and the common 
declaration on “more and better jobs”. Social protection was a basic 
pillar for decent work, but 80 per cent of the global population did 
not have social guarantees. Global social protection standards should 
be developed. He strongly supported the Global Jobs Pact and the 
Social Protection Floor – both ILO initiatives – and called on other 
international organisations and governments to help the ILO to carry 
them out. Social protection floors were needed to combat poverty and 
foster national stability, as well as to promote fair, global 
competition. They should include a set of basic social transfers, in 
cash or in kind, to provide poor, vulnerable people with essential 
health care, food, clean water, education and other essential services.     
Hein Donner may be overoptimistic about the actual size and scope of  ILO’s 
Job Pact and Social Protection Floor. Regardless, the debate about coverage of 
global social policies serves as a demonstration that global social policies such 
as universal pensions, a global jobs pact, and an universal social floor (staple 
examples of GSP) have become important agenda items of UN high-level 
talks. A renewed UN social policy agenda sketches a governance paradigm 
that is broader than development, the usual paradigm to guide global social 
governance today.  
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3.2.1[c] Universal pensions and the global jobs pact 
Global social policy may reflect historical claims made by social movements, 
which often include some form of wealth redistribution. Following this 
orientation, the UN has begun to think about concrete interventions in the area 
of employment and pensions. Interventions suggesting the need for better 
elderly care have received strong support from global actors. More 
specifically, ideas on providing universal pensions have emerged.  
For example, UNDESA has endorsed both universal pensions and universal 
employment. In terms of pensions, UNDESA policy brief n. 3 advocates for “a 
minimal universal social pension”, which “would provide a floor below which 
nobody could fall.”199 The policy brief goes further to explain that universal 
pensions “could provide the basis for a more comprehensive pension system 
which may consist of a mixture of public and private initiatives adapted in 
accordance with existing country practices, financial circumstances and equity 
considerations.”200 Lastly, UNDESA proposes to find a “fiscal space” and to 
rely on the donor community to directly subsidise “non-contributory” 
pensions.
201
 Similarly, the Global Jobs Pact is an ILO initiative that involves 
several other agencies and intends to “support economic recovery through 
decent work-friendly policies, reduce the risk that the crisis spreads further 
across countries and pave the way for a more sustainable, fairer globalisation.” 
The Pact includes several country-led and ILO-led initiatives.
202
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The most important component of the Global Jobs Pact, in this context, is the 
Global Jobs Fund which is an initiative that aims at providing an alternative to 
conditional loans. It targets countries hardly hit by an economic crisis, 
proposing a “counter-cyclical global mechanism … a global jobs fund [that] 
would provide support to countries facing global crisis. It would rely on a line 
of credit separate from that of the traditional IMF package…”203 In fact, in the 
report written by the Special Representative of the United Nations to the ILO, 
Jane Stewart, entitled The Financial and Economic Crisis: A Decent Work 




…the President of the UN General Assembly has established the 
Commission of Experts on Reforms of the International Monetary 
and Financial System (the so-called Stiglitz Commission) … 
Through its position in the UN system, the ILO can support the 
Commission’s work by pointing to the employment and social 
consequences of existing and proposed solutions to crisis in 
developing countries… 
The Global Jobs Fund, therefore, is not only a revolutionary policy 
proposition, but it is also an indication that the ILO and the UN are assessing 
projects that may function as staple components of the global public sector, 
yielding social, economic and political consequences. 
3.2.1[d] Universal global social floor 
The ILO is taking advantage of its position as one of the UN leading agencies 
in social matters. It has promoted policy talks not only about universal 
pensions and securing global jobs, but also about the universal social floor, 
which is a suggested social policy designed to provide “a basic floor of social 
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transfers” that are globally affordable. 205 The advancement of the debate about 
the Global Jobs Fund and the Universal Social Floor is groundbreaking; and it 
serves to reinforce the ideas about: 1) the UN undergoing a normative 
transition, which has advanced a more concrete vision of why and which 
social challenges need to be globally addressed; 2) the formation of a global 
public sector, which inevitably transforms the source of publicness (from the 
exclusive governmental domain to partnered global responsibilities).
 
 
According to the UN’s Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB), 
which is currently chaired by the Secretary-General directly assisted by ILO’s 
Director-General and other 27 high-level officers:
206
 
A social protection floor could consist of two main elements that help 
to realise respective human rights: 
Essential services: ensuring the availability, continuity, and access to 
public services (such as water and sanitation, health, education and 
family-focussed social work support). 
Social Transfers: a basic set of essential social transfers, in cash and 
in kind, paid to the poor and vulnerable to enhance food security and 
nutrition, provide a minimum income security and access to essential 
services, including education and health care. 
As of now, the social floor is a proposal intending to impact and supplement 
social policies world-wide, and to make available basic social transfers from 
the UN-System to several communities in need, via the national infra-
structure. The social floor is the materialisation of the intention of the UN 
CEB to address the effects of recent economic crises. In fact, CEB, with the 
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universal social floor, is not only responding to the effects of one specific 




The universal social floor, if implemented, will represent an innovative 
mechanism that comprises a joint response to economic crisis via global social 
interventions. As a result, this policy will distance itself from the international 
legal framework generally followed by the UN. For instance, many countries 
that have not ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) may benefit from an universal social floor, if 
implemented. Second, the social floor seems to be designed to authorise an 
universal plan that would provide services, independently on the status of 
international human rights within the country-level, although it might require 
legislative acts to ensure that the process of granting transfers will follow 
human rights norms (such as be free from discrimination). Global social 
policy, such  as the social floor, may help realise social and economic rights in 
countries where human rights treaties have not been ratified,  or in countries 
where national infra-structure is non-existent, but taken for granted. In fact, the 
MDGs, if achieved successfully, could have a similar effect.  
The 2008 economic crisis has revealed discrepancies that exist between what 
the international community expects countries to do and what they can do 
alone. This exposure has also allowed the UN to start using language such as 
the universal social floor or the “global new deal”.208 These innovations are 
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profound and they make of the social floor the quintessential example of GSP. 
More so, they inaugurate a different posture of the UN towards boldly stating 
its willingness to do more in the social realm and to adopt frameworks 
different from development. CEB’s social floor takes advantage of the global 
economic crisis to boldly state that it is working under a UN-System 
framework of “delivering as one” for the benefit of all countries.209 And that 
this joint (or system-wide) approach will likely be required to address 
emerging challenges that differ from development challenges.
210
  Equally 
important is to note that the committee acknowledged that the UN normative 
frame, when it comes to responding to new challenges, need to bring in 
“greater alignment” with the “operational work of the United Nations system 
at the global, regional, and country levels.”211  
As innovative as the discussions on the social floor are from a policy 
perspective, they have only superficially talked about the political challenges 
that GSP may reproduce or create. Addressing such challenges is vital for the 
implementation of the social floor in itself and for the long-term development 
of global social governance efforts.  
3.2.2 Innovation in global service delivery  
There are several arguments in favour of the social floor, but it has been a 
challenging task for CEB to transform the social floor into partnered service 
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delivery. Yet economic and operational considerations to implement the global 
social floor are well underway:
 212
 
… the definition [of a social protection floor] transcends the mandate 
of any individual UN agency so this document [discussed in Geneva 
in 2009] seeks to provide the elements for a coherent system-wide 
approach. Calculations by various UN agencies including the ILO, 
UNAIDS, UNICEF and WHO show that a basic floor of social 
transfers is globally affordable, even if the funding is not yet 
available everywhere. It would also have a major impact on poverty, 
access and use of key services including those for AIDS, tuberculosis 
and malaria, and on child labour and child trafficking. … When 
properly implemented, already existing cash transfer and basic health 
systems in many developing countries have positive impacts on 
poverty, child labour, health and nutrition, education, social status of 
recipients, economic activity, without having negative effects on 
adult labour market participation. What is needed now is a UN-led 
global coalition to safeguard the attainments of the Millennium 
Development Goals, as an important element of social progress. The 
social protection floor provides a conceptual catalyst to do just that. 
While the social floor is just an agenda item (albeit of great potential to change 
service delivery across the UN family,) the UN continues to engage in service 
delivery by scattered means, generally under the rubric of international 
development. Since agreement upon MDGs, the UN has improved old 
mechanisms and created new ones under its broad agenda for development. 
Provision of health care, especially healthcare to women and HIV/AIDS 
treatment, as well as food provision encompass a large percentage of 
international or global service delivery today. Matter of fact, as a result of the 
MDGs, many UN new inter-agency and global partnerships have been formed. 
For example:
 213
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The World Food Programme is mandated to support economic and 
social development, concentrating its efforts and resources on the 
neediest people and countries. UNAIDS is working with partners to 
ensure universal access to HIV prevention, treatment, care and 
support as well as social protection mechanisms for patients and their 
families. UN-HABITAT in collabouration with UNITAR is 
developing guidelines on access to basic services for all. WMO 
[World Maritime Organisation]  is promoting the development of 
Early Warning Systems relevant for a large range of natural hazards, 
which occurrence can jeopardize lives and goods, and ruining efforts 
to improve humankind conditions ...  
More recently, two other UN-led mechanisms have contributed to global 
governance in public services and to, more specifically, MDG achievement. 
They are the MDG Fund (MDG F) and the World Bank’s Public Private Infra-
Structure Advisory Facility (PPIAF). They both engage more openly with the 
language of public service delivery. The PPIAF’s objective, however, is the 
enablement of private projects in building public infra-structure.  The MDG-F 
focusses on realising MDGs through a partnership among the UNDP, the 
government of Spain, grant-recipient governments and nonstate actors 
working at the national level.  
The World Bank (WB) when introducing public-private partnerships in infra-
structure explains his position:
214
   
Over the last fifteen years, governments around the world pursued 
policies to involve the private sector in the delivery and financing of 
infrastructure services. Private participation in infrastructure (PPI) 
and reforms were driven by the high costs and poor performance of 
state-owned network utilities. The scale of this move away from the 
dominant public sector model was far more rapid than had been 
anticipated at the start of the 1990s with investment flows peaked at 
US$114 billion in 1997... 
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 WB’s PPIAF is a governance mechanism that also chose to differ from the 
public sector model, even when engaging with enabling the building of infra-
structure projects that are vital for the organisation of social life and wellbeing. 
This mismatch between a model that is not public and its scope that is 
historically public raises important questions that have received little attention 
at the global context. One of the reasons for lack of considerations of 
publicness at the global level is that publicness of inter-state organisations is 
taken for granted. Even financial organisations founded by member-states, like 
the World Bank, enjoy a reputation that associates their work with public 
interests, especially outside of academic and NGO activism circles.
215
 
Academics and activists have been more critical, but they are still far from 
engaging enough with issues of publicness in the Bank’s institutional context 
or in the broader social governance scenario. On one hand, the political 
ambivalence derives from the modern association of public services with the 
welfare State. On the other hand, the operational expansion derives from the 
necessity to achieve internationally-set social benchmarks that are often 
outside of the national reach, and also from advantageous economic 
opportunities that infra-structure represent for corporations in a globalised 
market. Not all of the UN work is influenced by these opposing trends. While 
mechanisms such as the PPIAF showcase that quantitative and private goals 
can sidetrack the need for broad politicisation and ethical considerations in 
global social governance, mechanisms such as the MDG Achievement Fund 
create opportunities for significant ethical, political, and operational 
innovation.    
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3.2.2[a] Contrasting the MDG Fund and the World Bank’s PPIAF 
The MDG Achievement Fund (MDG F) is a recently created international 




 ...established in December 2006 with a contribution of € 528 Million 
(Euros) from the Government of Spain to the UN system with the 
aim of accelerating progress on the MDGs. 
 
The MDG Fund is particularly relevant because it mainly funds local public 
services that are relevant to MDG achievement within 49 countries in need. 
The MDG Fund finances the initiatives and chooses priority areas. Within  
priority areas (such as child nutrition and youth employment), countries, 
NGOs and IGOs bid for grants and propose specific types of interventions to 
accelerate in-country MDG achievement.  
There are qualities of international governance and qualities of global 
governance in the projects elected for intervention by the MDG F. First of all, 
the Fund was established by a major grant of the Spanish government and 
relies upon UN agencies for its operation. In addition, its first criterion for 
intervention is the list of countries eligible for funding, which has been 
decided at the moment of agreement between the Spanish government and the 
UN-System. In this regard the Spanish government, in its role as major donor, 
has adopted a conventional territorial approach to governance and service-
provision.  
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Global governance qualities, nevertheless, are significantly present in regards 
to the modus operandi of the Fund. The MDG-F mainly funds partnerships 
engaged in multi-level delivery activities; more importantly, it highlights that 
the MDG F works:
217
 
... together with local and national governments, citizens and civil 
society organisations, NGOs and the United Nations to tackle 
poverty and speed up progress on the MDGs. With 128 joint 
programmes worldwide, the focus is on addressing inequalities and 
having an impact at the local level where people need it the most. 
It also highlights that the MDG Fund has contributed to bringing to the UN a 
broader mechanism that cuts across individual-agencies mandates and, as a 
result, is able to promote more effectively UN policies that relate to attempts 
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to deliver as one. Finally, the MDG Fund pledges accountability at three 
different levels: the global, the international and the country-level, as well as it 
often engages directly with the local level, promoting forms of public service 
delivery that do not necessarily go through national bureaus or departments. 
One good example is the MDG F-financed programme to deliver potable 
water and sewage systems in 12 cities of Honduras. The programme was 
accorded between the Fund and six local districts. The Fund will finance the 
construction of 20 projects of water and sanitation in 12 towns of Honduras.
218
   
In the analysis of programmes like the one above, it is quite clear that the 
MDG F, when it was designed, forecasted that it would have been heavily 
involved with global governance in public services. However, the MDG F 
website which follows a pledge for publicity, does not use the language of 
public services, but rather the language of partnered programmes to explain 
how it works. Again, a political justification for the absence of service 
language comes to mind: openly acknowledging the absorption of aspects of 
public service provision is to openly acknowledge MDG Fund projects should 
be classified as public, more specifically, (given the inadequacy of the 
traditional public sector frame) global public. This is particularly true when 
one considers public services medium of publicness. This way, the public 
services financed by the MDG-F, and the way they are designed, should help 
to construe social ownership, political openness, and visibility in social 
governance.  
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The MDG-F, however, works with financing services within the theme of 
democratic economic governance.
219
 Within an economic governance 
framework, the MDG-F recognises that it is ready to make important decisions 
about public service delivery, albeit it is not clear what its public 
responsibilities are beyond a general statement in favour of accountability. It is 
clear that the MDG-F has helped to expand public service governance towards 
a range of actors, working mainly with the idea of partners in delivery. These 
partners can be local governments, civil society groups and/or national 
governments. They always include a combination of UN-agencies (generally 
up to 6 agencies). Hence, the MDG-F is able to directly impact on public 
service provision.  Incidentally, one of the evaluation tools used to measure 
impact of MDG-F in the area of democratic governance is to look at “changes 
in the efficiency in the delivery of public services, as measured by changes in 
prices and cost of delivery” resulting from MDG F interventions. 220   
The Public Private Infra-Structure Advisory Facility (PPIAF) may also 
directly impact on public services. However, the Facility is concerned with 
facilitating the provision of many services, without worrying with democratic 
governance issues or with public services as mediums of publicness.
221
  This 
posture is quite common in international development projects: the major 
concern is to make service available. Concern with the public nature of the 
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 World Bank’s Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF) Public-Private 




service in question becomes secondary or non-existent. Actually, in case of the 
PPIAF, since the World Bank’s partners in building infra-structure are 
businesses looking for a commercial opportunity, the goal is about getting 
service delivered, but not so much about quality, or establishing means for 
public scrutiny.  
The PPIAF is a joint facility created by the governments of Japan and the 
United Kingdom, working closely with the World Bank infra-structure 
department and other development agencies (such as the UNDP) to assist in 
the implementation of public private partnerships to build infra-structure. 
Projects range from assisting the private sector to partner with governments to 
implement better systems of trash pick-ups in Ethiopia, to forming private-
public partnerships to promote the electrification of rural areas in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Specifically, the programme on electrification has used what is called  
output-based aid, which relies upon economic subsidies and incentives to the 
private sector to invest in areas that are socially and economically vital and 
that have been left unattended.
222
  
The PPIAF matters for global social governance because it intervenes in 
public services by facilitating the entrance of commercial nonstate actors in 
social governance. Thus, the PPIAF helps to form innovative public-private 
partnerships. The PPIAF is also important because it enters the realm of the 
social with a clear, overt business approach to public services. The study of the 
PPIAF, as it progresses through the years, can provide important insights 
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about how effective it is for inter-state organisations to adopt a business 
approach to public services, and enable cross-country, private sector provision 
of historically public services.   
For the moment, the examples above provide robust evidence that UN-family 
organisations lead efforts in many areas related to public service governance, 
and adopt different approaches to public service governance. More 
importantly, they show that there is an ongoing expansion of the international 
apparatus towards adopting broader governance frameworks to build 
infrastructure. Nevertheless, the examples also show that amidst this transition, 
considerations of publicness (if these interventions should be made public 
even if a product of governance and not government) have been side-tracked, 
or reduced to a factual observation about the failure of the traditional public 
sector to respond to social demands.  
For example, the position of the World Bank about publicness in partnerships 
for infrastructure is similar to the position of the UN (system-wide). It is pretty 
much a position not-taken, a position of ignorance. Publicness in public 
services has been reduced largely by the use of public-private partnerships, 
and has not been relocated by the efforts of the UN as the main international 
public player. That is to say that the UN has devoted significant resources 
towards crafting public-private partnerships of global reach, but it has not 
discussed the consequences of drifting away from what the World Bank called 
the dominant public model. Arguably, rushing to engage with public-private 
partnerships in the context of the MDGs has virtually not been accompanied 
by a preoccupation (neither by the UN nor by the World Bank) with the public 
component of public-private partnerships. Little has been discussed about how 
to compensate for the factual loss of traditional publicness. One would think 
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that this would be a more pressing topic, especially when it comes to 
partnerships in infra-structure. Until now global publicness types of debates 




For instance, while UN efforts towards unifying administrative strategies such 
as “delivering as one” or “responding as one” often involves the participation 
of civil society organisations, this is not sufficient to address the loss of 
traditional publicness.
223
 Debating the global aspects of publicness is now 
necessary.  
3.2.3 Global publicness types of considerations: illustration in the 
context of the suggested universal social floor 
The suggestion for a global social floor is promising. Politically, it comes from 
one of the most powerful UN offices. The social floor receives the support of  
high-level officials such as ILO’s Director-General Juan Somavia, Helen 
Clark, head of the UNDP, and Josette Sheeran, Executive Director of the 
World Food Programme (WFP).  
CEB’s 2008/2009 report brings relevant information about the UN overall 
current position amidst global crisis.
224
 By differentiating the responses 
implemented in the 2008 economic crisis from regular development responses, 
the report clearly indicates that the role of the UN-system in global social 
governance will expand to provide more social services. The major concern 
here, however, is to understand why some of the responses that the Committee 
felt necessary in the post 2008 context have not been discussed before, given 
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that they are clearly referring not only to the crisis in itself, but to more 
generalised effects of economic globalisation.  
In other words, the crisis per se did not engender a different, more unified and 
autonomous, posture of the UN. The high social cost of economic 
globalisation and liberalisation, added to the birth of an “unprecedented global 
consensus” on a broad vision of development “built through the historic 
United Nations conferences and summits held in the 1990s and 2000s,” 




 If ambivalence towards the global public sector has been the norm in UN 
documents, there is a change of tone in the 2009 CEB’s report. CEB is more 
comfortable in recognising the type of welfare governance that needs to be 




At its most recent meeting, held in Paris on 4 and 5 April, CEB 
endorsed a set of initiatives developed by the High-level Committee 
on Programme for a system-wide response to the global financial and 
economic crisis in nine different areas. While recognising the 
importance of the threats posed by longer-term climate change and 
development challenges, the Board, in pursuing these initiatives, is 
building upon its ongoing work which is increasingly directed 
towards developing United Nations responses to emerging 
challenges.  
By concentrating on emerging challenges, the UN starts to engage with 
another layer of publicness in social policy. This layer does not draw upon 
traditional state roles (not even upon international law), but upon new issues 
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that are transnational in nature, born out of transnational public opinion and 
out of transnational bonds of solidarity.
227
  
Enhancing global publicness of global social policies, therefore, will require 
universal propositions such as the social floor, but also political and 
operational changes – a better political space to accommodate universal 
policies. For example, if a social protection floor is to be established at the 
global level (rather than at the international), the CEB will have to expand its 
joint initiatives beyond the UN framework, changing the focus from a system-
wide approach to a global public approach. As it is, CEB’s policies will 
probably be defined via pilot projects slowly integrated into regional and 
country-level offices. This is what happens to pilot projects within the scheme 
of “delivering as one”, for example.228 Yet it is unknown whether this 
configuration (the CEB and the ILO taking a life of their own and proposing a 
wide policy such as the universal social floor to be deployed by the UN 
family) will attend to social needs that are urgent; that are not country-based 
but transnational.  
Specifically, CEB’s proposal for an universal floor raises questions about how 
to identify and attend to global public interests, without “toying with any 
notion of an imaginary plebiscite to discover the public interest” – although 
this idea, with the advancement of technology, is less impossible today than 
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what it was when Walter Lippmann wrote his account of the public interest.
229
 
CEB’s action towards creating an universal social floor emphasises the 
dichotomy between the reality of getting things done via executive bodies 
already available at the international level, and the necessity to politicize the 
governing of the social (in the sense of bringing it into the “recognizable 
public concern”, which is in this case transnational).230 If the social floor is to 
enjoy high levels of global publicness, it has to take transnational needs of 
communities as a “measuring rod”, 231  guiding the global level in a process of 
welfare governance that does not patronise, in this case, the diverse 
beneficiaries of the global social floor.
232
 
This tension can be summarised as a tension between means (genuinely 
inclusionary policies and self-steering) and ends (measurable results as fast as 
possible). In means versus ends resides one of the greatest challenges that I see 
plaguing global governance in public services coming from the UN. The 
necessary exercise of establishing the highest attainable level of global 
publicness, without jeopardizing the ability of achieving results. This 
compromise is so complex that it may, on one hand, enable the practical value 
of global publicness (because it is incremental and not absolute it is actually 
plausible) or, on the other hand, de-characterise global publicness in itself (it is 
incremental and we will never get there).  
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Although the universal social floor will likely be devised by high-level 
executives, the initiative attempts to address issues that have been debated for 
a long time in social justice circles, transnational networks and community 
meetings. For example, one of the issues is wealth redistribution. In fact, 
CEB’s elected areas of action embraced by the social floor reflect historical 
claims, which now begin to be discussed at, and sometimes undertaken by, the 
global level. CEB’s position, however, poses a great challenge for a normative 
idea of global governance as self-steering, which may be highly desirable, but 
may never totally materialise in practice by UN-led initiatives, given that the 
UN was formed based on an idea of State representation.
233
 The UN as a 
global public actor is not a representative of governments, but a mediator of 
the interests of multiple sources of power, old and new, traditional and non-
traditional. New and non-traditional voices have gained traction in the context 
of the 2008 economic crisis.  
The CEB showed enormous flexibility when it changed focus to address 
global problems aggravated (and made more visible) by the 2008 economic 
crisis.  Yet more attention towards the relationships between the decay of 
statist publicness and global social problems is still needed. By being 
conscious of new forms of publicness, the CEB would likely enhance the 
chances of the social floor to work. For now, what should no longer happen at 
the UN is ignorance of the existence and the importance of an emerging global 
public sector that starts to shape global publicness. The content of global 
publicness (including global and international services) need to be carefully 
debated and reflected upon, even when the nature of the policy response to a 
global challenge is presumed to be a benevolent one.  
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IV UN Exercising Social Leadership: Questioning Old Habits 
This chapter exposes that, in the practice of its social policies, the UN adopts a 
technical assistance culture, defers to the institution of national sovereignty, 
and searches for fast, measurable results. These patterns create operational 
habits that are not particularly favourable to confirm the UN as a global social 
governance leader. Some of these habits, or patterns, have been more studied 
than others, but they all seem to equally undermine the capacity of the UN to 
be effective as a global leader.
234
 For the purposes of this thesis, these habits 
are part of the map of how global governance in public services take place, as 
they are important areas where to concentrate further action.   
The UN case-study has exposed the following patterns:  
4.1 Disjointed UN Interventions  
Disjointed interventions are a challenge to effective global social governance.  
Some UN agencies continue to operate under traditional technical assistance 
frameworks, engaging mainly with vertical interventions. Others, as 
demonstrated above with examples of future and current mechanisms, such as 
the global social floor and the MDG Fund, adopt broader multi-actor 
frameworks. Yet the UN suffers from not crafting an overarching global public 
approach to social governance. While the MDGs have functioned as catalysts 
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for global social action, they are mainly quantitative targets internationally 
established, offering only limited guidance.   
Finding a cohesive approach to UN action in social governance is a significant 
challenge. The United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) which is under the 
auspices of the UNDP, concluded that “there is no centralized coordination 
and/or planning of evaluation for the UN system as a whole.”235 This raises 
concern, given that the UN lacks a broader vision and framework for global 
social governance. On the other hand, too much centralisation of operational 
processes might impair effective global governance, (which includes higher 
levels of self-steering) rather than advance it.   
CEB and the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) are coordination 
bodies with the difficult task of finding middle ground between coordination 
and imposition/control of  activities of the UN bodies and specialised agencies. 
These organisations work in a wide range of ways, often autonomously and 
remotely making important decisions towards achieving MDGs targets.
236
 UN 
coordination mechanisms thus far have succeeded in diminishing duplication 
of processes within the UN, but have had little impact on the creation of social 
value through the consolidation of social norms and global partnerships.
237
 
Specifically, when one resorts to global governance theory, one understands 
that strong social norms should enable self-steering (thus promoting less need 
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for traditional coordination). In theory, strong social norms make possible 
inter-agency coherence with less centralisation and formal regulation.
238
  
In fact, UN coordination mechanisms have not been able to herd agencies and 
nonstate actors under a more cohesive set of norms to guide governance.
 239
  
As a result, UN engagement with global social governance has been 
piecemeal. UN coordination mechanisms generally focus on coordinating 
jurisdictional matters within the UN. As it currently happens, once UN 
agencies have their mandates established and ascertain jurisdiction over a 
policy issue, they enjoy a lot of discretion to decide how they will operate and 
how they will prioritise programmes and funding.  
The UN main agencies should not see themselves as comprising the world 
executive that will perform the tasks for humanity, but rather as the organisers 
that will open avenues for safe, coherent and effective self-steering of the 
global public overlayer. A different view of coordination might help to open 
more avenues for better sociological engagement among UN institutions and 
between the UN family and other organisations. If the UN transitions from a 
position that has used coordination to seek efficiency (mainly concerned with 
not duplicating efforts) to coordination to bring people and institutions 
together by deliberating common goals (mainly creating social value),  
propositions such as “delivering as one” can be more successful and expanded 
to include non-UN actors.  
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4.2 Marginalisation of the General Assembly 
The UN General Assembly has a pivotal role to play in helping the UN to 
build an overarching framework for global social governance that is grounded 
upon consolidated social norms. Most would agree that the GA in itself is not 
particularly democratic.
240
 However, the GA has exercised leadership in 
promoting social welfare in parts of the world where it is most needed, 
reflecting that, even as a contested political space, the GA has provided 
governments of the Global South with some sort of platform to voice their 
demands.
241
 Hence, the GA presents a real, and perhaps the most attainable, 
possibility of democratic improvement within the UN in the short and medium 
terms. GA’s present and future roles matter because of the GA’s deliberative 
and political character.  
The highly political character of the GA has often been interpreted as a 
negative influence in social governance. Social governance has been 
interpreted as essentially technical, especially when it comes to providing 
services to developing countries.
242
  
Despite opposition towards vertical, international policies expressed at the GA 
floor by recipient countries, the GA has been left out of many important 
decisions concerning social policy and service provision, including budgetary 
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duties, which have been transferred to specialised agencies.
243
 Resistance 
towards giving the GA more power to deliberate about the delivery of social 
programmes flags the difficulty of democratising global social acts, no matter 
which perspective on publicness one takes. Neither a traditional perspective 
(which understands the GA as the ultimate representative of member-states) 
nor a global public perspective (which understands the GA as an assembly that 
could represent not only the votes of member States, but that could find 
mechanisms to hear transnational nonstate actors) is sufficient to address 
democratic challenges impacting GA’s role in social policy-making.  There are 
other challenges that relate to UN’s internal governance, such as the 
relationship of the GA, a political body, with specialised agencies, which are 
technical bodies making important political decisions.
244
  
Recent reforms and an alleged millennium mind-set have not changed the 
dynamics of how the GA interacts with specialised agencies.
245
 In fact, the 




Many of the powers that have historically been concentrated in the hands of 
specialised agencies are significantly impacting on how the MD manifests 
itself on the ground. They demonstrate the difficulty in having a genuine 
global project, when the ethical and political elements of these projects are 
overridden by an exclusive focus on meeting targets and measurable 
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benchmarks. More importantly, it is even more difficult to legitimise 
governance of public services outside domestic legitimacy, when the project of 
assistance has not been historically democratic, but rather representative of 




One of the main determinants of the policy of the United States and 
other governments towards EPTA [Expanded Programme on 
Technical Assistance] was their desire to isolate technical assistance 
activities from the tense political controversies which dominated the 
UN debates in the 1950s. They held that the technical competence of 
the specialised agencies should be fully recognised and the role of the 
Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly should be 
therefore limited to laying down … criteria and priorities for the 
Programme. Drafted under such thinking, Resolution 222 limited the 
Council’s functions … Their proposals aimed at narrowing the scope 
of interference by the intergovernmental bodies of the United Nations 
in EPTA. (…) Faced with such vested interests the developing 
countries were unlikely to enjoy much real control over EPTA. (…) 
The advanced donor countries on the other hand, especially large 
donors, could generally influence EPTA operations. 
Global governance in public services, understood differently from 
development and beyond an operational methodology that includes nonstate 
actors, requires devolution of original social functions to political bodies. 
Consequently, projects that involve global welfare should be led by the 
General Assembly, programmatically at the ECOSOC, as foreseen by the 
founders of the League of Nations.
248
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The ECOSOC has its own committees and programmes which have an impact 
on several welfare areas as well. However, the ECOSOC’s programmatic 
work is limited by the competences of specialised agencies (including the 
WHO and the ILO). In overlapping areas, it exercises a mere residual role. 
These areas represent key public sectors. If the global level performs vital 
public functions, its most important deliberative bodies should not play a 
residual role; they should play a greater role in any of the processes involved 
(be they of administration, policy-making, or budgetary.) Clearly, duplicated 
efforts and waste of resources are major concerns. Yet it is suggested that 
issue-area alone should not be the criterion used to guide the division of tasks 
in global welfare. Rather, expertise needs to be combined with global 
politicisation. These two-fold criteria  (political and technical) render many 
international institutions inadequate to mediate global social policy making 
alone. In fact, very few organisations will enjoy the same qualities as the 
World Health Assembly (WHA). This political, deliberative body handles 
issues strictly confined to global health. The qualities of the WHA have 
contributed to the success of global health as a policy-field. Other policy-fields 
could also benefit from a similar arrangement. The GA could serve as the 
global political stage needed to host global deliberations (including nonstate 
actors) on specific policy-fields.  
Although this exceeds the GA mandate, it could help to advance democratic 
tools of global social governance within a traditional interstate organisation. 
Specialised agencies, created as technical agencies, often engage with similar 
activities, which have transformed the governing of the social. They allocate 
                                                                                                                             
international law.” Philippe Sands and Pierre Klein Bowett’s Law of International Institutions 
(6th, Thomson Reuters (Legal), London, 2009) at 25.  
 [144] 
 
money and write budgets, they set priority-areas, and they build programmatic 
agendas autonomously, many times without undergoing public deliberation.
249
 
Because of the tendency to delegate to technical bodies, and to forget about the 
public nature of the services provided by the same technical bodies, GA’s 
potential as an effective leader of global social governance has been 
questioned, as has been the potential of the ECOSOC. Traditionally, two types 
of challenges, political and legal, are mentioned when it comes to the GA’s 
ability to lead governance schemes.  
The political challenge resides on historically established power-breaking 
roles. A universal project requires that power be more evenly distributed and 
that large and small countries buy-into the universal benefit of proportional 
and redistributive social policies. It also requires that priorities be analysed 
against the impact upon different social groups, which are not necessarily 
determined by citizenship, but rather by transnational affiliations (i.e. gender, 
race, religion). 
In the last twenty years, member-states have become more sympathetic to 
reforming the way the GA engages with social policy-making. They have 
entertained transnational claims in governance talks and paid more attention to 
the subject-matters that are generally discussed at the ECOSOC (under the 
auspices of the GA). For instance,  the possibility of creating an Economic 
Council modelling, but more inclusive than, the Security Council (SC), has 
been recently debated. It would not have been even mentioned ten years 
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 Other debates that have been revived include the Tobin Tax and 
Conditional Cash Transfers (TCCs).
251
 There are other signs towards the 
politicisation of socio-economic governance being pushed by the main UN-
Charter bodies, the GA, the Security Council and the UN Secretariat, 
especially in the recent context of the 2008 global economic crisis.  
In terms of global welfare, even the Security Council has ruptured with 
business as usual in order to extend the services of the world organisation to 
several countries in-need, as in the example of treating HIV/AIDS  as a threat 
to peace and security.
252
 While postal and meteorological services for years 
were used to attest to the effectiveness of international law, it is time to 
recognise that the global level can successfully mediate other types of claims, 
which are more political in nature. It is possible to envision social areas in 
which the global social machinery is not only relevant (it matters and it 
works), as it becomes vital for effective governing of the social. While UN-
wide action is required, the GA, as the most important deliberative forum, 
needs to be at the centre of mediation of transnational social claims.  
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Related to the difficulty in ascertaining its relevant global political role, the 
GA faces challenges to affirm its capacity to make global social policy. From a 
legalist perspective, the main obstacle is the so-called soft character of GA 
resolutions, the main instruments of GA policy-making.
253
 Despite the fact 
that the GA influences the making of international law (by encouraging State 
practice, by overseeing the work of agencies, by consistently repeating its 
recommendations and by making international customary law), most of its 
resolutions are considered recommendations with no binding effect externally 
to the UN. From this formalist reading, however, many important nuances of 
the GA work as a global actor are overlooked.  
GA’s resolutions are numerous and varied in content, dealing with most 
matters of human interest and binding the world’s official bureaucracy, the UN 
Secretariat. In almost every subject, resolutions can signal the political 
orientation of the international community, and in some areas, they determine 
policy priorities for the UN. The choice for fragmentation in delivery inherited 
from liberalisation has limited GA’s influence: many programmes necessary to 
carry forward the priorities of the international community are being executed 
by organisations that are outside of the jurisdiction of the UN and far from 
sharing UN’s values. More than delivering, however, many of these 
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As the history of UN programmes in technical assistance tells us, many of the 
important operational, day-to-day decisions that define the welfare work of the 
UN have been delegated to specialised agencies.
255
 In the same way that it is 
undesirable to centralise all execution at the GA, it is possible to attribute to it 
more decision-making. Different governance mechanisms that can subject 
specialised agencies to work under the auspices of GA’s policy priorities and 
budgetary capacity are needed. In this sense, a less fragmented practice led by 
a more politically open GA may engender more open and more collectively-
owned global governance.  
Due to the deliberative character of the GA, a stronger role in global public 
service governance, especially in enhancing the levels of self-steering, could 
not only contribute for a fairer distribution of world resources, but also for a 
renaissance of the General Assembly as remodelled global public forum. In 
this fashion, the ideal role of the GA in global governance builds upon the 
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4.3 Confusion about Autonomy and Capacity to Make-Decisions 
Many of the recurring critiques against the public service work of the UN 
actually address the UN’s specialised agencies. These critiques address the 
unchecked degree of autonomy that these agencies enjoy when making 
decisions that directly affect people’s welfare within States.257 Specialised 
agencies can enjoy a larger degree of autonomy when representing one party 
in a bilateral transaction, for example. When working with global public 
service governance, specialised agencies should not enjoy the same degree of 
autonomy they have been able to in development projects. For example, by 
defining programmatic and budget details of social service that can affect 
people all over the world, specialised agencies may exceed their technical role, 
making political decisions of the kind that they were supposed to avoid when 
they were first created.
258
  
Historically, one of the justifications to delegate tasks that would originally fall 
under the jurisdiction of the main bodies of the UN to specialised agencies was 
the UN’s highly political character. Specialised agencies were first designed as 
technical bodies. However, politicising the issue of global welfare regains 
importance once new kinds of social policies and service provision emerge. 
Such politicisation needs to make its way to the proper forums inside and 
outside the world organisation. For example, larger deliberation about 
regulation of autonomy and capacity to make global welfare types of decisions 
is urgently needed.  
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In the meantime, confusion about autonomy and capacity is great, and 
resolved unsystematically on the day-to-day of social governance projects.  
Relative autonomy is an useful concept to clarify how global actors deal with 
autonomy and capacity issues as they emerge in practice.  
I borrow from Deacon, Hulse and Stubbs to explain the idea of relative 
autonomy;  they see it as the type of autonomy used by international 




… shaped in part by the policies of the most powerful State actors 
underpinning them, nonetheless, the IOs [International 
Organisations] themselves and particularly their human resource 
specialists have a degree of autonomy within this framework which 
has increasingly been used to fashion an implicit global political 
dialogue with international NGOs about the social policies of the 
future that go beyond the political thinking or the political capacity of 
the underpinning State.  
Deacon argues that international organisations work in global social policy 
takes on a life of its own, relatively independent from the demands posed by 
the underpinning State. In global governance in public services, this fact is 
exacerbated by the demand for more and more global services. IGOs and 
NGOs are increasingly using the global structure to divide tasks and provide 
social services; they are doing so with similar, relative autonomy.  
The word relative is interpreted by Deacon vis-à-vis national demands. Given 
that global governance is a multi-actor framework without a centre of 
authority and with enhanced levels of self-steering, relative autonomy in 
global social governance should be expanded to mean relative autonomy from 
                                                 
259
 Deacon, Hulse and Stubbs, above n 152, at 44 and 61.  
 [150] 
 
any major restrictive source of power, be it the nation-state or an international 
financial institution, or a powerful UN agency.  
The current lack of systems to organise autonomy and capacity issues harm 
UN action in two ways. First, it may allow agencies that should not have the 
capacity to make decisions of global public consequence to do so without 
public scrutiny. Second, it may prevent the UN bodies and agencies from 
exercising their full capacity as global social governance leaders because 
jurisdiction that should have been discussed and clarified is still understood as 
exclusive of the nation-state.   
Consequently, the autonomy debate should be further developed in regards to 
how the UN political bodies (especially the General Assembly) negotiate 
leadership with its specialised agencies and with other transnational, 
international, national and local actors when global social challenges need to 
be addressed. This debate is different from the debate about autonomy that we 
are used to – which is reduced to the autonomy of the UN family vis-à-vis 
nation-states. The debate that is missing includes discussion about how relative 
autonomy and capacity is organised and made clear in a multi-actor political 
setting, pressed to deliver rapid social policy responses; and how this can be 
done in a way that helps to rebuild publicness, instead of undermining it.  
4.4 Detachment of the Rights Discourse from a Global Public Service 
Provision Strategy 
The research shows that the UN hesitates to adopt the human rights framework 
to conduct its work in the social realm. As a result, it only partially addresses 
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critiques against a historical prioritisation of civil and political rights in 
detriment of social and economic rights.
260
 
Social, economic and cultural rights (ESCR) have gained prominence after the 
Millennium Declaration, provoking questions about the role of the UN in 
enforcing these types of rights through global social policy making. The 
Millennium Declaration and the MDGs have also provoked debate about the 
types of implementation obligations generated by ESCR not only upon 
nations-states, but also upon international and transnational organisations 
making social policies. Yet the implementation of MDGs is still disconnected 
from a strategy about globally promoting service provision as a result of a 
commitment to ESCR.
261
 Assessing the implications of this divide is very 
relevant for the future of the UN’s involvement with global social policy and 
global governance in public services. For instance, governance frameworks, 
such as the MDGs, have demonstrated more potential to impact more on the 
ground (for better or worse) than what international human rights have been 
able to achieve. The MDGs have intervened in social problems,  transforming 
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Although MDGs do not engage with the international human rights 
framework, which is a clear challenge to UN internal governance, MDGs have 
partially emerged from a normative transformation pushed by a belief that 




    
Global governance in public services has grown partially because of the 
international human rights revolution of the recent years.  According to Falk, 
the global acceptance of the human rights discourse is perhaps the most 
important normative shift of the 20th century, providing, at a minimum, policy 
guidance to the Millennium Project. There is a clear relationship between 
social and economic rights and MDGs. Yet most UN agencies avoid talking 
about their social policy work in any way that implicate a connection with 
human rights obligations. The UN engages with the MDGs and the human 
rights framework as if they represented completely different agendas. 
Although this is an internal governance issue, it resonates politically and more 
broadly. For instance, the international human rights framework is scheduled 
to undergo significant reforms in 2012.
264
 The high-level debates concerning 
human rights reform do not even mention the MDGs. Relatedly, they do not 
take advantage of this opportunity to renew the discussion about what to do to 
advance the realisation of social and economic rights. 
UN agencies are devoting time and money to achieve MDGs, which are 
closely associated with bringing social and economic rights to fruition. The 
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World Food Programme, nonetheless, has dealt with realisation of the right to 
food and MDG achievement as if they were completely separate matters. 
MDG 1 (eradication of poverty and hunger) has provided the framework for 
food distribution policies. These policies result from MDG 1 and its target 1c: 
“Reduce by half the proportion of people who suffer from hunger.”265 Because 
of MDG 1, the WFP has expanded its efforts to distribute food.
266
 
The WFP justifies why it is currently better positioned to provide food 
transfers than other national or international actors. The justifications range 
from “unparalleled field presence,” “capacity to implement large-scale 
programmes,” “experience working with partners, including governments, the 
United  Nations agencies and a large number of non-governmental 
organisations” to “potential to consistently provide voucher, cash transfer and 
food transfer programmes according to local circumstances, and to flexibly 
switch their use as circumstances change over time.”267   
The policy document, in which the WFP breaks the silence about why it 
should be providing food services from the global level, does not mention the 
international right to food at all. This is surprising because ESCR, the MDGs, 
and related global services demonstrate clear affinity.
268
 The right to food 
could have been used as a justification, but it was not. In lieu of the 
international legal justification, the WFP chose mainly technical justifications.  
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The WFP, endorsed by the ECOSOC, has briefly stated that efforts towards 
achieving target 1c have followed the right to food framework.
269
 The legal 
basis for the right to food framework:
270
 
...is contained in article 11 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which in its paragraphs 1 and 
2 outlines the right to an adequate standard of living, including food, 
and the fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger.  
 However, this is not a predominant approach of the WFP. The Food and 
Agriculture Organisation (FAO) is the agency insisting on the need to renew 
“commitment to guarantee the right to food for the world’s hundreds of 
millions of hungry people.”271  The WFP has not embraced this approach. The 
WFP leads concrete efforts towards “partnering to feed the world” based on 




 WFP documents discuss little about the right to food framework. The WFP, 
even in the context of its most important programmes, such as the programme 
on Cash and Vouchers to transfer money to people “who are struggling to buy 
food for their families,”273  has not articulated the provision of global food 
services as connected with the international right to food. In other words, the 
cash and vouchers programme breaks ground and invests in a framework that 
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goes beyond technical assistance, taking important steps towards adopting a 
global public service governance framework. But it does not link global food 
governance with a specific international legal obligation deriving from the 
right to food. For instance the WFP explains the reasons for and the objectives 
of its Cash and Vouchers policy by explaining that:
274
  
Food assistance refers to the set of instruments used to address the 
food needs of vulnerable people. The instruments generally include 
in-kind food, vouchers and cash transfers. While food transfers 
represent WFP’s traditional form of food assistance, this document 
[2008 WFP report] shows how vouchers and cash transfers could be 
used by WFP as complements or alternatives to food transfer 
programmes [referring to nationally provided]. (emphasis added) 
By implementing a global service of Cash and Vouchers (in light of national 
programmes that distribute food stamps), the WFP realises the right to food for 
some groups of individuals located in diverse regions of the world. The 
ongoing building of innovative global policies to supplement or substitute the 
provision of staple welfare services from the global level –such as WFP’s 
vouchers – opens up opportunities for action, and for different interpretations 
to emerge in regards to ESR realisation, and also ESR implications for global 
governance. Global public service delivery seems to indicate that a stronger 
interpretation about the relationship between ESR and services is needed. 
Finally, innovative global social policies also signal that delivering ESR may 
now fall upon multiple actors, potentially avoiding the political challenges 
historically faced by their implementation.   
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As economic and social rights are programmatic, because they require the 
implementation of public services schemes to be realised, liberal economies 
(especially the United States) have historically opposed them. The relocation 
of publicness partially pushed by the 2008 global economic crisis and gradual 
impoverishment of the United States’ working and middle classes may change 
the dynamics of such opposition. Independently of the position of liberal 
economies, the connection between ESCR and global governance in public 
services is becoming more and more visible. 
Mostly social and economic rights, rather than civil and political rights, 
provide policy frames to the global public sector.
275
 The potential of human 
rights to promote material benefit, lifting populations around the world from 
poverty and subjugation, requires a more overt articulation of ESCR from an 
operational perspective.  
The right to health is a good example of recent adoption of an operational 
approach that took more than thirty years to be recognised and that is still seen 
suspiciously. The right to public health has been articulated as a collective 
right,
276
  which includes operationalisation of the right to health via universal 
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access. Paul Hunt, the former UN Special Raporteur on the right to the highest 
attainable standard of health, explains:
277
   
… through the endeavours of innumerable organisation and 
individuals, the content of the right to health to the highest attainable 
standard of health is now sufficiently well understood to be applied 
in an operational, systematic, and sustained manner. Crucially, this 
understanding is not new: it dates from within the last 10 years or so 
… At the heart of the right to highest attainable standard of health 
lies an effective and integrated health system encompassing medical 
care and the underlying determinants of health, which is responsive 
to national and local priorities and accessible to all.  
 From the operational perspective of the right to the highest attainable standard 
of health,  Hunt argues for a reconsideration of health systems. He grounds his 
argument upon a revision of the, arguably, most important document related to 
the right to health, the Alma Ata Declaration of 1978, which represents a 
people-centered framework for global health, based on the figure of the family 
doctor and preventative care.
278
 Hunt’s articulation is one of the best examples 
of what a broad-based reading of economic and social rights could achieve. 
Hunt, nevertheless, misses the opportunity to implicate the global level, which 
has had in health one of its major global social policy agendas. In fact, global 
health governance policies generally do not take advantage of a pragmatic 
perspective of the right to health.
279
 
Relatedly, ESCR language is not always welcome in politically liberal 
environments that have favoured governance frameworks, especially because 
it implies the expansion of public provision, whereas publicness is seen as an 
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exclusive quality of States. When the UN adopts language related to global 
social policy, rather than ESCR, the political challenge is diminished. GSP 
seems to be more politically effective than ESCR’ language. Consequently, the 
global social policy language has pushed an agenda that favours global service 
provision that could contribute significantly to realising ESCR. Yet it has done 
so without engaging with important questions about who has a duty of action 
towards realising ESCR. Addressing this big question mark, which still hovers 
over the heads of high-level officers, could open up new avenues for more 
effective global governance in public services.  
In many nations, quality food, good schooling, potable water, or a comfortable 
house has become luxury item. In addition, across countries, indigenous 
communities and communities of colour disproportionally suffer from lack of 
access to these public services.
280
 This transversal character of being in-need 
of services should encourage the UN to not only ground its public service 
actions upon technical advantages, and MDG achievement, but also on 
favouring solutions that honour ESCR and promotes their realisation.  
The absence of the rights-based framework in global public service 
governance is revealing of historical political tensions and of important 
consequences. It represents, at a minimum, a missed opportunity to revisit the 
discussion about how to realise ESCR, aiming at bridging the gap between 
human rights discourse and necessary action.   
                                                 
280
 For a structural view of inequalities, including disproportional lack of public service 
provision to communities of colour, see African American Policy Forum, 13 Myths about 





4.5 Overuse of the Development Frame 
The UN made a clear move towards transforming the traditional public sector 
when it invested in the MDGs, and, as a result, started playing a larger role in 
global social policy making. For a while, it did so within the “Development for 
All” framework. In 2005, however, Secretary-General Kofi Annan, explained 
that not all issues should be understood within a development frame. He 
clarified that some social challenges “encompass some of the broader issues 
covered by [UN] conferences.” He further acknowledged that the MDGs:281 
 ... do not address particular needs of middle-income developing 
countries or the question of growing inequality and wider dimensions 
of human development and good governance. 
Yet the UN continues to enlarge the agenda of development to accommodate 
these issues, rather than framing global aspects of its social policy work as 
something else. Global social issues differ from development (especially 
economic development) issues in the way they emerge and evolve, requiring 
different treatment at both the policy and practice levels. One main difference 
is the fact that traditional development policies are generally represented by 
vertical interventions, requiring polarising positions of donor and recipient, 
while global social governance frameworks aim at horizontalising action 
towards achieving a goal that is understood as collectively owned. In short, it 
requires enhanced levels of self-steering.  
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Ironically, different approaches to governing the social
282
 have been advocated 
by Global South leaders not satisfied with the last 40 years of development 
projects, by which many of their social policies have been designed or 
influenced. The UN summits of the 1990s, the increased visibility of the 
unacceptable suffering happening in the African continent and the emergence 
of powerful global south economies (especially, India and Brazil) contributed 
to fuel counter-development (or counter-aid)  advocacy.
 283
 This counter-vision 
generally does not ask for the end of aid, but rather for its transformation.
284
 It 
expresses the need to find different means to promote social and economic 
welfare. These means are concerned with promoting social justice, and 
remedying historical injustices. They likely end up promoting more self-
steering (means through which beneficiaries locate avenues to know more and 
become agents of the global social policies that directly impact on them.) 
 In this counter-vision, development policies (which generally focus on 
assistance, or charity, from rich to poor) can be questioned in terms of their 
use as the major (almost exclusive) avenue to govern the social. Development 
as an assistance project has a role to play that is different from the role of 
global public service governance. The latter should have in its core a 
preoccupation with identifying common goals and increasing self-steering in 
global social policies. 
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 Development may play a role in global governance as an implementation tool, 
but it should not be the chosen frame to address the most pressing social and 
economic issues challenging the world community.  Yet development, even 
post the MD, continues to be the frame of choice at the UN family. This is 
problematic at many levels. For instance, development projects (from grant-
making to grant-reporting) generally lack publicness, a fact that should be 
addressed if development continues to be deployed as an instrument of global 
social governance. However, enhancing self-steering, and hence global 
publicness in development may never be possible, given its dependency on 
donor-recipient models. Thus, for the sake of effectiveness of global social 
governance, the overuse of development frames, which has already been 
signalled by scholars and national governments, needs to be faced and 
remedied by the UN.
285
  
V Concluding Assessment of UN’s Current Role in Global 
Governance in Public services  
The world organisation is still deciding the role it wants to play in governing 
the social, and more specifically in global public service governance. Political 
ambivalence towards a global perspective on publicness (which inevitably 
expands the source of legitimacy of UN action towards beyond the nation-state 
and the interstate system) has, for too long, prevented the world organisation 
from engaging with global social policy. It also prevents it from implementing 
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more robust forms of service delivery, by taking advantage of global 
partnerships, and of claims made by transnational groups.
286
 
In short, the research shows that since the Second World War, the UN has 
influenced public services, but generally through international cooperation, 
technical assistance models, and through promoting economic development 
based on a donors-recipient model.  The research also shows, nonetheless, that 
in the last two decades, egalitarian discourses have pushed for UN reform, not 
only administratively, but also in terms of its capacity to intervene and act 
upon social challenges that countries and communities around the world have 
faced.  
Since the middle of the 1990s, with the advent of UN Summits around global 
environmental and social challenges, the UN has taken important steps 
towards expanding programmes of international governance and reshaping 
some of them as global social policy. For this, it has taken advantage of the 
universalist content of the normative frame provided by the Millennium 
Declaration, as well as it has taken advantage of civil society groups 
(especially academics, experts, and NGOs) to think about Millennium Goals 
strategies. Yet even in the context of the Millennium Declaration, the UN still 
refrains from openly undertaking activities that will expose its role in global 
service delivery (the MDG Fund is a significant step forward in this regard.) 
For instance, the language of public services is generally avoided in the text of 
UN documents; terms such as provision of utilities, basic needs, infra-
structure, and social services are preferred. International and global provision 
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of public services (precisely because services help make sense of what 
publicness represents at the global level) presents itself as politically 
challenging to the UN. Given the increasing number of international and 
global public services provided, the political discomfort will need to be faced 
soon.   
Despite the political challenge, the big picture provided here and the examples 
chosen indicate that the UN begins to take steps towards assuring itself as a 
global governance leader. And, by engaging further with global partnerships, it 
starts sending messages to other institutions of the type of leadership position 
it wants to occupy in the larger institutional framework.  The UN has an 
important role to play in leading the formation of global partnerships to more 
effectively make social policy and deliver services. However, this process 
requires more discussion about both the disruption and the relocation of 
publicness. Recognising and embracing global publicness discourses have 
been slow-moving.  
In ascertaining its role as a leader in global governance in public services, the 
UN  should pay closer attention to the initiatives of global publics as a way to 
speed up what Walter Lippmann called (and thus his scepticism about self-
steering) “‘the finest hours,’ when communities are lifted above their habitual 
selves in unity and fellowship.”287 Multiple globalisations, and strong inter-
dependencies, have enabled more of these finest hours to happen on the 
ground. International institutions (which generally follow a traditional 
understanding of the public) need to be able to recognise that on a regular 
basis. These performances need to be seen by, and somehow integrated with, 
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the agenda of the world organisation. This requires better UN internal 
governance, as well as a better understanding of the UN’s position as one actor 
of the broader global governance stage, rather than limited to its international 
image. It is also important to know why and in which policy-fields the UN has 
had more traction.   
For instance, more successful frameworks of global governance in public 
services have been observed in global health and have been led by the UN. 
More specifically, they are global responses to revert patents of essential drugs 
and seeds, provide basic drugs, and control communicable diseases. Not all 
policy areas, however, have been as successful as global health in adopting 
global governance frameworks, UN-led or not. The field of global education 
has been a very difficult field for successful global governance frameworks to 
emerge, for example. The UN in itself has had a smaller influence in public 
education, when compared to public health.  
Partially based on the MDGs policy-areas, I chose my next two case studies, 
which deal with education governance (Chapter 3) and global health 
governance (Chapter 4). The two sectoral case-studies serve as evidence that 
global governance in public services has increasingly been attempted in and 
beyond the interstate system, and particularly, in and beyond the auspices of 




Chapter 3: GLOBAL GOVERNANCE IN EDUCATION: MECHANISMS 
AND INTRINSIC CHALLENGES 
This case-study demonstrates that public education has been a challenging 
field to global governance frameworks. Scholars prefer to theorise on 
globalisation of education, rather than on global education governance. The 
idea of public education is still very much associated with the nation-state, and 
the idea of governance is associated with international organisations. As a 
result of this, the institutional framework developed in education beyond 
national borders is mostly comprised by international actors not global ones. 
International actors increasingly make education policy, and set both 
curriculum and evaluation standards.
1
 International development has had a 
profound impact on policy that relate to both curriculum and evaluation.
2
  
The focus of this chapter is two-fold. First, it maps the international 
institutional framework (including main actors and their strategies) influencing 
curriculum and evaluation. Next, it highlights the challenges to consolidating a 
global education field and successful global education governance. I argue that 
these challenges are intimately related to key principles in the field of 
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 Among these underlying principles, I find the following 
particularly relevant to considerations of global governance in education:   
 public education is historically associated with mass schooling 
provided by national or local governments;  
 cause and effect of poor schooling are generally considered 
national matters (there is not a structural consciousness, or an 
established understanding of interdependencies in global 
education);  
 there is always a local dimension to the governance of 
education, which is materialised by mediation and 
transformation inside of the classroom. The integrity of the 
classroom as a governance space is often considered 
incompatible with globalisation.   
 The local dimension of education diverges from an 
instrumental view of education, which refers to the use of 
schooling as a means to meet the modern demand for qualified 
workforce around the world. International actors have looked 
for education standards that can serve the knowledge economy. 
Standardisation of curricula and evaluations has been the main 
focus of international governance efforts in education.  
These principles become challenges to global education. They are intrinsic to 
the way that modern education has functioned. Building a global education 
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field needs to take them into consideration; they should not be ignored, but 
rather debated, and better addressed by those concerned with effectiveness in 
global education governance frameworks.  
While intrinsic challenges do not impede new governance frameworks from 
emerging in education, they feed scepticism about a potential, positive 
relationship between the global level and public education. As a result, 
mechanisms of supranational education governance have been created (and 
here I include international mechanisms as well) without a deeper assessment 
of these challenges and of how education governance can work for the public.  
Despite a boost in the number of policies and mechanism, the potential benefit 
of international or global governance in education continues to be contested. 
Education scholars are, in general, critical of the mechanisms that are already 
in place today.
4
 In order to map these mechanisms and to discuss why they are 
mainly following interstate governance frameworks, I first map institutions of 
international and global governance in education, their policies, and their 
impact upon important aspects of public education. Then, I move onto 
identifying and analysing key principles of public education, and how they 
challenge global governance in this specific policy-field.   
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I Introduction to Global Education Today: Prevalence of 
International Strategies  
Rizvi and Lingard suggest that 21st century education governance is 
summarised by activities that include “funding, ownership, provision and 
regulation,” and coordination conducted by a range of institutions such as “the 
State, the market, the community and households.”5 Mundy refers to the scope 
of global education governance as the “transnational dimensions of 
educational change.”6 In practice governance in education has been led by 
supranational actors and their strategies. In short, the European Union, UN 
Education Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), UN Children´s 
Fund (UNICEF), UN Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank 
(WB) and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) are the most studied institutions when it comes to promoting cross-
border changes in education.
7
  
This chapter shows that although interstate organisations still prevail in 
supranational aspects of education, the influence of nonstate actors is growing. 
Although they have had little input in discussions about primary education 
taking place at traditional education governance spaces, such as UNICEF and 
UNESCO,  nonstate actors have created spaces of their own, such as the 
                                                 
5
 Fazal Rizvi and Bob Lingard, Globalizing Education Policy (Routledge, New York, 2010). 
6
 Karen Mundy "Global Governance, Educational Change" (2007) 43 Comparative Education  
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Global Campaign for Education (GCE). The GCE, however, has paid more 
attention to country policies than to what happens supranationally.  
1.1 The United Nations Strategy in Education 
Given that international governance prevails in the field of education, I start  
mapping the institutional framework by looking at the UN strategy towards 
education governance.  
In general, UN efforts in education advocate for a “diverse providers” model 
operating from within the State through country offices, where democratic 
safeguards are presumed to exist and work well. These efforts have been far 
reaching. They can be summarised by these activities:  
1.1.1 Public administration type of action 
UN offices and agencies work with governments to target children’s 
enrolment and an adequate ratio of boys and girls in order to reach the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
8
 In fact, the UN has called for 
“more government” in education, in a format that follows principles of good 
governance, encourages the taking of loans via the World Bank’s Fast Track 
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 and concentrates on decreasing levels of corruption, as 
demonstrated by the Education For All (EFA) monitoring report.
10
  
1.1.2 Policy making type of action 
UN offices and agencies shape international education policy and rely a great 
deal on the Dakar Framework for that, as well as on the coordination role of 
the UNDP and United Nations Development Group (UNDG).  
1.1.3 Service-delivery type of action 
The UN high-level officials discuss global education provision within the idea 
of enlarging universal social protection and specific education services 
(generally related to primary education for girls), in which case a leadership 
role of the UNDP begins to take shape. 
1.1.4 Millennium Development Goals 
The UN agencies design education strategies to meet the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). Since the establishment of the MDGs, UNDP 
has coordinated the work of other organisations that have been highly 
influential in education; they are the UNICEF, the UNESCO and the World 
Bank. In many respects, these organisations have worked together to achieve 
MDG 2.  
The Millennium Project ( a private enterprise, represented by an independent 
advisory body commissioned by the Secretary-General),
11
 especially via the 
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Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), has influenced most education 
governance activities implemented or coordinated by the UN in the social 
realm, including education.  Targets established to realise MDG 2 – that is to 
achieve universal primary education by 2015– are representative of the multi-
faceted governance role (it includes public administration strategies, policy 
making, and delivery) played by the UN development agencies in education in 




Target 2a: Ensure that all boys and girls complete a full course of 
primary schooling 
2.1 Net enrolment ratio in primary education  
2.2 Proportion of pupils starting grade 1 who reach last grade of 
primary  
2.3 Literacy rate of 15-24 year-olds, women and men  
While UNDP is not a specialised expert agency in education, we use 
our role as coordinator of the UN development system to support the 
mandates of other agencies. 
                                                                                                                             
11
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The UNDP is taking the lead to coordinate efforts towards meeting MDG 2 
targets. It has, however, taken a conservative approach and has deferred to the 
central role of governments in MDG implementation. The MDG 2 project, 
however, is part of a larger global initiative called EFA.
13
 EFA grew out of the 
Dakar Goals. It started as a development project, but it expanded beyond the 
work of the UNDP and of the MDGs, requiring a global rather than an 
international approach. 
1.1.5 Education For All: an umbrella initiative coordinated by the UN   
The international Education for All Initiative (EFA) (also referred to as the 
Dakar EFA Goals) has had significant transnational repercussions, thus being 
considered an important instrument of global governance in education. Six 
Dakar EFA Goals emerged in the context of the 2000 World Education 
Forum, and to a certain extent, as companions to the quantitative-oriented 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The Dakar EFA Goals (Or EFA- 
Global Action Plan) promote early childhood education;  quality universal 
primary education; and lifelong learning and literacy;  gender equality in 
education; and education quality and learning achievements.
14
  In principle, 
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 [173] 
 
the national-public and the global-public arenas seem to share the Dakar 
concerns.  
The Dakar concerns, which were translated into a multi-actor EFA initiative 
are now geared to increase the quality and quantity of primary schools in order 
to meet MDG 2. The progress towards meeting MDG 2 is considered one of 
the most remarkable by the UNDP and UNESCO.
15
 Scholars, however, have 
criticised the implementation of MDG and EFA goals because policy 
decisions and implementation phases have been made by international 
agencies themselves, or by international agencies enabling education services 
(indirect provision through procurement).
16
  
UNDP’s webpage for MDGs explains why top-down capacity-building 
became the organisation’s main line of work.17 Recipient countries are 
organising, including at the community level, to fulfil the targets that the UN 
and donors have designed for them by writing complex assistance plans. These 
include capacitating local workers to achieve internationally-set benchmarks.
18
 
In addition, UNDP’s report on MDG 2, prepared in 2005 by the UN 
Millennium Project and titled “Toward Universal Primary Education: 
Investments, Incentives, and Institutions” highlights the roles of government 
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 Elements of good governance are presented 
within a plan to achieve the internationally-set MDG 2, while broader 
elements of the Dakar goals have been side-tracked.  
At the implementation level, EFA governance strategies have been virtually 
reduced to domestic governance mechanisms, ultimately of the responsibility 
of the nation-state. Overall, the strongest message of MDG 2 is for 
governments to be more efficient. Accordingly, the MDG 2 taskforce singles 
out problems of low performing nation-states, in regards to achieving 
universal primary education within its territories, situating these countries and 
their experiences as problematic focal points.
20
  
The Millennium Project’s taskforce in education identifies the following 
barriers to meeting MDG 2 (using case studies from a number of developing 
countries): poor management of public education by multiple players, such as 
the Ministries of Education and teachers unions; local government capturing of 
financing education, denying parental or community participation; teacher 
absenteeism; poor expenditure management and leakage in the flow from 
public expenditures from national governments to schools; bribery; private 
informal payments to finance public education; corrupt practices due to lack of 
legislation and enforcement; private tutoring that undermines the willingness 
and ability of teachers to teach in the classroom.
21
 In essence, these practices 
either relate to domestic good governance issues, referring to institutions of 
government within each national context, or to individual fault. An important 
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analysis seems to be lacking in the UN approach to realising MDG 2 in 
particular, and EFA in general:  that of how the global level (and global 
partnerships led by international agencies) may be implicated in contributing 
to the achievement of education-specific goals. 
1.1.5.1  THE EFA  MONITORING AGENCY:  UNESCO    
The UNESCO’s 2009 Education For All (EFA) Global Monitoring Report,  
Overcoming Inequality: Why Governance Matters
22
 emphasises “the central 
importance of government leadership and public policy” in achieving the 
Dakar Goals.
23
 Accordingly, UNESCO’s call for the application of governance 
mechanisms as a core element of the Dakar Framework for Action is both a 
call for good governance within government and a call for a stronger national 
government. In fact, international organisations have been said to have 
encouraged a “growing governmental interest in education” that is puzzling, 
given concurrent “debates on economic globalisation and the retreat of the 




Good governance is now a central part of the international 
development agenda. Beyond education, it is seen as a condition for 
increased economic growth, accelerated poverty reduction and 
improved service provision. The most widely used data on 
governance indicators show that objectives range from strengthening 
the rule of law, increasing accountability of public institutions and 
enhancing the participation and voice of citizens. 
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 Ibid.  
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 “UNESCO Governance Matters”, above n 10, at 241. 
24
 AJ Jakobi International Organisations and Lifelong Learning: from Global Agendas to 
Policy Diffusion (Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2009) at 1.  
25 “UNESCO Governance Matters”, above n 10, at 129. 
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Good governance in education as it takes place within nation-states is in the 
agenda of both UNESCO and UNDP. Their roles as active players in an 
envisioned global public sector are hardly discussed as part of the EFA’s main 
agenda. While there is a great emphasis on raising intra-State equity through 
education, EFA does not emphasise the role of global action in diminishing 
world inequality, or rather the speedy growth of it. It concentrates on the 
shortcomings of nation-states, especially developing countries, in providing 
quality education for the poor, without further structural or ethical 
considerations.
26
 In this sense, the 2009 monitoring report seems detached 
from the transformations – in general detrimental to national welfare structures 
– that domestic governance itself has promoted in public services in the last 
twenty years.  Analysing the report written by UNESCO, it is possible to infer 
that the nation-state is still the exclusive representative of publicness, and 
governance practices in education resemble an economic vision of “good 
government” rather than anything else. 
While the EFA initiative acknowledges the importance of nonstate actors, 
nonstate actors’ presence in education projects undertaken by the UN  is 
minimum or non-existence. This approach reflects the fact that the MDG 
education project as a whole has engaged little with nonstate actors. According 
to the UNESCO EFA’s monitoring report: 27 
Achieving EFA requires partnerships at many levels – between 
schools and parents, between civil society organisations and 
governments, between State and nonstate education providers. … 
National and international non-government organisations have also 
emerged as key EFA actors, holding governments to account, 
supporting provision and building capacity. 
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UNESCO acknowledges that nonstate actors play a role in global governance, 
but these roles are neither clear nor encouraged by UNESCO. UNESCO 
recognises that non-state actors play a supporting role and recommends that 
they should engage with governance to assist governments. Therefore, 
UNESCO understands nonstate actors as playing a domestic governance role 
rather than a global governance one.  
For example, in justifying the collection of comparative data concerning 
2006/2007 patterns in primary education decision-making, UNESCO clarified 
that “governance reforms in education involve the reallocation of decision-
making authority across levels of government.”28 UNESCO’s International 
Bureau of Education mapped 184 countries’ patterns in levels of decision-
making in regards to primary formal education across 6 broad categories: 
curriculum and materials; teacher training, management and employment 
conditions; school infra-structure; school supervision and inspection; school 
administration; financing arrangements;. It reported that:
 29
  
…even in nominally decentralized structures, central government 
continues to play a key role in various areas of education service 
delivery – notably in designing curricula and instructional materials, 
in teacher governance and management, and in financing 
arrangements. Other actors – including local government, schools 
and communities – play a highly variable role. 
More prominently, the data shows that government continues to play an 
almost exclusive role when it comes to primary school decision-making. Upon 
closer examination of the table, nonstate actors feature as influential in merely 
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10 countries out of 184, and only in respect of financial arrangements.
30
  In all 
other categories the influence of nonstate actors was measured as zero. The 
validity and reliability of the data is not in consideration here, especially given 
the role attributed by scholars to the UNESCO Bureau, as one of the most 
important agencies in the promotion of shared literacy concerning the global 
make up of education.
31
 At a minimum, these findings represent a set of 
choices that have been made by the UN when it comes to the governance of 
education, which is to locate the responsibilities for meeting international 
targets under governments. They also demonstrate that the idea of governance, 
and not government, in education is not popular. Public education as 
governmental provision continues to attract support across the UN-family. The 
UN deal with public education as government-run education even if 
internationally-set policies abound in the field.  
1.1.6 UN governance in education: summary considerations 
The use of governance as a tool of government is the most important aspect of 
the UN’s strategy in education.  
UN institutions engage with education governance from a traditional public 
administration perspective. Education governance is dealt with from a 
domestic perspective, rather than from an international relations or, more 
recently, from a global justice perspective.  
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The UN role in education governance reinforces the importance of IGOs as 
representative of State interests, while it downplays the cross-border nature of 
many educational challenges and the transnational work of many NGOs.
32
 
NGO efforts with transnational repercussions (consolidating themselves as 
global governance acts) have been at the margins of the umbrella initiative 
Education for All, which could hold and foster NGO-led initiatives.
33
 UN’s 
international institutions have had difficulties to access, account for and 
recognise education services that are not internationally or government 
generated, but that have been discussed at the moment of writing the Dakar 
Goals and again at the 2005 World Summit.
34
  
The 2005 World Summit was more successful in bringing investments into 
well-established, international institutions and in encouraging them to take a 
larger role in education governance.
35
 Some of the most important 
international governance institutions have exponentially raised their 
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contributions to education governance since the 2005 World Summit.
36
 
Together, these institutions trace the framework of an emergent, educational 
sector at the supranational level.  
1.2 The Group of Eight (G8) 
The G8 Initiative on Global Development devotes a considerable amount of 
resources to education governance. Nevertheless, it engages little with the 
global level represented by hybrid alliances working towards achieving public 
education goals. Given the constitution of the G8, this position seems more 
natural, following a framework of traditional international cooperation, and 
negotiations through bargaining mechanisms, which impact education itself 
and a range of other areas.
37
These mechanisms are common in developmental 
approaches to governance.  
According to the G8, education is a broad area encompassing “all levels of 
public and private instruction, from primary through university into lifelong 
learning.”38 This conception of the G8 illustrates its historical and 
contemporary interest in framing education as a neutral instruction activity. It 
also illustrates the differences between teaching and schooling, the former 
being associated with the act of instructing and promoting learning,
39
 and the 
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latter being “the institution of mass-education.”40 Yet in policy-making 
environments education is easily confused with schooling. Schooling has been 
the main target of international education governance championed by the G8.  
The G8 chose education as the priority theme of its 2006 Saint Petersburg 
Summit.
41
 In that occasion the G8 was proclaimed a “governor” of education, 
and responsible for a “global education governance” project championed 
within its global development division.
42




… technical, vocational and professional training and mobility, the 
employment and labour market, productivity, innovation and 
competitiveness in the new knowledge economy, and the governance 
of cyberspace. It further embraces social and political subjects, such 
as gender equality in education, education to prevent the spread of 
disease, education as a MDG, access to education in developing 
countries, literacy, and free information flows.  
The G8 initiative fails to recognise that developing economic growth may not 
develop ‘social and political subjects.’ The G8, as with most development 
projects, invests in education as mass-schooling to develop qualified 
individuals to serve and consume in the knowledge economy. This, by 
definition, constrains the possibility of using education for global justice ends. 
The wide acceptance of the term and philosophy of the knowledge economy 
has prevented a global public ethos from permeating education as a field, 
especially outside of national policies.
44
 The G8, as many other powerful 
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institutions, endorse the use of education to meet the needs of the knowledge 
economy.
45
 This is a view that not only discourages publicness, but 
encourages competition, and a new interpretation of education as an attractive 
commercial project. This new approach treats schooling as a product that can 
be offered to millions of youngsters who want to qualify for jobs worldwide.   
1.3 The World Bank 
The World Bank has expanded its role in the governance of education via the 
Fast Track Initiative (FTI).  
The FTI is “a global partnership between donor and developing country 
partners to ensure accelerated progress towards the Millennium Development 
Goal of universal primary education by 2015.”46 The efforts under FTI 
concentrate on helping low-income countries to “build and implement sound 
education plans.” 47 Therefore, the FTI has a direct impact upon both policy 
and delivery.  
FTI partners include low-income countries enrolled in the programme (who 
are also beneficiaries), voluntary donor countries, and a few advocacy groups 
like the Global Campaign for Education.
 Donor partners are “all major donors 
                                                                                                                             
must always be linked to the instrumental purposes of human capital development and 
economic self-maximization;” thus education acquires a rather instrumental character. Concept 
articulated by Rizvi and Lingard, above n 1, at 81.  
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for education: more than 30 bilateral, regional and international agencies and 
development banks.” 48                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Through the financial resources directed to low-income countries via the FTI, 
the World Bank has become one of the major voices in education governance. 
For instance, the FTI agenda includes a range of objectives from specific 
learning outcomes (such as increasing reading skills indicators) to promoting 
capacity and teaching quality. Programmatic targets are included as conditions 
to the FTI. In other words, FTI loans for education are given to high-risk 
countries in exchange for “policy reforms.”49 
The critiques against FTI are about whether a financial institution such as the 
World Bank should be involved with the three major pillars of education: 
curriculum, teaching, and assessment. The Fast Track Initiative has launched 
not only financial schemes to help address education problems, but has 
developed  education plans and teaching frameworks. An example of this can 
be found through the FTI Indicative Framework:
50
 
FTI's Indicative Framework now incorporates the two reading skills 
indicators. Governments are asked to generate baselines for 2010 
and, thereafter, report learning outcomes data on an annual or 
biennial basis. Local Education Groups are asked to take this 
information into account in their appraisal of sector strategies. 
Analyses of a country's trends in children's reading skills should be 
regularly included in mid-term reviews of FTI operations. 
While the FTI initiative has financed many important projects in developing 
countries, it has side tracked other national and local initiatives that could have 
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been more able to adequately devise education frameworks. More so, 
questions about the legal, political and outcome consequences of FTI’s 
undertaking of public functions in developing countries (related to the 
financing and implementation of education plans) seem to have been 
unnoticed by high-level officers. Partially, this is due to a certain hurry to meet 
the education statistical targets established by MDG 2 and the FTI, especially 
considering primary education. The targets themselves have been considered 
deficient when applied to different national contexts.
51
  
 From a global public perspective, the FTI has fallen to operate at high levels 
of global publicness. For instance, ethical concerns that reflect awareness 
about the World Bank’s expanded role in education governance, which is 
more than financing via FTI, is not seen on FTI’s website.52 Despite the fact 
that the principles of FTI dwell on mutual accountability, progress as 
measured by the World Bank focusses on the economic performance of low-
income countries and on the implementation of more and better education 
services. Low-income countries, FTI’s loan takers, have had little input in 
setting benchmarks and in drawing up FTI policies.
53
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At the international level, even if unintended, the eventual outcome 
of pursuing EFA [Education For All] targets may well be an 
increasing control of individual systems by institutions such as the 
World Bank or aid agencies, supported by global testing 
corporations...  
Goldstein’s preoccupation with the consequence of pursuing EFA targets, as 
encouraged by the FTI, illustrates that policy and delivery of education are 
generally seen as national matters because of the importance of context-
specificity to education. Yet Goldstein’s worry is in accordance with the view 
that one needs to enhance publicness in global governance responses because  
publicness always assists in making more visible the demands of different 
groups and the shifting meaning of quality education. This implies that we 
need to find those alternative forms of delivery, curriculum design, pedagogy, 
financial incentives without forgetting that they are part of a public strategy, 
even if they are not coming directly from governments. Finally, more 
publicness in global governance in education would likely bring partners, 
other than nation-states, under public scrutiny. Their heavy influence in 
specific aspects of education reform (from the number of teachers they require 
to the type of didactic materials they fund) would also become more visible.
55
  
1.4 The OECD 
It is important to mention that the role of the OECD in education is considered 
by commentators one of the most important in terms of education research and 
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 The OECD’s main instruments in education are policy 
review, learning indicators, and the Programme for International Student 
Assessment (PISA). PISA is “an internationally standardized assessment that 
was jointly developed by participating economies and administered to 15 year-




The OECD’s impact on education, especially through PISA, has been widely 
felt within both member and non member-countries. PISA has been both 
positively and negatively critiqued, frequently raising questions about the role 
of international organisations in mass-evaluation of students, and more 
broadly, the feasibility of having global mechanisms when local realities of 
teachers and students are so diverse. Most countries, however, continue to 
adopt PISA as an important instrument of policy-making and framework 
implementation.  
According to the results of students in PISA, countries have changed their 
policies at home. For example, Brazilian students continue to rank very low in 
the assessment – a position of 43 out of 50 that contrasts with the rapid 
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economic growth of the country and its rising literacy indexes.
58
 The Brazilian 
government has developed many of its reforms for intermediate and high 
school levels based on the competencies assessed by PISA.
59
 But why should 
the Brazilian government use PISA’s assessment as the main guide to define 
how its teachers will teach sciences or promote reading skills? Brazilian 
officials justify the belief in PISA based on the influence that PISA has among 
most powerful economies and aid institutions that provide loans.
60
 These are 
geared to develop an education system that prepare workers to compete in the 
international job market and to provide qualified services worldwide.  In most 
Brazilian education publications, such as renowned education magazine, Nova 
Escola, the Brazilian government is encouraged to increase the performance of 
students in PISA.
61
 The shortcomings of the assessment’s format are generally 
not considered convincing justifications for failure to perform in the test. 
Indifferent students and poor quality of education are usually mentioned as 
reasons of bad performance.
62
  
Education scholars, however, are more critical of PISA. They point out that 
measuring competencies in standard form is a very difficult task, since many 
countries opt for teaching specific contents rather than developing specific 
abilities (such as logical interpretation.) Moreover, the themes of choice may 
reflect the culture explored by schools located in the countries where the tests 
are developed, generally the United States. Finally, the translation process 
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generally ignores the natural flow of a language, which increases the chances 
of a text to be written in such a formal way that undermines the ability of 
students who receive the translated text to properly understand the questions.
63
    
Despite these critiques, PISA continues to be used by more than 50 
governments as an important evaluation and policy tool, consolidating itself as 
an important mechanism of governance in education.  
PISA would have to change how it operates to follow a global public 
approach. It is possible that changes will come in the near future to address the 
critiques frequently raised by education scholars. Most of these critiques deal 
with issues such as tailoring the tests to country-needs and opening up the 
processes of translation and correction to further scrutiny of teaching 
communities organised worldwide. These advancements directly refer to rising 
publicness in PISA, a governance framework that has used international 
organisations and transnational testing corporations to change the way 
evaluation and curricula are set.
64
  
1.5 The Tuning Project  
The Tuning Project grew up as a pilot project coordinated by a group of 
European universities as participants of the Bologna Process.
65
 Tuning’s motto 
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 The Bologna Process is “the process of creating the European Higher Education Area 
(EHEA) [and] is based on cooperation between ministries, higher education institutions, 
students and staff from 47 countries, with the participation of international organisations.” In 
2009, ministries met to review the goals of the EHEA up to 2020, revising the Process to 
include “the importance of lifelong learning, widening access to higher education, and 
mobility.” Nevertheless, the practice of EU’s efforts in education are quite distant from 
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is “to make study programmes and period of learning more comparable and 
compatible.”66 Tuning does not have consultative status with the Bologna 
process, but has been considered an important part of it.
67
 More broadly, the 
Bologna Process creates the European Higher Education Area (EHEA), and 
the Tuning is a vital part of the broad, EHEA implementation strategy. Thus,  
the Tuning helps to transform education systems, at a minimum, in countries 
in Europe. Increasingly, the Tuning spreads around the world.  
The Bologna process uses the institutional, public space of the European 
Union to come to fruition, and the Tuning Project takes advantage of that 
space, recently becoming part of the Lisbon Strategy.
 68




As a result of the Bologna Process the educational systems in all 
European countries are in the process of reforming. This is the direct 
effect of the political decision to converge the different national 
systems in Europe. For Higher Education institutions these reforms 
mean the actual starting point for another discussion: the 
comparability of curricula in terms of structures, programmes and 
actual teaching. This is what Tuning offers. In this reform process the 
required academic and professional profiles and needs of society 
(should) play an important role. 
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The Tuning Project follows in the footsteps of the knowledge economy. 
However, it is only now beginning to be discussed in the context of the 
Bologna Process, as well as in terms of its impact upon education policies and 
practices in other regions of the world.
70
 
The Tuning process and its implementation mechanisms play a different role 
than development projects. They are based on the Bologna Process and 
operated by international, and civil society representatives, including 
UNESCO, and the European University Association. These organisations 
joined the forty-six Bologna Process countries to think about ways in which 
the European Higher Education system could be reshaped. The Tuning Project 
responds to the Bologna process as a companion organisation that has been 
placed at the hands of universities. On another hand, Tuning practices have 
resembled top-down development projects. For instance, the Bologna Process 
counts with regional institutions involved with activities to uniformise 
elements of higher education in Europe. However, unification is not stated as a 
clear goal of either the Bologna Process or the Tuning Project:
 71
 
… universities do not and should not look for uniformity in their 
degree programmes or any sort of unified, prescriptive or definitive 
European curricula but simply look for points of reference, 
convergence and common understanding.  
Unification and uniformity are rather hot-button issues in EU education policy 
debates, hence, these terms are avoided by the Tuning project. As a result, the 
Tuning has not been openly contested by EU members, when it positions itself 
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as a means to “tune” education policies and practices of post-socialist 
countries and developing countries in particular.
72
 By expanding its horizons 
to Latin America and Asia, the Tuning project has become a global enterprise 
with an European genetic code. European-style standardisation of curricula in 
other regions of the world contribute to one of the goals of the Bologna 
process, that is “to make higher education more responsive to the needs of 
business and industry and help Europe become the most competitive 
knowledge-based economy in the world.” 73 The special focus of the Tuning 
Project, targeting Latin America and post-soviet countries for example, 
expands the reach of Europe in its search for “compatible” human capital, and 
for a leading position in the knowledge economy.
74
  
Jakobi summarizes well the trajectory of the field of education as an object of 
world investment in Europe:
75
 
…European activities in education used to be opposed by the 
member States, and only the Treaty of Maastricht 1992 officially 
established education as an European activity: Articles 126 and 127 
contain the aim of developing a European dimension in education, 
but “harmonization” was explicitly excluded … In March 2000, the 
European Council proclaimed the so-called Lisbon Strategy to make 
Europe the most competitive knowledge-based economy in the world 
by the year 2010.  
The linkage between the Tuning Project and the Lisbon Strategy with the goal 
of ensuring EU competitiveness worldwide consolidates the Tuning Project as 
an important education governance mechanism of global reach. 
                                                 
72
 Merrill, M "Educational Borrowing in Quality Assessment Standardds: The European 
Tuning Project Played on a Kyrgyz Komuz" (paper presented to the XIV World Congress of 
Comparative Education Societies, Istanbul, June 2010).  
73
 Terry, above n 67, at 112. 
74
 Robertson “Embracing the Global?”, above n 70, at 15.  
75
 Jakobi, above n 24, at 55. 
 [192] 
 
1.6 Policy Borrowing and Lending as Governance Strategy 
The Tuning Project can be cited as the quintessential example of borrowing 
and lending of education policies. Policy borrowing and lending is a generic 
governance mechanism that has been widely studied in the context of 
international development and education governance.
76
 In general, policy 
borrowing is the use of procedures originated elsewhere that are identified “to 
improve provision” at home.77 In the field of education, the Tuning Project has 
been used as both a positive and negative example of policy borrowing (and 
lending).
78
 Negative critiques of the Tuning Project resemble critiques of 
international development. Philips and Ochs deepen this connection by 
explaining the challenges faced by policy-borrowing as theory and practice:
 79
 
'Policy borrowing' is, of course, a term firmly established in the 
literature of comparative studies in education, and though it is 
common nowadays to point out the fallacious assumptions behind the 
notion that policy can simply be transplanted from one national 
context to another, nevertheless serious investigation of aspects of 
education in other countries seeks to identify what contributes to 
success in the hope that lessons might be learnt which could have 
implications for policy development in the 'home' context. (citation 
omitted) 
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 Although the concept of policy borrowing applies to many other contexts and disciplines, 
education scholars have used and developed policy borrowing as the main tool to guide 
analysis of current international education governance. This great amount of academic interest 
in policy borrowing as an analytical tool was only found in the discipline of education. It was 
not found in other policy-fields that I studied to write this thesis.  
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According to Phillips and Ochs, thus, the value of policy borrowing in 
education lies “in enabling us to be ‘better fitted to study and understand our 
own [country system].”80 Straying away from this meaning, the Tuning Project 
has been referred as a case of “policy export.”81  
In the borrowing process, negotiations involve actors at different power levels, 
consequently, there will likely be levels of coercion.
82
 In the context of the 
application of the Tuning Project in Kyrgyzstan, for example, signs of 
imposition were identified, harming Kyrgyz students, universities and the 
effectiveness of the national policy per se.
83
 Students were being prepared to 
serve EU employers, while becoming less employable in their own country.
84
  
As the Kyrgyzstan experience shows, the Tuning project has ventured outside 
of the EU and towards Central Asia.  This is an attempt to expand the 
European Higher Education Area in order to place the EU in a leadership 
position as a governor of education. For instance, the efforts to expand the 
Tuning into Asia have said to pose a “direct threat to Australia, and the United 
States,”85 as powerful players of the knowledge economy. There are also 
efforts to develop the Tuning Project Latin America, which describes itself as 
an independent project coordinated by universities seeking to fine tune their 
educational structures. Precisely because of the aspects of education that have 
been globalised, the Tuning is a global project linked together by the policies 
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and practices that have been sent from Europe elsewhere. While this is not 
necessarily a problem, it may raise operational, cultural, legal and ethical 
challenges that will be difficult to solve in the current competitive environment 
in which the Tuning is immersed. These challenges should stand out in the 
broader debate about the future of public education as object of governance 
frameworks that deal with evaluation, teaching and/or curricula.  
1.7 The Global Campaign for Education 
The prevalence of international and regional education initiatives based on the 
knowledge economy has provoked the creation of transnational organisations 
to counter it. They generally defend a non-instrumentalist view of public 
education. The most studied of these important mechanisms is the Global 
Campaign for Education (GCE). 
GCE’s mission statement is unique in the global education arena.86 It openly 
seeks to promote public education and focus its transnational efforts on 
keeping education public.  The GCE mission states that:
 87
 
The Global Campaign for Education promotes education as a basic 
human right, mobilises public pressure on governments and the 
international community to fulfil their promises to provide free, 
compulsory public basic education for all people, in particular for 
children, women and all disadvantaged, deprived sections of society. 
One would imagine that language as below would have been plenty, at least, at 
the discourse level, but it was not the case. 
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The GCE is aware of the implications of performing a public role. It is a 
membership organisation open to “independent and democratic national and 
regional coalitions of civil society organisations, and international networks 
and non-governmental organisations working for quality public education for 
all.”88 Because it recognises its own public function, the GCE: 89 
…commits itself to achieve its mission with objectivity, transparency 
and accountability and to follow democratic norms and processes in 
all its plans and actions.
 
 
GCE is a multi-level campaign that focusses on access to education for all and 
on emphasizing teachers’ issues in EFA strategies, stimulating the grouping of 
teachers unions and their involvement in international advocacy. 
Commentators, nevertheless, cite that one of the main difficulties of the 
campaign is not in materialising the transnational public sphere by involving 
several actors to advocate for education. Rather, the main challenge is to 
productively talk to international institutions.
90
 Jones and Coleman explain in 
the context of the GCE’s relationship with UNESCO: 91 
 The establishment principles of UNESCO, with their constitutional 
recognition of NGOs as partners, are a reasonable reflection of what 
the transnationalist and NGO movement over the past two decades 
has been clamouring for. UNESCO’s failures to take engagement 
with them seriously points once again to the organisation’s structural 
and operational incapacity to function according to its constitutional 
mandate and objectives. 
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Jones and Coleman focus on technical reasons to justify the tokenistic 
behaviour of UNESCO vis-à-vis the Campaign.
92
 In addition, my research 
indicates that UNESCO has held an institutionalist approach to public services 
and a specific view of the objectives of education that would likely clash with 
the views upheld by the Campaign. There is the political issue of deference to 
statism that needs to be taken into account as well.  
NGO’s themselves are ambivalent concerning their role as public 
representatives and public service providers, often relying upon the 
recognition of UNESCO, through funding or consultation, “to strengthen their 
sense of their own visibility and sense of global reach.”93 The Campaign, 
despite its accomplishments, is also ambivalent about its role vis-à-vis nation-
states. It is clear that the Campaign is not sure of its alleged capacity as a 
global public actor on its own right. On the contrary, its modus operandi 
depends on governments, since its main activity is to pressure governments to 
act. However, similarly to what happens to UNESCO’s work, GCE’s work has 
also taken a life of its own, being heavily involved with policy. GCE, 
however, is little involved with the delivery of education services. In the 
future, it may be able and willing to play a role in this regard as well.  
Because GCE has taken a different approach to policy-making, it is, at times, 
in direct conflict with the positions endorsed by IGOs and regional 
organisations. It has been particularly critical of  UN’s EFA financing systems, 
more recently suggesting that the G8 and the IMF should build upon the Fast 
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Track Initiative to build a Global Fund for Education.
94
 Instead of relying 
upon the national infra-structure to organise advocacy movements and to 
envision new action, the Campaign has relied “on outside” action to meet EFA 
goals.  “Outside” refers to using actors and mechanisms that are not rooted on 
State or interstate structures.
95
  
GCE believes that quality education for all is achievable, is a human right, and 
is a core obligation of governments.
96
 Nevertheless, the Campaign has 
gradually influenced the governance of EFA strategies, playing a public role 
itself. In addition, it has pressed for a Global Fund for Education, which 
acknowledges the public education role that can be played by global actors and 
not only by the State.  
In large part, global publics like the GCE emerge from a lack of trust in what 
the State can achieve alone. The GCE seems to have given up hope in respect 
of what States can do to provide quality basic education for all without 
pressure from transnational actors. While the campaigners, for example, 
envision the nation-state as the ideal space to develop public education, they 
are sceptical of the frameworks pushed by the international level. Namely, 
piecemeal leadership of the UN in promoting public education, and a 
piecemeal international financial machinery. As such it is not surprising that 
transnational public actors are pressing national governments to reclaim their 
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public roles as deliverers of education, at the same time that they start acting 
upon matters of policy on their own.  
II Hindering Global Governance? Key Principles of the Field of 
Education 
Four key principles of the field of public education are generally in tension 
with the practice of global governance. By researching the education 
scholarship on international and global efforts, it is possible to understand why 
these principles situate global governance and publicness in opposite sides. 
These underlying principles make it harder for education scholars and 
practitioners to entertain the idea that publicness in education can be built 
outside government programmes. These principles are reinforced by 
international education policies that are far from encouraging self-steering and 
beneficiary-centrality in respect of both student and teacher. The analysis of 
the principles (I also call them intrinsic characteristics) does not judge them as 
good or bad. It suggests that these underlying principles, or characteristics of 
the field, need to be recognised as important, revisited and addressed in the 
context of making new education governance frameworks.  
Through studying the mechanisms of education listed above and the most 
common critiques to them, I name the following key principles: 
 Public education is associated with government provision of mass-
schooling, and poor mass-schooling is a national matter. In other 
words,  cause and effect of poor schooling are generally considered 




 The integrity of the classroom as a governance space is paramount and 
is seen as threatened by economic globalisation and powerful 
international actors. 
 A local approach to education diverges from international efforts that 
have tried to standardised mass schooling to meet the modern demand 
for qualified workforces around the world. 
 There is a practice of interpreting the right to education through the 
perception that this is a right of the child and not of the lifelong learner. 
The association of the right to education with children is also a 
reflection of the modern understanding of education as mass schooling.  
These underlying principles facilitate a better understanding of why global 
education continues to be a contested and under-studied field. In addition, they 
have important consequences for the understanding of global social 
governance more broadly. They flag that most successful global governance 
frameworks will likely organise (at least in the short-run) around policy-fields 
that count with less historical reliance on national governments for mass 
provision or enjoy a scale of organisation that is not as local (in this case the 
most local level is the classroom). Alternatively, they enjoy having a common 
objective that is more easily understood as a right of all (rather than of 
children, for example.) Given the presuppositions of these key principles and 
their consequences to education governance, each principle is considered in 
more detail.   
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2.1 Public education represents mass-schooling, and poor schooling 
is exclusively a national problem 
Today, mass schooling is intimately related to the ability of the State to 
manipulate the content of education and, as a result, the formation of qualified 
global workforces. The spread of schooling is historically based upon the 
relationship between the political expansion of the modern nation-state and the 
rise of formal education as a means to promote homogeneity of behaviour 
across institutions within a given nation.
97
 Despite its origins, history shows 
that schooling taken as a prerogative of the State tends to be underprovided 
for, opening up opportunities for the commercialisation of education.
98
 History 
also shows that private schooling has not solved the issue of underprovision of 
quality education for the largest portion of the world population, promoting 
elitist consumption of a public good, hence de-publicising the good in itself.
99
  
Kaul and Mendoza explain that many societies have chosen to make basic 
education “available in such plentiful quantities that there need not be any 
competition over who gets to use” it. 100 Based on their explanation, one infers 
that Kaul and Mendoza are talking objectively about schooling, the 
institutionalised form of mass-education.
101
 It is also possible to infer that they 
assume that basic schooling has not been underprovided in many nations. The 
difficulties to meet MDG 2 targets demonstrate that education services not 
only have been underprovided globally, as they have been underprovided to 
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specific constituencies, like Indigenous people and African descents regardless 
of the countries in which they live.
102
  
The ineffectiveness of nation-states as political organisations is perhaps a valid 
justification for the formation of new publics to provide education services, a 
justification which has already been many times repeated by scholars and 
politicians themselves.
103
 Society at large, however, still prefers to place 
indispensable welfare services in what it perceives as safe hands.
104
 The “safe 
hands” of the State may represent a decaying infra-structure for all levels of 
schooling, and a non-existent infra-structure to provide for the social and 
economic empowerment of historically oppressed populations. But, still, it is a 
known institution and an easily-recognisable political structure.  
The difficulty in envisioning an alternative public space for education is such 
that even progressive scholars who, in the context of their research, are able to 
justify when one should doubt nation-state’s capacity, find it difficult to talk 
about education as a service part of something like a global public sector. For 
example, although Jakobi’s conclusions about life-long learning illustrate that 
a supranational level should be more naturally thought as a political 
alternative, they also express how counter-intuitive the global public domain 
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 Publicness is not even alluded by Jakobi when she discusses the 
expansion of international organisations as providers of education:
106
  
… international organisations and countries that deal with lifelong 
learning often do not assume that all stages of education are provided 
by the public system … The extension of education is hence mostly 
an extension of regulation, not provision. … The movement towards 
lifelong learning is therefore rather paradoxical: on the one hand, the 
State is increasing its field of educational responsibility from ‘cradle 
to grave;’ on the other hand this space is often linked with private 
provision of education. This in turn is likely to enhance the education 
sector, which is currently developing and which is also already part 
of the WTO negotiations. … The emphasis on lifelong learning can 
thus not only change a national education system, but also enhance 
the growth and expansion of international education service 
providers. 
The global public sector and global publicness are concepts that are generally 
not deployed by education scholars. The international level is better accepted 
politically. As such, it is more frequently mentioned as a desirable governance 
partner, despite the severe critiques against the lack of effectiveness that apply 
to almost every international mechanism of educational governance introduced 
thus far.  
2.2 The classroom as the most local education governance space 
In the context of the Tuning Project, it became visible that standardising 
practices are at odds with a common scholarly view that the classroom is the 
ideal environment for education governance to take place. In the classroom 
policies are made, mediated and translated into practice according to the 
demands of the students.
107
 From a subsidiarity perspective, the classroom as 
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the most local level should be the stage for governance decisions whenever 
possible.  
Within the Bologna process action-line, one finds most of its objectives 
associated with standardising  higher education practices, despite scholarly 
reporting of the negative implications of standardising from above.
108
 In 
practice, standardising  processes and procedures facilitate comparisons and 
measure of compatibility, while erasing the meaningful differences that enrich 
the European, the Latin, the Asian... experiences and that demand different in-
classroom practices. Standardising  processes include how to establish an 
interchangeable system of credit to uniformising evaluation systems, and 
content for core education areas, such as physics and earth sciences.
109
 While 
compatibility considerations are valuable, they should not precede more 
substantial questions about disempowering the classroom as a governance 
agent. Standardising  processes such as those promoted by the Tuning Project 
will likely disempower the classroom, or other local spaces that can function 
as democratic arenas.  Susan Robertson reinforces this argument by arguing 
that each European country has its own higher education culture:
 110
 
Overall, Europe is not perceived as a union as regards higher 
education. There is a perception of ‘Europe’ as an entity in general 
terms and as an economic union. However, when it comes to cultural 
aspects and higher education, most students saw Europe as a range of 
very different countries. 
The Tuning Project worries little with country-to-country differences and with 
the many different classroom cultures developed throughout Europe. The 
Tuning Project is included into an unitary political structure (represented by its 
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inclusion in the Lisbon strategy). It is not as concerned with differences as it is 
with transforming the whole of Europe into a place where the best 
professionals are prepared for the knowledge economy.  
In the context of Europe and the Tuning, it is visible that placing the project 
under the responsibility of a well-established regional unit may not secure the 
exercise of publicness, since the means and objectives of the Tuning are not 
necessarily within the public interest. Implementation of an European outlook 
of competencies, curriculum and teaching practices are far from responding to 
the many different demands that exist throughout the EU, even if universities 
have been given the opportunity to deliberate about the Tuning.
111
 It is even 
more difficult to think that the European-style Tuning will satisfy the 
curricular needs of students in Latin America, for example.  
Without awareness of context-specificity (which would challenge the 
European DNA of the Tuning Project), global governance in education may 
not deliver the type of governance mechanisms that are most effective. In fact, 
exploring context-specificity requires the opening of the project to be 
something else. According to Susan Robertson, when trusting in initiatives like 




Embracing the global, not just rhetorically but materially and 
institutionally, as we see with the expansion of the Bologna Process 
and Tuning Project into the neighbourhood spaces surrounding 
Europe, Asia, and Latin America, is thus particularly risky. …  
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Going global by embracing the market, has created more than a stir 
in the United States and Australia where these countries have the 
lion’s share of the higher education export industry … In the face of 
heightened competition the EU may well face greater governing 
problems for the European Commission because (ii) the ‘globalizing’ 
project is seen as alien to the idea of the ‘European’ university and 
European civility (legitimacy gap). 
The global embraced by the Tuning Project, therefore, is a type of global that 
education scholars are used to critique, a global that relates to economic 
growth, adopts an instrumental use of education, and that materialises itself 
through development projects that are not concerned enough with publicness 
and with steering at the most local levels. It is different from the global domain 
that is public, and that wants to open new windows of opportunity for the 
classroom to be seen, and to voice its demands, as part of self-steering 
arrangements. The key question that arises, thus, is whether the education field 
can ever embrace a global that is not market-oriented; that is not seeking 
standardisation; and that strengthens rather than diminishes the governance 
role played by the classroom.   
2.3 Education as a means to meet the demand for a qualified 
workforce 
Jones and Coleman describe the transition from the immediate post-war to the 
Cold War development environment as it relates to the education field.  
Although human rights, and other egalitarian theories, have made their way to 
education development during the course of the late 20th century, an economic 
approach to education has since become the bottom-line.  
The economic approach has permeated domestic and international governance 
schemes, as well as bilateral and regional arrangements, figuring as one of the 
main obstacles to effective governance in public education. The economic 
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development approach to education has propelled the use of education as a 
means to shape the world workforce in the format most suitable to economic 
growth – thus the popularity of the term knowledge economy.113 
 There is a key difference between approaching global education as a means to 
create highly-specialised workers needed to promote economic growth and as 
a means to achieve specific education goals, such as the emancipation of the 
learner as agent of her or his own thinking, the improvement of curricula to 
create better learners, the construction of classrooms as democratic and fair 
spaces, or the valuing of teachers.  
The economic development paradigm not only promotes non-education goals 
as the objectives of education governance, but it also uses strategies that do not 
enhance publicness and self-steering. The economic development paradigm 
for education governance accepts the hierarchical rationales of donor-recipient 
(not only of money but of the brightest students), rich-poor, North-South, 
West-East, and employers-employees. Although there is awareness, especially 
in academic circles, that a new paradigm is needed, education governance 
continues to be driven by the objectives of the knowledge-economy and of 
promoting economic growth. As a result, hybrid alliances in education have a 
great chance to work for objectives that are not education-specific objectives, 
but to serve the knowledge economy.  
2.4 The right to education perceived as a right of the child 
The right to education is:
114
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… widely recognised. It is affirmed in a number of important 
international human rights instruments, including the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (article 26), the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (article 13), and the 
Declaration of the Rights of the Child (Principle 7). 
There are limitations to the realisation of education as a human right. The first 
limitation relates to enforcement and is true to all social rights, as already 
explained in Chapter 2, when I advanced the argument of adopting a 
complementary approach between economic and social rights and services. 
The second limitation relates, once more, to the perception that education is 




For all practical purposes, to speak of a right to education is to speak 
of a right of a child. Adults too may be said to have a right to 
education, since the eradication of illiteracy has been a goal of many 
governments and organisations for many years. But ensuring that 
children have a right to education is the best place to begin. Indeed, 
discussions of the right usually takes place in the context of the right 
of the child. 
Although articles 28 and 29 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC) affirm that the right to education can be manifested in different ways, 
this right is generally perceived as a children’s right to schooling that is “free 
and compulsory, at least at elementary level.”116 This vision has informed 
education governance practices as carried forward by IGOs and national 
governments, adopting or not a rights-based discourse.  
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While the Convention on the Rights of the Child has paid a great service to 
society, it has also reinforced an idea of education as primary schooling. 
Lifelong learning is at the very beginning of its trajectory. it has provided an 
alternative meaning to education and to education policy developed by 
international organisations and transnational networks, opening up 
opportunities for adults to more often benefit from supranational education 
policies.
117
 Nevertheless, lifelong learning has not been interpreted to generate 
any further legal obligation towards both children and adults.
118
  
I suspect that many attribute the moral trait of the right to education to the 
vulnerability of children, rather than to its broader, social justice qualities. The 
human right to education should be generally associated with the right to 
lifelong learning and self-determination. Anja Jakobi demonstrates that, 
although national agendas have been reshaped by international organisations 
working with lifelong learning,
119
 these changes are still limited by 
international policies and mechanisms submitting to the needs of the 
knowledge-economy.
120
 Consequently secondary and tertiary education have 
been constrained by the needs of the world economy. Primary education has 
been influenced by a liberal approach to the rights framework, which sees 
public education as an obligation to cover basic needs of children, rather than 
to emancipate the lifelong learner. These two approaches combined define the 
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priorities of education governance today, generating tension among those 
forming hybrid alliances, scholars, students, and teachers.  
III Dealing with Education’s Key Principles  
More research is needed about the potential of the global level to effectively 
make decisions and deliver aspects of public education. Education scholars on 
both sides of the debate, those who believe in the potential benefit of education 
globalisation, and those who do not, could benefit from a more thorough 
construction of global public theory. Global public theory should not be 
prescribed by global philosophers as a universal magic-bullet, as education 
should not be seen by education scholars as the solution for all social and 
economic troubles. It can, nonetheless, highlight new, global avenues, for 
public education to thrive.
121
 The on-going crisis in public education 
demonstrates that alternate routes are much needed.  
Not enough research has been done to unpack the baggage of the term ‘public’ 
in education, especially in the global environment. Although the field of 
globalised education has received considerable attention in the last ten years, 
this attention has overlooked the ‘global public’ and has stumbled on the key 
principles of the field of education.  Below, I suggest two ways to redirect the 
debate about global education, by adopting a global public perspective. 
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3.1 Trusting in multiple publics to restore publicness in education 
Main challenges towards global publicness in education governance are not 
only related to internationalising or commercialising elements of education 
(especially curricula and evaluations), but also to an unitary vision about the 
ideal public response. Most scholars regard governmental responses as the 
responses of choice to reclaim public education.
122
 Believing that public 
education can be restored by a roll-back of governmental provision alone is to 
ignore the formation of other publics that may be of great significance.  
In general, education scholars and professionals debate the contribution of 
international actors to making education policy and enabling delivery.
123
 
These fundamental debates dwell on the legitimacy of international actors to 
deal with teaching, evaluation and curricula from above. Since the classroom 
is a local space with great potential to be both technical and political, it should 
be a more present actor in supranational education governance. Yet the 
development of the classroom as a governance agent, constituted by students 
and teachers as active actors of global social governance, is just beginning. 
Similarly, transnational voices of students and teachers, such as the Global 
Campaign for Education, are slowly beginning to converse with other 
supranational actors and to play a larger role in education governance. 
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Specifically, there are important developments in the field that go beyond the 
scope of this chapter, but that might open new possibilities for global 
education governance to enjoy higher levels of self-steering. For instance, 
education scholars are thinking about “emergent taxonomies of education”, 
and discussing the necessity of creating different, and concomitant, systems of 
public education.
124
 They suggest that, while the traditional system of 
schooling matters, a different system should be put in place that, for example, 
measures one’s creative disposition, one’s ability to be savvy and resilient. 
These range of “soft skills” have been made unimportant, or not stimulated, by 
mass schooling and standard curricula.
 125
 Education policies developed at the 
global level could address challenges such as this, thus being complementary 
to traditional public education projects.  
Amidst different challenges and demands in the 21st century, a source of 
significant agreement in education academia is the need to restore publicness 
in education. Academics, however, rarely question the position of public 
politics when it comes to education, often ignoring the recent ‘displacement’ 
of the public that has reflected heavily in public services.
126
 Although, it may 
take time for the “idea” of the “global public” to consolidate within the 
education field (if it ever does) it is the task of global governance research, and 
an emergent global public theory, to point out the not-so obvious connections 
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between the organic necessities of the field to reinvent itself as a public sector, 
and what an emergent global public domain has to offer.   
Perhaps the most important new public space to address issues of Global 
education is the Global Campaign for Education. The GCE as a global public 
actor contributes to enhancing levels of global publicness in education 
governance. The GCE is a positive example of enhancing global publicness in 
global governance: making more visible the demands of the student and 
teacher populations across the globe and, thus, increasing education 
effectiveness at the local level. Its model may help other global publics to be 
formed in the near future.  
The GCE  is one element of the EFA framework that is cherished by teachers, 
academics, international actors, and national policy-makers alike.
127
 The 
products of the GCE are generally deliberated within the transnational public 
sphere, representing a step towards thinking of education as part of a global 
public domain, and as different from international development. Yet even the 
GCE avoids the idea of articulating and calling upon the global as a legitimate 
political space to host public education policies and services.  
3.2 Exploring interconnectedness in education 
The processes of globalising education often adopt traditional 
developmentalist approaches. They include borrowing and lending of policies, 
standardisation and harmonisation, and other efficiency benchmarks for 
schooling. These processes are, in fact, encompassed by neither a 
communitarian nor a modern-State understanding of the public. While 
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globalisation of education is happening and, mostly, international actors are 
highly influential in making education policy,
128
 such influence originates 
from a developmentalist tradition, rather than from awareness about an 
emergent global public domain in general, or a global public sector in 
particular. 
Education as part of the global public sector needs to be articulated as a good 
or a service that if underprovided has transnational repercussions. 
Underprovision of education originates for reasons intra and beyond the 
nation-state  (such as in the case of the effects of colonialism in the quality of 
education of the Global South.) This structural view of education matters 
because it helps society to envision the interconnectedness of education, and 
its ability to shape and be shaped by economic, cultural and political choices 
made outside the nation State and beyond the inter-state realm.   
Most of the time, academics who study the globalisation of education actually 
study inter-state governance instruments. Their analyses of global education 
look at top-down initiatives impacting on the national environment; they 
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In general, scholars see the “global” suspiciously, representative of interested 
factions that oppose education as an empowering instrument. Again, this 
outlook downplays the equally powerful, political-resistance content of the 
global level, which is at the core of an emerging global public theory. 
Occasionally, scholars are concerned with common elements of mass-
schooling that are rising ever more similar as a result of international 
development.
130
 Neither of these outlooks, or concerns, openly explores global 
publicness in education governance. Most scholars see the terrain where global 
education is immersed through bordered lens.  
Education governance scholarship still relies upon an unitary-vision of the 
public (a bordered vision of public education), which configures one of the 
conceptual challenges to enhancing global publicness in global education. 
More research is needed to explore how poor or excellent education resonates 
transnationally and how poor or excellent education links the fate of the world 
together. Hopefully, the exposure of multiple publics and how their claims 
connect beyond borders will provoke new inquiries, and the spreading of new 
spaces for publicness within a genuine frame of global education governance.  
IV The Current State of Education as a Precarious Medium of 
Global Publicness 
At this point, a global public approach to education remains highly contested. 
Scholars understand public education as an exclusive government matter, 
directly associated with the local needs of students and teachers. While 
messages of education for all emerged and have been institutionalised, they do 
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not engage with the global public domain, but rather keep focus on 
standardising education through international development and for the 
knowledge economy.  
Why do global theories have had little practical effect in the field of 
education? Much has to do with key principles of the field as pointed out 
above. They include the belief that globalisation is incompatible with the local 
nature of the classroom as a learning and a political space, and that top-down 
international practices represent virtually all attempts to provide education 
from outside the nation-state.  
The idea that aspects of public education can be relocated to the global level 
will not naturally spread in the education field, but it will have to be constantly 
battled for.
131
 In practice, most efforts of supranational governance in 
education have just taken us closer to ensuring basic schooling for all, on 
quantitative terms.
132
 They have helped little to enhance the quality of the 
classroom experience, as they have helped little to reframe perceptions about 
globalisations and new forms of publicness.
133
  
Experiences of the Global Campaign for Education are perhaps the best 
examples of how aspects of education governance have migrated to the global 
level and have maintained a concern with publicness. For instance, the 
                                                 
131
 Popkewitz has a similar opinion about notions of progress and emancipation arguing that 
“there is nothing natural” about them. TS Popkewitz Cosmopolitanism and the Age of School 
Reform: Science, Education, and Making Society by Making the Child (Routledge, New York, 
2008) at 12. 
132
 Ibid, at 111. 
133
 In this case, Popkewitz, above n 131, at 12, refers to the work of Martha Nussbaum. M. 
Nussbaum "Patriotism and Cosmpolitanism: Martha Nussbaum with Respondents" in M 
Nussbaum and J Cohen (eds) For the Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism 
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Campaign “unites civil society in the common pursuit of the right to quality 
basic education for all, with emphasis on publicly-funded education;” whereas 




Despite of its focus on government provision, in terms of global governance 
aspects, the Global Campaign for Education has been one of the most active 
transnational organisations influencing education policy.
135
 Hence, it has 
prompted relevant questions about the role of NGOs in social policymaking 
and their ability to enhance publicness, even if they do not engage directly 
with provision. Although the Campaign operates as an important global public, 
enhanced global publicness is not reflected generally in the global education 
field. Overall, education is currently a precarious medium of global 
publicness; almost all policies in what has been called (not by many) global 
education are actually a product of traditional international governance. This 
conclusion is based on the above analysis of the mechanisms, policies, and key 
principles of the field of education, which present themselves as resistant to 
the relocation of public services to anywhere other than the realm of 
governments. 
Public education is embedded in a difficult terrain for effective global 
governance to take place; at least when associating global governance in 
public services to a group of transnational frameworks that uses high-levels of 
self-steering to make global social policy and provide services.  
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 “GCE Constitution”, above n 87. 
135
  Karen Mundy and Lynn Murphy “Transnational Advocacy, Global Civil Society? 




Current education policies such as EFA, even when endorsed by important 
global publics, like the GCE, might always face important obstacles to 
enhance self-steering. They range from the mismatch between internationally-
set policies and domestic government capacities to the overall ineffectiveness 
of standardising  curricula and evaluation mechanisms, when local learning 
experiences are so particular and varied. This is not to suggest that global 
governance mechanisms should be abandoned in public education. On the 
contrary, this is to suggest that a different approach towards global education 
is needed: an approach that envisions more opportunities to reclaim publicness 
elsewhere.  Education and governance scholars, educators and students should 
continue to push for publicness not only in respect to government-run 
programmes, but also in respect to the policies and practices that are 
increasingly being developed at the supranational level. Hence, this argument 
is not a call for fewer supranational mechanisms of governance in education, 
but for improving present and future programmes by making them more 




Chapter 4: AN EMERGING GLOBAL PUBLIC SECTOR: GLOBAL 
HEALTH LEADING THE WAY?  
I Introduction to Global health 
Global Health Governance (GHG) is ahead of other sectors in terms of 
enhancing global publicness in its mechanisms and policy responses: both the  
scholarship and practices discussed in this chapter support this claim.
1
  It is 
slowly, but progressively, bridging the fertile formation of global health 
publics (and the important political role they play,) with global provision of 
health services. GHG leads the way towards consolidating the global public 
domain, and marking the characteristics of an emerging global public sector.  
Because of intrinsic characteristics, global health – both as a field or a service 
sector – has promoted relatively successful models of global governance in 
public services. There are specific characteristics of the field of global health 
that, I argue, facilitate cooperation through global governance. These 
characteristics can be associated with enhanced levels of global publicness in 
policy and delivery responses. Put simply, because of intrinsic characteristics 
of the field, there seem to be more publicness in global health, which allows 
for more successful mechanisms to be in place.  
                                                 
1
  The GHG literature is multi-disciplinary. GHG has been already consolidated as a specific 
discipline, but global health related research is also found in medical research, law and policy, 





   
…collective action of a new type, moving beyond the nation State. In 
particular they [many new actors] created hybrid alliances or 
organisations – frequently called public private partnerships – in 
pursuit of specific health goals. (emphasis in original)  
In theory, GHG represents a new approach to public health for a transformed 
21st century. But newness in global health governance should not only be 
about mixing actors to form alliances, but about an emergent global health 
ethics that contributes to a different ranking of health goals. GHG should not 
only be about controlling the spread of diseases across borders; it should be 
about “people, solidarity and global citizenship.”3  
This chapter explores institutions, policies, and characteristics of GHG, 
understood as a new way of working with public health issues that have 
transnational repercussions. This chapter investigates why and how, despite of 
political and economic challenges, global health mechanisms and policies have 
been able to gradually create a more conducive context (when compared to the 
context of global education), in which successful global governance 
frameworks can emerge.
4
 Global health becomes a sector where there is room 
                                                 
2
 Ilona Kickbusch, Wolfgang Hein, and Gaudenz Silberschmidt “Governance Challenges 
through a New Mechanism: The Proposal for a Committee C of the World Health Assembly” 
[2010 Symposium Global health Governance] Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 550, at 
554.  
3
 Ibid.  
4
 In summary, the analysis of governance practices in education shows that international actors 
have pushed for stronger government action to promote good governance. This preference, to a 
large extent, refers to the relationship between globalisation of education and the construction 
of competitive knowledge economies, including using education as a means for qualifying a 
suitable workforce (This is a problematic instrumental use of education portrayed in the 
previous chapter and exacerbated by globalisation.) The preference for stronger government 
traditions are also related to the nature of education services themselves, which are deeply 
ingrained in local cultures and indigenous needs.  Martha Merrill “Educational Borrowing in 
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for global publicness to grow and for more effective governance capacities to 
develop. The more robust development of global health is also evidence that 
not every field responds in the same way to the globalisation of policy-making 
and service delivery.  
Fidler explains in which procedural and theoretical contexts, new ways of 
working in health (or, in the words of Kickbusch, transnational hybrid 
alliances with specific health goals) have emerged:
 5
  
On the process side, the concept of ‘Global Health Governance’ 
emerged as a framework for governance distinct from the State-
centric approach. The global health concept developed from both 
empirical and normative analysis. Experts begun to examine the 
increasing role that nonstate actors, such as multinational 
corporations (MCNs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 
were playing in national and international public health... Facts on 
the ground demonstrated that this trend was not academic 
daydreaming. Normatively, public health experts began to debate the 
wisdom of harnessing nonstate actor participation in the process of 
governing public health issues. … Forms of governance that bring 
together more concertedly State and nonstate actors will be central in 
a global era. 
Mapping actors, policies, and reasons why global governance matters for 
public health further advances GHG theory and practice. Mapping governance 
in global health, which grows to be the most consolidated global social policy-
field, also provides insights that may be applicable to other welfare areas.  
A map of GHG includes those characteristics of global health which may have 
facilitated global governance by gradually embracing principles of global 
publicness. In this fashion, this chapter may not only be important to the global 
                                                                                                                             
Quality Assessment Standards: The European Tuning Project Played on a Kyrgyz Komuz” 
(Lecture to XIV World Congress of Comparative Education Societies, Istanbul, 2010).  
5
 D Fidler SARS, Governance and the Globalisation of Disease (Palgrave Macmillan, New 
York) at 48-49. (Citation Omitted).  
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governance scholars and practitioners working in global health, but to all of 
those who want to learn good lessons and share best practices about global 
governance in public services. While not all frameworks will be applicable to 
other fields, they provoke general thoughts about the selective character of 
global governance. More specifically, mapping the existent practices and the 
facilitating characteristics of global health sheds light into questions about 
when and how to use global governance frameworks to design and deliver 
public services, and how to construct a more conducive context for successful 
frameworks to come forward.   
Given these reasons, the sketch of GHG that follows draws attention to public 
health’s intrinsic characteristics, which make the GHG context a more 
conducive environment for States, NGOs, IGOs and grassroots networks to get 
together (entering the global social realm) to realise a common health-specific 
goal (entering the global political realm). In order to map GHG, I explored the 
specialised literature and information about the institutions of global health 
provided by the actors themselves (institutional information provided on their 
websites, annual reports, and official publications).  
II Global Health Governance Institutional Framework 
GHG institutional framework is complex and diverse as is the group of policy-
issues that constitute global health. For instance, GHG actors engage with both 
communicable diseases and non-communicable diseases. In the context of 
communicable diseases, one can more easily appreciate the practical relevance 
of mechanisms of global health governance. Two main concerns are 
predominant in global governance of infectious diseases as we know it today; 
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reflecting a biological approach to health. The biological approach refers to 1) 
diagnosis and cure, and 2) the epidemiological effect of controlling a disease.
6
  
Many global actors have had to work in concert to control or eradicate 
infectious diseases. Players at different levels of governance (from local 
community centres to transnational networks) perform important public health 
tasks. Key players such as the World Health Organisation (WHO) and the 
Global Fund to Fight Aids , Tuberculosis and Malaria (or Global Fund) 
undertake a transversal role (i.e. acting in several GHG projects at the same 
time and bringing them together). In addition, key formats, such as hybrid 
partnerships, characterised GHG. Transnational, international, national, local 
and grassroots organisations partner in a range of different ways form the 
global health institutional framework.  
WHO, UNICEF, the World Food Programme (WFP), the Food and 
Agriculture Organisation (FAO), the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development, the UNDP, the ILO, the WTO, International Financial 
Institutions (including the Global Fund), the OECD, and the G8 interact with 
GHG transversally; their actions cut across various governance and technical 
issues. Many of these actors are considered “non-health focus” organisations 
(that is promoting health is not the primary mission of the organisation).
7
 Most 
non-health focussed organisations are heavily involved with GHG and with a 
range of other public services, such as education. For instance, the World 
                                                 
6
 World Health Organisation and Partnership to Stop TB Report of the Sixth Meeting of the 
Subgroup on Public Private Mix for TB Care and Control 2010 (Subgroup on Public Private 
Mix for TB Care and Control, 2010). 
7
  According to Lee and others, “non-health-focussed institutions are concerned with a wide 
range of issue areas that indirectly affect social determinants of health.” Kelley Lee and others 
“Global governance for Health” in Ronald Labonté and others (eds) Globalisation and Health: 
Pathways, Evidence and Policy (Routledge, New York, 2009) at 295. 
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Bank, the WFP, the OECD, and the G8 exercise influence upon both public 
education and public health. This fact obviously relates to issue-link, (that is 
one child not well-fed cannot learn; if undernourished a child will likely be 
sick, etc.) But, beyond issue-link, this fact also points out that there is a 
broader concern of international organisations with global governance 
frameworks that have been used to transform public services.  
Key international players are aware of the relocation of public services to the 
supranational overlayer. As they are also aware of the importance of public 
services to govern social life, they have taken advantage of the growing 
demand for public services spawning from globalisations. As will be 
demonstrated below, international organisations have greatly increased their 
contribution to social governance matters in the last ten years.  
In health, global governance is, and will likely develop as, a powerful avenue 
for international institutions to directly influence the public affairs of nations 
around the world. A sort of anticipatory strategy is very clear in regards to the 
position of the G8, for example. The G8 has been considered a ‘governor of 
globalisation’ and a governor of health and educational change.8  
This chapter’s main goal is to provide a sketch of the global aspects of health 
change. Thus I find it inevitable to investigate key international institutions 
that have exercised governance roles in public health. I also judge essential to 
investigate the role of public private partnerships, the most popular form of 
engagement between international institutions and other global actors. I start 
the institutional mapping by investigating the role of the WHO.  
                                                 
8
 Andrew Cooper, Ted Schrecker and John J Kirton “Governing Global health: Challenge, 
Response, Innovation” (Ashgate, Burlington, 2007) at 117. 
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2.1 World Health Organisation 
The WHO plays a pivotal role in setting the global health agenda. Recently, it 
got more involved with health policy implementation and health services. In 
fact, after the MDGs, the need to rank global health issues and meet health-
related targets expanded the social work of the WHO. In 2006, the WHO’s 
constitution was amended, promoting debate about how the WHO can be 
adapted to hear nonstate actors and fit the necessities of diverse beneficiaries, 
from mothers and children to those suffering from mental health.
9
 For 
instance, new debates about how the WHO can better work for the 
transnational public interest emerged. These debates include questioning if 
partnerships, especially those promoted by the WHO, have received input 
from beneficiaries and have provided tools for preventable or controllable 
diseases to be preventable or controllable everywhere and across race, class, 
and age. It also includes a consideration of how the global level can better 
engage with the provision of regular, basic health care by going beyond 
technical assistance. To achieve goals like these, the historical role played by 
WHO, as a technical specialised agency, is insufficient.  
The WHO is said to provide robust technical leadership, but falls short from 
providing the political and the ethical leadership that it could, given its 
technical, legal, and political mandates.
10
 The WHO, via the World Health 
Assembly (WHA), could indeed become a better forum to deliberate about and 
politicise global health issues, including, but not only, those that have been 
                                                 
9
 Constitution of the World Health Organisation
 
(Forty-fifth edition, Supplement, October 
2006, first adopted by the International Health Conference, 19-22 July 1946, signed on 22 July 





deliberated by a few inside international institutions, such as the World Bank 
or the WTO in respect of patents to essential medicines.  
Lee and others ponder that:
 11
  
The key question is whether technical leadership alone is sufficient to 
achieve real progress…  
Moral or ethical leadership can also be considered an important 
factor in global governance. Such power arises from shared support 
of certain values and principles seen as underlying decision making 
and action. 
 
Most of the commentators, who seem to be ambivalent about multiple publics, 
have indicated that the WHO is the natural institution to exercise global health 
all-around leadership. Nevertheless, questions remain about the WHO’s 
“organisational, political, and technical capacity” to do that.12  
In Chapter 2, this thesis discussed the roles of specialised agencies and argued, 
along with other commentators, that specialised agencies are, in general, 
technical bodies. The WHO, nevertheless, is unique, being empowered by its 
constitution to engage in broader activities, such as law and policy making.
13
 
This is in part a result that the WHO counts with a deliberative body, the 
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 Lee and others, above n 7, at 307.  
12
 Ibid.  
13
 The WHO’s Constitution, forty-fifth edition, states that WHO’s functions include: “…to 
provide or assist in providing, upon the request of the United Nations, health services and 
facilities to special groups, such as the peoples of trust territories; …(h) to promote, in co-
operation with other specialised agencies where necessary, the improvement of nutrition, 
housing, sanitation, recreation, economic or working conditions and other aspects of 
environmental hygiene; …(j) to propose conventions, agreements and regulations, and make 
recommendations with respect to international health matter and to perform such duties as may 
be assigned thereby to the Organisation and are consistent with its objectives; …(t) to 
standardize diagnostic procedures as necessary; …(u) to develop, establish and promote 
international standards with respect to food, biological, pharmaceutical and similar products. 
Constitution of the World Health Organisation
 
(Forty-fifth edition, Supplement, October 2006, 
first adopted by the International Health Conference, 19-22 July 1946, signed on 22 July 1946 




WHA, which has 192 members with a voting right.
14 
Other specialised 
agencies do not count with the same type of deliberative forum, lacking an 
adequate venue for politicisation, as argued in the second Chapter. While 
many of the UN-system organisations should defer to the GA and ECOSOC to 
debate political issues with a bearing on their technical mandates, the WHO 
enjoys a more privileged position.  
While the WHA is generally overlooked and underutilised, the potential 
political uses of the WHA are in great demand at the WHO.
15
 The WHO, 
because of its boosted political capacity could emerge as an important 
mediator for new publics. In fact, the WHO has already exercised, albeit 
timidly, some of the functions of a new-public mediator after the 2003 
outbreak of SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome), when the WHA 
approved wider International Health Regulations (IHRs), providing the WHO 
“with new, clearly defined roles and responsibilities.”16 
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 “World Health Assembly” (2010) World Health Organisation 
<http://www.who.int/mediacentre/events/governance/wha/en/index.html>.  
15
 For a position contrary to the political role of the WHO, see the position of the United States 
in the context of debating health assistance to Arab-occupied territories. The United States 
emphasises humanitarian and medical assistance to the Palestinian people, but opposes the use 
of the WHA as a political forum. This position includes the following considerations: “The 
WHA again took up the issue of “Health conditions of, and assistance to, the Arab population 
in the occupied Arab territories, including Palestine.” According to the United States, “The 
proposed resolution was unacceptably one-sided against Israel”. The resolution was adopted, 
92-6, with a number of countries absent. The WHA adopted by consensus WHO's $4.54 
billion budget for 2010-2011, including a 10 percent increase in voluntary contributions. 
United States Department of State Annual Report Annex  (Bureau of International Organisation 
Affairs November, 2010).  
16
 For more on SARS, see its own section, under GHG policy below. World Health 
Organisation “World Health Assembly Adopts New International Health Regulations” (2005) 
Media Centre <http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2005/pr_wha03/en/>.  
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In timid ways the WHO is more robustly undertaking new political activities.
17
 
For example, the WHO regional bodies have been used as a stage for political 
messaging and political battles.
18
 For instance, the case made against Nestlé’s 
marketing practices regarding milk substitutes for breast feeding was highly 
visible at both global and regional offices; it generated the International Code 
for the Marketing of Breast Milk Substitutes.
19
 Other ground breaking 
initiatives championed, in part, by a political role played by the WHO include 
Primary Health Care programmes (PHC), often delivered in conjunction with 
Faith Based Organisations (FBOs)
20
 and the essential medicines list.
21
 In fact, 
political roles taken on by the WHO more recently reflect a stronger concern 
with basic health care and with social conditions that determine lack of 
                                                 
17 
Lee and others, above n 7, at 307-308. 
18
 Loughline and Berridge on one hand describe several instances in which the decentralised 
(regional) structure of the WHO has caused political discomfort or tension, pushing important 
debates.
.
Despite these events, the authors also give clear examples of how the WHA can be 
susceptible to political pressure, often passing resolutions that reflect old compromises, rather 
than new political arrangements. Outside of the inter-state scenario (which is marked by ups 
and downs, political progress and retreats) WHO’s political activity has covered criticisms of 
behaviour of corporations, the World Bank and the WTO itself. Kelly Loughlin and Virginia 
Berridge “Global Health Governance: Historical Dimensions of Global Governance” 
(Discussion Paper n.2 Department of Health and Development World Health Organisation, 
2002) at 16.  
19
 Ibid. 
20 The WHO identifies and classifies medicines for “The WHO Model Lists of Essential 
Medicines [which] has [sic] been updated every two years since 1977. The current versions are 
the 17th WHO Essential Medicines List and the 3rd WHO Essential Medicines List for 
Children updated in March 2011 ... Essential medicines [are] those that satisfy the priority 
health care needs of the population. They are selected with due regard to public health 
relevance, evidence on efficacy and safety, and comparative cost-effectiveness. Essential 
medicines are intended to be available within the context of functioning health systems at all 
times in adequate amounts, in the appropriate dosage forms, with assured quality and adequate 
information, and at a price the individual and the community can afford.” “Health Topics: 
Essential Medicines” (2011) World Health Organisation < 
http://www.who.int/topics/essential_medicines/en/>.  
21





 In the context of this renewed focus, the WHO has major 
opportunities to embrace public health as a flagship service of the global 
public sector. The rise of WHO activity in forming and leading public private 
partnerships (PPP or PPPs) is one of these opportunities. In fact, partnerships 
and alliances have been the most important engine behind global governance 
frameworks for health.  
2.2 Public Private Partnerships 
The presence of nonstate actors in governance produced a new service-
provision arrangement based on hybrid alliances. These hybrid alliances are 
formed to achieve health-specific goals and are generally organised as PPP. 
Alliances can be called PPP or, in this field, public-private partnerships for 
health (PPPH). The WHO also adopts the term Public Private Mix (PPM).
23
 
PPPH and PPM are the ways by which most global health governance 
mechanisms function.
24
 PPP as the main engines of global health governance 
deal with a range of issues, but they mostly concentrate on infectious 
diseases.
25
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 Loughline and Berridge, above n 18, at 16. 
23“Public-Private Mix for TB Control” (2010) World Health Organization < 
http://www.who.int/tb/careproviders/ppm/about/en/index.html>.  
24 
A few mechanisms have been established to monitor the work of PPPH (they do not make 
distinction, however, between those PPPH led by the commercial sector or the third sector, or 
IGOs.) The Initiative on Public-Private Partnership for Health located in Geneva, under the 
auspices of the Global Forum on Health Research, an independent organisation, monitors the 
work of transnational PPPH. Global Forum for Health Research “Initiative on Public-Private 
Partnership for Health” (2010) Global Forum for Health < http://www.globalforumhealth.org>. 
25
 Michael Reich compiled a list of public private partnerships figuring on the WHO’s website. 
They include Global Alliance for TB Drug Development, Global Alliance to Eliminate 
Leprosy, Roll Back Malaria, and Stop TB Initiative. For a complete list, see Michael Reich 
“Global Health Governance” in Michael Reich (ed) Public Private Partnerships for Health: 
Partnerships for Public Health (Harvard Center for Population and Development Studies, 
Cambridge (Mass), 2010). 
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Proving or debunking the alleged benefit of PPP is not my objective here. In 
fact, the research shows that PPP’s effectiveness will depend on the principles 
and characteristics of the policy-field, and on the specific goal established as 
object of joint action. Effectiveness needs to be assessed on a case-by-case 
basis. Yet there are major governance considerations (administrative, political 
and ethical) to be made about the use of PPP to achieve global health goals 
and, consequently, to deliver a range of health services.  
The object of this section is to map the uses of PPP in global health, and the 
challenges attached those uses. This section adopts as sample different types of 
partnerships developed by global health actors, especially by the WHO.  
The WHO has promoted the creation of important PPP. Understood as a global 
leader, the WHO enjoys critical functions and attributions that are considered 
indispensable for the success of partnerships as effective governance actors.
26
 
Through these functions, the WHO has promoted the following objectives:  
 encouraging Health For All;  
 facilitating universal delivery and access to drugs and basic services; 
 promoting research and development for neglected diseases;  
 preventing premature mortality, morbity, and disability in countries of 
all stages of development;  
 encouraging the development of ‘healthier’ products to be available 
worldwide;  
 enhancing the organisation’s image and its visibility beyond the 
specialised health and international relations arenas; 
                                                 
26
 Ibid.  
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  integrating health and sustainable development;  
 acquiring knowledge from the private sector.  
In addition to promoting health-specific goals, another use of PPP is to bring 
businesses or business-like practices to the provision of services and the 
building of public infra-structures. Governance scholars following a public 
administration tradition have observed the harmful bringing of the ‘private’ 
into the nationally public sphere during the 1980s and 1990s.
27
 At the global 
level, PPP have become popular partially because they bring businesses 
strategies or resources into public service governance. This use of PPP is 
criticised because it brings to global social governance not only more 
resources, but also private agendas. Scholars disagree about the role of private 
agendas in PPP. More specifically, they debate whether private interests can 
help advance global health goals that are shared, and that justify forming PPP 
in the first place. The ultimate goals of PPP are public goals. The question is 
whether private strategies, resources, and agendas can help advance public 
health goals.   
 Lee and Buse suggest that, when it comes to regulating the work of PPP for 
health, “consideration of the circumstances under which private health domain 
governance is appropriate and how to go about identifying when additional 
safeguards to protect public health governance” is helpful.28 But is this 
residual role attributed for public protection good guidance? Should not we be 
thinking about bringing public values and processes into governance efforts 
                                                 
27
 DJ Savoie "Introducing the Topic" in DJ Savoie and G Peters (eds) Governance in the 21st 
Century: Revitalizing the Public Service (McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal, 2000).   
28
 Kent Buse and Kelley Lee “Business and Global health Governance”( World Health 
Organisation Discussion Paper n. 5, Department of Ethics Trade and Human Rights and Health 
Law, 2005) at 7. 
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that directly relate to historically public activities, such as the design and 
provision of health services?  
If PPP’s scope of work crosses national borders, its ultimate goals continue to 
be of shared concern. PPP continue to deal with services like distribution of 
essential medicines and antiretroviral treatments, pre-natal care, immunisation 
and food security. Essentially, these services continue to be public, even if 
their origin is beyond the Sate and their reach cross borders.  
Despite the public nature of PPP’s work in global health, PPP (mechanisms of 
governance and not of government) are seldom understood as public. GHG 
scholars and practitioners have failed to offer solutions that could bring PPP’s 
functional publicness into publicness that could engender more visibility, 
democracy, and scrutiny. Lee and Buse, for example, suggest the principle of 
co-regulation for bringing PPP into account; co-regulation draws attention to 
the status of PPP as not public, but hybrid mechanisms.   
Lee and Buse suggest the innovative framework of co-regulation as the 
“newest form of private sector involvement in global health governance, and 
arguably the most controversial.”29 Co-regulation is a conceptual device used 
by Lee and Buse to attest to the “hybrid” nature of PPP and their substantive 
involvement in GHG often doing similar things as governmental and 
intergovernmental organisations, arguing that there is:
30
 
…some attempt to develop systems of rules in which both public and 
private sectors have a voice in decision-making (although when they 
assume a legal identity they are often established as not-for-profit or 
are embedded in public or private hosts.) 
                                                 
29
 Ibid, at 36.  
30
 Ibid, at 36 and 37. 
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The question is whether one needs a different classification for PPP and 
whether a new category would be able to push them closer to, or further from, 
the specific health goals that justify their existence in the first place. Why to 
classify, register, and regulate PPP as global public entities seem so out of 
question? While the global public health sector is not well-established, 
palliative measures will be inserted to ameliorate the effects of private interests 
in public health, such as the large impact of pharmaceutical companies in 
public health.  
Many health commentators argue that PPP and PPM are procedurally hybrid 
(they follow both private and public principles of administration) and, as such, 
should engage more systematically with principles of good governance. Good 
governance, nonetheless, is a problematic paradigm when transferred to the 
global level, especially because PPP should create health-related “social 
value”. In order to meet good governance criteria, PPP do not have to be 
concerned with creating social value as a necessary goal of joint action.
31
 This 
weakness is becoming more evident in the GHG scholarship and in high-level 
deliberations.   
In the WHO, debates on the nature of global health governance have just 
gained prominence.
32
 A conversation about PPP’s publicness within the 
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 Diana Barrett, James Austin and Sheila McCarthy “Public-Private Partnerships: Illustrative 
Examples” in Michael Reich (ed) Public-Private Partnerships for Public Health (Harvard 
Center for Population and Development Studies, Cambridge (Mass), 2010) 41, at 54.  
32
 For instance, WHO Director Dr Margaret Chan delivered a speech on June 2011 on the 
importance of Global health, in which she pointed out that “The year 2008 will likely go down 
in history as the tipping point that demonstrated the perils of living in a world of radically 
increased interdependence.” In fact, since 2008, not only global health, but global governance 
in public services in general has taken a new dimension across international institutions. 
Margaret Chan “The Increasing Importance of global health: Success, shocks, surprises, and 
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WHO, however, is yet to develop. It may advance a debate about the types of 
publicness that the WHO itself wants to engage in the 21st century. Even in 
regards to partnerships made with the WHO (a traditional global player,) 
actors representing several constituencies are quick to request that the “public 
health link” be made clearer. In other words, many transnational actors (which 
do not represent any nation-state in particular) understand the importance of 
being recognised and treated as institutions that do public work.  
Gill Walt and Kent Buse argue that the term public-private partnership 
“reflects the increased intensity, extent, and purpose of growing private-sector 
interests in public-sector decision making.” 33 Although the authors claim that 
public-sector interests and values will eventually influence companies and 
NGOs helping to steer and row public health, they do not directly discuss 
publicness or how to make it count. The authors focus on the attributions of 
the WHO by arguing that the UN “plays a prominent role in providing a 
platform for the discussion, negotiation, and promotion of these norms and 
values [norms and values that bind together nation-states].”34 They also argue 
that the effectiveness and legitimacy of the partnership model should be 
grounded upon some “critical and unique functions” of the WHO to mediate 
conflicts between public and private interests and cultural differences. These 
functions and attributes include the exercise of moral authority, the provision 
of norms and standards, legitimation, protection of the global commons, 
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promotion of collective action, and the harnessing of country-level support.
35
 
The authors also contend that the UN (including its laws) and the WHO should 
be responsible for selecting private partners and determining “rules of 
engagement” that weaken conflict of interests in the promotion of public 
health.
36
 All these suggestions are in-line with a type of GHG that enjoys 
enhanced levels of global publicness. However it requires major changes in the 
way the WHO engages with the private sector. Changes are two-fold: they 
require that the WHO more forcefully assesses the commitment of companies 
and NGOs to public health goals; as they also require the WHO to trust and to 
recognise companies and NGOs as legitimate, global health governance actors. 
The inevitable question is whether private actors enter PPP to play public roles 
and to work for the public interest?  
Although the UN system, especially represented by the WHO, encourages the 
use of PPP, there is a concern that too much of this approach “will further 
fragment international cooperation in health and undermine UN aims for 
cooperation and equity among States.”37 In fact, this preoccupation refers to at 
least three open questions in global governance theory: Firstly, how much 
centralisation does one need in the name of coordination, leadership, 
stewardship or the like in a system that was originally conceived as fluid and 
less institutionalised than its previous model?
 
 Secondly, how much devolution 
to the local level is needed?
38
 Finally,  how can the system understand and sort 
                                                 
35
 Ibid, at Table 7.1.  
36
 Ibid, at 184. 
37
 Ibid, at 170. 
38
 This question speaks to the core of the theory of subsidiarity, which is very popular in 
Europe. Subsidiarity is at the core of EU law and policy. For years, EU governance scholars 
have been debating its meaning. In general, subsidiarity refers to devolving governance acts to 
the most local level possible (i.e. the most local level that is able to achieve the objectives of 
 [235] 
 
through the several nonstate actors that engage in GHG under PPP and also 
under the umbrella-term of NGOs? I further discuss these issues below.  
2.2.1 Role of transnational NGOs and the public interest 
The role played by transnational NGOs in the drafting of the Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) underscores that transnational NGOs 
may or may not advance public interests; or may or may not exercise a public 
role. Specifically, it underscores that transnational NGOs can influence global 
social policy and PPP’s work, but not always positively.  
While the third sector is generally associated with benevolent, social work, 
NGO is an umbrella term that can host different types of organisations that 
engage with global health matters, such as tobacco control.   
Kelley Lee argues that coherence in global anti-tobacco policy was hindered 
by conflicts of interest introduced by the International Tobacco Growers 
Association (ITGA) during the drafting of FCTC.
39
 ITGA was founded in 
1984 as a non-profit organisation representative of the needs of tobacco 
growers worldwide. In fact, ITGA functions as a lobby organisation that 
advances the interest of the industry by giving it “a human face and a Third 
World grassroots voice.”40  ITGA’s attempts to hinder debate on global 
tobacco control policies demonstrate that one cannot assume that NGOs are 
acting on behalf of the public-interest, based solely on its tax status as a non-
profit organisation.  It also demonstrates that the classification of NGOs as 
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private may be accurate from a functional perspective, but it contradicts the 
societal functions that permitted tax breaks to be attributed to NGOs in the first 
place. Lastly, the ITGA’s episode demonstrates that the WHO and other UN-
based organisations gradually start blocking the input of representatives of the 
private interest (legally established either as for-profit or non-profit) in public 
health matters. During the drafting process, ITGA’s profile was revealed and 
the WHO blocked aspects of ITGA’s participation.41 
By not authorizing ITGA’s full participation in deliberative processes, to 
which nonstate actors were invited to, the WHO demonstrates capacity to 
assess the profile of a nonstate actor and its status function (whether it works 
or not for the public). On the other hand, by blocking participation, the WHO 
exercises its power as a traditional public organisation, running the risk to 
undermine democratic practices that are required in a frame of global 
governance.    
 The WHO stood its ground despite severe criticisms. The WHO’s attempts to 
block ITGA participation were grounded upon its international legitimacy and 
upon the collective relevance of the subject-matter. The WHO argued that 
tobacco governance, a public health matter, is already heavily skewed in 
favour of industries. Historically, the tobacco industry has had access to 
political and economic tools able to thwart tobacco governance for public 
health, at the national and at the international level.
42
 Lee, Bissell and Collin 
argue there is a continuum of “industry capacity to thwart effective tobacco 
control.” This includes the industry’s ability to preclude serious consideration 
of control strategies; defuse calls for public law approaches by using voluntary 
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The industry’s historical ability to prevent progress in effective tobacco 
control justifies the participation reservations posed by the WHO to 
transnational tobacco corporations. ITGA, for instance, only submitted written 
briefs in the process of FCTC negotiations.
44
 “Actors traditionally excluded 
from the State-centric politics of UN governance were heard in public 
hearings.”45 Corporations took this opportunity to suggest that the WHO was 
not a legitimate institution to initiate efforts to control tobacco. Although 
corporations used the language of subsidiarity to claim that tobacco control 
should be devolved to the nation-state, member-states not only recognised the 
legitimacy of the WHO as a global public entity, but also demonstrated 
willingness to differentiate between groups of actors usually bundled together 
as non-profit actors. Despite deceptive attempts to undermine this 
investigation, FCTC’s processes succeeded in bringing voices that are not 
usually heard into deliberation (thus attempting at levelling the playing field,) 
while giving less consideration to some of those who have been consistently 
heard, and who have benefitted for too long from a private orientation to 
health governance.   
Finally, the very “framework convention-protocol approach” demonstrates 
political skill (some would call it a type of political evasion) “resulting from 
the incremental nature of the process, and its ability to evolve over a long time 









horizon.”46 It also demonstrates that a global public sector needs to be 
envisioned as the product of long-term negotiations that will shape and be 
shaped by the evolution of an understanding of which levels of publicness are 
feasible. The proposed transition implies to move from an exclusive 
association of publicness with governmental mechanisms to include an 
association of publicness with mechanisms that involve new publics, 
especially those forming transnational coalitions around issues that relate to 
public agendas, such as issues identified as global public goods.  
The World Health Assembly, although increasingly aware of its functions to 
steer elements of new public health, is cautious when initiating a process of 
collectively deliberating about regulation of a far-reaching issue such as 
tobacco, with worldwide economic implications. Indeed, tobacco control 
affects growers and urban workers and their families, local and national tax 
revenues, national and multinational corporations in all continents. This 
diversity exemplifies the difficulty of consolidating a global public sector to 
administer, design and deliver elements of public health under a global level 
that is not grounded upon electoral politics. In reality the global level on its 
own does not rely upon any well-established criteria for public representation, 
or for establishing the global public interest.  
There is a need to better understand what configures global public interest, 
which could guide the formation and promotion of PPP that work for the 
public.  Kelley Lee and Buse, despite the general scepticism about 
corporations’ bottom-line, advocate for the involvement of business47 in global 
health governance, affirming that “where private governance [of global health] 
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is effective, is consistent with the public’s interest…”48 On the other hand, 
Barrett, Austin, and McCarthy find it difficult to reconcile profit-seeking 
agendas with the public interest, a conflict that is often present in the current 
operation of PPP.
49
 In general, GHG literature is divided concerning whether it 
is possible to conciliate profit-seeking with collective benefit.
50
 Put simply, the 
question whether businesses can form PPP that work for the public has not 
been adequately addressed in GHG scholarship.    
A preference for conciliation generally leads to an odd habit, which is to 
endorse business’s heavy involvement with health governance based on their 
capacity to deliver, regardless of their obvious profit-seeking objectives.  This 
preference has been propelled by the fact that both the commercial sector and 
the numbers of health problems facing governments are too large to ignore. 
Lee and Buse point out that a request for conciliation is not the same as to 
suggest that goals will be equivalent if public and private actors get involved 
with the same issue area.
51
 Hence, Lee and Buse do not consider necessarily 
problematic the difference in objectives that are known to exist between the 
private and the public entities now forming PPP.  
I find this difference very problematic, when one considers that most of the 
regulations concerning PPP are not hybrid regulations, but private-oriented.
52
 I 
also find it problematic because of the political characteristics of the global 
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level. Businesses looking for maximization of profit should continue to use the 
national forum (in which routine procedures and safeguards abound) to 
participate in the political process, lobby, and play the important role they play 
as private entrepreneurs. They should not take the NGO seat in global PPP.  
The global public domain should be open for business in very specific 
circumstances. It has a fragmented public (organised through multiple publics 
largely represented by transnational NGOs and partnerships); it needs to 
provide goods and services of collective nature; it requires a frame of global 
governance, hence of self-steering, and not of elected government. Because of 
these characteristics, the interventionist position of the WHO, which was 
heavily criticised by private and public organisations, regarding the 
participation of tobacco transnational corporations in the writing of the FCTC 
may be indeed justified. It matters more when one considers the several tactics 
employed by companies in different types of public forums to block global 
governance frameworks and global tobacco policy.
53
 This destroys trust, and 
there is nothing to do with a sense of shared fate: with getting together to do 
something together.  
In the context of encouraging engagement with PPP, the WHO has already 
limited the participation of stakeholders that are known to act in the private 
interest when the private interest is widely-acceptable as harmful, including 
the epidemic of tobacco-related diseases.
54
 While an interventionist position of 
the WHO may reinforce its role as a traditional international player, it may be 
necessary in this early stage of GHG, which tries to conciliate the agendas of 
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several actors. In this sense, WHO mediation is necessary to reinforce the 
global public role that transnational NGOs and corporations should play if 
engaging in PPP for public services. The rule is that transnational NGOs will 
work for the public, but exceptions exist. Enhancing publicness in global 
governance implies higher scrutiny of partners’ profiles and agendas. If 
partners exercise a public function, they should not fear scrutiny, but cherish it. 
Higher levels of assessment of partners’ roles (if private or public) may open 
better avenues for political organising at the global level, allowing IGOs and 
transnational NGOs to build new forms of cooperation for steering.  
2.2.2 Role of the commercial interest 
One of the main issues at the core of innovation in health governance relates to 
how GHG deals with private agendas that can be deployed by a number of 
actors, from PPP to commercial firms or transnational NGOs.
 55
 At the outset, 
it is important to mention that, as things currently stand, partnerships, NGOS, 
or the commercial sector can represent similar low levels of global publicness. 
In other words, while companies are the authentic representative of the private 
sector, hybrid partnerships and NGOs can also be used to advance commercial 
or other private agendas, undermining their relationship with the public 
interest.  
There are not effective criteria to evaluate whether global public service 
governance organisations are operating with either reduced or enhanced levels 
of publicness. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify signals and craft 
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mechanisms to help us check the commercial interest in activities exercised by 
nonstate actors, like companies and NGOs, in the context of public services.  
Instruments like the Human Rights Guidelines for Pharmaceutical Companies 
in relation to Access to Medicines (hereafter called the Guidelines) aim at 
checking the commercial interest of pharmaceutical companies when they 
engage with public health services.
56
 The Guidelines, while recognising that 
the main actor responsible for increasing access to medicines is the State, also 
reflect that pharmaceutical corporations “help deliver the right to health. They 
save lives [… and] with this role comes responsibilities – and companies must 
be held to account in relation to those responsibilities.”57 The Guidelines help 
to give content to those responsibilities, by recommending that companies 
“take all reasonable steps to make the medicine as accessible as possible, as 
soon as possible, to all those in need, within a viable business model.”58 The 
author of the Guidelines himself, UN Special Raporteur Paul Hunt, 
acknowledges that the Guidelines combined with a business model are not 
enough to realise the content of the human right to health, and to bring public 
traditions to GHG.  
On a written exchange of ideas promoted by the Public Library of Science 
(PLOS) Medicine Debate in 2010, the question whether drug companies are 
living up to their human rights responsibilities was posed to the former UN 
Special Raporteur on the right to the highest attainable standard of health, to a 
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representative of the pharmaceutical company Merck, and to Harvard public 
health researchers. All of the respondents answered that pharmaceutical 
companies fall short from fulfilling their human rights responsibilities. All of 
them deploy arguments that related to more accountability, but accountability 
is envisioned in very distinct ways. Gruskin and Raad, from the Harvard 
School of Public Health, and Paul Hunt request higher levels of assessment, 
including public-type of  assessment mechanisms.
59
 Merck’s perspective is 
that companies already do important things towards realising human rights, 
but could do more on a voluntary basis, using a corporate social responsibility 
approach (The Merck Perspective).
60
  
I am most interested in Hunt’s suggestion for a global safeguard. This measure 
is justified based on a complex understanding of the right to health as 
including service provision.
61
 It also takes on pharmaceutical companies as 
responsible partners for quality and quantity of provision. Suggesting, for 
example, that an office of the Ombudsman could be established to check 
corporate activity in GHG, he challenges corporations to accept public-type of 
oversight. Hunt comes close to suggest a reciprocal relationship between the 
public and private spheres.
62
 It seems possible to infer that Hunt suggests that, 
if pharmaceutical companies are coming into the delivery of essential 
medicines, some government traditions should make their way into the 
pharmaceutical company. 
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Specifically, he suggests that:
 63
 
If a company is serious about its responsibilities to society, why not 
establish, for example, a corporate Ombuds
64
 with oversight of its 
right-to-health responsibilities relating to access to medicines? 
… 
If others [courts, States, companies] fail to act, a consortium of civil 
society organisations should appoint a panel of well-respected global 
leaders, supported by a small but properly resources secretariat, to 
monitor the policies and practices of pharmaceutical companies and 
hold them publicly accountable for the discharge of their right-to-
health accountability mechanisms, then civil society must take the 
initiative. 
Hunt’s call for a global civil society Secretariat and Ombudsman is similar to a 
call for the insertion of public traditions in global governance and, for this 
reason, very significant for this thesis. Scholars have called for public 
traditions to guide especially the governance of essential medicines.
65
  
Ideally, pharmaceutical reform via global governance would dwell on the 
immorality of patent rights (a private law resource) over seeds and 
pharmaceuticals that are vital to people’s wellbeing. Pharmaceutical 
companies generally envision reforms through voluntary, social 
responsibilities measures that aim at giving back to the community. IGOs look 
at pharmaceutical reforms from a regulatory perspective that aims to cap profit 
from essential medicines and guarantee that essential medicines can be made 
available in all countries. Even if international mechanisms have been in place 




 I assume that Hunt adopts the term Ombuds to refer to ombudsman or to an Office of the 
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to guide reform, such as the regular enforcement of the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), access to essential 
medicines continues to be one of the major challenges in GHG.
66
 Actual 
access to EMs requires more than isolated community projects or stronger 
trade policies, but integration with the work of local health agents, better 
distribution infra-structures, and worldwide affordability.
67
  
In order for essential medicines to be available to all, pharmaceutical 
companies would have to let go of their most profitable patents, even if these 
patents could imply the death of thousands of people elsewhere. Thus, it 
requires a major change in how the market and government see their roles in 
global governance: the company generally sees its role as private; the 
government generally sees its role within its national borders. In addition, the 
circumstances that shape the moral values of those who run pharmaceutical 
companies also contribute.  
Moral values that relate to a context where social and cooperative psychology 
is predominant (i.e. the global public domain,) rather than a meritocratic and 
individualistic context (capitalist nations) may also be associated with 
enhancing global publicness. Only when companies and governments 
understand the type of context in which GHG is embedded, including the 
characteristics of the types of bonds that make sense of the global public 
domain, they will develop global health policy for essential medicines that will 
enjoy higher levels of publicness. Similarly to what happens with Hunt’s 
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Guidelines, opening up access to essential medicines also depends on the 
ability of bringing public traditions into the work of corporations. 
There is “much lament about how evil corporations are putting profits above 
people, above health, above animal welfare, above the environment.”68 And 
these laments may be based on true facts about negative effects of corporations 
in the organisation of social life. However, complaints and critiques are 
usually misdirected.
69
 The root of the evil lies not in corporations themselves. 
It resides in how society regulates and incentivises entrepreneurship and 
profit-seeking activities within areas that are part of the social realm (which is 
populated by issues that should be decided and acted upon collectively).  In 
other words, the problem resides in a societal lack of ability to make corporate 
acts of social governance more public. For example, governance acts that 
interfere with access to essential medicines are situated in the social realm and, 
hence, should be made public. This task is even more difficult at the global 
level, where democratically debating, publicising, regulating, and holding to 
account are also acts of governance. They are acts of collective responsibility 
and there is no government to help us out.  
In issues of global public concern, such as essential medicines, corporations 
need to be incentivised, monitored and brought into responsibility regardless 
of the national, commercial and tax laws that regularly apply. The global level 
needs tools of its own to be able to take advantage (thus for global public 
goals) of what multinational companies have to offer. At the same time, those 
groups that generally are not invited to steer, including small businesses, 
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grassroots organisations, and transnational organisations working with 
minority rights need to be called to steer within governance frameworks. In 
this sense, the market can be an active actor in global public service 
governance if it is part of an arrangement of self-steering and channelled to do 
what is good for society.
70
 While this is a philosophical argument, even small 
steps towards bringing the work of pharmaceutical transnational companies 
into the global public realm may have important repercussions on the ground.   
The assumption that there is room for the commercial sector to profit from 
global governance strategies is not settled and requires further thought. A 
productive way to think more deeply about the role of the commercial sector 
and of the private interest is to engage in much-needed dialogue about the 
current functions of PPP for health, and their ideal legal and political status as 
public or private or mixed enterprises.  
2.2.3 Final considerations about nonstate actor participation in GHG 
Nonstate actors have influenced or transformed all the global health campaigns 
analysed in this research project (discussed below). Questions about the actual 
benefits of nonstate activity remain open, especially whether beneficiaries of 
global campaigns benefit equally, or benefit as they should. A similar question 
is whether nonstate actor presence is able to democratise, improve or originate 
new services, when compared to what traditional arrangements usually 
achieve. If not why to let go of the welfare State for provision of health 
services?  





As the role of the private sector grows in delivery so does the discourse for 
more accountability measures.  Accountability measures may become valuable 
tools for the global public sector, but they are not the same when applied to 
public services understood from a global public perspective. Actually, 
accountability at the global level may as well serve as a measure for the 
cooptation of publicness and not the enhancement of it.  I will argue more 
extensively in the next chapter, following the work of political theorist Jane 
Mansbridge,
71
 that accountability is almost an empty concept at the global 
public level. Yet, ironically, it is at this level that the concept has been 
articulated the most. While the global public environment, in which it is 
immersed remains poorly understood, with murky legal and political roles, 
standard accountability as a concept is virtually inoperable.
72
 It should not be 
the one default principle used to authorize action of a public nature, that will 
affect, in one way or another, the world population.  
There is a need to design mechanisms that undermine the deeper, ethical 
challenges that emerge when transnational nonstate actors, commercial or not, 
get involved with the provision of the most basic services, such as child 
welfare – from birth to school. The language of public-private partnerships is a 
reminder that the dominant presumption is that governance in public services 
does not need to follow public principles. In this regard, transnational actors, 
just as international specialised agencies, may take advantage of the political 
shield of the nation-state.  In fact, when it comes to analysing partnerships for 
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public services little is said about their political responsibilities. In other 
words, there are few opportunities to discuss the political responsibilities of 
actors who are exercising functions that presuppose political authority.  
Many hybrid alliances, based on qualitative analyses of case studies conducted 
by health specialists and presented below, have been beneficial. Most 
beneficial partnerships have, to some extent, engaged with social movements. 
Consequently, successful partnerships have been part of historical struggles for 
adequate health provision for different constituencies, such as in the case of 
Polio, TB and HIV/AIDS campaigns. Nevertheless, it is important to 
understand that not all hybrid alliances will be beneficial. I suggest that the 
GHG partnerships we need more of are those that recognise their duties and 
responsibilities as global public actors, consciously enhancing the levels of 
global publicness in their programs and policy responses. For instance, hybrid 
alliances which provide health care to assist vulnerable groups of the Global 
South and of the Global North are urgently needed. I envision, for example, 
global partnerships to provide basic health care for global immigrants, 
attending service workers from the United States to Dubai. Thus, while there 
are many roles that should be played by the private sector in hybrid alliances, I 
agree with scholars that argue there should be little room for the private 
interest to be factored in GHG decision-making and provision. The main 
purpose of PPP in this context is that they work for the public.
73
 This is one of 
the most important debates in GHG. It is also relevant for a general debate of 
global publicness in global governance as new institutions are developed to 
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finance programmes in public health, like the Global Fund to Fight Against 
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.   
2.4 The Global Fund 
The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (or simply The 
Global Fund) represents an innovative means to finance global governance 
projects; financing is a very important aspect of global governance of health 
services. The Global Fund has emerged from the need to re-invent 
development financing, and it has adopted a language that showcases its 
attention to new publics:
74
 
The Global Fund represents a new approach to international health 
financing.  
… 
As a partnership between governments, civil society, the private 
sector and affected communities, the Fund works in close 
collabouration with other bilateral and multilateral organisations, 
supporting their work through substantially increased funding. 
Among other activities, The Global Fund is currently the main funder of the 
Partnership to Stop Tuberculosis (TB). Since 2002, it has been able to increase 
exponentially the levels of funding to global TB treatment schemes.
75
  
For instance, in four years of financing the Global Campaign to Stop TB, the 
Global Fund has been invaluable in the production of important results. 
                                                 
74
 UN-ECOSOC Innovation Fair Database “The Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and 
Malaria” (2009) Office for ECOSOC Support and Coordination 
<http://esango.un.org/innovationfair>.  
75
 The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria Results with Integrity: the Global 
Fund’s Response to Fraud (April, 2010) section 1, 4.  
 [251] 
 
According to the 2010 report on Global TB Control, key mechanisms financed 
by the Global Fund are:
 76
 
… the Global Drug Facility (GDF), Green Light Committee (GLC) 
and TBTEAM, which facilitates countries' access to a network of 
technical partners and competent, well-coordinated technical 
assistance. 
These mechanisms developed through a ‘network of technical partners’ 
generated the following results:
 77
 
1.8 million TB/HIV services provided - a 150 percent increase since 
the end of 2008, contributing to the decline of TB prevalence and 
mortality rates in many countries. 
Approved TB proposals totalled up to US$ 3.2 billion covering 112 
countries. This contributes 48 percent of the projected coverage 
required to achieve the Stop TB Partnership targets for the detection 
and treatment of new smear-positive TB cases. 
The Global Fund provides 63 percent of the external financing for 
TB and multidrug-resistant TB (MDR-TB) control efforts in low- 
and middle-income countries - it is the major source of international 
funding for tuberculosis. 
It is likely that if the Global Fund had not been established to directly finance 
TB services, these results would not have been achieved. Although, similar 
transformations have been observed in HIV/AIDs control, the malaria effort 
led by the Global Fund is lagging behind.
78
 Malaria treatments have only 
recently expanded globally. Reasons for the delay include high cost and chain-
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of-supply challenges in the production of the type of therapy needed ( 
Artemisinin-based combination (ACT)) . Yet, despite these difficulties:
 79
 
... the Global Fund is presently the single largest funding source for 
ACT procurement worldwide, funding an estimated 264 million 
treatments through its fifth funding round. Analysis of global ACT 
financing indicates that the Global Fund is responsible for funding 
approximately 70–78% of all public sector ACT procurement. 
Despite of the expansion and improvement of the Global Fund priority areas, 
the Fund has been critiqued for its quantification of health goals and strict 
single-disease focus.
80
 There is also a concern that the Global Fund is not 
autonomous to choose its funding priorities and policy interventions. The Fund 
follows the will of its major donors (which are both private and public). This 
may undermine considerations about which countries or policy-areas need 
funding the most. In this sense, the Global Fund may reproduce the same 
problems of international development funding, when following the agendas 
of large countries or large foundations. These agendas may include diplomatic 
retaliation and maximisation of economic gains. This preoccupation refers to a 
concern with low levels of publicness. Yet, from an operational point of view 
the Global Fund is innovative; its status as public or private is murky (and here 
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global public-private partnerships as the Global Fund.  For more on this matter see Davinia 
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The critique that refers to the Global Fund’s status, as neither public nor 
private, is relevant because it promotes wider discussions about publicness in 
GHG. First, it reflects that the challenge of enhancing publicness goes beyond 
including nonstate actors in the process of governance acts, in this case 
funding. It also reflects that while the Global Fund has promoted more service 
delivery, delivery does not necessarily mean that services have reached those 
who needed them, those who needed them the most, or in the way 
beneficiaries needed them. In fact, while GHG in general has enjoyed more 
global public service delivery, there has been relatively low levels of interest 
in the quality and publicness of these new services. 
These challenges, which are fundamental in a debate about enhanced 
publicness, enhanced self-steering, and successful global social governance 
will become more apparent when specific GHG policies are analysed.  
III Examples of GHG Policy   
3.1 The Millennium Goals and Global Health 
Primary Health Care (PHC) has become more prominent in the agenda of 
IGOs given the fact that six of the Millennium Development Goals are directly 
related to health. The WHO considers health-related MDGS as the following: 
MDG 1 (eradicate extreme poverty and hunger); MDG 4 (reduce child 
mortality); MDG 5 (improve maternal health); MDG 6 (combat HIV/AIDS, 
malaria and other diseases, which have propelled the creation of the Global 
Fund) MDG 7 (ensure environmental sustainability) and MDG 8 (develop a 
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global partnership for development).
82
 MDGs 1, 4, and 5 are directly related to 
the establishment of functional PHC systems.  
The MDGs have engendered UN-system action, especially led by the WHO 
and the UNDP. The WHO and UNDP have used the three spheres of action 
identified in the second chapter to conduct global health work. They have been 
influential in reshaping public administration traditions, in transforming global 
social policy, in an increasingly generating new ways of service delivery. They 
have assisted nation-states to create more PHC programmes, such as family 
health programmes, they have engaged with nonstate actors to design and 
provide immunization and adequate nutrition, as well as construction of 
sewage and water systems, and they have directly delivered services when 
necessary (like in the case of WHO work in Sudan.)
83
  
                                                 
82“Health Related MDGs” (2010) World Health Organisation 
<http://www.who.int/gho/mdg/en/index.html>. 
83
 In Sudan, the impact of global humanitarian work on public services has been profound. 
With the start of conflict in Darfur at the end of 2003, a humanitarian emergency was triggered 
and spread throughout Sudan. Since then, the WHO, largely because of the conflictious 
situation, implemented a focus for its work that includes direct health-policy making and 
service provision. More specifically: 
 As of October 2004, up to today, WHO focusses on: 
 The completion of the physical rehabilitation [of health care facilities] 
 The introduction of the Rational Use of Drugs policy, according to the national 
essential drug list and according to international standards. Training of pharmacists 
and clinicians in this list forms an essential part of this. 
 The enforcement of the referral system aims to decrease the workload by enhancing 
the Primary Health Care centres network and transportation facilities. A medical 
referral form adapted to the specific IDP situation, is to be used as a two-way 
communication, including the tracking of patients. 
 The capacity building of the hospital management (both at federal and State level) 
 Introduction, or where already existing, enhancement of Health Information 
Systems.  
Global governance in public services in Sudan and through global humanitarian work more 
generally requires further research. For this project, I chose to leave out how humanitarian 
work helps to build a global public sector and shape public services. Clearly, there is an 
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The MDGs have contributed to increasing global stewardship in social policy 
making.
84
 Unfortunately, deep-rooted inequalities and country-to-country 
differences challenge the capacity of global actors to meet the 2015 deadline. 
Besides, the origin of the MDGs as an exclusive quantitative project, with 
internationally set benchmarks, has been demonstrated to sometimes 
exacerbate the weight of inequalities rather than undermine it.
85
 Yet 
mechanisms of global PHC governance have been further developed precisely 
in the context of MDGs. There are more mechanisms pretty much everywhere, 
but the benefits of these mechanisms seem to vary exponentially from country-
to-country.
86
 Two examples are the provision of nutritious food through 
technical networks organised by the World Food Programme and the 
Partnership for Maternal, Newborn and Child Health.
87
 While maternal health 
perhaps represents the most challenging part of the MDG strategy, political 
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mobilisation has increased in the last two years, especially under the auspices 
of UNDP administrator Helen Clark.
88
 
The Partnership for Maternal, Newborn and Child Health (PMNCH)  is an 
important 21st century mechanism of global governance, which was born out 
of MDG 4 ( improve maternal health) and MDG 5 (reduce child mortality). It 
is also a good example of a mechanism of GHG that does not refer to a 
dreadful epidemic, but to basic issues concerning the health of mothers and 
children. As the Partnership demonstrates, not only epidemiological services 
have been transformed by new governance mechanisms, but also basic 
services such as pre-natal care. Transformations in basic health services have 
been more intense given the MDGs. Below, I use the area of maternal health 
care as an example of how the governance of primary care has changed as a 
result of MDGs. 
According to the WHO, 10 million mothers and newborn children die each 
year from preventable causes.
89
 In this context, the partnership has a large task 
at hand to achieve MDGs 4 and 5. It includes six priority actions: from 
tracking progress and doing advocacy to the development of a hands-on 
package of interventions. This package of interventions relates to technical 
                                                 
88
 Helen Clark "The Millennium Goals: Ten Years Down, Five to Go" (speech to the general 
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 The Partnership for Maternal, Newborn and Child Health (PMNCH) “New Global 
Consensus on Maternal, Newborn and Child Health to Save Over 10 Million Lives” (2009) 




assistance to public administrations, supply-side services, and also relates to 
demand-side, which is developed via community outreach.
90
  
In April of 2010, a group of experts and representatives of the partnership 
deliberated about specific interventions. They varied from prevention and 
treatment of eclampsia with magnesium sulphate to the provision of rotavirus 
vaccines for prevention of rotavirus diarrhoea.
91
 During the same meeting, in 
New Delhi, the constituencies of the Partnership presented their “Statement of 
Commitments” at the closing session.  The NGO and the Academic, Research 
and Training constituencies produced statements around the principle of the 
right to health; the idea of universal access; and the objective of promoting the 
health and survival of all the world’s women and children.92 The NGO 
statement also made a commitment to implementation which includes the 
strengthening of local capabilities “to develop, adopt, scale up” proven 
interventions and “to develop, test, and evaluate innovative approaches, 
including modern information and communication technologies to deliver 
essential, high quality health and social services and information, especially 
for marginalized and vulnerable groups.”93 In the same Summit, both 
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constituencies pledged their support for action and accountability. This 
Statement exemplifies the emergence of another pattern in GHG that has 
gained momentum with the revitalisation of primary care as a main concern of 
MDGs: NGOs are more often, and more overtly, committing to providing 
services. Besides, they seem to have acquired better means of doing so.  
The MDGs, as the example of maternal and child health demonstrates, have 
contributed to promoting policy debates about the importance of primary care 
as part of a global health strategy.  But there is little evidence that the MDGs 
will succeed as main drivers of partnerships that work for the public. New 
alliances have been created to work towards the MDGs, including new 
arrangements inside of the UNDP and UNDESA (which is the case of the  
PMNCH). They are now responsible for debating important issues of global 
primary care.
94
 With these new arrangements, however, the WHO’s role is 
said to have been dangerously reinterpreted to achieve the MDGs, which 
decreased significantly its capacity and willingness to exercise its public 
function of setting norms and standards and of re-establishing political debates 
about health.
95
 This emphasis on MDG achievement, thus, has the potential to 
exacerbate the lack of political and ethical leadership that plagues PPP 
working in health under the field of Development.   
The text of the Millennium Declaration does not ignore the problem of the 
developmentalisation of health. It recognises that “in addition to our separate 
responsibilities to our individual societies, we have a collective responsibility 
                                                 
94
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to uphold the principles of human dignity, equality and equity at the global 
level” (citation omitted).96 In effect, the MD inspires a global public sector that 
is quite different from the services being provided by the international 
community to achieve the MDGs, one of the most popular mechanisms of 
global social governance today. Yet the content of the Declaration and the 
recent lessons learned through the MDGs project give hopes that a more 
holistic approach (other than an international, developmentalist targets-based 
approach) to global social challenges may complement the MDG project in the 
near future, or revisit it all together.  
3.2 GOARN and the Control of SARS 
David Fidler explained, in his study of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
(SARS), that global governance is generally envisioned as the best way to 
address the threats posed by the communicable diseases of the 21st century.
97
 
This is grounded upon the fact that no organisation alone is able to contain 
microbial pathogens, and a concerted effort that goes beyond the international level 
is needed.
98
 This fact became more salient in the context of controlling the 
2003 SARS outbreak.  
The control of the SARS outbreak in 2003 and the creation of the Global 
Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN) are cited as landmarks in 
the setting up of post-Westphalian governance in public health.
99
 Fidler, whose 
work I borrow from to introduce an analysis of SARS and governance, 
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explains that “during the response to SARS, GOARN electronically linked 
some of the best laboratory scientists, clinicians, and epidemiologists” forming 
a “united front against a shared threat” to effectively control a disease that was 
new and poorly understood, with no effective vaccine or cure.
100
 In this 
context, SARS was controlled by a new way of working, which is 
characterised by the participation of “not only States and intergovernmental 
organisations but also nonstate actors, such as NGOs and multi-national 
corporations” in the governance process.101 As GOARN, many health 
governance mechanisms today include nonstate actors and differ from 
interstate mechanisms of a few years ago.
102
  
Efforts used in the control of SARS produced positive results: the containment 
of the 2003 outbreak in four months and, equally important, a framework of 
governance that could work without a regulatory and legal apparatus in 
place.
103
 As reported by the former WHO Executive Director of 
Communicable Diseases, David Heymann:
 104
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The coordinated international response to SARs under GOARN 
followed a proposed new way of working under the International 
Health Regulations (IHR), the set of international legal rules that 
provide the WHO its mandate for global infectious disease 
surveillance and response. The IHR seek to ensure maximum public 
health security in the face of the international spread of infectious 
diseases, but the Regulations have not kept pace with the nature of 
the microbial menace.  
The handling of SARS was new compared to how epidemic control had 
previously been handled inside of the WHO. For instance the 2003 SARS 
effort acknowledged the existence of International Health Regulations (IHR) 
but overcame it, by updating the regulations just after the outbreak was 
controlled. The regulations, at the time of the outbreak, had last been revised 
in 1969. The IHR have been since revised to accommodate many of the 
practices adopted by the WHO in the context of SARS, avian influenza, and 
HIV/AIDS. Currently, member-states are required to report the diseases 
originally covered by the IHR– cholera, plague, and yellow fever – and other 
EIDs; nonstate actors also contribute to the reporting process.
105
 Therefore, the 
SARS new way of working promoted, as a consequence, the formation of new 
publics around epidemic control: laboratories, scientists and community 
centres, all working towards advance the control or eradication of diseases. 
These actors revealed the need for new regulation, which came after the fact. 
The WHO resorted to these actors, despite of the incompatible regulations in 
place, as the only way to provide much-needed global public services related 
to communicable disease control.  
In this fashion, the SARS experience reflects some of the elements of global 
governance theory, which emerged in International Relations one decade prior 
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to the outbreak of SARS in 2003. In this regard, the most important fact is that 
WHO practices have highlighted the diminished relevance of formal laws and 
regulations to guide global level action. SARS, an epidemic that “reinforced 
the mutual vulnerability of societies to microbial threats,”106 is considered the 
first dangerous pathogen to emerge in a “radically new governance 
context.”107 Thus SARS control was marked by the availability of new 
technologies and the facilitated and recognised communication with nonstate 
actors. It was also incentivised by the exacerbated fear of microbial organisms 
associated with new diseases and terrorism,
108
 which opened up new political 
possibilities for joint action, interstate and beyond, despite the limiting WHO 
regulations in place at the time.  
There are specific characteristics of SARS (and they seem to happen in the 
context of other communicable diseases) that make possible the creation of a 
conducive political environment to the specific goal of achieving disease 
control. SARS in 2003 was a new “virus [that] spread efficiently by 
respiratory means” from person-to-person. There was no diagnostic, 
therapeutic, or vaccine technologies available. The speed and volume of air 
travel as a force of globalisation was increasingly high and a “global havoc” 
was generated by new infectious diseases imprinting a sense of urgency in 
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These characteristics of SARS reflect that GHG in high-profile communicable 
diseases has triggered responses based on a sense of emergency, rather than on 
a long-term interest in improving public health. This has shown mixed results 
ranging from successes in controlling isolated outbreaks, including the 2003 
SARS outbreak, to impoverishing basic public health infra-structures, which 




3.3 The HIV/AIDS Global Campaign 
The Global HIV/AIDS Campaign was able to undermine some of the 
challenges associated with the conflict between epidemiological versus basic 
care, and between short and long term health goals. Participation of 
transnational nonstate actors and international entities have been mediated by 
the UN via the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS). 
UNAIDS, in turn, has relied upon national programmes for delivery and for a 
discrete application of global social policy; national programmes have listened 
to and relied upon a range of civil society movements and organisations. These 
organisations advocated for the creation and distribution of antiretroviral drugs 
for all, often articulated as a realisation of the human right to health. 
The HIV/AIDs global campaign is unusual because is said to have “effectively 
spearheaded a larger global health agenda” due to a combination of security 
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rationales (pushed by nation-states) and claims for social justice.
111
 The 
HIV/AIDS movement benefitted from the advocacy of high-profile artists, 
fashion icons, progressives and thousands of other minority groups around the 
world, which not only brought awareness and compassion to the plight of 
HIV-positive individuals and those living with AIDS, but also demonstrated 
that HIV/AIDS was a major challenge to the world community as a whole. 
The HIV/AIDS movement also involved a material component, which 
provided disposable needles, condoms, distribution of antiretroviral drugs for 
many, public education, and other services to populations of many races and 
social classes. With its discursive and material components, the HIV/AIDS 
movement reflects the formation of global publics, and a growing demand for 
global public services that are able to respond to transnational claims.  
UNAIDS, for example, has used transnational NGOS, national governments, 
and transnational drug companies to “build a health infrastructure that 
provides affordable drugs to insure that combination therapies are used 
appropriately.” 112 In fact, the HIV Drugs Access Initiative started as a pilot 
programme in which a few developing countries joined UNAIDS’s co-
sponsors to make antiretroviral drugs more available to their population. 
UNAIDS has managed the effort that started in 1998 with the support of five 
pharmaceutical companies: Bristol Myers Squibb, Glaxo Welcome, Hoffmann 
La Roche, Organon Teknika, and Virco N.V. Meanwhile, national 
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governments also joined the initiative by creating drugs advisory boards under 
their Ministers of Health. And non-profit companies acted as a “clearing house 
for placing orders for bringing drugs into the country as the channel for 
subsidies from companies.” UNAIDS’s role was not only to coordinate all 
actors and to decide which drugs were most needed, but also UNAIDS was 
responsible for providing part of the funding and logistical support.
113
   
This 1998 pilot initiative became one of the pillars of the Global Aids 
response, which has helped millions of people to access treatment. In fact, 
providing “universal access to antiretroviral therapy for people living with 
HIV” by 2015 is a main goal of the current UNAIDS strategy.114 While 
opening up access to treatment and drugs is one of the most important health 
interventions of the Global AIDS response led by UNAIDS, there are other 
specific health programmes targeting prevention. For instance, the WHO (one 
partner of UNAIDS) is conducting efforts for HIV prevention such as male 
circumcision, which is said to reduce in 60% the risk of heterosexually 
acquired HIV infection in men.
115
 For instance, the WHO:
116
  
… scaling up male circumcision programmes in the 13 priority 
countries of sub-Saharan Africa. As of January 2010, over 133 000 
male circumcisions had been done in six countries providing data on 
service delivery.  
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Yet the main strategy of the Global Response in regards to controlling 
HIV/AIDS is based on universal access to treatment. This demonstrates the 
affiliation of the Global AIDS response with the Millennium project and also 




Several organisations in the UN family—notably WHO, UNICEF 
and the World Bank—have for many years had both individual and 
joint programmes to increase access to basic drugs in various parts of 
the world. As mentioned earlier, the WHO Action Programme on 
Essential Drugs (DAP) and UNAIDS are currently developing a joint 
UN action plan to improve access to drugs for people living with 
HIV/AIDS. 
TB has also benefitted from emphasis on drugs distribution. The Global Drugs 
Facility (GDF) was created as a mechanism of the Stop TB Partnership. The 
Drugs Facility aims at increasing “access to high quality tuberculosis (TB) 
drugs,” and it is housed by the WHO headquarters in Geneva and “managed 
by a small team of the Stop TB Partnership Secretariat.”118 The Secretariat is 
responsible for receiving expressions of interest from potential vendor-
manufacturers, conducting evaluation of proposals, and coordinating 
purchases and distribution.
119
  It is expected that the GDF may increase its 
jurisdiction to provide access to drugs to other highly infectious diseases and 
to improve child and maternal health.
120
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Finally, another mechanism related to global drug provision is the Global 
Alliance for Vaccination and Immunization (GAVI). GAVI has been crafting a 
global strategy for procurement and distribution of vaccines in order to reach 
children in need of immunization around the world, part in the developing 
world.
121
 GAVI manages its own fund (the GAVI fund) and its own Geneva-
based Secretariat.
122
 GAVI is an innovative partnership that provides a range 
of services related to drug distribution, including immunisation strategy and 
policy, drug development, and worldwide delivery. It is a partnership that 
openly states its engagement with the functions of policy-setting and public 
service delivery. The partnership includes a range of actors, from the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation, to national governments, research and health 
institutes, agencies of the UN family, and independent researchers. GAVI, 
through the alliance of a range of global and local actors, could work to reduce 
the gap between the opportunities to get vaccinated in the Global North and in 
the Global South, undertaking a type of world-equality activism that is part of 
an emergent global ethics.   
The creation of a range of mechanisms to distribute drugs globally, following 
the success of the Global Aids response, demonstrates that aspects of drug 
provision have been relocated to the global level since the 1990s. Globalised 
aspects refer to the globalisation of essential medicines; medicines to control 
the spread of infectious disease; and medicines to increase the quality of life of 
those infected with high-profile diseases such as HIV/AIDS. Similar to 
GAVI’s claim that vaccine intervention is a legitimised public equity 
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intervention, it is suggested that distribution programmes should be measured 
against their relationship with the promotion of “equitable public health 
intervention[s].”123 By doing this, distribution of drugs can play a significant 
role in global public service governance. It is a robust example that specific 
delivery practices have been developed from the global level, especially after 
the 1980s, when HIV/AIDS called the world’s attention to pandemics. And, 
equally important, global drugs distribution represents a new form of public 
provision, given that global distribution schemes have been, in part, designed 
to address the shortcomings of the mainstream pharmaceutical industrial 
model and the lack of resources at the national level.  
3.4 Global Initiative to Eradicate Polio 
The objective of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) is the 
“production of polio eradication.”124 Polio is a highly infectious, person-to-
person disease.  
The global campaign to eradicate polio has included a range of actors: from 
governments, to the American Civil Rights Movement, to a global 
mobilisation of local Chapters of Rotary Club International.  
GPEI has been documented as an effort “correlated inversely with a country’s 
income,” requiring “massive and sustained efforts over a 5-10 year period.” 125 
The “production” of polio eradication involves the private sector, through the 
donation of personnel, vehicle, and money to assist in mass vaccination. It also 
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includes a global network to collect data and to standardise laboratory 
practices, especially in diagnosis.
126
  
Rotary is considered to be one of the most remarkable of all polio eradication 
partners, including the WHO, UNICEF, and governments. Rotary helped 
vaccinate millions of children around the world. In very few countries the 






Rotary International, the private sector service organisation, which 
has played a central role in this global initiative through its 
“PolioPlus” Program and 1.2 million volunteers worldwide. Rotary 
has not only been central to the mobilisation of financial resources 
from donor governments, but will also have contributed nearly US$ 
600 million of its own resources by the end of 2005.  
The classification of Rotary, if public or private, in this global effort is 
relevant. Rotary is generally considered a voluntary charity with influence in 
several public sectors. Rotary chapters all over the world generally represent 
privileged groups united to promote a social agenda that is agreed upon by its 
members. In this context, Rotary’s operations are of a private nature. Rotary’s 
chapters, in the context of GPEI, however, have played a very important 
global public role, which should be more widely acknowledged. One of the 
main advantages of this type of recognition is to expose the political 
responsibilities that should be attached to these types of roles. Rotarians all 
over the world voluntarily joined GPEI and contributed enormously to its 
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success. Yet the debate about the responsibilities of Rotarians, and other 
people doing similar work in the public realm, deserves more attention. 
Rotarians, and other volunteers, engage in governance acts without discussing 
possible political and legal implications.  
A pattern in the work of GHG actors, especially those mainly built around 
volunteers, can be inferred from the analysis of governance in communicable 
diseases: there is a general lack of awareness by private charities of the global 
public role they play; of the responsibilities acquired by actors performing 
public functions. Although the exact implications of these roles are not well-
known, there is a self-explanatory character of public activities that can serve 
as guidance.  
When the campaign for the eradication of polio started in the United States, 
many people perceived the private foundation that led the campaign efforts as 
public, and the perception encouraged donations.
129
 Today, I speculate that 
most people would consider that, for example, the Red Cross  performs a 
public function, if not perceived as a public entity.
130
 These wide perceptions 
of publicness could serve as guidance to define what roles and actors should 
be reconsidered under a global public perspective.  
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As argued in the first chapter, global public status entails prerogatives of 
participation in acts of social governance, but it should also entail political and 
economic responsibilities. A discussion of global public function and status of 
global charities like Rotary and the Red Cross could impact the ways in which 
local divisions and chapters set their agendas and organise social services 
around the world, like immunisation and others related to the campaign against 
Polio.  
Polio eradication has yet to be globally achieved. Four countries still remain 
endemic and the disease has found its way again to re-emerge in other poor 
nations.
131
 This fact, I argue, does not impair the status of GPEI as an 
important global governance mechanism. Although GPEI is yet to achieve 
global eradication, it can be considered ground-breaking, from a governance 
perspective. It is a broader effort when compared to the SARS effort. Despite 
its relative success and massive participation of volunteers, the global effort 
has failed to address the polio needs of some non-Western, least developed 
countries. 
The countries that continue to suffer with polio are countries that also suffer 
with stereotypical images of poverty and cultures as more or less prone to 
infectious diseases.
132
This is true, for instance, in regards to India, a country 
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that has suffered with both neglected diseases, including polio, and pervasive 
stereotypes related to poverty.  This fact reinforces the idea that in order to 
achieve more effective forms of global governance, one needs to understand 
and deconstruct stereotypes that circulate at the global level. Arguably, a larger 
debate about framing diseases (as of the poor, or the rich; the white or non-
white; the immigrant or resident) may facilitate action towards eradicating 
polio once and for all. The importance of breaking stereotypes, which relate to 
poverty and sickness, for global health governance is discussed later in this 
chapter. In a nutshell, studies about how perceptions and stereotypes inform 
decision-making (called framing studies) matter because they can assist social 
governance actors to choose governance priorities and set agendas more 
equitably.  
3.5 The Global Campaign to Stop TB 
The global campaign against TB is a product of the ideological and technical 
transformations of the 21st century. Leading partners have been influenced by 
cosmopolitan and social justice discourse, and have openly addressed ethical 
issues, considering absurd that until the year 2000, two million people per year 
still died of TB.
133
  
TB has recently been chosen as the object of a global campaign, in spite of 
1990s WHO’s top-down efforts, via which a number of developing countries 
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were selected to receive internationally developed treatment schemes.
134
 When  
WHO was addressing TB cases outside of a partnership format, its 
interventions fell short of attending the needs of patients contaminated with 
both HIV/AIDS and TB, and also of those who were contaminated with 
multiple-strain TB, a drug-resistant form of TB.
135
  
WHO’s Directly Observed Treatment with Short-course Chemotherapy 
(DOTS) in developing countries transitioned from a vertical strategy to being a 
part of a broader campaign, in which several actors pulled resources together 
to control TB. DOTS started as a classic example of the WHO undertaking 
“vertical” interventions within countries. Bi-lateral agreement between the 
WHO and one affected country proved to be insufficient to control TB, despite 
of its localised success. Until the beginning of this century, worldwide, half of 
the individuals in need were still not receiving treatment, even though DOTS 
had proven to be more effective than the treatment made available by national 
systems.
136
 The successes and limitations of DOTS, as policy and provision, 
led the WHO to expand its TB work by forming the Partnership to Stop TB. In 
2006, a global campaign to stop TB was already in full motion. DOTS 
continues to be the heart of the Stop TB Strategy.
137
 DOTS encompasses 
sustained financing, case detection and bacteriological monitoring, 
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standardisation of treatments, patient support, an effective drug supply and the 
management of drug distribution, evaluation and impact measurement.
138
 
At the outset, and now as part of the Stop TB campaign, WHO promotes 
DOTS through five principles, all of which denote a high level of concern for 
TB as a collective health issue:
 139
 
WHO, other UN bodies, and private organisations harness 
government commitment and funding to sustain TB control 
activities. 
WHO and nation-states lead case detection … among … patients 
self-reporting to national health services…  
WHO, NGOs, and States provide and administer standardized 
treatment regimens lasting at least 6-8 months…, with directly 
observed treatment for the initial 2 months.  
WHO and the Global Fund secure a regular, uninterrupted supply of 
all essential anti- TB drugs. 
WHO is responsible for standardized recording and reporting system 
… (citation omitted) 
Through these five principles, the WHO-led Partnership has been successful in 
reducing mortality and morbidity among patients. It has also contributed to 
weaken the chain of TB transmission. According to Kim and others, the 
Achilles’ heel of DOTS (before managed by the WHO-led partnership) was 
that it had not been implemented fast enough, reaching only 27% of the 
individuals affected by the disease by 2003.
140
 Before 2003, DOTS was 
vertically provided by the WHO, representing a traditional international 
service. Then, it moved to rely on a global partnership model, engaging more 
actively with principles of self-steering.  With the partnership model, the 
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WHO capacity to carry DOTS forward has been significantly enhanced by a 
range of private actors and IGOs that are now part of the Partnership.  
DOTS as a global social policy relates to the three spheres of UN public 
service action identified in Chapter 2. It involves UN policy-making 
(designing campaign strategies like the inclusion of nonstate actors in the 
process); delivery (the chemotherapy treatment); and the influencing of 
national health administration (actively engaging the State in the containment 
and monitoring of the disease).  
From a historical perspective, DOTS is also important because it highlights the 
insufficiency of traditional (national and international) public responses, and 
the capacity of global partnerships to fill the gap. To what extent this is 
effective, and how much global publicness the Stop TB campaign will be able 
to materialise can only be observed over time. For now, it is important to 
highlight that the transition from an international to a global project has 
yielded positive results. 
The Partnership has been significantly more effective than WHO’s vertical 
policies in its capacity to design and implement policies for countries where 
the M.Tuberculosis has become resistant to drugs (drug-resistance strains).
141
 
For those countries, DOTS requires 12-24 months of a costly treatment that 
neither the WHO’s budget nor the country’s budget alone can afford or 
execute.  Hence, the most important accomplishment of the TB Partnership 
has been to bring resources together to address the needs of patients 
contaminated by drug-resistance strains. This has proved to be impossible 
under international or national governance frameworks.   
                                                 
141
 World Health Organisation and Stop TB Partnership, above n 134, at 14-17. 
 [276] 
 
From 1998 to 2004, WHO complemented its DOTS programme with modest 
policy guidance to poor countries learning how to deal with multiple-strain 
contamination. Before 2004, concerns with costs prevented global TB efforts 
from emerging. The vertical approach that guided TB control until 2004, 
similarly to the securitist approach used in the SARs context, yielded limited 
but positive results in terms of offering better treatment and controlling the 
disease in specific countries. Although DOTS has been considered “one of the 
soundest interventions of any kind for countries struggling to pull themselves 
out of poverty,” DOTS proved to be insufficient to stop TB when executed 
outside of a global governance framework.
142
  
Today, the partnership relies upon DOTS as a service strategy and DOTS 
continues to rely heavily upon the WHO. Nevertheless, it is now part of a 
global campaign.  The WHO provides strong leadership in this area by 
offering services itself and coordinating several types of actors working on the 
ground, in governments, trans and internationally to stop TB.
143
 More 
importantly, the Partnership to Stop TB demonstrates that public service 
processes can indeed be generated by the global level and benefit from a 
concept of public service that involves actors other than States and IGOs.  
While preserving important roles for the nation State and international 
organisations, as key partners (often mediators) in global public service 
governance, the Partnership has been concerned with creating  links between 
its work, and a new type of publicness.
144
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The 2010 Report of the Sixth Meeting of the Subgroup of Public-Private Mix 
(PPM) for TB Care and Control
145
 showcases the depth of the Partnership, 
which counts with a range of organisations, from grassroots to the Global 
Fund, and individuals from entertainers to civil volunteers taking TB control to 
diverse sectors of society. For example, the report argues that the size of PPM 
in TB control is yet to be fully measured. Its wide reach, however, is already a 
fact:
 146
   
Countries in the South-East Asian Region have been able to 
successfully involve hundreds of public, private, voluntary and 
corporate institutions and thousands of individual providers in TB 
care and control. Social security organisations are major 
collabourating providers of TB care in the Region of the Americas. 
In the European Region, prison health services play an important role 
in TB care delivery and also, PPM is seen as a key instrument to 
improve treatment success by ensuring patient-centred care. Almost 
all countries have been using ISCT [International Standards for 
Tuberculosis Care].  
 
With this large amount of innovation and actors involved in TB control, the 
PPM subgroup of the Partnership has highlighted that “combining 
collabouration with regulatory approaches may help in more effective and 
faster” PPM interventions.147 The regulatory approach includes WHO’s 
International Standards for Tuberculosis Care  (ISTC) and also complementary 
methods championed by States, such as “restricting access to anti-TB drugs as 
done in Ghana, Tanzania and Brazil” in order to control when these drugs 
should be used; requiring certification and accreditation of care providers 
linked to national systems or insurance providers; and requiring mandatory 
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notification of TB cases.
148
 This approach, which has been pushed by the 
private actors themselves, recognises the publicness of the same actors’ 
activities and initiates the construction of a public structure, not only to 
regulate, but to hold together the global public service of TB control, whose 
main objective is “progressing towards universal access to quality TB care.”149 
In fact, this mix of collaborative with regulatory concern is a material 
illustration of how some public services will be managed in the future. Hence, 
one of the recommendations of the PPM subgroup to Ministries of Health is to 
introduce and document the above-mentioned complementary mechanisms. In 
this fashion, accreditation of private providers, TB case notification, and 
restricting anti-TB drugs to be sold only to authorised care providers are 
policies that suit well the global public sector and that have already been 
initiated by members of the global Partnership. 
The Partnership took on TB control and improved it. As it moved control from 
the international to the global level, from the traditional global public domain 
to the re-constituted global public domain, it divided tasks and expanded 
services.  
Since successful TB control depends upon transnational TB treatment 
schemes, delivery efforts concerning TB have been largely dealt with by actors 
other than the State or its international envoys. Global actors were able to see 
TB in a more holistic way, targeting various stains of TB, carrying forward 
longer treatments, and also applying a more structural view of the disease, 
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using an approach that considers the social determinants of health (SDH).
150
 
Second, the expansion of DOTS towards a global campaign is in fact a 
convergence of “political commitment, surveillance, prevention and 
treatment.”151 The  Partnership, by Expanding DOTS and creating a 
partnership for policy and delivery, increased the global publicness of its 
policy responses. Today, it reaches more people more effectively, while it still 
remains connected with the WHO, and the traditional public powers that entail 
from its inter-state affiliation. These powers remain important and contribute 
to enhancing publicness in TB control.  
The Partnership, however, goes beyond inter-state powers. For example, it 
relies extensively on the Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria 
and on the Gates Foundation for financing the expansion of DOTS.
152
  The 
variety of agents involved with TB governance is another characteristic of the 
change in approach to TB control, from vertical international intervention to a 
global partnership approach.  
3.6 The Alma Ata Framework and Primary Health Care  
The Alma Ata Declaration has been considered a blueprint for effective global 
health governance for the 21st century.
153
  
The Declaration of Alma Ata recognises health as a fundamental human right, 
enforceable by the nation-state; it considers people as the “prime movers for 
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shaping their health services”; it sees public health linked to various other 
social issues and constituted by areas such as water, housing, sanitation and 
nutritious food.
154
 Alma Ata considers that health involves promotive, 
preventive, curative, and rehabilitative components. According to Alma Ata, 
health services need to be universal and reaching the underserved. They need 
to use medical technology that conforms with cultural, social, economic, and 
epidemiological needs of the affected population; they need to use essential 
drugs in generic form in order to avoid that medicine becomes a threat, rather 
than a resource to preserve life and quality of life.
155
 
In fact, the content of Alma Ata seems to match well with a vision for public 
health which is based on social determinants of health.
156
 The Alma Ata model 
devolves health jurisdiction to local communities, and approaches health as an 
ethical challenge that goes beyond absence. It also engages little with 
quantification of health, preferring socially-embedded methods.  
The socially-conscious prescriptions of Alma Ata, a document that was a 
“watershed in the concepts and practices of public health as a scientific 
discipline” were a result of the welfare ideology and power alliances that were 
forming throughout the 1970s.
157
 Alma Ata commitments did not survive the 
“sea change in national and international” power equations though. The end of 
the Cold War and the increasing influence of the Bretton Woods system 
reduced the Health For All agenda to a few basic care policies “on the basis of 
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virtually no scientific data.”158Alma Ata is now more than 30 years-old. Just 
recently it was revisited by academics and by the WHO’s renewed effort on 
Primary Health Care (PHC), which was launched in virtue of the 2008 World 
Health Report.
159
 Upon launching the 2008 World Health Report, an annual 
publication of the WHO, its director, Dr. Margaret Chan, explained the 
meaning of a PHC approach. In her words:
 160
  
Primary health care is a people-centred approach to health that makes 
prevention as important as cure. As part of this preventive approach, 
it tackles the root causes of ill health, also in non-health sectors, ... . 
According to Dr. Chan, a PHC approach is needed “now more than ever” both 
because the world is going through a financial, fuel and food crises with great 
impact on health and because gaps in health outcomes within and between 
countries are greater than in 1978. This is true, despite the progress that health 
in general has made in aggregate terms, for instance, elevating life expectancy 
in seven years.
161
 Also, Dr. Chen reinforces that the current trends in health 
governance follow a policy of commercialisation of health. She warns to the 
fact that society should not repeat the mistakes that were made in public health 
dealt with as a domestic issue; she is in fact warning of the failures of 
governance as it has played out in the national terrain:
162
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In the recession that followed the Declaration of Alma-Ata, major 
mistakes were made in restructuring national budgets, with 
reductions in health and other fundamental social services. Health 
care has still not recovered from these mistakes, and the bill has been 
extremely high. This is especially true in sub-Saharan Africa, but also 
in large parts of Latin America and Asia. If history tends to repeat 
itself, can we not at least learn from the past and avoid repeating 
mistakes? … But health systems will not automatically gravitate 
towards greater fairness and efficiency. This world will not become a 
fair place for health all by itself. Deliberate policy decisions are 
needed.  
It seems that, discursively, Dr. Chen implies that the global level is implicated 
in assisting States to restructuring, while also contributing, on its own right, to 
a better redistribution of health.  
By reading about the WHO’s recent embracing of primary health concerns, it 
is possible to detect a few trends in terms of scope and division of labour that 
not only revisit the Alma Ata framework, but also expand it.
163
 The first trend 
refers to certain elements of the public health apparatus that seem to be more 
easily migrated to new public arenas, built outside of governments and 
recognised as such (i.e. routine vaccination.) A second trend relates to very 
specific areas in which there is a roll-back of the State in health. In this regard 
there is an effort by national and international organisations to increase 
government provision at the community level by implementing health 
programs related to family care (e.g. reinvigorating the image of the family’s 
doctor).
164
 While these suggestions are scattered in the health literature, they 
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are seldom based on evidence or structured deliberation. A better 
understanding of the scope of activities and of the division of labour among 
global actors, including WHO partners, is needed, especially because the focus 
of health governance gradually expands towards primary health care. 
Many mechanisms of global governance in PHC are related to the work of 
transnational organisations such as the Red Cross, religious networks and 
Doctors without Borders, especially working to promote access to medicines 
or medical care to those in need, within or outside humanitarian 
catastrophes.
165
 In addition, transnational PHC also originates at the grassroots 
level, where organisations often absorb functions that should generally pertain 
to governmental programmes, when these government structures have their 
capacities diminished.
166
  In fact, in some countries, FBOs provide up to 70%  
of a country’s health care.167  
These facts expose both the importance and the complexity of frameworks like 
Alma Ata, which are able to bring the diversity of public health needs under a 
long-term vision of both preventative and curative strategies. Alma Ata, 
nevertheless, is a framework that, albeit available, will have to be revisited to 
involve different levels of governance, governments and individuals. It will 
have to be revisited to include the range of actors that are now involved with 
public health. While Alma Ata has not been used as much as it should, it can 
be used today as background for the crafting of a much-needed, broader 
framework for health governance.  
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IV Facilitating Global Governance: Intrinsic Characteristics in the 
Field of Health 
The abundance of GHG actors, mechanisms and policies has not happened by 
chance. It is a result of a historical battle for universal health and for securing 
wellbeing. There are intrinsic characteristics of global health as a policy-field 
that, arguably, facilitate the development of relatively successful global 
governance frameworks. These characteristics may have the potential to 
enhance global publicness of GHG policy responses.  
The list of characteristics discussed below is not supposed to be exhaustive. 
Rather it is indicative of specific characteristics that function as incentives for 
collective action, likely making the field a more conducive environment for 
successful global social governance frameworks to come forward. For 
instance, the consolidation of GHG as its own disciplinary genre is first in the 
list. Theoretical work includes a range of concepts that have guided 
practitioners and significantly advanced more effective forms of health 
governance on the ground.  
4.1 Consolidating GHG as an Academic Discipline 
In public health, there is a robust body of literature accounting for new 
processes and developing new theory in respect of governance practices 
occurring beyond, or in partnership with, the State. The new processes 
observed generally engage with disease-specific challenges; more recently, 
scholars have also observed global changes in respect of basic care for all. 
Global health is a broad theme that (differently from global education) already 
enjoys a disciplinary home. Together with the creation of institutions and 
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mechanisms of global health, multi-disciplinary research engendered the 
formation of GHG’s own field. The body of work conducted under the rubric 
of “Global Health Governance” or “global governance for health”168 is both a 
signal of growth and a source of influence of global health governance as 
applied to real situations on the ground.  
Scholars look at roles played by global actors working in public health and  
frequently take on advocacy positions.
169
 For example, they are concerned 
with the realisation of the individual and collective right to the best attainable 
standard of health, or with the roles played by the World Health Organisation 
(WHO) and its public-private partnerships for health (PPP), or with the larger 




Accordingly, academics identify two main uses of GHG:  
1) governance with a focus on communicable, infectious diseases, especially 
Emerging and Remerging Infectious Diseases (EIDs,) which include both 
high-profile diseases such as HIV/AIDS and so-called “neglected diseases” – 
those that disproportionately affect the poor.
171
 Governance that focusses 
mainly on high-profile pathogens is said to adopt a securitist approach to 
health (also called securitism).
172
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2) governance with a focus on Health for All, with primary care associated 
with development policies. 
Within these two broad areas, global health scholars have developed important 
conceptual tools.  
4.1.1 GHG Conceptual Tools: High Level of Applicability 
In the context of both communicable diseases – high-profile or neglected 
epidemics – and, more recently, in the context of primary care and Health For 
All, academics have developed conceptual and analytical tools of high 
practical applicability. Below, I showcase a few conceptual and analytical 
tools that have fuelled academic debate and engagement with GHG research 
and practice. 
4.1.1.1 Global Burden of Disease (GBD) 
An emerging ethics of GHG has increasingly informed global cooperation and 
has contributed to transforming the field into a more conducive environment 
for global governance.
173
 Global health ethics has contributed to the creation 
of important analytical concepts, including the Global Burden of Disease 
(GBD).  
GBD is the disease burden disproportionally carried by poor countries and its 
poorest inhabitants (also called the 90/10 divide.)
174
 Scholars point out that 
there are two main ways of dealing with GBD that are preferred by 
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practitioners, such as global philanthropists: 1) eradication of severe poverty 
and 2) access to vaccines, cures and treatments.
 175
 GBD has been used to rank 
where diseases have been neglected and which actions are more urgent. Polio 
has been one of the diseases analysed through a GBD perspective.
176
 GBD 
analysis is predominantly quantitative. The burden of polio, for example, has 
been disproportionally larger in South Asian and Sub-Saharan countries. 




Although GBD has been an useful concept, it is a complicated discourse. The 
discourse about global burdens carries an uncomfortable mix of ethics with 
quantification of disease suffering, places and peoples. A mix of economic, 
securitist, and ethical reasoning has permeated much of the discourse about 
global burdens of disease.  
A justification found on the website for the Global Campaign to Eradicate 
Polio (GPEI) is illustrative of the economic/ethical mix that surrounds 
justification for global action in health:
178
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In 2010, only four countries remain polio-endemic. This has 
prompted some to propose that the eradication goal should be 
replaced by one of ‘effective control’. However, economic modelling 
studies have demonstrated both the financial and humanitarian 
benefits of polio eradication. … 
The investment in polio eradication pays major dividends beyond 
preventing millions of polio cases. For example, the investment in 
polio has helped avert 1.25 million deaths through vitamin A 
supplementation and 2.3 million deaths through measles mortality 
reduction activities. Investing in eradication will facilitate the 
continued integration of the polio infrastructure and operations with 
other activities. 
This ethical-economic mix is carried into the concept of GBD and has 
informed policy-making and grant-making in the area of health.
179
  
The principle of GBD, although sharing both an economic and an ethical 
component, may be understood from a structural perspective. Here lies an 
interpretation that may help a range of actors (from practitioners to activists) to 
expand the utility of GBD as an analytical concept and a policy strategy. Using 
GBD to explore structural causes of disease and poverty helps society to  
understand why and how disease develops more rapidly and severely in one 
country in comparison to another, and why and how it affects certain 
populations more than others.  
Encouraging a structural view of GHG via GBD is an exercise that private 
foundations, such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, have engaged 
with. Also, racial justice advocates have longed engaged with public education 
campaigns to “reframe” the discourse about what causes disadvantage and 
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 Unfortunately, in the case of global burden of disease, many 
organisations, governments, and individuals do not assess that:
181
 
…given that the poor bear the greatest burden of the disease, it then 
becomes equitable for health care projects, and health projects more 
generally for the indigent, to be supported by governments, and/or to 
appeal to donors and/or philanthropists to support projects … 
As a means to expose structural inequalities and promote redistributive action, 
GBD has great room to expand and potential to help global governance 
succeed. However, for this to happen, the structural origins of global 
inequalities and, hence, burdens need to be better understood.  
4.1.1.2 Social Determinants of Health (SDH) 
Kelley Lee, in her analysis of GHG actors and mechanisms,
 182
 advances a 






... the conditions in which people are born, grow, live, work and age, 
including the health system. These circumstances are shaped by the 
distribution of money, power and resources at global, national and 
local levels, which are themselves influenced by policy choices. The 
social determinants of health are mostly responsible for health 
inequities ...  
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 Adopting this view is particularly useful when it comes to constructing global 
publicness in GHG. SDH have been considered transformative instruments of 
GHG, since they focus on public health as a collective issue shaped by and 
shaping other social factors.
185
 SDH is an important theoretical construction 
that reinforces the idea that the successes or failures of global social policy are 
dependent upon a myriad of social and economic factors. This structural 
perspective opposes an exclusively econometric view of health while pushing 
for a socially-driven reshape of the field. Lee explains that:
186
 
…the nature of contemporary global governance relevant to SDH 
cannot be described as a system per se. Rather, it is a set of 
institutions evolving from a base established in the 1940s, through ad 
hoc changes determined by changing circumstances, historical 
precedent and ideological orientation, and the current and historical 
unequal distribution of power and resources. 
 
SDH scholars initiated a debate about how institutional legitimacy for global 
health is based on attending to demands generated by particular circumstances 
of men and women living in community. These debates have informed some 
of the most traditional mechanisms of governance. For example, it has served 
to push changes within the WHO and has been responsible for the recent 
creation of the WHO Commission on the SDH.
187
 The creation of the 
Comission is an indication that the global level has begun to reflect upon its 
social role, when engaging with a broad-range of issues directly or indirectly 
related to public health.  
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For instance, just recently the SDH approach has been developed, and there is 
still little discussion about GHG social causes and effects, empirically or 
normatively. A socially embedded view of health is deeply inter-related with 
global publicness (which deals with inclusiveness, openness, and political 
authority disseminated and legitimised by social interactions.) Therefore, the 
further the SDH approach develops, the better may be the possibilities for 
enhancing publicness at the global level.  
But the SDH approach to health, which is intimately associated with a global 
public approach to health, is not the most predominant. Different discourses 
that prefer a biological approach to GHG heavily influence the study and 
implementation of GHG. GHG academics are especially divided between the 
SDH-types of approaches, and a more traditional biological school. The 
biological approach focusses on individual treatment and absence of disease. 
Individual treatment and absence of disease are recurrent themes in GHG, 
especially when it comes to the global governance of communicable diseases. 
The biological approach is preferred by governments and IGOs. However, the 
gradual interest in SDH shows that things are changing towards a perspective 
of GHG that is not only about absence of disease, but about the wellbeing of 
people in developing and developed countries.
188
   
                                                 
188 
One example of the gradual rise of the SDH approach is the success of the WHO 
Conference on Social Determinants of Health. The Conference brought together health 
ministers and officials from 125 member-states, representatives of the transnational civil 
society and high-level international officers, including WHO’s Director-General, Dr. Margaret 
Chan. At the end, leaders drafted the Political Commitment on the Social Determinants of 
Health. World Health Organisation “WHO Conference on Social Determinants of Health” 




4.1.1.3 Biological approach  
The biological approach to health is the most traditional. It has been influenced 
by neoliberal principles of individualism and state-minimalism, and had 
figured virtually alone in international health initiatives of the 1980s and 
1990s.
189
  In turn, it has also engendered many of the critiques against GHG, 
and also new scholarship and policy guidance, such as SDH. The backdrop of  
SDH critique  to a traditional approach is the disease-specific focus adopted by 
the WHO in the 1990s.
190
  Issues concerning SDH (as a theory) include the 
ability of a disease-specific approach to reproduce a sort of elitism that has 
plagued the provision of public services, and to fragment and weaken public, 
including WHO’s, responses to health challenges.191 The WHO discourse has 
recently become more sympathetic to SDH,
192
 a framework that pushes for 
interventions not only in epidemic control, but also basic care and infra-
structure, dealing with matters that are generally not treated as health-focus but 
that are vital, such as the provision of water.   
Even if the discourse of the WHO is now more integrated and concerned with 
a holistic approach to health (a positive impact of the Millennium 
Declaration),
193
 both the literature on global health and GHG policy still 
disproportionally focus on control of infectious diseases due to security 
risks.
194
 This is a clear pattern that can be spotted in the literature. It reflects 
that at the discourse level there is an emergent concern with an integrated 
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approach to health services, but health services are more likely to be developed 
on the ground when epidemiological disasters are about to, or have happened, 
following a biological approach. The WHO, following this tendency, has 
recently put in practice new services, new ways of working. However, the 
major focus is still specific communicable diseases. It is a focus that benefits 
the biological approach vis-à-vis other, more socially-embedded approaches.   
4.1.1.4 Global Public Goods for Health (GPGH) 
Smith and others theorised on Global Public Goods for Health (GPGH) in 
2003.
195
 They took as a point of departure the seminal work of Kaul and others 
on global public goods and analysed them from a public health perspective. 
GPGH theory dissects the meaning of public health goods at the global 
level.
196
 In addition, GPGH considers important public processes towards 
producing GPGH. These processes become global public goods themselves. 
According to Woodward and others, the two main GPGH are:  the “prevention 
or containment of communicable diseases” and the economic externalities of 
ill or good health. Using these two broad categories, the authors divide GPGHs 
into three subcategories “knowledge and technologies,” “policy and regulatory 
regimes,” and “health systems.”197 In this sense, the GPGH approach can be 
used to guide traditional development projects and international cooperation, 
as wells as the creation of global governance mechanisms.  
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The classic example of global public good for health is the global eradication 
of a disease, such as what happened with smallpox and what has been 
attempted in the case of polio.
198
 Achieving eradication generally requires a 
globally concerted effort.
199
 In a sense, Woodward and others transformed the 
theory of global public good in regards to health by posing important questions 
related to access and quality, going beyond health technologies. Their main 
focus with GPGH theory is “whether, and how best, it can be used to advance 
the health of poor populations, especially those in poor countries.”200 Since 
2003, innovative governance interventions have used GPGH especially to 
think about global health beyond new microbes, and beyond research and 
pharmaceutical patents.  
According to Smith and others:
 201
   
…their paradigm for GPGH can be used as a “framework focussed 
on the problems of, and possible solutions to, collective action at the 
global level. As such, it can unify often-disparate disciplinary 
approaches, such as the legal, economic, and medical. It also allows 
the presentation of a coherent argument to complement “traditional” 
aid, and as such may be a powerful tool for advocacy.  
Finally, the authors signal that the global public goods debate needs to secure a 
space within “the wider array of international approaches to the funding and 
provision of health for the benefit of all.”202 In this sense, the function of the 
global governance framework is similar to the function of GPG as constructed 
by Woodward and others in health. Accordingly, the concept of GPGH 
developed by these theorists is more closely associated with one that would 
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suit global governance in public services. In this context, the acronym of 
GPGH refers to both the theory and also to  goods, which exhibit “a significant 
degree of publicness (i.e. non-excludability and non-rivalry) across national 
boundaries.”203 The authors defend that this concept will also diminish the 
problems with collective action, inferred as another component of the process 
of GPGH production. Hence, per se, the understanding and production of 




Although the concept of GPGH provides a better tool for global health 
governance than the traditional global public goods concept, it should not be 
used as a blue print to define GHG action. GPGH theory, in light of GPG 
theory, refrains from making an ethical assessment when defining what a 
global public good for health is. For example, Woodward, Smith, and 
Beaglehole suggest that GPGH concepts can only be applied to diseases of 
wide-spread territorial reach and risk for contagion. For example, they argue 
that controlling of malaria is not a global public good because it does not 
affect all countries. They define it as, at maximum, a regional public good, 
given that it is no longer a worldwide threat.
205
In this sense, the global 
approach follows a strictly territorial approach.  
The interpretation of malaria as a global public good is preferred. The 
inclusion of Malaria as a priority of the Global Fund speaks to the fact that an 
ethical interpretation of malaria as a global public good has overcome a 
territorial interpretation. A complete framework that can guide a GHG priority 
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area should go beyond the territorial criterion, but should look at structural 
causes of diseases, and the ethical questions that the incidence of certain 
diseases raise to the world community as a whole. In this regard, the combined 
use of the concepts of GPGH and global burdens discourse could be helpful.  
Mooney and Dzator question the utility of global public goods theory pointing 
out two theoretical flaws in the current framework: 1) a welfarist base (in the 
sense of ‘charity’, and hence individually oriented) 2) a lack of concern for 
altruism.
206
 As such, they argue that global governance is “one of the difficult 
issues” because one cannot define which sort of multi-actor government 
should produce GPGH, as well as “for which global public.” As it stands, the 
production of GPGH involves a myriad of private actors and goods, and the 
transition of these items to the “public domain” is not an easy one; for many it 
is not feasible. Mooney and Dzator defend that GPGH continues with the 
tradition of providing the poor with palliative frameworks. Frameworks like 
these might help the disadvantaged but at such a high cost that the benefit 
deteriorates or become marginal, especially in light of what could be achieved 
if a different framework were to be adopted.
207
  
Although not absolute, GPGH matters as tools for better ranking of GHG 
issues. GPGH  as a concept does not solve the main ethical challenges that 
face GHG but it has promoted advancements in the functioning aspect of 
partnerships, and in influencing the agenda of global health.  
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GPGH can assist, but it cannot solve complex issues of prioritization. Mooney 




The terms of trade whether it be in goods or in benefits (health and 
other) from GPGH, are set in a world of very unequal power or, what 
is the same thing, where the distribution of property rights is very 
firmly skewed in favour of rich countries. This is the key argument 
against free trade where free trade only equals fair trade if it is 
between more or less equal powers, or if there is altruism present in 
negotiations.  
The laws of trade can be analogised with a charity approach to global public 
goods, where the rich will dictate the rules of the provision, if “caring and 
commitment are absent.” In the case of global public service governance, this 
is also the case. Mooney and Dzator argue for altruism as a vital component of 
a global health framework, which they defend need to be different from the 
flawed GPGH paradigm. It is flawed because “there is no thought of duty, or 
commitment … the way forward is to build a caring world, and especially 
caring governments and caring institutions.”209  
Although Dzator and Mooney’s arguments may sound idealistic, they are 
actually more realistic, and more modest, than of those that suggest specific 
global level action without assessing “altruism and caring.” They are more 
modest because, at this stage, they do not try to suggest an operational magic 
bullet, but rather they aim at promoting a dialogue for the politicisation of 
these issues; for a wider and more democratic debate about globalisations and 
global public health. For example, Dzator and Monney suggest that the theory 
                                                 
208 
Ibid, at 236-237. 
209
 Ibid, at 237. 
 [298] 
 
of GPGH may benefit from a non-consequentialist approach in reappraising 
the relevant value base.
210
 Specifically, they suggest that:
211
    
… the notion of a constitution for health services might be useful in 
this context, even if until now this has been seen purely in terms of 
individual’s countries health services… Such constitution represents 
the value base on which the services might be built rather than the 
goals or objectives of the system.  
GPGH is not a values-full theory (and one of the main demonstrators is that it 
follows first a territorial approach rather than an ethical one), and originally it 
does not embrace a structural view of social needs. But it has been used to 
build mechanisms of global governance that, eventually, have gone through a 
values-based assessment. For this reason, it is suggested that GPGH remains a 
useful concept which can, despite its insufficiency, create opportunities for 
society to debate how to promote public health for all and other global 
common interests.  
4.1.1.5 “Framing” in GHG 
Only recently, “framing studies” emerged in GHG. Framing studies have 
become a relevant feature of a type of health constructivism that strongly 
impacts on global governance policy today. It has emerged within GHG in the 
last ten years and has been promoted by UNAIDS.
212
 This sub-field of GHG is 
concerned with “what determines whether or not global health problems 
become global priorities?”213 It is particularly relevant for the argument that 
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effective global governance depends upon a values-full assessment of ranking 
of global issues. Consequently it is particularly significant that GHG 
scholarship recently “drawing on earlier constructivist work on ‘framing’, has 
begun to examine precisely these issues and to develop more nuanced 
explanations of prioritization in global health.”214 The ‘framing’ literature on 
GHG becomes relevant to this thesis to the extent it facilitates a better 
understanding of the manipulation of frames and its consequences for 
governance. It exposes the relevance of socially constructed images of things, 
goods, services, spheres (private and public) in decision-making.
 215
 I argue 
that there is a connection between frames and the formation of global publics, 




For example, the way diseases are perceived and, consequently, framed 
demonstrates that global governance will always carry values into policy. The 
question is: which values are these? Values-full frameworks imply an ethical 
commitment to ending inequalities, and draw upon the human right to the 
highest attainable standard of health and broad social justice values that 
demand the end of discriminatory practices and stereotypes, which prevent 
patients from receiving equal treatment. The current values of global health 
governance may be those that reproduce stereotypes. Constructing new values 
is a long-term task.  
Scholars studying ‘framing’ in GHG have contributed to exposing the effect of 
stereotypes and have claimed for the inclusion of egalitarian values in 
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governance. As a result, they have facilitated global governance that is more 
inclusive and more global public. Critical scholars in GHG have pointed out 
historical moments, in which stereotypes were broken and more effective 
governance frameworks, thus, established. The HIV/AIDS Global Campaign 
and the trajectory of efforts against Polio are two examples of these historical 
moments.  
Today, the HIV/AIDS movement focusses on the regions where many still die 
of AIDS (Africa, South-East Asia and Latin America.)
216
 The HIV/AIDS 
campaign has promoted a type of humanization of the patient that will likely 
benefit GHG in general. By humanizing the patient, some HIV/AIDS 
campaigns emerging from the Global South – perhaps also benefiting from 
their longevity – have been able to approach epidemic control in more holistic 
ways.
217
 For instance, scholars observed during the Global Aids campaign an 
unprecedented use of human rights.  
At the outset, factions of this movement portrayed HIV/AIDS as a disease of 
the gay community.
218
 AIDS was linked to behaviour that was reproached by 
these same voices, hence unworthy of political and monetary investment. But 
HIV/AIDS was affecting communities that, despite discrimination and the 
burden of the disease itself, were able to mobilise and change the  imaginary of 
HIV/AIDS. Making a similar point, Sidibé, Tanaka, and Buse, writing the 
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Global AIDS governance is messy, comprising a wide range of 
actors with competing interests and ideas. We give prominence to the 
role of ideas and beliefs given the importance that framing has played 
in positioning the AIDS response, conditioning perceived State 
interestsi and perpetuating norms based on identity politics—in large 
measure due to the bio-political nature of HIV—but not going as far 
as fetishizing social constructivist approaches. (citation omitted)  
It is possible to infer from their arguments that in the process of framing HIV 
contagion and AIDS treatment as concerns of all, global governance 
innovations were able to be put in place. Sidibé, Tanaka, and Buse list five 
most relevant elements of UNAIDS-led campaign as currently established:
220
 
… enhanced global political commitment and accountability for a 
health-related issue 
… expanded political space for affected people, communities and 
civil society in the governance of a health-related development 
challenge 
… realizing the slogan of ‘health for all’ through global commitment 
to universal access to HIV prevention 
… the promotion of human rights beyond the right to health 
… novel arrangements to the global health architecture.  
 
The report’s list reinforces many of the points made in this thesis, especially in 
the first chapter, about global elements of publicness that should be involved 
in global governance. It includes the issue of politicisation, the empowerment 
of the affected communities as agents and their organisation into global public 
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spaces, and the need to find a social justice platform around which the 
initiative can be mobilised (for example, human rights). It also includes the 
aspiration to work at the delivery level to secure access for all, thus 
complementing a human rights discourse with service provision. In fact, the 
list above, written in December of 2010, facilitates the positioning of global 
HIV/AIDS governance as one initiative that is gradually undertaking 
considerations of global publicness, even if they are not articulated as such. 
These concerns, which are generally lacking in other initiatives, showcase a 
recently-launched search for global publicness in global HIV/AIDS 
governance, albeit not named as such.  In turn, the search for global publicness 
has been facilitated by transformations around the imaginary of HIV/AIDS 
“mainly driven by people living with or affected by HIV, that have remade the 
playing field for tackling other global challenges.”221  
The global campaign to end Polio has also benefitted from grassroots activism, 
which has contributed to the evolution of its image. However, the Polio 
initiative, like the HIV/AIDS movement, experimented with a range of 
political and economic processes before reaching its current configuration. 
Polio became a global issue just recently. Hard battles were fought at the 
national context, especially in the United States, for Polio to be understood as 
it is today: a highly infectious disease that affects all and that needs to be 
eradicated in all corners of the world as soon as possible.  
The changing ‘image’ of polio, from a disease that affected the poor to a 
disease that affected us all, has influenced global social policy in reference to 
polio eradication. As a result, the history of the global polio imitative becomes 
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a classic example of how framing (in this case of a disease and of patients) is 
one of the most important determinants of how global governance in public 
services will take shape.  
Eradication of polio in the format of a campaign that included many societal 
groups started in the United States. The history of polio eradication in the 
United States can assist in the assessment of important questions that 
eventually transcended United States borders.  
The campaign against Polio in the United States was launched by President 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt.
222
 Nevertheless,  it was mostly private resources, 
funds and volunteers, that carried the campaign forward.
223
 Private money 
funded research and pushed policy, while thousands of volunteers worked in 
health centres during national immunization days. Also, it was hard-fought 
battles on the ground that transformed the campaign into an inclusive effort, 
rather than a campaign motivated by a scared political elite (given Roosevelt’s 
infection) and by pre-conceptions of who was susceptible to the disease and 
worthy of treatment. Finally, in the United States and in the world, the fact that 
polio was characterized as mainly a children’s disease (rather than an adults’ 
disease) helped to motivate a myriad of organisations, such as the Rotary 
International, the Red Cross, Doctors without Borders, and governments via 
the WHO and their national health care systems to engage with the campaign. 
All of these efforts contributed to construe an image that, eventually, would 
put Polio on the global governance agenda. This image “made more visible the 
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narratives” of patients who have been historically unattended by national and 




A historical outlook of Polio demonstrated that openness and inclusiveness is 
not natural in global governance, but rather battled for, reinforcing Newmann 
and Clarke’s argument that publicness is “historically and socially variable” 
and that the construction of public matters “involves political struggles to 
make them so.”225  
Naomi Rogers’ critical analysis of Polio’s history in the United States226 
facilitates the understanding of how significant the images of disease have 
been to define the agenda of GHG in particular, and global public service 
governance in general. In the United States, Polio’s image was originally built 
as a disease of the “immigrant ghettos.” 227  With the contagion of Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt in the late 1930s, it started to be perceived as a disease of 
the rich and the blue eyed. The contagion of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, on a 
personal basis, jumped started the foundation of institutions to research and 
treat polio.  Due to legal segregation, treatment was mostly made available to 
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 Then, civil rights activism was able to push for the extension of 
Polio treatment to Black children and adults.
 
 
By investigating the changing images of Polio in the United States one starts 
to understand why a global polio governance initiative was able to be launched 
in 1988. The study of Polio includes historical markers such as Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt’s contagion, the opening of the National Foundation for 
Infantile Paralysis (also called March of Dimes campaign) and the civil rights 
claims for larger attention to Black Polio, in times of legal racial segregation. 
In the specialised literature, the question of why polio was chosen by world 
leaders and communities alike as a disease to be eradicated regardless of 
obvious political, monetary and technical challenges is not easily found. 
Rogers offers an important analytical window that highlights the importance of 
the image of Polio to how and when it was made object of public policy.  
This historical tracking reinforces the argument that the imaginary of a disease 
can provide a better understanding of how and why public service governance 
agendas are made. As images of diseases, peoples and things travel across 
nations, framing is also relevant for governance and agenda setting at the 
global level.   
4.2.Emergence of GHG Ethics  
Despite of the rapid advancement of GHG as a discipline, it is far from 
exhausting its opportunities for exploring new inquiries. For instance, GHG 
traditional literature focusses on the “architecture” of global governance for 
health, treating the ethical question as a normative question rather than 





constitutive of the phenomenon.  For most commentators, “global health 
governance includes not only States and intergovernmental organisations, but 
also nonstate actors such as NGOs and MNCs, as participants in the 
governance process.”229  
In the traditional literature, nevertheless, the “radical break” between a  new 
and a traditional system of health governance remains located on the 
participation of nonstate actors in steering and in the belief that nonstate actors 
are “legitimate actors in their own right.”230 This participation does not need to 
be qualified by public values; global actors may engage in global social 
governance regardless of the values they promote. I consider this an important 
but limited view of the content of GHG.  
Today, conceptual constructions of GHG do not include consideration of 
global ethical values. The lack of availability of a well accepted values-full 
theory of global governance undermines the likelihood of higher levels of 
global publicness to be engraved in the design and implementation of global 
health policies. Hence, the emergence of a GHG ethics is welcome and 
important from a global public perspective. 
A values-full theory of global governance emphasises global governance as 
self-steering. As such, it relates to its capacity of harnessing “openness and 
inclusiveness with regards to the actions performed in public spaces as well as 
the attitudes and values that define ‘public values.’”231 When participation of 
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nonstate actors in global governance is qualified by the promotion of public 
values, ground-breaking frameworks should emerge.  
A values-free interpretation of GHG is especially limited if global health is to 
represent the flagship service of an emerging global public sector. It asks too 
little about the role and responsibilities of nonstate actors involved with health 
policy. GHG ethics raises questions about the political and economic 
responsibilities of global health organisations, even if they have been 
important players in world health for years. GHG ethics reflect directly upon 
the challenges to operationalising global public status, a status that should not 
be voluntary, no matter how (financially or politically) independent an NGO 
can be or would like to be.  
An emergent global public ethics of GHG begins to question the means and 
the aims of transnational and international organisations dealing with health 
services. Global ethics as applied in this context departs from the premise that 
global health refers to collective health challenges: to diseases that concern 
and affect us all. It also relates to collective wellbeing: to policies and practices 
that are necessary transnationally to guarantee the type of healthy societies that 
we want. Global health ethics showcases the immutable collective character of 
global health issues, which necessarily require transnational cooperation to be 
adequately addressed. Analysis from a global ethics character does not want to 
harm or stop important global health projects; it draws attention to the 
immutably collective character of global health policies and services, and to 
the questions that this character raises. These questions begin to be applied to 
practice. Global ethics can be used as a lens to analyse the work of all global 




Ethical questions about services provided by the NGO Doctors without 
Borders/ Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) are good illustrations of the role of 
emergent ethical considerations in global social governance.
232
 MSF is one of 
the most acclaimed GHG actors; nevertheless its work has been challenged 
from a global ethics perspective.
233
 Its ethical dilemmas reveal some of the 
difficulties that arise with attempts to globalise social services outside of a 
well-constituted global public domain. It is important to explain that MSF is 
increasingly offering services outside of humanitarian emergencies, but rather 
related to primary health care. As MSF becomes a regular provider at the 
global level, new ethical questions emerge.   
For example, in 2006, they “treated 150,000 severely malnourished children, 
primarily with ready-to-use food, or RUF, a revolutionary new product that is 
radically changing protocols for responding to this devastating childhood 
disease.”234 This was the start of MSF´s global campaign against mal-
nutrition. In 2007, the organisation engaged in another global campaign that is 
directly related to primary care: a campaign against the giant laboratory 
Novartis for “its legal challenge to India patent law in order to protect the 
production of low-cost generic medicines.”235 This was the start of a larger 
campaign for cheaper and more accessible essential medicines worldwide.
236
 
Today, MSF´s emergency work is “only part of its current practice.”237 Its 
                                                 
232
 Fidler, above n 97, at 53-55. 
233
 See generally Peter Redfield “Doctors, Borders and Life Crisis” (2005) 20 Cultural 
Anthropology 338 at 335. 
234





 Peter Redfield “Doctors, Borders and Life Crisis” (2005) 20 Cultural Anthropology 338 at 
335.  
237
 Ibid.  
 [309] 
 
current practice has been significantly expanded. Its more than 2,000.00 
volunteer physicians and the 15,000.00 local staff feel that they can provide 
health care services to patients without sociological or political constrains.
238
 
Their principles for action are based on “humanitarian principles of medical 
ethics and impartiality.” 239Impartiality refers to its political autonomy. In this 
context, the type of impartiality that the organisation cherishes implicates lack 
of political responsibility and lack of concern with its sociological engagement 
with other actors. As it increasingly engages with primary health care, a 
traditional public service, impartiality is problematic. Since MSF plays a 
fundamental public role in respect of the wellbeing of people, it should be less 
impartial and more politically responsible for its acts. Besides, it should be 
concerned with the input of other actors. For instance, it is relevant that MSF 
prefers not to be associated with a broader political domain, a global public 
domain.   
Although their work has won a Nobel Peace Prize, their legitimacy to conduct 
health services in isolation (i.e. within the limits of one NGO) needs to be 
assessed. As one of the most important global actors, Doctors without Borders 
fails to engage in health governance from a public-policy perspective. 
According to Peter Redfield, “the sort of medical action pursued by MSF 
reveals ethical complications within this field of global crisis, including 
dilemmas of place and capacity in the aftermath of European empire, as well 
as the political limits of medical sensibility.”240  Redfield’s critique relates to 
important issues concerning NGOs’ independency and lack of political 
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responsibility because they engage with public service provision; the nature of 
their work is public. It also touches upon the fact that MSF may end up 
promoting its own policy and philosophy through vertical interventions rather 
than through global governance. For example, MSF is able “to extend norms 
of power in an effort to effect the government of health, but without any 
certainty of control as responsibility for rule is deferred by humanitarian 
organisations such as MSF to absent political authority.”241  
It is difficult to concretely assess the specific responsibilities that global public 
status would entail, and specifically to whom an organisation such as MSF 
should respond to, given the vagueness of the global public domain and the 
relative success of  global service delivery thus far. The work of MSF, 
according to Redfield citing Michael Foucault and Antonio Negron, “certainly 
contributes to the greater contemporary world order, forming part of an 
established apparatus for crisis response.”242 And I add that it certainly 
contributes to the consolidation of global health as a flagship service of a 
global public sector. However, issues considering independence and 
apoliticisation should be faced with care. Global public status should engender 
bonds of solidarity between provider and recipient, State and NGO, 
multilateral entities and NGOs, as well as shared responsibilities. These bonds 
of solidarity and responsibility challenge the type of apolitical, and 
sociologically independent position that is proudly held by MSF.  
The emergence of a global public sector seems to be inseparable from a 
tension between the autonomy of nonstate actors working solo, and their duties 
and rights as members of the global public domain.  The effective work of 
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MSF, which has made visible the health demands of many who otherwise 
would not have been heard or attended (thus enjoying some level of 
publicness,) could be improved in terms of its suitability to champion global 
public health services as part of a global public sector. The resistance to 
recognising a transition from humanitarian NGO to global provider is 
deliberate; MSF carefully “avoids wider governance” roles, even if already 
offers services in 80 countries, where it found the services to be inadequate.
243
  
These types of transitions could be facilitated and improved if the status of 
global public actor would be better understood, and if independence of action 
could be exchanged by publicness of action. It is hard to say whether MSF, the 
Nobel Peace Prize winner, will eventually situate itself as a global public 
actor, or if it will be accepted as such by practitioners, scholars, or global 
social policy makers. The same question is valid to many other transnational 
NGOs and public private partnerships.
 244
   
These political and sociological challenges have been present in the work of 
all other mechanisms of GHG studied thus far. They raise vital ethical 
questions. They speak to the issue of relative autonomy introduced in the 
second chapter. They also speak to the issue of division of labour and of 
responsibilities among global public actors and between these and the nation-
state.  More research and understanding of these issues are urgently needed, 
given the levels of global actors’ involvement in public health. In fact, 
especially nonstate actors’ increasing engagement with primary health care 
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requires that issues of political and sociological engagement be soon addressed 
as part of an emergent concern with ethics in GHG.  
4.3 Interconnectedness, Sense of Shared Fate and Securitism 
There are types of interconnections that are clearer in health than in any other 
public sector. More specifically, the fact that microbes cross borders and may 
affect any country in the world obliges countries to cooperate to control 
infectious diseases.  Due to its focus on security, this type of cooperation is 
called securitist. Securitism is based on obvious links and is the most studied 
type of inter-connection in global health. There are other links as well. For 
example, the effects of poor basic health care and poverty can be felt world-
wide; they come from underrated relationships such as between family 
planning and migration flows. Different types of interconnections, including 
but not only epidemiological, help to make of global health the most fitting 
environment for global governance in public services to emerge and flourish.  
The development of Social Determinants of Health (SDH) theory and the work 
of the WHO’s Commission on SDH demonstrate how health interconnections 
go beyond travelling microbes. These two resources (one conceptual and the 
other practical) show that interconnectedness in health has been debated 
beyond communicable diseases. Poor basic care has pervasive transnational 
repercussions, as it is linked with so many other social and economic 
variables. SDH debates have also had practical repercussions, where new 
mechanisms of governance not only lead the way in the control of epidemics, 
due to the threat they pose, but start to function as arenas hosting debates about 
the need for regular, basic health services to be provided globally.  
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GHG debates that do not concentrate on specific high-profile diseases are 
growing, but are still not predominant. The predominant objective of GHG 
remains epidemiological control. Without it, it is likely that advancements in 
global health would not have been made at the same levels. Yet an exclusive 
focus on high-profile diseases may be counter-productive. GHG has benefitted 
from the particular psychological, economic, and political circumstances 
generated by the scary world of communicable diseases, and within these 
environments, it has worked relatively effectively. The question as to whether 
this is sustainable, or whether this can be made part of a larger discourse of 
health as a vehicle for social justice, has been raised by the SDH literature and 
remains unanswered.
245
   
The successful 1970s global smallpox campaign and the 1988 global 
campaign to eradicate polio were the first mechanisms to engage with aspects 
of global communicable-disease governance, as we know it today.
 246
 Since 
then, global health governance has largely been associated with health 
securitism. GHG has been more about how to prevent dangerous diseases from 
travelling globally, than about addressing historical underprovision of health 
as a moral obligation, like the lack of adequate nutrition that plagues the 
African Horn and poor neighbourhoods around the world. 
While smallpox and polio campaigns did not directly make use of “threat” 
language, the campaigns for their eradication were largely successful because 
of a scared population, a scared group of high-level officials, who invested 
time and money to revert a dangerous prospect of mass contamination and 
                                                 
245
 Garret, above n 111. 
246
 Bernard Seytre and Mary Shaffer “The Death of a Disease: a History of the Eradication of 
Poliomyelitis” (Rutgers University Press, New Jersey, 2005) at 108. 
 [314] 
 
death.  Although these two campaigns involved nonstate actors and were, to a 
great extent, successful in controlling diseases, they also geared the attention 
of health governance to communicable diseases, and shifted resources out of 
primary care to complex care.
247
 For example, the pictures of disabled children 
who figured on the advertisements of the March of Dimes (the main funding 
mechanism in the Polio campaign) served a similar function in the 1960s and 
1970s to videos of airports and scared passengers wearing masks in the 2000s. 
These images mobilise people, institutions, and governments to act quickly, to 
fund campaigns, to buy medicine, etc.  
These types of rapid responses, although sometimes necessary, have not 
always proved effective. For example, scholars labelled the recent purchase of 
millions of boxes of the medicine Tamiflu (produce by the laboratory Roche) 
in the 2009 outbreak of H1N1 as a poor use of resources by some 
governments, given the short shelf-life of Tamiflu and doubts about its effects.
 
248
 Ironically, the fact that not all countries had access to a minimum amount 
of anti-viral drugs, such as Tamiflu, was also mentioned as one of the main 
challenges of containing H1N1.
249
 In any event, the benefits of Tamiflu have 
not been scientifically proven. According to findings reported by a multi-part 




 In short, the research shows that scientific evidence just isn’t there to demonstrate that 
Tamiflu prevents serious complications, hospitalisation, or death in people that have the flu. 
See the findings and discussion at Tom Jefferson and others “Neuraminidase Inhibitors for 
Preventing and Treating Influenza in Healthy Adults: Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis” 
[December 2009] British Medical Journal, 339.    
249 The Atlantic also ran a report on the BMJ’s research on Tamiflu. See at Shannon Brownlee 








Neuraminidase inhibitors comprise nebulised zanamivir (Relenza; 
Glaxo Welcome) and oral oseltamivir (Tamiflu; Gilead Sciences and 
F Hoffmann-La Roche)... Neuraminidase inhibitors do not, however, 
prevent infection or stop nasal viral excretion, so they may be a 
suboptimal means of interrupting viral spread in a pandemic. If used 
to contain a severe pandemic outbreak, neuraminidase inhibitors 
should be considered only part of a package of measures to interrupt 
spread, including physical measures.
 
 
A concern with the consequences of these findings (indication that Tamiflu is 
a suboptimal means to be used in a pandemic) from a  global governance 
perspective raises the following issue:
251
 
Governments, public health agencies, and international bodies such 
as the World Health Organisation, have all based their decisions to 
recommend and stockpile Tamiflu on studies that had seemed 
independent, but had in fact been funded by the company and were 
authored almost entirely by Roche employees or paid academic 
consultants.  
Issues such as this, which emerge out of the relationship between GHG and 
threats and emergencies, are closely related to global publicness (or the lack 
thereof). While epidemics continue to be addressed only when they are well 
advanced (and sometimes they will have to be) decisions tend to be made 
behind closed doors, and delivery mechanisms tailored accordingly, likely 
benefiting certain populations over others. The issue is not with rapid 
responses per se, but whether more democratic, network-types of apparatuses 
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can be made available. In the history of the control of Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS,) analysed in the previous section about 
GOARN, a mechanism was created to function as a hub for laboratories, 
scientists, governments, and the like to provide rapid input about the future of 
the control strategy.
252
  This is the type of apparatus that can make a 
difference, when rapid responses are needed and facilitated by a sense of 
shared fate among all nations of the world. In addition, it is important to 
remember that rapid responses to contain epidemiological threats should be 
made the exception of GHG practice, and not the rule.
 253
   
4.4 Strategic Use of Securitism in GHG 
Securitism as a concept may be used to expose that world interconnections 
created by scarce primary care, and not only by microbial threats, matter and 
can create a willingness to globalise health governance. 
There is agreement about the fact that epidemiological threats should not be 
the only object of GHG. There is so much less discussion whether, or how, 
fear of disease and a sense of threat can be turned into something positive for 
GHG.
254
 For my purposes, the question is whether a security paradigm can 
enhance levels of publicness in governance. What has been observed in the 
above study of mechanisms is that securitism has the capacity to bring States 
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and IGOs to cooperate with each other and with other nonstate actors, but it is 
not clear whether securitism brings elements of global publicness to the 
process of disease-control.  
The exclusive focus on high-profile diseases could even be harmful, since it 
directs political and financial resources away from public health in general, 
often harnessing resources to the health threats that affect the rich and 
affluent.
255
 The not-so obvious challenges, which generally do not affect as 
strongly the rich and affluent, are harder to govern from the global level, 
especially because they require a stronger moral commitment to be made 
global and public. For example, the fact that diarrheal diseases still kill 
millions today should be made global public not because it is an obvious 
hazard to many – but not all – countries of the world, but because it is morally 
wrong.
256
    
The call for global health to intervene in basic health care is of moral nature. It 
is about people who are unduly ill. With the advancement of rapid 
communication and multi-media resources of the late 20th-century, Global 
South leaders started advocacy campaigns defending that it is “an affront to 
our conscience” to grasp that the diseases that kill the most in the world are 
perfectly curable and preventable.
257
 The issue is how to link the moral 
obligation with the security concern, making visible the connections between 
lack of primary care and the emergence of new microbes.   
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By researching the characteristics of GHG, it is possible to infer that the area 
of communicable diseases is obviously of global concern. It is globally public; 
and securitism has contributed significantly to enhancing global visibility and 
a sense of shared responsibility for communicable diseases. There are 
facilitating characteristics in the world of communicable diseases that create a 
more conducive environment for political, economic, and popular forms of 
cooperative schemes to emerge. In this sense, the services provided by GHG to 
control epidemics are important mediums of global publicness. It has been the 
area in which innovative global governance policies and practices have 
emerged.  
GHG in communicable diseases following a securitist approach, even in the 
absence of altruistic and caring justifications, harnesses support to rapidly 
control a disease and save lives. But, will it be as beneficial as it could be in 
regards to other health goals (such as prevention) if the same efforts were 
brought forward under a more complex global public health approach, for 
example the Alma Ata framework (emphasising primary health care) instead 
of advancing a predominantly securitist framework? The answer here seems to 
dwell on the opportunities to use the appeal of communicable diseases to 
expand the debate.  
For instance, the research shows that the HIV/AIDS campaign helped to 
harness attention to the complexity of health and the emergence of structural 
propositions such as looking into social determinants for establishing 
prevention. It helped to consolidate the human right to the highest attainable 
standard of health as a viable platform for policy. It also helped to gauge the 
world’s attention to the pervasiveness of poverty, and consequently is 
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associated with the Millennium Declaration mind-set.
258
 With the momentum 
created by HIV/AIDs, the MDGs, and new theoretical constructions such as 
SDH, a window of opportunity was opened that, today, allows us to think 
about public health more broadly. It is also an opportunity to think about how 
GHG can use securitism to harness support for grave, structural problems 
related to the lack of primary health care worldwide.   
V Global Health: Medium of Global Publicness and Successful 
Global Governance? 
The mapping of  GHG (its institutions, policies, and its intrinsic 
characteristics) allows for important inferences about global health as a 
medium of publicness. It is suggested that the consolidation of public health 
services in communicable diseases, but especially in non-communicable 
diseases (which is beginning to happen) is a good indicator that aspects of 
publicness have been relocated to the global level. It also demonstrates that the 
global public sector is increasingly influenced by the pioneer work of GHG 
and by the global health demands made more visible in the 21
st
 century.   
As previously demonstrated, there are clear reasons for the rapid growth of 
GHG in communicable diseases, given the field’s global visibility, a sense of 
collective responsibility and, hence, a higher affinity with global publicness. In 
short, a growing number of services and higher affinity to global publicness is 
brought about by: microbial pathogens which do not recognise borders; people 
and governments both in the North and South feeling scared and vulnerable; 
and the necessity of concerted action among various actors and nations, which 
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otherwise would not be able to control travelling microbes. There are other 
less obvious factors building global publicness in global health.  
The promise of GHG as a flagship global public service comes from its 
potential to conciliate priorities in the area of communicable diseases with a 
long-term global primary health care strategy.  In turn, this requires agreement 
among scholars, practitioners and activists that both epidemiological and basic 
health interventions should be made globally public,  and that both security 
and moral obligations justify global health governance. 
As the discourse about moral and security obligations continues to diverge, 
GHG faces the challenge of maintaining focus on infectious outbreaks at the 
same time that it expands its coverage of neglected diseases and basic care. 
The debate about global primary care is one about values, structural causes of 
disease, and global services for basic health. It begins to happen, pushed by the 
attention harnessed by communicable diseases and by a broader movement 
which is committed to exposing the social determinants of health.     
The question that arises then is about the possibilities for success in primary 
care, especially the success of policies that have been created to address not 
only the obvious, but also the not-so-obvious global health challenges. The 
latter do not enjoy the same, technical, political and economic context that 
facilitates global governance today. This context, however, can be created. 
Primary Health Care programmes can be made more obviously global public. 
It requires that society deliberate about morals, historical structures and 
deeply-ingrained inequalities (rather than eminent security risks). The process 
in primary care has to be understood as a long, incremental, and necessary 
process. This process is vital not only for the long-term success of GHG, but 
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also for the consolidation of global publicness beyond global governance 







Chapter 5:  GLOBAL GOVERNANCE IN PUBLIC SERVICES: A 
SUMMARY ASSESSMENT  
I Function of the Chapter 
This chapter summarizes the main observations and arguments presented thus 
far. It recaps the theory and current practices that are changing public services 
at the global level. At this point, I find most important to revise concepts, to go 
over practices, and to discuss, what I argue is the main challenge to global 
social governance, namely a lack of publicness.  
This chapter takes advantage of the case studies examined to identify cross-
sectoral and cross-institutional trends that relate to current theory and practices 
of global governance in public services. In this case, the comparisons were 
made between global health governance and global education, and among the 
UN social initiatives. There will always be limitations to generalisations, 
especially given the specific characteristics that define global governance in 
different contexts. Still, the analysis of similarities and differences across these 
realms grants new insights about the future direction of global social policy 
and governance.   
When analysed as a whole, the trends identified led me to think about new 
approaches to both understand and effectively act upon global social 
governance. Global social governance calls for a global domain that is better 
understood and more widely recognised as public. State officials, scholars and 
NGO executives should be as worried about publicness in global governance, 
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as they are worried about creating important new policies and mechanisms for 
public service delivery. Currently, this is not the case.  
The summary of current trends presented here is approximate. The list is not 
exhaustive and rather identifies global social governance concepts, discourses, 
and actions discussed in the course of the research. As the research shows, 
these concepts, discourses, and actions are yet to be mapped and synthesized, 
especially from a new perspective, namely global public theory.  
II What do our case studies teach us about Global Governance in 
Public Services? 
The specialised literature of global governance in health and education refers 
to global governance as a combination of transnational aspects of “funding, 
ownership, provision and regulation” coordinated by a range of institutions 
such as “the State, the market, the community and households.”1 Global 
governance in public services, or global social governance, refers to the 
quantity and quality of joint activities that relate to funding, ownership, 
provision, and regulation of staple welfare services. Global social governance 
impacts on traditional and new public administration initiatives, either 
disrupting or advancing domestic governance practices of subsidies, 
outsourcing and privatisation. Global social governance can also refer to more 
autonomous practices, through which international and transnational actors 
carve a political space of their own; they make important decisions about key 
policy-fields;  and they design social policy and delivery schemes for services 
that traditionally absorb a great amount of governmental resources. 
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2.1 Political Meanings 
Most scholars view global governance in public sectors (health, education, 
water supply, housing) through a liberal lens. They investigate the role of 
hybrid alliances such as public-private partnerships and their capacity to 
regulate, bring to fruition the enjoyment of rights, and/or redistribute to the 
extent that “basic survival needs” are fulfilled.2 A liberal approach mirrors the 
3Rs strategy advocated by the Commission on the Social Determinants of 
Health (CSDH).)
3
 The liberal approach is also popular with governments. It 
holds close affinity with formal institutions (formal laws/regulations and 
international bodies formed by national consent) and traditional ways of:  
 understanding publicness and fulfilling basic needs as a 
prerogative of the nation-state; 
 exercising democracy via elections in the national territory;  
 and understanding the scope of public policy as affecting: 
persons under a given national territory rather than persons 
linked by a more plural set of affiliations.
4 
 
Liberal scholars working with global social governance study how to make 
basic resources available to poor countries. Yet there is a pressing need for 
global social policy and action to respond to the demands of groups that are 
spread out across the globe and disproportionally in-need. These include 
women and children pertaining to ethnic minorities, who are generally in the 
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bottom of social and economic indexes in places that range from Brazil, to 
India, to the United States. These types of policies may achieve more in terms 
of reducing inequalities (and promoting awareness about why inequalities 
exist) than adopting an almost-exclusive focus on developing countries.
5
 
In the last ten years, IGOs, transnational NGOs, and FBOs have advocated for 
basic services for all, regardless of nationality. This rhetoric for ‘basic’ 
services is visible in several public sectors. There is a call for access to potable 
water for all; a call for primary health care; a call for primary education; a call 
for popular housing; etc. Although the discourse around basics goes beyond 
the national border, it reflects the liberal approach to global governance 
frequently deployed by governments and international organisations. 
The liberal approach influences rights-based discourses. Consequently, rights-
based discourses do not include a debate about the responsibility of States to 
provide services to realise social and economic rights.  All sectors, albeit at 
different levels, deploy the language of the international legal apparatus –
generally  international human rights – to advocate for rights such as 
education, housing, and health for all. However, the human rights framework 
operates through remedying gross violations (like hunger and extreme 
poverty) rather than through providing services to avoid them. Rights-based 
discourses are generally deployed uncritically and fail to connect rights 
advocacy with advocacy for service provision 
Especially in terms of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ESCR) service 
provision has only recently been included in interpretations of what constitutes 
these rights (although debates about the connection between rights and needs 
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have historically accompanied human rights studies).
6
 In fact, human rights 
discourses do not make the link between right and provision. Mostly, social 
and economic human rights are universal propositions that materialise inside 
of the national territory and in relationship to the national legal system. 
International lawyers, and international legal scholars, do not traditionally 
interpret human rights as generating an obligation of provision. In the field of 
health, this begins to change.  
The emphasis given by transnational NGO’s to human rights has expanded 
opportunities for nonstate actors to participate in the global governance of 
health, advocating for a more integrated interpretation between rights and 
necessary action.
7
 Social movements brought international human rights law 
to bear on public health, piercing the sovereign veil and scrutinising how 
governments treated their citizens and their health – strategies not supported 
by a traditional read of the right to the highest attainable standard of health. In 
global education, scholars form a more critical cohort, generating counter-
discourses to the liberal approach. For instance, education as a means to win in 
the knowledge economy (a sort of ‘mantra’ adopted by governments and 
IGOs) as the avenue to prepare self-sufficient individuals who can cure the 
world social problems, has been contested by education scholars writing about 
global education from different viewpoints. Yet global education lacks the 
social movement component that is strong in global health, especially around 
campaigns against epidemics.  
                                                 
6
 International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights (opened for signature 16 
December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976).  
7
 D Fidler SARS, Governance and the Globalisation of Disease (Palgrave Macmillan, New 
York) at 40. 
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Due to a combination of critical theorists and advocacy networks unsatisfied 
with the liberal approach, another approach has attracted attention: the social 
constructivist approach.
8
 The social constructivist approach, when applied to 
public services, “focusses on the norms, rules, and social institutions that make 
up the global system and constitute the identities and interests of States and 
other international actors, and enable it to learn and go beyond self-interest 
towards a global agenda and a global system.”9 The social constructivist 
approach, therefore, adds another ‘R’ to the 3Rs strategy, the R of recognition. 
Recognition not only refers to the beneficiaries as the centre of global 
governance, but also to their environments as determinants of their needs and, 
consequently, of policy choices. Recognition refers to noticing, validating, and 
building upon the democratic experiences successfully created at the local 
level to address challenges that are transnational (they can be service 
associations such as groups that organise day care, federated associations to 
build houses, and community-based micro-credit federations). The R of 
recognition is closely related to calls for deepening democracy.
10
 Based on the 
case-studies provided, it is possible to infer that recognition enhances levels of 
self-steering. 
I identify recognition as the fourth R of a scholarly revised approach to 
global social governance that is based on constructivist ideas. These ideas 
                                                 
8 
Makinda provides a good summary of these three approaches to global governance in the 
context of social services. Samuel Makinda “Recasting Global governance” in RC Thakur and 
E Newman New Millennium, New Perspectives: the United Nations, Security, and 
Governance (United Nations University Press, 2003). 
9
 Ilona Kickbusch “Global health Governance: Some New Theoretical Considerations on the 
New Political Space” in Kelley Lee (ed) Globalisation and Health (Palgrave, London, 2003) 
192 at 194.  
10
 The relationship between deepening democracy and improving global social governance will 
be further discussed in ch 6, section Grassroots Realpolitik. 
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were designed to undermine shortcomings of the “liberal” view of global 
governance. The R of recognition should be considered a sort of transversal 
and overarching R, which should contribute to the realisation of social and 
economic rights, and the making of better regulation and redistributive 
policies.  The question then is: how can the overarching R be fomented and 
pragmatically accessed? Also, how can the concept of recognition be 
translated into practice that transversally checks regulation, rights, and 
redistribution? More attention to social constructivism and to recognition of 
local voices in global governance signal that these questions may receive more 
policy attention in the near future.
11
 In fact, an emerging global public theory 
provides a disciplinary home for these preliminary thoughts and for 
improved approaches to flourish.  
Global public theory sub-fields focus on matters of principle such as the role 
of the local level in public private partnerships and decision-making, but they 
can also refer to those less obvious, but equally important, matters such as 
framing in global governance.  
Framing as a sub-field of global health governance is an innovative way to 
investigate  “what determines whether or not Global health problems become 
global priorities?”12 It looks at the subjects and objects of global governance 
and how they are framed, perceived, imagined, and believed to be. According 
to framing scholars, these imaginaries are culturally, sociologically, and 
politically relevant to global governance. Imaginaries change how actors 
                                                 
11
 Ibid.  
12
Michael Sidibé, Sonja Tanaka and Kent Buse People, Passion & Politics: Looking Back and 




engage with each other and how global agendas are set. Hence, framing can be 
considered an important sub-field of global public theory.   
Global public theory can serve as a disciplinary home for multi-disciplinary 
research, which helps us understand the new political meanings attached to 
global governance. What issues and actors populate the global public domain, 
who governs and who is governed, who benefits the most, and why, and how 
one can increase the levels of self-steering, and publicness of this domain? 
Global public theory as a discipline is not, therefore, only about a new political 
space; but about the sociology of this domain, the organisation and function of 
this domain, and the psychology of the actors that enter this new political 
space.  
2.2 Normative Meanings  
Normative prescriptions dwell on technical aspects of global governance as an 
administrative methodology; they dwell, to a lesser extent, on democratic 
principles, people’s capacity to self-organise, public ethics and moral values.  
For instance, the concept of humane governance was prescribed as an 
aspirational vision to animate transnational forces working to build legal and 
political structures capable of better addressing contemporary human needs.
13
 
Humane governance aims at bringing common needs of every human being to 
the forefront; it has contributed to debates about how to make governance 
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 Richard Falk "Humane Governance for the World: Reviving the Quest" (2000) 7(2) Review 
of International Political Economy 317. 
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more people-oriented; and it has been used in the process of setting the 
governance agenda for the Millennium Declaration.
14
  
Similar to the prescription for humane governance, other visions of global 
governance in public services figure in both the general normative and 
specialised literature on global governance. The scholarship deals with how 
the global health sector, the global education sector, the global housing sector 
should look like … Just like humane governance, the prescriptions ask for 
more democratic means, more self-organisation, and more realisation of 
human rights; the prescriptions have had varying degrees of practical 
applicability.  
The field of global health exemplifies well the mismatch between prescribed 
roles and actual roles exercised by global actors engaging with social policy. 
GHG discourse has emphasised the necessity of relying upon regular, 
nationally-integrated health services to deliver care. It has prescribed the 
revitalisation of the national level to row and steer health services. In practice, 
global health services are more likely to be designed and funded top-down and 
when epidemiological disasters are about to, or have already happened. In this 
emergency scenario, all kinds of actors partner to deliver health services. 
Likely, partners do not assess, or are not required to assess, how their 
strategies better fit within the national health governance strategy: In fact, they 
are generally not required to assess the publicness of their actions either from a 
national perspective or from a global perspective. Such a lack of assessment of 
                                                 
14
 Sakiko Fukuda and Richard Ponsio “Governance: Past, Present, Future; Setting the Agenda 
for the Millennium Declaration” (Draft paper for Fourth Global Forum: Dialogue and 
Partnerships for the Promotion of Democracy and Development, December, 2002, Morocco, 
version 22 October 2002.) 
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publicness may be associated with many factors, from the urgency of the 
action, to lack of effective national health strategies, to a habitual strategy of 
dealing with social challenges by using vertical development policies.  
Publicness considerations are generally addressed through post-facto 
instruments such as mechanisms of accountability. Actually, accountability is 
a common prescription of scholars studying effectiveness in global social 
governance. 
With a focus on the nation-state, global governance discourse has focussed on 
the term accountable to portray the global governance that is desired. In other 
words, the global governance mechanisms commonly envisioned are those 
considered accountable. But accountability functions poorly when the focus is 
adjusted to the current circumstances of who provides and who receives public 
services. The new focus reveals unknown global actors performing undefined 
political and technical roles.  
Following the work of political theorist Jane Mansbridge,
15
 I argue that 
accountability is a requirement of effective global governance, albeit almost an 
empty concept when situated at the global level, a fragmented political space 
from where plenty of new social policies and service schemes are now being 
made. While the global environment in which global social governance is 
immersed is badly understood politically and technically (with undefined legal 
                                                 
15
 See Jane Mansbridge “A Deliberative Perspective on Neocorporatism” (1992) 20 Politics 
and Society 493; Jane Mansbridge Beyond Adversary Democracy (University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago,1983); and Jane Mansbridge “The Fallacy of Tightening the Reins” (Keynote 
Address to the Austrian Political Science Association, Vienna, 10 December 2004). 
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and political roles, and an undefined division of labour) standard 
accountability as a concept is virtually inoperable.
16
 It only works as discourse.  
Accountability as a discursive trend is important to call the attention of global 
actors to the necessity of creating new mechanisms that suit the fragmented 
global level. Accountability has likely been overused as the default mechanism 
grounding prescriptions for global action that will affect, in one way or 
another, the world population. Accountability is a post-facto mechanism. 
Together with accountability, there is a need to design deliberative 
mechanisms to avoid the deeper, ethical and political challenges that emerge 
when transnational nonstate actors get involved with the provision of public 
services, such as child welfare – from birth to school.  
Historically, public services and providers have been part of the political 
realm (the realm made of things and people grouped together to realise a 
common objective). But, just recently, public services and providers have 
become the focus of international law and international legal scholars.
17
 For 
instance, authors have just recently begun suggesting legal frameworks on a 
sector-by-sector basis that can increase the profile of international and global 
public services. Gostin suggests an international legal framework for global 
health that can encourage “poor countries to take ongoing responsibility for 
their own health in collabouration with IGOs, States, business, 
foundations, and civil society”.18  
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 Jennifer Rubenstein, ‘Accountability in an Unequal World’ (2007) 69 The Journal of 
Politics 616, at 620-625.  
17
 LO Gostin "A Proposal for a Framework Convention on Global health" (2007) 10(4) Journal 
of International Economic Law, 989 at 993. 
18
 Ibid (emphasis added). 
 [333] 
 
An emergent global public sector adapts and adopts democratic governance 
prescriptions, such as varying notions of political openness.
19
 Political 
openness welcomes the formation and recognition of new publics and is used 
as the seed of a larger social realm. Discussions on the universal social 
protection floor introduce one opportunity for political openness to be used in 
global social policy.   
Political openness at the global level depends upon a moral commitment that 
could both transform global economy, according to Harvey, as it could create 
transnational forms of democracy, as articulated by Held.
20
 In fact, a moral 
commitment is the backbone of an emergent philosophy of global social 
governance.  Nevertheless, the moral argument is the last one to be deployed 
to promote action on the ground, being discredited and substituted by other 
justifications for cooperation such as enlightened self-interest. Global 
governance as both a public and transnational phenomenon is much more 
contested than global governance understood only as transnational. In fact, the 
public approach, which benefits and promotes political openness, requires 
profound changes. In comparison, the territorial approach, although more 
practical in the short-term, does not advance a clear understanding of the 
                                                 
19
 Leading theorists David Held (who argues for openness in decision-making in the context of 
transnational democracy theory) and David Harvey (who writes on cosmopolitanism) highlight 
the importance of articulating new forms of political openness, even if the exact shape of it is 
not yet clear, or far from being agreed upon.  Respectively, David Held “Regulating 
Globalisation: The Reinvention of Politics” (2000) 15 International Sociology 394; And David 
Harvey Cosmopolitanism and the Geographies of Freedom (Columbia University Press, New 
York, 2009) at 188-201. 
20
  David Harvey Cosmopolitanism and the Geographies of Freedom (Columbia University 
Press, New York, 2009), 255-257. 
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“proper form and place” for the decisions and initiatives that increasingly 
influence the wellbeing of peoples worldwide.
21
  
Although social services are historically public, governance scholars focus on 
the architecture of global governance in public services, treating the question 
about the need for publicness as secondary, rather than constitutive of the 
phenomenon. In short, most scholars accept that global governance takes place 
whenever nonstate actors of transnational reach engage with decision-
making.
22
 They do not consider a global public ethos a constitutive element of 
global governance. A global public ethos would require that nonstate actor 
engagement actually promoted higher-levels of self-steering. Global social 
governance with higher levels of self-steering and political openness is the 
normative meaning I would like to see further developed and pursued. 
III Who Does it?  
The function of this section is to provide a reference to the main mechanisms 
and policies of global social governance studied thus far. They serve as a 
sample of the institutional framework of global social governance. The 
numerous policies and mechanisms studied provide evidence of the 
supranational level providing and designing public services by mainly using 
development, but gradually more global governance frameworks. Yet 
understanding global governance as promoting higher levels of self-steering 
remains a challenge.  
                                                 
21
 Held “Regulating Globalisation: The Reinvention of Politics” (2000) 15 International 
Sociology 394, at 398.  
22
 For a historical critique of this position, see Kelly Loughlin and Virginia Berridge “Global 
health Governance: Historical Dimensions of Global governance” (Discussion Paper n.2 
Department of Health and Development World Health Organisation, 2002). 
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3.1 Global Social Policies in the UN Context
23
  
In the context of the UN, I have drawn attention to the importance of the 
Millennium Declaration as a new paradigm guiding global social governance 
strategies. I also called attention to the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) as quantitative benchmarks that favoured old international 
frameworks for action, such as technical assistance and economic 
development.  
More remarkably, after the Millennium Declaration, the UN started to engage 
in ‘Delivering as One Schemes’ (UN-wide development projects, including 
partnership, coordinated to deliver as one,) which brought together UN 
agencies and local offices in a more aggressive effort to improve service 
delivery at both the international and national levels.  
The Millennium Declaration and the global economic crises (2005 and 2008)  
created momentum for broader UN-led social interventions. The UN family 
started to engage with ideas about using social integration and basic social 
services as a new paradigm for global social governance. In this regard, I 
studied high-level debates, reports and policy papers about creating a scheme 
for universal pensions, better frameworks for a Global Jobs Pact and, finally, 
how to fund and execute a global universal social floor.  
Besides these macro-level social policies, achievement mechanisms were 
established at the UN after the Millennium Declaration. I studied The MDG 
Fund, and the World Bank’s Public Private Infra-Structure Advisory Facility. 
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 For discussion and citation of the resources mentioned in this and the two subsequent lists, 
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These two mechanisms have helped influence how social service delivery is 
funded.  
Finally, I studied other mechanisms put into practice by the UN family and 
partnerships led by UN specialised agencies. I studied them as part of what 
goes on at the two policy-fields  chosen as case-studies.  
3.2 Global Social Policies in Public Education 
There are not many sound global social policies in education. There are plenty 
of education policies as a result of international governance for economic 
development. For instance, I studied policy borrowing and lending as a means 
to advance economic development and global investment in the knowledge 
economy. Attempts to broaden education governance towards global efforts 
are related to the UN’s Strategy for Education – Education For All and the 
Dakar Framework (EFA), based on MDG 2. The MDG 2 engendered its own 
achievement mechanisms, including the World Bank Fast Track Initiative 
(FTI). It also engendered monitoring mechanisms, especially clustered under 
the auspices of UNESCO.  
Supranational governance in education goes beyond the UN and the MDG 2. I 
studied, for example, the OECD’s Programme for International Student 
Assessment (PISA) and the EU’s Tuning Project. These are instruments that 
are not directly related to MDGs, but have a bearing on how education policies 
are being made nationally and supranationally. These mechanisms have 
interacted little with the UN-wide Dakar Framework.  
Despite the fragmented character of supranational education governance, 
where isolated international strategies have highly influenced curricula, 
teaching, and evaluation methods at the national level, some organisations do 
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work with overarching frameworks. The Global Campaign for Education 
(GCE) is an important example of a global governance mechanism provided in 
Chapter 3. It is an instrument engaging with grassroots, UN and non-UN 
actors, and articulating new means of advancing public education, understood 
as free education services provided by national governments. GCE’s methods 
are truly innovative, but they still work with a vision of public education as 
designed and provided within the national territory and by national 
governments.  
With just a few signs that education can be effectively envisioned as global 
public (with both international and governmental provisions leading the way,) 
public education as a policy-field has been considered challenging terrain for 
effective global education policies to be crafted.  
3.3 Global Social Policies in Global Health 
Unlike education, global health provides good evidence that public services 
are being increasingly designed and provided at the global level. There are 
several mechanisms that engage with nonstate actors, and a few that clearly 
engage with nonstate actors based on a sense of shared fate or other moral 
considerations. For example, the Partnership to Stop TB was created after 
decades of  deficient international policy to control tuberculosis, a treatable 
disease that until recently killed more than two million people a year.
24
 In 
addition, the World Health Organisation has engaged with a broad security 
strategy, inviting nonstate actors to participate in its epidemiological research 
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 “World TB Day: Two Million People Die Each Year; Drug Resistance is Growing” (press 





and alert schemes through the Global Outbreak Alert and Response 
Framework (GOARN). More recently, the Global Fund has not only funded 
epidemiological control but also supported initiatives to address correlated 
basic health lacks that facilitate contagion at the national level.  
Following the tendency of addressing basic care issues through global social 
policy, I also accompanied the developments of the International Right to the 
Highest Available Standard of Health framework, which has been interpreted 
from an operational perspective, in the last ten years. This means that in the 
right itself there is an obligation to build accessible health care systems. 
Encompassed by this interpretation, a campaign for democratisation and 
distribution of Essential Medicines (EMs) was launched. Other campaigns 
associated with primary care or chronic issues came to prominence after the 
Millennium Declaration and were analysed by the case-study. They are the 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control and the Partnership for Maternal, 
Newborn and Child Health.  
3.4  Policies and Mechanisms: Achievements and Promises 
New structures of international and global governance, such as the ones 
mentioned above, have created new ways of governing the social.  
As forecasted by Rosenau, many mechanisms exceeded the boundaries of the 
laws and regulations available at the time of conception. The Global Outbreak 
Alert and Response Network – GOARN was presented as a clear example of 





 Also, framework policies such as the Framework Convention on 
Tobacco Control created new forms of participation, both inviting and 
contesting the role of NGOs in global social policy-making. As demonstrated 
in the case of FCTC, participation of nonstate actors per se does not secure the 
democratisation of social governance processes and does not secure openness 
and inclusion at the global level.  
In this context, the study of mechanisms and policies provides more than a list 
of new names and institutions, it highlights the urgent need for new 
considerations of publicness to emerge and be consolidated. The important 
social work of all these mechanisms and policies needs to be structured within 
a feasible frame of publicness in governance (rather than traditional 
government-related publicness).  
Along with IGOs, transnational NGOs more often commit to providing public 
services. However, it is not yet clear what kinds of activities they exercise, and 
how their activities differ from one country to the next from one sector to the 
next and from one issue-area to another. In the area of maternal health, for 
example, NGOs are part of the Academic, Research and Training (ART) group 
that produced a statement in favour of concentrating their work on advocacy, 
monitoring and evaluation mechanisms that relate to the right to health of the 
world’s women and children.26 However, the NGO statement also ventured 
into a commitment to implementation which includes the strengthening of 
local capabilities “to develop, adopt, scale up” proven interventions and “to 
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 World Health Organisation “Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network” (2011) Global 
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The Partnership for Maternal, Newborn and Child Health (PMNCH) Academic and 
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develop, test, and evaluate innovative approaches, including modern 
information and communication technologies to deliver essential, high quality 
health and social services and information, especially for marginalised and 
vulnerable groups.”27In engaging with delivery services, NGOs fulfil two 
traditional roles that are commonly associated with the third sector: they fill 
the gap left by states and create innovative ways to address persistent social 
challenges. These two roles are important, but they need to be exercised with 
an awareness that services provided should enjoy higher levels of publicness 
(with more opportunities for beneficiary input and scrutiny of outcomes). 
Levels of publicness in global social governance vary greatly, largely because 




Increasingly, the approaches that have been considered more successful have 
emphasised a mix of cooperative and regulatory approaches with efficiency 
approaches. The Private Partnership Mix (PPM) subgroup of the Partnership to 
Stop TB has highlighted that “combining collabouration [sic] with regulatory 
approaches may help in more effective and faster” partnered interventions.29 
                                                 
27
 The Partnership for Maternal, Newborn and Child Health “NGO Statement” (2010) 
(PMNCH)<http://www.who.int/pmnch/events/partners_forum/20101114_ngoStatement.pdf>. 
28
 Publicness at the global level has attracted more and more attention in the last two years. 
After the data collection for this research finished, two new articles were published that 
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with Jennifer Brinkerhoff  “Public-Private Partnerships: Perspectives on Purpose, Publicness 
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 WHO and Partnership to Stop TB, above n 6, at 3.  
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The regulatory approach includes WHO’s International Standards to Control 
TB. 
Sometimes, complementary methods endorsed by nation states have 
considered public ends, other than speed and economic gains. They include 
“restricting access to anti-TB drugs as done in Ghana, Tanzania and Brazil” in 
order to avoid unnecessary sales and strictly control when and by whom these 
drugs should be sold and used; requiring certification and accreditation of care 
providers linked to national systems or insurance providers; and requiring 
mandatory notification of TB cases.
30
 This complementary approach 
recognises some level of publicness of international and transnational actors’ 
activities, building a public structure not only to regulate, but to hold together 
the global public service of TB control, whose main objective is “progressing 
towards universal access to quality TB care.”31 These complementary 
approaches, although successful in global TB governance, are not common. 
Other examples of practical safe-guards include activities of the Global 
Campaign for Education, a multi-level partnership that focusses on access to 
education for all and on emphasising teachers’ issues in the Education For All 
(EFA) strategy.
32
 The GCE, by using transnational advocacy mechanisms has 
promoted the strategic grouping of teachers’ unions transnationally as well as 
instruments to facilitate transnational support to country-based education 
claims (these include open letters to Congresses and Presidents, and 
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 Ibid, at 3.  
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 WHO and Partnership to Stop TB, above n 6, at 3.  
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  "Constitution and By-Laws" (2010)  Global Campaign for Education 
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worldwide collection of supporting signatures for GCE petitions.)
33
 But, today, 
not all global actors work for recognisable public objectives.   
Public private partnerships, even when formed at the heart of international 
organisations, such as UNESCO or the WHO, may not work for the public, 
but for the benefit of their major donors or other interested parties. In reality, 
‘working for the public’ is not a criterion of global governance or good 
governance, as it is generally not a criterion used to authorise or de-authorise 
participation of single actors in partnerships. As such the infra-structure of 
global governance in public services does not engage with considerations of 
publicness.  
Publicness within governance has not been a major, or at least an explicit, 
concern. For example, the MDGs have engendered UN-system action, 
especially led by the WHO and the UNDP. The WHO and UNDP have used 
the three spheres of action (public administration, global social policy, and 
service delivery) identified in the second chapter to conduct global governance 
in public services. They have assisted nation-states to create basic 
programmes, such as pre-natal care programmes and primary education 
schemes. They have engaged with nonstate actors to design and provide 
immunization and adequate nutrition, as well as construction of sewage and 
water systems; and they have directly delivered services when necessary (like 
in the case of WHO work in Sudan.)
34
 Outside statistics and UN annual 
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reporting, little is known about what beneficiaries are 
thinking/feeling/benefiting as a result of MDG work as a new policy guiding 
service delivery.  Besides, there is a lack of information on how these services 
are ranked, designed, procured, and provided. 
The commitment towards realising MDGs within the original time frame 
(2015) has fuelled the creation of many hybrid alliances, the engines of global 
governance today. Hybrid alliances have been effective in progressing towards 
meeting some MDGs.
35
 There is little reporting of how the machinery to fund 
and administer hybrid alliances has been run on a daily basis; much less is 
known about the ethical considerations that guide daily action. In contrast, 
reports show that both economic interests and reluctance of major donors to 
provide more money have prevented hybrid alliances from being truly 
transformative.
36
 Hence, MDGs have not had the type of real-world impact 
that was expected, being considered by some rather “under-ambitious” 
targets.
37
 Some have considered them an all-around wrong social governance 
strategy, because it relies upon Official Development Assistance (ODA), 
quantitative targets and institutionalisation of the fight against poverty.
38
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In sum, hybrid alliances, their mechanisms of operation and their policies, 
have transformed the infra-structure for basic services (taking by reference 
what has happened in health and education and other areas related to the 
MDGs). This research signals that there is more money for and there are more 
actors interested in delivering public services after the MDGs. What is 
unknown is whether this new, attractive machinery has been useful to improve 
life conditions on the ground at the levels it could, if broader public principles 
were considered constitutive of any global social governance strategy.   
IV How it Happens Today 
Below, I summarise recurrent characteristics of global governance in public 
services as it happens today.  
4.1 Many Hybrid Partnerships for Public Services 
Hybrid partnerships with specific welfare goals are the engine behind global 
governance in public services. Hybrid partnerships make global social 
governance happen. But their status, rights and obligations vis-à-vis other 
actors and the public they serve is far from settled.   
Hybrid alliances or partnerships are also called Public Private Partnerships 
(PPP). PPP is the most common form by which global governance in public 
services takes place. They are seen as technical partnerships, providing a 
service to a nation or to a group of individuals linked by a particular claim or 
need. For example, PPP have been used in global health governance to contain 
or eradicate communicable diseases, like in the case of the Partnership to Stop 
TB. More recently, they have been used to provide basic care, such as in the 
areas of maternal and child health. New public private partnerships for 
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services, which include partnerships for building public infra-structure, have 
been created in record numbers, given the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) and the rapid growth of the non-profit sector in the 21st century. 
According to Lee, global actors connect via a “systematic promotion of 
mutually reinforcing policy actions among government departments and 
agencies creating synergies towards achieving agreed objectives.”39 In 
practice, alliances emerge once individualised attempts, often in the format of 
vertical interventions, fail (see the case of TB control) or will likely fail (see 
the case of controlling the outbreak of SARS). Synergies between State and 
nonstate actors, around agreed objectives, will depend on the policy area. The 
success of partnerships highly depends on the policy area, even if many of the 
social issues are today understood as inter-connected or overlapping.  
PPP’s success depends upon the type of technical, financial, sociological and 
political environment constructed in a given policy-field. For example, policies 
in health, education, or housing may demand high-technology or low-
technology services; may or may not provide actors with ready-available 
solutions; may or may not rely upon global funds to support them; may be less 
or more hierarchical; may or may not be perceived as urgently demanding 
collective action. These variables are able to reduce or enhance the publicness 
of policy responses.  
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There is little research on how to build publicness in PPP involved with public 
services. But looking at the characteristics of individual policy-fields could 
help. PPP in public services are categorised as for health, for education, for 
housing, for infrastructure, etc. Besides scope and policy-field classifications, 
scholars and practitioners should devote more attention to studying the legal 
and cultural status of PPP. They are legally considered private; they are 
culturally and functionally perceived as public and, from a regulation 
perspective, they may be considered hybrids (although this is a relatively new 
scholarly construction).
40
 Enhancing publicness in PPP relates to valuing the 
public role they play, and to bringing their operational strategies to bear on 
public principles.  
Today, many public and private actors get together to help steer and row 
public services, helping to run global social governance. Agreed objectives 
define outcomes of joint action (such as providing 70% of the malaria 
treatment needed in the world; evaluating ten thousand of 15-year old students 
in dozens of countries every three years; or building 2,000 houses). While 
agreed objectives represent public goals, the processes of meeting them do not 
require democracy and publicity. Democracy and publicity are not major 
characteristics of global social governance today. The major characteristic is 
the use of many public-private partnerships, legally private actors, to deliver 
public services and meet specific social goals.        
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4.2 Rapid Development of Conceptual Tools  
Recently developed conceptual tools, like the Global Burden of Disease 
(GBD), Global Public Goods (GHG), the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs), and Social Determinants of Health (SDH), have become important 
instruments of global governance practice. Because they facilitate deliberation 
about global social priorities, they not only help to justify the need for global 
social policy, but also help practitioners to make sense of the global level as a 
politically and operationally viable environment and as a necessary space.  
Global social policy makers, including philanthropists and high-level 
international officers, have mainly used these concepts to facilitate raking of 
social issues and to set global agendas.
41
 Important global social initiatives like 
global campaigns to eradicate disease, the global social floor high-level talks, 
and the Global Campaign for Education have made use of these concepts.
42
 
Sometimes, practitioners prefer to employ these concepts rather than to 
employ the rights-based discourse. This preference came through, for instance, 
in the analysis of the World Food Programme’s (WFP) documents related to 
distribution of cash and food vouchers. The WFP prefers to adopt MDG and 
GPG language to adopting the right to food framework. 
The more scholars develop conceptual tools, the more practitioners appreciate 
the governance aspects of social policy, which is usually interpreted as mainly 
technical. For instance, the concept of Global Burden of Disease (previously 
discussed) has assisted public health scholars in bringing resources into the 
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governance of historically neglected diseases and into campaigns for 
democratising essential medicines.
43
 The GBD concept promotes a more 
structural view of the world. Yet Global Burden of Disease (GBD) has been 
criticised because it adopts a quantitative approach to explaining lack of 
health, and consequently to addressing issues that involve pain and suffering. 
GBD, even if adopting a quantitative approach, provokes a structural analysis 
of poverty and of absence of service provision for the poor. As such, a GBD 
approach to global governance in public services may be criticised for 
quantifying suffering. However, the largest value of GBD as a conceptual tool 
resides in its ability to promote awareness about the geopolitics of disease, 
illiteracy, homelessness, etc. GBD has been widely used by international 
organisations and private philanthropies such as, the Global Fund and the Bill 
and Melinda Gates Foundation.
44
  
Despite the wide use of scholarly-developed conceptual tools by practitioners, 
and the increasing use of scholarly networks as advisors to IGOs and 
transnational NGOs, each conceptual tool has its own critiques. Scholarly 
concepts should not be considered absolute tools – or magic bullets– but rather 
instruments capable of providing some guidance for those making social 
policy and setting agendas from the global level.   
For instance, social justice scholars are sceptical about the significance and 
utility of the concept of global public goods, including its health version 
(Global Public Goods for Health). Scepticism is either because global public 
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goods represent universalist propositions in a world where altruism, ‘caring 
and commitment’ are absent, or because the concept in itself does not engage 
enough with altruism (‘caring and commitment’), promoting values-free 
frameworks.  
In general, Global Public Goods (GPG) theory advances an economic and 
territorial approach to the process of identifying what is a global public good 
and what is not.  In the specific cases of global health and global education, I 
previously discussed how an economic/territorial approach (interpreting public 
goods as those which are non-rival and non-exclusive across all global 
borders) is problematic, since it may lead to the exclusion of relevant global 
challenges (such as the control of malaria.) The limitation of concepts like 
Global Public Goods does not diminish their practical utility. GPG is very 
useful to explain the content of global governance in public services. 
Securitism is another important concept, but it rather explains the lens through 
which global public goods can achieve such status. 
 Securitism has succeeded as a strategy to advance global health governance 
(GHG) of communicable diseases; its limitations have helped to push for 
expanded GHG coverage towards primary health care. Governments often use 
securitism to justify global health cooperation to contain disease threats; at the 
same time scholars criticise it because the main objective of social policy 
should not be security, but in this case, broader health-specific goals.  
Securitism deals with transnational epidemics as systemic risks. Because of 
their-high profiles, epidemics are considered the major reason for public health 
cooperation among small and large, poor and rich States; the ranking of 
epidemics as a top objective begin to be contested by global health leaders, 
such as the WHO.  
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Systemic risk is the conceptual tool that has been used the most by IGOs and 
IFIs, especially working with global health. Simply put, it is the use of a 
security paradigm to guide health governance and global health policy. 
Security strategies have been deployed to advance global governance with 
mixed results. For example, global governance mechanisms deployed to 
control a clearly visible global risk (like contagion by microbial pathogens in a 
world where flights go everywhere from anywhere) are more successful in 
harnessing support from powerful players, and in achieving their targets. 
However, they might be counter-productive, addressing the consequences of 
often dysfunctional systems, rather than the root causes of social problems. 
Yet in global health, the high level of interconnectedness represented by 
communicable diseases has helped securitist discourses to be effective, 
promoting the diversification and advancement of global health governance 
mechanisms in other, broader, public health areas. The history of the global 
AIDS effort shows this connection: of how an epidemic can open 
opportunities for larger public policy areas to be advanced, like reproductive 
health.  
Threats and emergencies can overshadow more fundamental, primary health 
care policies. Threats and emergencies promote cooperation reactively, rather 
than proactively; they take advantage of fear rather than of positive, moral 
values to engender cooperation. Advocates of the systemic risk approach, 
however, disagree. The World Economic Forum’s report on global health 
describes the new paradigm of health as focussed on health security and 
controlling systemic risks. The report emphasizes that a systemic-risk 
approach can engender a more regular, long-time effect. It explains that 
“above all, people affected by health issues such as AIDS and breast cancer 
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have become powerful advocates and policy influencers, inaugurating an era 
in which people are increasingly acting as public agents for population 
health.”45 Similarly, Fidler argues that the early initiatives to address 
HIV/AIDS did not try to retrofit the pre-existent WHO regulations, but to 
imprint a different, more humane approach. The campaigns looked at 
prevention and control of HIV/AIDS as part of the human right to health, 
creating innovative frameworks for mobilisation, such as adopting, for the first 
time, an anti-discrimination approach to disease prevention.
46
 As long as 
securitism continues to channel energy towards expanding debate and practice 
for global health, its benefits will likely surpass its harms. This conclusion, 
however, is not shared by all.  
Treating epidemics as security issues, rather than as a public health concern, 
may be necessary to attract political interest and policy attention to public 
health, so that the discourse can be, eventually, desecuritised. Kirton and 
Cooper, for example, believe in the strength of securitism in “public health 
governance today and [in] the continuing importance of this policy belief in 
the future.”47 Most scholars agree with them. A few argue that the political 
gains of using securitism as a governance strategy are smaller than the damage 
it promotes on the ground in the long run. Yet securitism, and the feeling of 
shared fate – unfortunately difficult to replicate based on moral reasons –
firmed public health as a global field.  
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The debate about the content and impact of securitism on global health is far 
from resolved by the GHG literature. Cooper and Kirton defend that 
“conceptual order to the relationship between security and public health” is 
both absent and necessary. Conceptual order in this regard could facilitate 
understanding about the nature of health issues, when they are individual or 
when they are collective; when they are preventable or non-preventable risks; 
and when they require a global concerted effort. Conceptual order between 
securitism and other public services can help to advance better social 
governance as a whole.  
4.3 Practice under the Development Umbrella  
Most of the global social policies mechanisms studied here hold a relationship 
to development. Development methods may promote economic grow through 
top-down interventions or conditionalities; create flows of funds outside public 
streams; rely upon voluntary or donor-driven reporting and oversight. In sum, 
many social policies become development projects and development officers 
often become the officials who truly make social law and policy. This 
contributes to the projectisation of the governing of the social.  
Reliance upon the development infra-structure to promote wider intervention 
in public services can be associated with another structural trend, which is the 
reliance upon old, traditionally-public institutions to make global social policy. 
The publicness of IGOs, as representatives of the inter-state system, is 
presumed. However, IGOs also adopt development methods overwhelmingly, 
ranking technical and economic aspects higher than political aspects.  For 
instance, the recurrent choice for technical assistance methods has diminished 
the transformative potential of UN’s social work.  
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Development programs, such as the MDGs, depend upon a readily-available 
welfare apparatus at the national level. However, since the 1990s national 
governments in the Global South have been requested by financial institutions 
to be less social and more economically liberal. When high-level officials, in 
great part inspired by Kofi Annan’s leadership, signed the Millennium 
Declaration, they had a different mind-set: they conveyed a different discourse 
grounded upon values of universality and collective responsibility for social 
challenges, like poverty and lack of basic social services.
48
 The latter 
projectisation of the millennium mind-set failed to represent the values it first 
embraced. It continues to impose on governments internationally-set targets, 
which are often impossible to meet. When Global South governments 
dismantled their social welfare apparatus to develop economically, they also 
disrupted their capacity to perform public functions. This is another reason for 
the global level to step in with a collective-responsibility approach.   
The issue with the MDGs implementation agenda is not so much the results it 
wants to produce (although a quantitative approach has been criticised and not 
yet fully addressed).
49
 Rather, it is the lack of a sense of shared agency, 
responsibility and authority spread out across multiple actors, including those 
with less formal political power (developing countries) and those without a 
presence in formal political circles. Inclusion at the output level, since the 
MDGs were previously set behind closed doors, is better than no inclusion at 
all. However, inclusion at the output level, such as when transnational, local 
and UN actors partner to deliver services to achieve MDGs, will not configure 
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the level of publicness in global governance that I am arguing for. This 
requires higher levels of self-steering, and less of the top-down, 
internationally-set social policies that now form the core of the Millennium 
Project, and the UN broader development agenda.  
 Many scholars are sceptical of the ability of the development agenda to 
effectively deal with social challenges, especially global social challenges. 
These demands are beyond the capacity available at the national and the 
international levels. Since the 2005 Enron crisis, and the 2008 global 
economic crisis, the UN has talked about building mechanisms for global 
social governance that differ from development. New language to deal with 
social challenges has been allowed to surface, such as the global social floor, 
universal pension funds, and transnational cash transfers. These talks have 
made slow progress, which is not surprising. These new policies, if made 
available, would inevitably challenge the developmentalist approach and the 
political and economic hierarchies that have been established within it.  
4.4 Undefined Division of Labour and Jurisdiction 
The lack of political and operational organisation within partnerships also 
undermines the possibility of effectively assigning roles, and dividing labour, 
for global governance in public services. While humanitarian work has already 
benefited from a better organised division of labour amidst the many players 
involved such as the Red Cross, Oxfam, and the UN agencies, global 
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Lack of leadership in global governance in public services is observable in 
almost every mechanism studied. In general, there is not only a lack of an ideal 
candidate to exercise leadership, but also there is a lack of knowing the 
meaning of leadership in global governance and what types of activities a 
global governance leader should be responsible for. Political and legal 
leadership is considered difficult but urgently needed; technical leadership is 
considered more available, but usually used to overshadow the need for 
politicisation of issues. Moral and ethical leadership are lacking, but 
increasingly asked for by academics. All of these types of leadership have 
raised issues that vary from hegemonic concerns to who/ or which institutions 
can exercise one or all of these types of leadership. Leadership is understood 
here as “the ability of an individual [or institution] to influence, motivate, and 
enable others to contribute toward the effectiveness and success of the 
organisations [and of the partnerships] of which they are members.
51
 
Policy-fields organise the global public domain and influence decision-making 
about which new partnerships are needed. Global politics develop accordingly. 
Specifically in regards to global health, the WHO is uncertain about how and 
to what extent to politicise its work. In the 1970s, high income countries 
“argued that the WHO was [inadequately] engaging in ‘political’ issues.”52 As 
global health governance advances operationally and theoretically, the debate 
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about the degree of political activities in the WHO also moves on. For 
instance, the WHO has both opened and closed opportunities for nonstate 
actors to participate in health governance, depending on their relationships to 
the broader public interest. These moves, however, are not common practice 
and tend to be associated with technical mandates. For instance, the WHO has 
been active in scrutinising NGO participation in the context of tobacco control. 
As political initiatives, they provoke further questions about whether the WHO 
should (or is prepared to) undertake a global political role that would require a 
different type of relationship with new publics.  
Confusion about political leadership and coordination roles has provoked 
several misunderstandings in theory and practice. For instance, on the ground, 
in the course of providing public services, confusion is plentiful about 
autonomy and authority, and who tells who what to do when public provision 
is needed. For instance, while humanitarian organisations, such as Oxfam and 
the Red Cross, have already taken steps to divide labour and organise their 
local partners to work under that strategy, the same discussion about division 
is yet to happen in terms of social policies, as of now delivered under the large 
development umbrella. As the point of reference for execution of regular 
public services moves away from the nation-state, in practice, many NGOs, 
IGOs, grassroots organisations involved with provision, or wanting to get 
involved, simply do not know what to do or to whom to ask for support. At the 
same time, the most powerful global actors generally do not have a protocol 
for leadership, mediation, or coordination to follow. Organisations decide 
about these actions in isolation.  
In global social governance, leadership, coordination, and mediation lack 
clarity, publicity, and organisational strategies to absorb all the resources 
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available. Global social governance, therefore, lacks effectiveness. This 
observation leads to important inferences. First, global governance actions are 
challenging especially because they are supposed to include as many 
stakeholder as possible. Second, leadership, mediation and coordination will 
not turn out clear and effective without a deeper assessment of who exercise 
public roles and which new considerations of publicness the global level 
entails.  
V What’s Wrong 
Most of the time, critiques against global social governance are in fact 
critiques against top-down supranational social policies, generally interpreted 
as global governance. Global governance, as envisioned by James Rosenau in 
the 1990s,
53
 refers to processes that allow society to “steer itself, and the 
dynamic of communication and control are central to that process.” 54 
Frequently, critics misunderstand global governance theory, reducing it to 
variations of (bad) economic globalisation or of domestic liberalisation. 
Specifically, critics confuse global governance with domestic governance, 
reinterpreting global governance as attempts to privatise, to marketise the 
social, legal, and political jobs that the State would traditionally perform. 
Although domestic governance and global governance represent very different 
things, confusion is easy to spot in the specialised literature.
55
 Conceptual 
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confusion only increases the ambivalence against social governance at the 
global level; it reproduces perceptions that global social governance will 
necessarily use business-like or top-down practices that prevail at the domestic 
or international level; and it dilutes faith in the capacity of the global level (its 
mechanisms and conceptual tools) to innovatively represent global public 
interests.  
As I argued earlier not only theoretical, but cultural, legal, economic, and 
political challenges have prevented the “global public service language” from 
evolving, but not the “global service structure” from growing. This service 
structure is often led by international organisations. Critiques have not 
prevented practice. For instance, many global mechanisms and policies have 
been generating public health services. Doctors without Borders count with 
more than 15,000 medical professionals and hundreds of health programmes 
around the world;
 56
 the Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria 
is responsible for funding more than 70% of the most adequate treatment to 
control Malaria;
57
 and the OECD’s worldwide student evaluation, called the 
Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), had conducted four 
cycles of large-scale assessments by 2009.
58
 PISA has assessed literacy in 
math, reading, and sciences of more than one million pupils, since year 2000. 
In each cycle, PISA evaluates “between 4500 and 10000 students from at least 
150 schools … in each country.”59 In 2009, 67 countries took part in the 
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assessment, comprising “almost 90% of the world’s economy.”60 “Policies like 
PISA demonstrate that the OECD can actually provide governments with 
high-quality, immediately policy-relevant services and can thus be more than 
an expensive think tank.”61 In many countries, PISA meant a “radical policy 
change.”62 
International and transnational actors are rapidly making their way into 
schools and universities, hospitals, laboratories, and popular housing projects. 
In the 20
th
 century, the modern State entered these spaces, which have been 
historically considered vital for organising social life inside of a town, a 
province or a country. The modern State transformed these spaces by creating 
a government-ran public model. Multinational companies, transnational 
NGOs, and even IGOs dealing with social policy and often creating radical 
change are yet to create their public model and public traditions that are 
compatible with the multi-actor, global political space.  In fact forms of 
expressing publicness, including the old model, have been lost in the global 
transformation of public services.   
Paul Hunt, the former UN Raporteur for Economic and Social Rights (ESR) 
illustrated this situation well, suggesting that if pharmaceutical companies are 
coming into the delivery of essential medicines, some governmental traditions 
should also make their way into the pharmaceutical company.
63
 This critique 
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is relatively new, and useful for the advancement of the debate about 
publicness in global social governance practices. Hunt’s call for more 
publicness in the work of pharmaceutical companies delivering essential 
medicines has fallen on deaf ears.  
A degree of ignorance in regards to the global public domain, accompanied by 
a lack of attention to critiques may have benefited global social governance. It 
may have facilitated speedy development of policies and mechanisms. It is 
becoming more apparent, however, that ignorance of the global public domain 
and lack of attention to recurrent critiques involve high risks of failure. It may 
be the time to take a step back.   
5.1 Main Challenge: Issues of Publicness 
The global level is a new political ecosystem. Research has yet to characterise 
this political ecosystem, to define the roles of its players (especially the 
commercial sector) and of its priority-themes.
64
 In sum, practitioners and 
scholars have taken only a few steps to assess the current and the ideal make-
up of this new eco-system, which inevitably absorbs and reshapes aspects of 
publicness and public service provision. For instance, specific challenges vary 
from addressing transnational demands for services while respecting and 
engaging the local context to creating funding schemes outside the nation-state 
and regulating the use of resources geared to global social policy making and 
service delivery. In fact, most of the challenges faced by global social 
governance today dwell on issues of who and what constitutes the social 
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realm, who takes part and owns social processes, and who exercises political 
authority in the 21st century. These are global publicness types of 
considerations. 
Ambivalence towards the language and practice of global publicness is a basic 
feature of global governance; it flags resistance to the global level as public 
and as capable of serving egalitarian agendas. Although most scholars and 
practitioners value the public, official documents and specialised literature 
analysed in the case-studies reveals scepticism around the language of the 
global public. The case-studies reveal preference for the public interpreted as 
State-centred.  
Mostly, the public is accepted and traditionally understood as the nation-state.  
Because of the rapid growth of partnerships between the State and other actors 
(hybrid alliances), the new faces of the public figuring in practice require 
different political interpretations. Despite an increasing acceptance of  
publicness as a function of hybrid organisations, there is still resistance against 
the global public discourse. Put simply, the global aspects of  publicness (and 
consequently, the recognition of a global public sector) have been overlooked. 
Yet global actors are increasingly designing and providing public services.  
Global actors resist the language of publicness because it entails ethical, 
political and legal responsibilities that, today, do not come attached to 
participation in global social governance. Put simply, global social governance 
is generally understood as technical – hybrid alliances grouped together to 
deliver policy-specific goals. Interpreted merely as technical enterprises or 
administrative frameworks, global social programmes, policies and projects 
are simplified. They do not require as much deliberation (the political aspect) 
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as they have fewer legal consequences (for example obligations to perform, to 
achieve results, and liabilities.)  
This thesis’s case studies have shown that international and transnational 
actors steer and often row public services, while silent about global publicness. 
They are also silent (sometimes inflexible) about the legal, political, and 
ethical responsibilities that should emerge from steering or rowing in the 
public sector.  The officials of the 21th century do not engage with public 
services conscious of their participation in a public sector that is global; they 
do not label themselves global public actors or part of the global public sector. 
Besides, not only practitioners fail to recognise global public functions.  
Global public theory is currently underdeveloped, and academics lack 
expertise on global social governance and global publicness. There is only 
scattered knowledge about the global aspects of publicness, and about the 
partial relocation of public services to a level that overlays the State and that 
behaves orderly enough to be recognised as a public sector.  
This thesis’s case-studies have also signalled that national, international and 
transnational actors already know whom to ask for funding for housing, 
education, and health when the national level cannot or does not want to deal 
with these demands.  Global actors ask for funding and policy-guidance with a 
range of objectives, including building houses, creating and executing 
worldwide student assessments, or distributing drugs. Actors who fund as well 
as actors who ask for funding are important agents of global social 
governance; they might or might not work together with States. However, they 
have not been pulled together and integrated under a global public sector 
model. This is still needed.  
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Transnational NGOs, IFIs, and IGOs work in public services with a relatively 
well known profile, and well known modus-operandi. However, their status as 
public or private is not as well known. This fact is not irrelevant. I speculate 
that the Red Cross has been perceived as a public entity for years, benefitting 
(via donations) from such cultural status. Such status comes with an ethical 
challenge that relates to its legal and political private status. The Red Cross has 
benefitted from a cultural belief in its functional publicness (from private 
donations, to tax benefits, to public funding, to in-kind contributions.) At the 
same time, the Red Cross does not take on liabilities as a public entity, does 
not hold an obligation to beneficiaries as a result of citizenship; and does not 
follow procedures that secure administrative justice. The Red Cross’s legal 
private status and political independence protect it from taking on these kinds 
of obligations and relationships.  
States – and sometimes the United Nations as in the case of the Ethiopian 
famine in the 1990s and recurrent in 2011 – pick up responsibilities in 
humanitarian work.  The work of Red Cross International has not been 
exclusively humanitarian, but related to basic health. It may include, 
depending on the country, ambulance services and a great number of blood 
services, provided on a regular basis to States and private health practices.
65
 
These facts only contribute to a debate about mismatching functions of the 
Red Cross (public), the general perception about its functions (arguably as 
public), and the legal and political status it enjoys (private). To a certain extent 
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public work is self-explanatory, no matter if conducted by governments or 
transnational organisations. 
Public functions easy to recognise– like the control of epidemics, blood 
services, and the provision of food – should inform the constitution of the 
global public sector, the actors and the policies under its auspices. If there is a 
popular understanding of what global public work is, then, it is possible to 
delineate and further develop a global public sector. I am not judging these 
facts as beneficial or harmful. At this point, I am just saying that the global 
public sector and the responsibilities that emerge with global publicness 
should not be ignored, but better understood and organised.  According to JG 
Ruggie, those who do ignore the existence of the global public domain (a 
broader environment in which an alleged global public sector is emergent) do 
so at their own peril.
 66
  
Academics and practitioners are reluctant to recognise publicness in global 
governance; disagreement with publicness relates to disagreement about 
having a global bureaucracy as a centralised provider. In other words, 
engaging with the language of global publicness could send wrong messages 
related to attempts to form a world government. Academics and practitioners 
also fear that engaging with global publicness may send a contrary message: 
that they are distancing themselves from public provision (free and 
government-ran) and getting closer to encouraging privatised services or fees-
bases systems run by multinational corporations. Again, these disagreements 
signal confusion, since publicness in global governance is completely different 
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from suggesting a centralised bureaucracy or from encouraging business-like 
practices to address global social challenges. 
The marketisation of public services – exacerbated by economic globalisation 
– have displaced the public so badly that, for many advocates and social 
justice scholars, it is difficult to envision the global level as a suitable space for 
publicness to relocate to. For example, important public theorists, like Clarke 
and Newman, refrain from using the language of the global, or even situating 
analysis of the transformation of public services outside the national unit.
67
 In 
addition, Clarke and Newman depart from the premise that public services are 
no longer part of a public sector, which is one of the main points they sustain 
as curious and worthy of investigation. They analyse, for instance, the “new 
arguments about the public roles of public services, even where these no 
longer form part of a public sector.”68  They refer to the traditional public 
sector model, to publicness within government.  
The distribution of medicines, the large-scale evaluation of students, the mass 
construction of popular housing and the worldwide provision cash vouchers 
for food are policies and mechanisms that are now part of the transnational 
sphere. Frequently, they represent the goals of organisations (transnational, 
international, national and local) that get together to achieve outcomes that 
otherwise would be impossible. Because these common goals implicate larger 
transnational constituencies, governance activities should be as politically 
open and as visible as possible. They should enjoy higher levels of self-
steering. 
                                                 
67
 Janet Newman and John Clarke “Introduction” in Public, Politics and Power: Remaking the 





The exercise of constructing the ideal context for global social governance to 
take place, a context that favours higher-levels of self-steering in very specific 
global social policies, I call an exercise of seeking maturity for global social 
governance. Maturity is a new approach to pursuing a stronger global public 
domain. 
A stronger global public domain is a condition to more effective global social 
governance; constructing this new political space as global and public requires 
a change of values – especially political, but also moral. It requires patience 
and persistence to progress a little at a time. More pragmatically, it requires 
that certain vital, but contentious, elements of global publicness be identified 
and nurtured over time; for that a change of consciousness is needed.  
The maturity approach recognises how difficult it is to promote the political, 
cultural and moral transformations required to fortify the global social realm as 
public. It also acknowledges, at a more practical level, that efforts towards 
strengthening global publicness and, thus maturing for global governance, are 
urgent. They are as urgent as coming up with new mechanisms of global social 
governance which can provide basic needs for people that have been 
historically unattended. The maturity approach is not outcomes-based, rather it 
focusses on more fundamental changes; on setting the context right.  
I introduce the maturity approach in the next, and final chapter, as a way 
forward. I do not intend to provide a flawless or conclusive framework for 
maturity, but rather build upon scholarly work that suggests that, rather than 
more institutions, policies and mechanisms, it is time to think about more 
fundamental changes that can strengthen the global public domain and, as a 
result, improve global social governance. Hopefully, a maturity approach will 
provide a framework that we, as a global society organised in local 
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communities, can get behind. Hopefully, we can work with it and face the 





Chapter 6:  IMPROVING GLOBAL SOCIAL GOVERNANCE: 
PROPOSING A MATURITY APPROACH 
“The real solution lies in a world in which charity will have become 
unnecessary.”  
Chinua Achebe 
I Function of this Chapter 
This chapter suggests a new, creative approach to improving global social 
governance. The choice for prescribing a creative, values-based approach to 
global social governance, instead of a more pragmatic approach, was 
deliberate. The proposal of a maturity approach is, in short, a call for a change 
of mind-set and for reframing, once again, our understanding of publicness. 
Arguably, pragmatic frameworks are unlikely to overcome bottlenecks 
currently spotted in global governance processes, if not followed by a set of 
fundamental principles, related to the global level as a new political ecosystem 
that is still under construction.  
 While there is a reasonable amount of innovative policies, programmes, and 
legal frameworks being used to address global social inequalities and a more 
equitable distribution of social goods and services, these have not been, albeit 
valuable, transformative. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the 
Alma Ata Declaration, the Education for All platform are good examples, 
which have been scrutinised by this study. Along with these initiatives it is still 
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necessary a paradigm shift, which relates to understanding the global level, 
global goods and the processes of providing them, as ultimately public.  
Although the prescription here is for a values-based approach, it is not to be 
regarded as a rhetorical proposition. A maturity approach is tangible and 
feasible. It proposes that the elements of maturity be considered as the 
backdrop for every policy, program and international convention that will deal 
with the design and provision of social services and of global goods beyond 
the nation-state. If the elements of maturity proposed here be considered as 
background for global social policy making, arguably, chances of success are 
higher and concrete benefits might be many. 
The proposal of a maturity approach relates to gradually enhancing global 
publicness and strengthening the global public domain as the ideal political 
context for global social governance. It argues in favour of developing 
maturity for global governance, with the purpose of nurturing the ideal space 
for global governance frameworks to thrive.  
This chapter also introduces elements of the maturity. The elements of 
maturity form the structure of the theoretical prescription, exploring concrete 
tools and ideas that can concretely inform more effective global social policy- 
making. The elements represent key, preliminary ideas and tools that should 
be expanded through future research and action.  
Final considerations bring this chapter, and this thesis project, to a close.   
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II Improving Global Social Governance: Proposing a Maturity 
Approach 
Previously, I argued that the main challenges to global social governance boil 
down to a lack of global publicness and, relatedly, the lack of self-steering in 
governance frameworks. Building global publicness requires a better-
understood and a stronger global political context, the global public domain. 
Constructing this better political context is not an easy task. There are political, 
legal, moral, and cultural traditions to be revisited.  
Creating a better political context for global social governance requires more 
than new institutions and partnerships; it requires profound, macro-level 
changes to accompany the wave of innovation taking place at the global level, 
especially the design and provision of public services. A maturity approach 
recognises the long-term processes involved in building a more favourable 
political context. It also implies that more effective frameworks are  possible 
and easier to be developed when maturity is used as a lens to understand the 
content and the objectives of global social governance. 
In the first chapter, this research dealt with early writings on global 
governance, which made clear that the capacity and the will of peoples to self-
organise and self-steer make up the content of global governance.
1
  In turn, the 
need to revisit and promote self-steering as a necessary component of global 
governance is at the centre of an argument in favour of building maturity. 
                                                 
1
 See the original James N. Rosenau "Governance, Order, and Change in World Politics" in 
James N. Rosenau and Ernst Otto Czempiel (eds), Governance without Government: Order 
and Change in World Politics (1992) and the more recent JN Rosenau Along the Domestic-




Maturity becomes a means to enhancing global publicness, which is, in a 
frame of governance, closely linked to creating a context in which higher 
levels of self-steering can actually develop.   
Self-steering is the arrangement by which global agents, including policy 
beneficiaries, become one group linked together to address a social challenge 
or produce a common goal. Self-steering defines new political linkages among 
global actors. At the global public domain, the political linkage is not defined 
by territorial lines, voting or representation, but by solidarities and by the need 
or desire to jointly face a global challenge and achieve a common goal. In this 
fashion, self-steering is not only about how actors will relate to each other, or 
about an administrative methodology; self-steering redefines politics and 
builds global publicness because it brings more people into the process of 
decision-making.  
In a global governance frame, beneficiaries need to become agents. 
Beneficiaries of global social policy are recognisable cross-border groups (like 
those infected with TB, or 15-year old students, for example.) Searching for 
higher-levels of self-steering opens opportunities for beneficiaries, through 
networks, successful local projects, or other means to become agents.  
Better frameworks of global social governance relate to enabling higher levels 
of self-steering. Nevertheless, self-steering, even if the back-bone of original 
visions of global governance, has been ignored. Firstly, the maturity approach 
aims to fill this gap, by seeking to build a political context that encourages 
self-steering.    
The case-studies (Chapters 2,3,4) showed that considerations about self-
steering, or about other means of enhancing publicness, were generally 
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overlooked in the practice of global social governance. These considerations 
need to be put back into global social governance discourses and applications. 
The same considerations come along with claims for democratic governance, 
ethics, and humane governance. All of these claims, however, require building 
a global public domain that can promote more self-steering. Promoting self-
steering is a daunting task. This claim seems indisputable.  
Promoting higher levels of self-steering will not happen overnight. It requires 
not only a debate about better operational frameworks for public private 
partnerships, but also a change in values;  it requires people and institutions to 
recognise and exercise political power differently; to engage at the global level 
in a socially and politically organised way. This thesis’s case-studies 
demonstrate that, today, public-private partnerships face serious difficulties in 
understanding leadership, coordination, the definition of autonomy, and 
division of labour. Besides, they still operate in a hierarchical, political 
structure, where international organisations and international financing 
institutions often dictate the rules. These operational and political features 
harm attempts to enhance levels of self-steering within governance.    
In order to enhance self-steering, and consequently, publicness in global 
governance, a new political context needs to be built. The research shows that 
the types of services that are now provided at the global level, especially food 
and medicine distribution and others related to MDGs, require macro-level 
changes, which relate to values and to the organisation of a new political 
space.
2
 It also shows that effective global governance does not require more 
new policies, new mechanisms, and new institutions at the same level that it 
                                                 
2
 For a discussion on MDGs see Chapter 2, for a discussion on health-related services see 
Chapter 4.  
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requires a new context, new foundations. These foundations, as they enhance 
self-steering, will also advance democratic governance and, eventually, foment 
better policies and practices.
3
  
So, the question is how to go about these macro-level, foundational changes.  
A maturity approach highlights that effective global governance requires a 
long process of constructing a global public domain that, at a minimum, is able 
to more frequently and more inclusively host: 
1. deliberation about common, global priorities;  
2. recognition and validation of grassroots claims of transnational 
repercussion as expression of public choice;  
3. structural organisation of themes that are interconnected historically, 
environmentally, socially and economically;  
4. the understanding of ethical arguments as sufficient reason for 
collective action;  
5. global literacy, information and intelligibility that refer not only to 
country-to-country data, but to data that showcases transnational types 
of group affiliations (including race, gender, and age).   
                                                 
3
 The United Nations Programme for Public Administration (UNPAN) works under  a frame of 
democratic governance, but always within countries (not transnational, for example). 
According to the UNPAN: “More countries than ever before are working to build democratic 
governance. Their challenge is to develop institutions and processes that are more responsive 
to the needs of ordinary citizens, including the poor. UNDP brings people together within 
nations and around the world, building partnerships and sharing ways to promote participation, 
accountability and effectiveness at all levels. We help countries strengthen their electoral and 
legislative systems, improve access to justice and public administration, and develop a greater 
capacity to deliver basic services to those most in need.” UNPAN “Democratic Governance” 




The global public domain should enjoy these five qualities. I term these 
qualities – that relate to global publicness and that should abound – elements 
of maturity. 
A maturity approach therefore aims at developing these elements. Arguably, 
they function as building blocks of a better political context for global 
publicness, and consequently for better global social governance frameworks 
to flourish without a global government. This approach believes that global 
actors should aggressively invest in harnessing elements of maturity. Global 
actors (grassroots leaders, IGOs, NGOs, and TCN representatives, national 
government officials, and governance scholars) questioning about what is 
needed to mature for global governance, and genuinely attempting to respond 
to it, can begin to reconstitute the global public domain; embrace global 
publicness; and harness a more favourable context for global social 
governance.  
As global social governance has organised itself through policy-lines, elements 
of maturity will be less or more able to surface depending on the 
characteristics and resources available in each policy-field.
4
 Working with 
elements of maturity within globalised social policy-fields, such as global 
health, becomes a practical way forward.  
Within each policy-field these elements inhabit challenging spaces. They will 
raise numerous conflicts, methods and opportunities that only reinforce the 
                                                 
4
 When I refer to developing the global public domain by sectors, I do not mean to deal with 
each sector in isolation. In fact, issue-link has been a consolidated aspect of global social 
governance. Therefore, what I mean is that each sector (hosting only a few or many inter-
related issues) provides different opportunities for improved global governance frameworks to 
emerge, presenting challenges and promises of their own. 
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need for a maturity approach. I believe that these challenging elements, 
identified as elements of a process to create a better political context (thus of 
maturing, of becoming ready) rather than either immediate goals or unfeasible 
aspirations, might feel less abstract, less impossible to attain. Elements of 
maturity may sound more appreciable and tangible when understood as part of 
a long-term process that society chooses to move forward day by day. 
Finally, a maturity approach is not suggested as a magic-bullet approach. It is 
not outcomes-based focussed as institutionalist strategies or targets-based 
strategies, like the MDGs. On the contrary, it is preparatory work long 
overdue; it aims at making the search for a better global context and the 
pursuit for a more public, democratic, and humane global domain appreciable 
and workable, one step at a time. 
III Why A Maturity Approach? 
A maturity approach reveals that global governance in public services requires 
a given political context to be effective. The current context (as the critiques to 
the Millennium Project illustrate), unfortunately, falls short.
5
 Isolated global 
public services and global deliberative spaces have emerged, but within a 
territorial political culture and within an administrative culture that recently 
suffered changes itself – changes that made it less public and more business-
                                                 
5
 Critiques to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) include that the goals quantify 
complex, social problems; that they underrate the complexity of these social problems since 
they believe that they can be solved by the reaching of pre-fixed benchmarks in a relatively 
small period of time; that they represent yet another form of imposing the social framework of 
rich countries upon the small and poor; and that the MDGs depend on the donation of rich 
countries, thus following a charity approach. All of these critiques seem to resonate with a 
global political context that is immature: not ready to implement genuine strategies of global 
social governance because it is not ready to open up for new ways of working through self-
steering and collective rowing, when it comes to facing global social challenges.  
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like. Although scholars are not sure what this new, ideal political context looks 
like, they seem to agree that it does not look like any traditional depiction of 
the statist public domain.  
Normative visions of global social governance have contributed little to the 
construction of a better political context. Although they suggest how to make 
global governance more just or more operationally sound, these thoughts will 
not be able to materialise outside an accepted global public domain. The 
consolidation of the global public domain requires prior debates about: what 
publicness looks like; how publicness can be built if deeply-held beliefs still 
hold the public sphere as exclusively statist and the beneficiary as incapable of  
governing, and what constitutes global commonness vis-à-vis what constitutes 
the priorities of the State or of a few. These macro-level, fundamental debates, 
I suggest, are both the reason for and part of the process of constructing global 
publicness (one manifestation of publicness within governance) and seeking 
maturity for global governance.  
A maturity approach is a new, creative proposition especially situated within a 
larger inquiry about how to build publicness within governance, and not 
government. Global governance, international human rights, development, and 
public administration scholars have thought more about improving or creating 
public private partnerships than about the current and ideal political context for 
them. Global constitutionalists, transnational democratic  and global justice 
theorists have explored contextual questions, but not from a maturity 
perspective.  
A maturity perspective is compatible with a range of previous, normative 
propositions related to better global governance. For example, it agrees with 





 Yet a maturity approach is not an argument of this sort. It 
is a way to approach these normative propositions, based on what has been 
observed in the context of global governance in public services. It is how to 
face the daunting task of crafting more humane, more just, or more democratic 
public private partnerships, by nurturing a more fertile context where these 
previously theorised visions can be realised. Thus a search for maturity is 
partially a search for how to make possible key elements of these thoughts, 
which function, therefore, as reasons why a maturity approach is necessary. 
Below, I expose the visions of global governance that inspire a maturity 
approach.  
First, I draw from Evan Luard. He masterfully imagined how the nation-state 
needs to be able to both relinquish power to stratospheric organisations and, at 
the same time, use local needs and the work of local organisations as lightning 
rods.
7
 The State is envisioned as an institution that opens opportunities and 
directs public service provision upwards (at the functional supranational level) 
and downwards (at the local level especially through partnering with local 
business and communities). 
Second, the suggested reforms of international financial institutions and the 
UN’s General Assembly are mentioned as potential avenues for immediate 
improvement, while new forms of from-below political organisations become 
                                                 
6
 Richard Falk "Humane Governance for the World: Reviving the Quest" (2000) 7(2) Review 
of International Political Economy 317.  
7
 Luard’s political philosophy was explored in further detail in Chapter 1. Evan Luard "The 
Globalisation of Politics: The Changed Focus of Political Action in the Modern World " 
(Macmillan, London, 1990). 
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stronger and more widely recognised.
8
 Increasingly, experts recommend that 
democratising provision of global public services should be made through 
bridging transnational and international organisations and local organisations. 




Third, I also ground my arguments on the belief that public-private 
partnerships must work, first and foremost, for the public.
10
 Public goals, 
however, are  challenged by their vagueness at the global level (since it is not 
clear which issues are of global public interest) and by the prominence of self-
interest or enlightened self-interest as reasons for creating public-private 
partnerships.      
Lastly, deep democracy is another vision that inspires a search for maturity.
11
 
Deep democracy refers to speeding up or trickling down forms of decision-
                                                 
8
 JR Groom "Getting to Go: The Birth of the UN System" in JR Groom and Paul Taylor (eds) 
The United Nations at the Millenium: Principal Organs (Continuum, New York, 2000) . 
9
 V Roudometof  “Transnationalism, Cosmopolitanism and Glocalisation” [2005] Current 
Sociology 113. 
10
 Contrast with Kent Buse and Kelley Lee “Business and Global Health Governance”(World 
Health Organisation Discussion Paper n. 5, Department of Ethics Trade and Human Rights and 
Health Law, 2005). 
11
 Deep democracy and the “speeding up” of participation have been suggested by cultural 
globalisation scholar Arjun Appadurai. Most scholars suggest “to scale up” rather than to 
“speed up”. Nevertheless, Appadurai suggests to speed up processes that started from-below, 
giving to organised communities more fuel to run their action-plans effectively, rather than 
using larger organisations to bring successful, local stories up-to-scale. In this fashion, 
therefore, Appadurai envisions international organisations, donors, the nation-state as enablers 
and the community as both agenda setters and executors. Speeding up  processes on the ground 
require that local communities be given the tools they already determined they need to 
continue social work they designed and now want to implement. This proposition seems far 
from effectuating  because it requires higher levels of trust among supranational actors, the 
State, and local grassroots organisations. It also requires the reframing of the understanding of 
the positions of who governs and who is governed. Despite the challenges, “speeding up” is an 
useful framework to understand how self-steering could be enhanced in practice. A Appadurai 
“Deep Democracy: Urban Governmentality and Horizon of Politics” (2002) 14 Public Culture.   
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making. It opens up opportunities to organise delivery schemes for services 
like housing, child care, and immunisations; and it displays the self-organising 
capacity of communities formed around common interests. Generally, 
however, global agendas aim to reach internationally set goals and not 
necessarily community interests; this happened to the MDGs. In general, 
MDGs were not based on the result of public consultations or other types of 
participative processes.  
Deepening democracy would require deliberation at different levels of 
governance, especially when the object is social policies with transnational 
repercussion. Deliberation would impact on the content of policies and on their 
execution plans; execution-plans should take advantage of community-based 
initiatives already started by grassroots groups at the local level. It could also 
take advantage of the will of local business owners to contribute.  
Successful community projects should not be scaled-up. They should rather 
inspire global actors to find and support more of these projects worldwide as a 
means to govern the social. As a result, deeper forms of democratic 
governance would likely enhance levels of self-steering in policy responses, 
like the MDGs. Enhancing self-steering and fostering deep-democracy can, 
therefore, be interpreted as mutually beneficial.  
All these visions, at higher or lower levels, relate to realising the promise of 
global governance as a theory of self-steering. They matter to global social 
policy-making, as they increase the potential of global governance to succeed 
as the chosen methodology to address global challenges. While these 





suggestions (and so many others similar to these) are invaluable, they proved 
to be hard to materialise without a better defined global political context.
12
  
The main problem in how global social governance currently happens is that 
international and transnational actors make important decisions about welfare 
and create new services without caring for the historical public nature of these 
decisions and services. Similarly, these decisions and services have not been 
debated enough in academic and political circles from a public law 
perspective. They have been debated as development; they have been debated 
in their technical aspect, but not in their political and ethical aspects. The 
question is, then, what to do.  
Based on the argument that challenges against global social governance boil 
down to lack of publicness, I suggest that more time needs to be devoted to 
developing a better global political context (at the same time that we discuss 
new, more pragmatic frameworks for global governance.) To face this grand 
challenge, a maturity approach is required. 
IV A Way Forward: Nurturing Elements of Maturity 
Based on the research conducted thus far, five elements of maturity for global 
governance have been selected. They should be further researched and 
gradually integrated into the processes of global social policy making. 
                                                 
12
 One good example is the history of the Partnership to Stop TB. It took more than one decade 
for TB control to make into the global social governance agenda. Just recently, the TB 
campaign became a global, partnered effort. Even with the success of the Stop TB partnership, 
TB continues to be a serious health threat in many countries of the world. Besides, many other 
treatable diseases continue to be neglected. For more on neglected diseases see World Health 
Organisation Working to Overcome the Global Impact of Neglected Tropical Diseases 
(Neglected Tropical Diseases Department, October 14, 2010). For more on the trajectory of 
TB control, see Chapter 4.  
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Throughout the thesis, I have touched upon issues that relate to these elements. 
By no means, I have done it enough. For instance, many of these elements of 
maturity now find their way into areas and literature that have not been 
adequately analysed in this study, like the literature on sustainable 
development.  
In the last ten years, the sustainable development agenda, in its three 
dimensions (social, economic and environmental) has been significantly 
advanced, pushing the ways in which social development is conducted and 
thought of.
13
 This means, among other things, that economics, as well as the 
international legal regime that guides sustainable development,  can be used as 
analytical lens to deepen the analysis on global social governance. In this 
Chapter, it was inevitable to use examples of the advancements made in 
sustainable development to flesh out the elements of maturity and illustrate 
how a better political context can be built. However, a more significant 
engagement with the specialised literature will have to be done elsewhere.    
Here, hopefully, I have done enough, and have engaged with a sufficient 
number of disciplines and sources, to 1) highlight where the elements of 
maturity may be located and 2) demonstrate that they are concrete enough to 
be acted upon.  
The elements introduced here are: Global Commonness, Grassroots 
Realpolitik, Embracing the Moral Argument, Global Interconnectedness, and 
Global Intelligibility. Arguably, scholars, practitioners and activists can 
                                                 
13
 For more on the theory of the three dimensions of sustainable development, see John 
Elkington “Partnerships from Cannibals with Forks: The Triple Bottom Line of 21st Century 
Business” 8 Environmental Quaklity Management 37-51 (1998). 
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develop maturity by studying and acting upon these key areas.  Developing 
maturity means promoting a more conducive political environment for global 
social governance frameworks to emerge and thrive. A more conducive 
environment depends upon constructing higher levels of publicness at the 
global level. Thus elements that develop maturity are those that help society to 
embrace and construct global publicness.  
Macro-level interventions – like devising forms to promote multi-level 
deliberation about global common objectives and to collect transnational 
welfare data grouped by social categories such as race and gender –  are 
building blocks of global publicness; these building blocks are what I call 
elements of maturity. Elements of maturity have been identified, albeit timidly, 
in global health. The Partnership to Stop TB and the Global Polio Eradication 
Initiative, for example, demonstrated that it is possible to enhance nonstate 
actor participation at the local level, while keeping a clear focus on global 
disease control or eradication. Outside the objectives of controlling infectious 
diseases, elements of maturity were not so easily located even in global health.  
Elements of maturity are not suggested as magic-bullets. They work as all-
encompassing pre-conditions to enhancing levels of global publicness in 
global policy responses. Therefore, they should be further discussed and 
advanced. Discussing and advancing the elements below, or other elements 
that may be identified in the future, bring to fruition the maturity exercise. The 
maturity exercise, therefore, includes scholarly debates, formation of 
international commissions, public education campaigns, local forms of 
deliberation, and other pragmatic steps to understand the implications of a 
maturity approach (which is long-term and context-changing) and nurturing 
the elements of maturity themselves. These interventions should accompany 
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more pragmatic initiatives to make policy and create mechanisms, such as the 
universal social floor.     
Global constitutionalist and critical legal theories encouraged me to think 
about what a global public overlayer should look like. I designed the elements 
of maturity by thinking about the characteristics found in global health that 
advance global publicness, and about the characteristics in health and 
education that hinder global publicness. I also thought about how these 
characteristics interact with visions of ideal forms of global governance 
previously prescribed by global justice theorists (more humane or from below 
or just).
14
 I concluded that the ideal image of the global, public overlayer 
should remain within a frame of governance and not government, self-steering 
and not political representation.  
In this fashion, the maturity approach does not add to the literature that 
defends the need for global government or more of the traditional international 
institutions. Rather, it adds to scholarly work about how to make publicness 
transnational and more suitable for a frame of working that increasingly relies 
on public private partnerships. An alternative, broader approach to publicness 
and public services is needed, especially as IGOs, transnational corporations 
and transnational NGOs increasingly engage with social policy-making and 
service delivery.  
Because of the reasons above, I introduce the following macro-level areas for 
further research and action. They are not only components of a new approach– 
elements of maturity – but they are also vital opportunities to create a better 
                                                 
14
 The background for the assessment was based on critical, global justice and transnational 
democracy scholarship explored throughout this thesis, but mainly in Chapter 1. 
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context for staple public services like control of epidemics, distribution of 
essential medicines, education evaluation assessments, and food vouchers to 
be more effectively delivered by transnational networks and public private 
partnerships.  
 4.1 Identifying Elements of Maturity 
Global actors should be devoting more time to building global publicness by 
using a maturity approach.  
In order to provide more specific guidance, I attempted to gather enough 
evidence to, preliminarily, suggest the building blocks of global publicness 
and, as a consequence, of the maturity approach. At this point, the identified 
elements are only means to initiate a debate about further research and 
practical avenues by which the maturity approach could be further developed. 
Even if preliminary, the proposed elements are designed to be thought-
provoking and encourage further developments among academics and 
practitioners.   
4.1.1 Global Commonness
15
   
Global public goods and public-private partnerships have helped the global 
level to organise and rank action that significantly impacts peoples’ welfare. 
The scope of global public goods and public private partnerships, however, 
                                                 
15
 Global commonness is a term that has been used by critical scholars and global justice 
theorists to refer to issues, ideas and challenges that are of transnational concern and 
transnationally owned. The term commonness derives from the term Global Commons, which 
“acknowledges the growing insufficiency of relying on States to achieve an acceptable form of 
global governance by acting on their own. With reference to oceans, polar regions, ozone 
depletion, climate and biodiversity, there is the awareness that only global cooperative regimes 
with longer-run perspectives can avoid disaster befalling the global commons.” Falk, above n 
13, at 328.  
 [385] 
 
have seldomly been decided democratically. A larger deliberation of 
commonness that can facilitate the setting of a genuinely global common 
agenda is required. It is a daunting challenge, perhaps utopian in its absolute 
form. For this reason, I suggest that making efforts to access global priorities 
(what actually can be considered top priorities among different groups) should 
be pursued, especially within multilateral processes and within the strategic 
planning processes that antecede the creation of global partnerships. These 
efforts could considerably contribute to rising the levels of maturity for social 
governance.  
I draw from the case study on education governance to demonstrate that, 
despite obvious challenges,  positive efforts are needed to promote a search for 
global commonness. I also higlight from innovative practices at the United 
Nations to demonstrate how multilateral processes have attempted to identify 
and rank the common demands of different sectors of global civil society.  
The processes established within the UN to converse with nine Major Groups 
is an example of a concrete, consultative process that  helps to identify and 
rank common interests at the global level. UN Major Groups, for instance, are 
not organised around national lines. They represent nine sectors of global civil 
society and are invited to take part in conferences, summits, and informal 
rounds of negotiations. They   organise themselves in transnational networks 
and are coordinated by a special office, under the UN Commission for 
Sustainable Development, responding to the UN Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs (UN DESA). UN Major Groups are:
16
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 Agenda 21, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, and the Statement of 




2 Children and Youth 
3 Indigenous People 
4 NGOs 
5 Workers and Trade Unions 
6 Business and Industry 
7 Scientific and Technological Communities  
8 Farmers and Small Forests Landowners 
These groups represent an important outcome of the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) held in Rio de 
Janeiro, Brazil, 3 to 14 June 1992. The UNCED strengthened the role of Major 
Groups, bringing them into the priorities of the Agenda 21.
17
 Since, 1992, 
when the Agenda 21 was written, major groups are slowly, but increasingly, 
participating in UN conferences, summits and informal rounds of negotiations. 
Despite advancements, however, the role of Major Groups in decision-making 
on social and economic development remains marginal, and agendas are still 
set behind closed doors. This is not only a political problem, but a technical 
problem; it poses a barrier to making effective global social policy. With fewer 
groups represented at the decision-making table, our ability to assess contents 
that correspond to shared, global interests is greatly impaired.  
                                                                                                                             
at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) held in Rio de 
Janeiro, Brazil, 3 to 14 June 1992). Section III, Strenghening the Role of Major Groups, 
A/Conf.151/26 Vol.III.  
17
 Chapter 23 of the Agenda 21 explains that  “Any policies, definitions or rules affecting 
access to and participation by non-governmental organizations in the work of United Nations 
institutions or agencies associated with the implementation of Agenda 21 must apply equally 
to all major groups.” Agenda 21, ibid.  
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In the context of education, Michael Apple argues that universalist discourses 
need to be interpreted with care, and that any vision of commonness in 
education – and likely in public services in general – needs to go through a 
process of inclusive deliberation.
18
 In other words, society needs to 
democratically debate what common interest is in an agenda that, for example, 
aims at providing education for all. As in other welfare areas, the quest for 
commonness – and publicness in education – remains generally associated 
with the roll-back of the nation-state, and deliberation within it, rather than 
associated with the global public domain as a legitimate arena to debate and 
create mechanisms for world-wide promotion of participatory agenda-setting, 
as in the case of inviting Major Groups to participate in rounds of multilateral 
negotiations.  
Although the participation of Major Groups in the process of agenda-setting 
for sustainable development has been marginal, this methodology is a victory 
for global civil society. Not replicating it to other policy-fields, beyond 
sustainable development, is a missed opportunity.   
Debating common interests is difficult enough in the context of nation-states 
and democratically elected governments. Thinking about a democratic process 
to define common interests at the global level, and which public services may 
emerge from such deliberation, seems yet more challenging.  
Recognising the political and legal force of global public demands (understood 
as the result of deliberation produced by new publics, as those represented by 
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 Michael Apple "Understanding and Interrupting Neoliberal and Neoconservative Policies in 
Education" (paper presented to the XIV World Congress of Comparative Education Sopcieties: 
Bordering, Re-bordering and New Possibilities in Education and Society, Istanbul, June 2010.)   
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the nine UN Major Groups) may be the only avenue available at this point to 
democratise global social governance.  
Innovative ways of deliberation include enrolling new publics, such as the UN 
Major Groups, as capable and responsible actors in the process of global social 
policy-making.
19
 Enrolling new publics serves the purpose of organising 
transnational constituencies, around which deliberation about commonness 
can take place. In fact, enrolling new publics to deliberate commonness is 
different from arguing for participation and consultative status for NGOs 
engaging with the WHO, the ILO, or with another agency.  
Enrolling new publics starts before consultation; it helps to more accurately 
define what should be the scope of work of global actors, as a result of better 
understanding what is truly common across border. For example, the 
Partnership to Stop TB has worked to enrol more publics to get involved with 
TB control at the local and national levels. But this is a rather recent and 
isolated initiative. Initiatives to enrol diverse publics to participate in global 
partnerships are rare. In the field of education they are even more difficult to 
develop. Again, the example of the UN Major Groups for sustainable 
development is perhaps the best one. They have been participating in crafting 
background papers and official text within the global sustainable development 
agenda, especially in the last two years.
20
   
                                                 
19 
I borrow this term from Newman and Clarke who mean that new publics need to be 
encouraged and brought into the process of governance. Currently, new publics have only a 
certain extent of agency to enter the processes themselves, at their own will. See Janet 
Newman and John Clarke in Publics, Politics and Power: Remaking the Public in Public 
services (SAGE, the University of Michigan, 2009).  
20
 For details on how Major Groups participation is taking place, see the list of Regional 
Preparatory Meetings for Rio+20, through the Annotated Provisional Agenda for the Meeting 
(November 2011) E/ECE/RPM/2011/1. 
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The story of global education is different, but it points to a similar direction. It 
demonstrates that innovative means of participation are needed to improve 
education and offer better opportunities worldwide. It shows that a 
satisfactory, global agenda cannot be deliberated adequately within the 
traditional democratic avenues offered by the nation-state. It also cannot be 
defined by international cooperation alone. Besides, it cannot only be the result 
of country-to-country comparisons and policy borrowing, but the result of 
convergences among diverse constituencies (like students and teachers of 
different backgrounds) located around the world. Accordingly, a search for 
global commonness should take deliberative opportunities, as those created by 
the Global Campaign for Education, all the way down to the classroom and to 
professional associations.  
In the field of education and beyond, for global governance to more closely 
reflect “the agreed actions and means adopted by a society to promote 
collective action and deliver solutions in pursuit of common goals,”21 one 
needs to think about the characteristics of the context where governance is to 
be applied. Global governance is about “the sum of many ways individuals 
and institutions … manage their common affairs.”22 Global governance for 
any other purpose rather than advancing common affairs does not have a 
theoretical foundation. Common affairs that relate to global challenges, like 
education and sustainable development, should match with claims expressed 
democratically in a transnational public sphere; these claims justify the use of 
global governance in this context. In reality, besides the experience with the 
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  Kelley Lee and others, “Global Governance for Health” in Ronald Labonté and others (eds) 
Globalisation and Health: Pathways, Evidence and Policy (Routledge, New York, 2009) at 





UN Major Groups, the governance of most global affairs is often conducted 
without any regular form of deliberation of commonness, even if done in the 
name of global public goods or human rights, two commonly used platforms 
to trigger the creation of global governance mechanisms.  
Currently, there is no acceptable means of assessing global commonness. 
Similarly, there is no acceptable method, or shape to operationalise 
transnational democracy.
23
 Nevertheless, deliberative forums like the Major 
Groups have been more frequently created around the world to discuss 
matters that bring people together, that reveal interconnections among people 
living in different countries, and that obviously require global collective action 
to be resolved. In addition, transnational democracy theories have been 
rapidly growing and contributing significantly to debates about global 
constitutionalism. These are two promising developments that could be used 
as benchmarks to advance global commonness as part of a maturity approach.  
4.1.2 Grassroots Realpolitik  
Arjun Appadurai coined the term Grassroots Realpolitik. For him, it is a 
concept used to frame grassroots agency in the 21st century public sphere; it is 
partially fuelled by the human rights discourse, and mostly fuelled by the 
needs and organising power of the poor.
24
 His arguments were developed 
based on the observation of the Mumbai Alliance, an Indian organisation 
working in the housing sector and having transnational impact. The context in 
which the Alliance is “securing claims to proper housing” and “generating 
new forms of politics” nationally and transnationally shares many elements 
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 David Held “Regulating Globalisation: The Reinvention of Politics” (2000) 15 International 
Sociology 394. 
24
 Appadurai, above n 11. 
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with visions of more effective global governance. The Alliance’s work reflects 
that grassroots politics expressed cross-borderly may be an effective outlet for 
defining common objects, transnational reasons for people to get together to 
make social policy and devise new delivery schemes. Grassroots realipolitik 
encourages those who are usually beneficiaries of global social policies to 
become agents. This is the main reason why grassroots realpolitik is an 
element of maturity for global governance. It is a new political horizon that 
highlights the claims of beneficiaries and may facilitate their entry into the 
process of steering at the global level.
25
 Grassroots realpolitik, therefore, may 
help governance processes to be more inclusive, more democratic, humane or 
from-below. 
Nurturing grassroots realpolitik relates to recognising and supporting 
transnational grassroots networks that ceased opportunities to steer and row as 
actors of global governance. Grassroots communities are generally the 
beneficiaries of global social policies; they are not invited to make decisions 
and to execute plans of actions. When they cease opportunities to make 
decisions and to execute plans themselves, often advocating for their cause, 
and seeking resources and support with other transnational and international 
groups working in a similar area, they become agents. By engaging in 
grassroot realpolitik, they enhance the levels of self-steering of global social 
policy responses.  
As an element of maturity, nurturing grassroots realpolitik is important 
because it helps to transform beneficiaries into local agents of global 
governance. Thus, it helps to harness a political environment that will 
                                                 
25
 Appadurai use the term “horizon of politics” in this article about deepening democracy and 
fostering grassroots realpolitik.  
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inevitably require more self-steering. Encouraging and recognising grassroots 
realpolitik opens new opportunities for global actors operating at different 
levels of organisation to see each other, to meet, to deliberate common 
agendas, and to better divide steering and rowing tasks.
26
  
Appadurai explains that transnational networks of grassroots groups exercise 
grassroots realpolitik by discussing the following questions:
27
  
How can they organise transnationally without sacrificing their local 
projects? When they do build transnational networks, what are their 
greatest assets and their greatest handicaps? At a deeper political 
level, can the mobility of capital and new information technologies 
be contained by, and made accountable to, the ethos and purpose of 
local democratic projects? Put another way, can there be a new 
design for global governance that mediates the speed of capital, the 
power of states, and the profoundly local nature of actually existing 
democracies? 
At the political level, nurturing grassroots realpolitik relates to promoting more 
inclusive discussions about a new design for global social governance that 
hears, takes advantage of, and encourages existing steering initiatives at the 
grassroots level. Politically, grassroots mobilisation to provide solutions to 
transnational problems (as access to water, HIV/AIDS transmission, food 
insecurity) flags which locally agreed objectives may represent global 
common affairs. It also flags policy-areas and modes of operation for the 
global level to debate and, potentially, invest in. 
At the operational level, nurturing grassroots realpolitik relates to creating new 
opportunities for engaging existent democratic processes at the local level, 
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 Appadurai, above n 11.  
27




exposing the transnational reach of grassroots claims, and showcasing the 
capacity of grassroots networks to organise to carry forward social policies and 
services that are needed across many countries. Consequently, grassroots 
realpolitik matters for global publicness, and global social governance, 
because it promotes a global political space that is more reliant upon forms of 
grassroots organising. It also matters because it provides an avenue to IGOs 
and transnational NGOs to enrol beneficiaries of social policies as agenda 
setters or decision-makers or service deliverers. Therefore, grassroots 
realpolitik relates to previously discussed concepts, such as deepening 
democracy and the fourth R missing in the liberal 3R strategy.
28
  
In summary, the relevance of grassroots realpolitik in developing maturity for 
global social governance is two-fold. First it encourages self-steering and, 
second, it flags areas that may be of global concern, serving as a point of 
departure to promote global deliberations of commonness and how to access 
what global public goals are. Grassroots realpolitik flags which areas should 
be debated as potential objects of global public choice, increasing the chances 
of  welfare issues around which grassroots groups organise and are “active” 
(i.e. politically organised and socially engaged,) to make global social agendas 
and be developed within a global governance frame.
29
  
Maturity for global governance requires that national and international 
organisations take more notice of what goes on at the grassroots level. For 
instance, the MDG project created new infra-structure, new partnerships, new 
                                                 
28
 As a reminder, a liberal approach promotes rights, regulation, and redistribution to meet 
basic needs.  
29
 Amitai Etzioni, From Empire to Community: A New Approach to International Relations 
(1st ed, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2004).  
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services from the international level, but it has interacted little with grassroots 
initiatives that already exist in towns, rural areas and cities. The MDG 
Achievement Fund is an institution created to fill some of that gap at the 
rowing level (delivery), accepting requests for proposals (RFPs) from civil 




Mechanisms attempting to bring civil society voices into international 
institutions (such as the WTO and the WHO) have been the object of several 
studies. Researchers have emphasised deep political tensions that consultation 
generate and the difficulties IGOs have in translating the demands made by 
NGOs into practice.
31
 While these attempts are valuable, they are limited. 
These initiatives do not transform the beneficiaries into agents. At the global-
level, new and non institutionalised approaches are necessary, especially 




The type of politic that brings the local and the global together to deepen 
democracy and increase self-steering requires “long-term pressure” rather than 
“confrontation or threats of political reprisal.”33 These characteristics reinforce 
the choice for grassroot realpolitik as the element of maturity that directly 
relates to making the global public domain more politically open. Grassroots 
realpolitik suits a maturity approach because it acknowledges that long-term 
                                                 
30
 For instance, the MDG Fund makes available these two informative tables at The MDG 
Achievement Fund “Our Programmes” (2011) <http://www.mdgfund.org>. 
31
 Appadurai, above n 11.  
32
 Jeff Collin, Kelley Lee and Karen Bissel “The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control: 
The Politics of Global health Governance” (2002) 23 Third World Quarterly 265 at 267. 
33
 Appadurai, above n 11, at 25. 
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processes and bonds of trust are necessary to address democratic challenges 
that currently abound at the global domain.   
Social justice communities, grassroots organisations, high-level international 
officers and public administrators all need to buy into the political value of 
grassroots realpolitik for more local democratic organisations to be able to 
articulate claims transnationally and to cease opportunities to steer and row. 
Transnational articulation and agency in global social governance frameworks 
require building trust among these actors before thinking about how such 
recognition would be materialised in practice. This is one of the strategies of 
the Global Campaign for Education (GCE), one of the only mechanisms of 
global education governance studied and recognised by educators, scholars 
and high-level international officers alike. In other words, embracing the new 
political design is now more challenging and more important than coming up 
with an operational design. As demonstrated in the context of the GCE and of 
the Partnership to Stop TB (to cite an example from health where global 
partnerships are more common), building trust among global partners is a 
long-term project. Hence, the issue of democracy in global governance efforts 
is another that can only be understood as a long-term process of transforming 
the historically held hierarchies of who governs and who is governed.
34
  
                                                 
34
 For example, Appadurai builds upon his theory on the cultural dimensions of globalisation 
to articulate a global governance model that recognises and validates the expression of public 
choice made by groups engaged in Grassroots Realpolitik. This validity does not come easy, 
but it sends clear messages about which choices are made every day by transnational publics, 






Currently, transnational grassroots messages about how local democratic 
projects organise to provide social services simply do not resonate with those 
making policy supranationally.  In fact, the informality of these new publics 
and their activities function as a good excuse for ignoring not only their claims 
and their successes, but their existence as political actors. Creating outlets for 
the grassroots real-politicians to meet the traditional real-politicians (generally, 
powerful IGOs, TCNs, and IFIs representatives) is vital for the future of global 
governance. I am not advocating here for means of participation or 
consultation within old institutions, for example. I am advocating here for, at 
the outset, the creation of better forums for international and transnational 
actors to interact with grassroots organisations, understand which governance 
structures are already available at the grassroots level, what kinds of 
transnational claims they work with (such as the provision of shelter and 
popular housing), and which governance roles transnational grassroots 
networks can play in governing the social. This should engender 
encouragement for grassroots networks to continue their social work, 
incorporating it into larger frames of global social governance and future 
global social policy, such as in the 2015 reassessment of the MDG strategy.  
4.1.3 Embracing the Moral Argument   
The term embracing the moral argument refers to promoting slow but yet 
significant strengthening of world equality as the raison d’être of global social 
policy and global social services.
35
 The backdrop of this argument is that 
world inequalities, and lack of health, education, shelter, are not national 
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 This is one of the main arguments of Evan Luard in his book on the globalisation of politics. 
Evan Luard The Globalisation of Politics: The Changed Focus of Political Action in the 
Modern World (Macmillan, London, 1990). 
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matters, but global. They are not national matters because inequalities are 
caused more and more because of bad policy choices made outside the 
national territory, and often, outside the reach of national governments. For 
instance, the international control over essential medicines patents is a good 
example of how unavailability or lack of resources and social services is often 
not under the control of governments, especially of small countries, much less 
under the control of individuals. Therefore, pushing for the moral argument to 
justify global social governance means pushing for a systemic view of 
inequalities. If countries are not always responsible for policy choices that 
cause lacks and wants, it is morally wrong for the global level to look at lacks 
and wants as exclusively national problems. This country-focus has occurred 
in many of the good governance frames used to set, for example, the strategy 
for MDG achievement.  
Embracing the moral argument builds a better political context for global 
social governance because it is grounded upon a social psychology, rather than 
an individual psychology.
36
 The moral argument demonstrates that policy 
choices impact on groups regardless of their individual achievements or their 
nationalities. It also advances the formation of new bonds of solidarity based 
upon a structural view of the world. For instance, the argument that the control 
of diarrheal diseases is a global public good was discussed in Chapter 4. This 
argument has had little traction within an individualist psychology, but it has 
attracted attention when a structural, collective view of the world is deployed. 
For instance, articulating diarrheal diseases as a global challenge requires that 
                                                 
36
 Milton Fisk argues that self-interest in cooperation can be countered by the use of a social 
psychology to guide global politics and the protection of global public goods. Milton Fisk 
“Global Public Goods and Self-Interest in ED Boepple (ed) Sui Generis: Essays Presented to 
Richard Thomas Hull (Bloomington, Author House, 2005) at 13-22. 
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we, as a global society, become concerned with the fact that millions of people 
still die of diarrheal diseases in certain regions of the world, feeling engaged 
and compelled to do something about it. A structural understanding of 
inequalities and the impact of policy bring people together to manage global 
challenges. This became clear in the context of communicable diseases, in 
which structural factors (such as aviation for the masses and the speed of 
mutation of viruses) are very clear as determinants of contagion. Since all are 
at risk and there is no one to blame for contagion, cooperation is facilitated.    
Embracing the moral argument and a collective psychology is gradual. It is an 
element of maturity for global social governance because it helps to foster a 
collective mind-set, or a social psychology to guide global actors towards 
devising effective strategies to act upon neglected problems (such as the rapid 
spread of malaria in specific regions of the world, which was also discussed in 
Chapter 4) and to think about the need for redistributive policies. This social 
psychology depends upon educating policy-makers about why redistribution is 
a moral obligation. It also depends upon organising civil society to more 
bluntly demand global public services from IGOs, NGOs and TCNs already 
making important welfare decisions.  
Nurturing the moral argument is one avenue to check the challenge of self-
interest as a pure bottom-line of global actors making important welfare 
decisions.  
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), for example, argues 





 More specifically, the UNDP defends that, by investing in education 
in developing countries, donors are fulfilling both the interests of the world 
and their own interests.
 38
 This type of argument has become more popular 
with globalisation (and theories of inter-connectedness, systemic risks, and 
spillovers.) It is a chief discourse of the campaign for the achievement of 
Millennium Development Goal 2 (achieve universal primary education), and 
of the Dakar Framework for Action.
39
  
The UNDP’s head, Helen Clark, has held the position that the “moral 
argument alone” does not work in practice.40 Put simply, while the moral 
argument does not persuade major donors to cooperate, enlightened self-
interest and a sense of dreadful shared fate do. Enlightened self-interest 
questions the usefulness of the moral argument, by explaining why nation-
states support development policies from a realist perspective.  
The enlightened self-interest discourse seems a compromise towards 
attempting to inaugurate an era of cooperation that is moved by true bonds of 
solidarity, but that has not yet arrived. Perhaps, enlightened self-interest has 
been elected as an effective UN discourse because of an overarching moral 
crisis in development, which has encouraged more radical commentators to 
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Helen Clark "The Millennium Goals: Ten Years Down, Five to Go" (speech to the general 
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suggest the death of aid.
41
 This suggestion is as unattractive as thinking about 
development as the only avenue to finding a way to provide public services 
outside of the nation-state. In fact, Faith Based Organisations (FBOs) have, in 
some countries, provided more public services than the States or IGOs; as they 
have received most of the global funding available for provision.
42
 And, 
without judging this fact as problematic or beneficial, it reinforces the findings 
that the discourse of development is limited in several ways, as is the 
understanding that global social challenges will be addressed only by self-
interested approaches to national economic development, enlightened or not.  
While enlightened self-interest discourses have been embraced as effective in 
harnessing support for social policy, they are more strategic than promoters of 
fundamental social transformation. They do not advance equity as a 
constitutive element of global social policies, but rather as a positive collateral 
effect. Gradually embracing the moral argument reveals both the short-term 
benefits of enlightened self-interested approaches (as an effective first step) as 
the problematic of adopting it as a long-term strategy.  
Scholars acknowledge that an enlightened self-interest argument may be of use 
in stimulating much-needed donations for aid; they also acknowledge that the 
same argument does not advance the type of commitment necessary for overall  
improvement of development schemes.
43
 Enlightened self-interest as the norm 
for current discourse and practice has helped little in making public services in 
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developing and developed countries more democratic, where several 
constituencies do not enjoy equal opportunities, and do not thrive precisely 
because of that.  
The individualist Western mentality promotes a belief that opportunities for  
all those people who want to seize them are made equally available by 
international organisations and national governments, irrespective of race, 
gender, nationality, etc.
44
 The case-studies confirmed that this is still a 
mentality that influences agenda setting and the theory behind what constitutes 
or not a global public good  (the classification of the control of a malaria as a 
regional good, instead of a global good, illustrates well the lack of a collective 
mentality at the global level). Increasingly, and not only in developing 
countries, one can see that equal opportunity is not the case and that problems 
have been exacerbated by innovative domestic governance initiatives, by 
which schools and health services are privatised and become more vulnerable 
to discriminatory practices.
45
 Increasingly embracing the moral argument, 
instead of enlightened self-interested or other individualistic paradigms, aims 
at promoting a revision of these types of considerations, which relate to how 
global social policy addresses systemic inequalities, and how decision-makers 
see the causes of inequalities.  
Gradually understanding world inequality as systemic will likely promote 
bonds of solidarity as sources of global cooperation; as the right reason to 
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 For a critical view of how race, gender and class impact education in the United States, see 
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bring people together to manage global social challenges. This requires a 
better understanding of inequalities as products of bad policy choices made 
throughout humanity’s history, rather than as products of individual choice or 
cultural inferiority.
46
 These types of lessons are not going to be learned 
overnight, but they can be learned eventually. For instance, they depend upon 
educating larger audiences about structural inequalities, so that a new 
generation of global leaders may understand why it is morally wrong for many 




A structural view might be able to persuade global actors that people around 
the world are often caught by oppressive structures, be they represented by a 
history of colonisation or racial and gender discrimination or economic 
recessions; thus they are at a needy situation at no fault of their own. These 
oppressive structures, regardless if governments have helped build them or 
not, have created demands for social services and redistribution not only 
sparingly and not only within countries, but across transnational lines. A 
structural view of inequality would help global leaders to understand why the 
global level might be better suited to provide services to address social needs 
that have become common place around the world. Making these connections, 
between cause and effect, and between actions needed and their character as 
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moral impediments, is the function of working towards a larger use of the 
moral argument.   
In the case of the UNDP and MDG achievement, for instance, it seems 
disingenuous to adopt enlightened self-interest strategically, without doing 
more to advance the moral argument. If the moral argument is not working to 
harness support for MDGs but should be working, as it is inferred from Helen 
Clark’s statement, something should be done about it. A long-term vision of 
global social policy-making has to include a scenario in which the moral 
argument works and promotes profound changes in global social policy and on 
the ground. Embracing the moral argument depends on promoting large-scale 
public education about structural inequalities and systemic causes of poverty. 
It is part of a maturity approach to create schemes, perhaps championed by the 
UN, to promote more structural views of world inequality, through large-scale 
public education efforts and inter-institutional debates.  
4.1.4 Global Interconnectedness  
‘Global Interconnectedness’ refers to the increasing ways by which the world 
is connected (economically, socially, culturally, legally and politically), 
despite abysmal differences in the availability of opportunities, and stages of 
development. It refers to the aspects of our welfare that are shared 
transnationally either because of policy choices or because of shared fate.  
Global interconnectedness as an element of maturity that we should nurture 
refers to giving visibility to interconnections and to better understanding how 
they could help us come up with more effective governance frameworks.  
Global interconnectedness contributes to a more conducive environment to 
global social governance because it exposes which areas concern us all and 
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which vulnerabilities are common to humanity, or are made common to 
transnational groups. World interconnectedness showcases that many 
problems are global and require global solutions, albeit they might have 
different origins. As global matters that concern us all, regardless of 
nationality, interconnections should be brought into a suitable political domain 
to be debated and addressed. Today, not all types of interconnections are as 
visible as epidemiological and economic interconnections. 
In economic terms, global interconnectedness refers to the good and bad 
externalities that travel the world, in many directions, including North-South 
and South-South. Despite the importance of economic interconnectedness, 
global interconnectedness aims at highlighting the weight of other sorts of 
inter-connections, and how they are relevant to global social governance and 
wealth redistribution. Increasing the visibility of multiple interconnections 
from a global social perspective is one important step in the exercise of 
seeking maturity. For example, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) explains the importance of not ignoring 
systemic inter-connections generated by poor education.  It claims that 
“despite the high stakes and the cost of inaction, few governments treat the 
crisis in education as an urgent priority, in stark contrast to their response to 
financial market problems.” It further explains that the risk of “contagion” is 
not clearly seen by governments.
48
 The effects of the denial of education 
opportunities are not as visible as banks collapsing,
 49
 or thousands of people 
falling ill across borders due to the same disease.  
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Interconnectedness is not a new phenomenon, but the many types and speed of 
interconnections that we are experiencing in the 21st century, as a result of 
multiple forms of globalisations, is new. Today’s interconnections go beyond 
economic ties and imminent security risks (although these connections are 
enormously important and originate many others). Recognising this is vital for 
a better understanding of global publicness and better use of global 
governance. Generally, the issues that are more visible from an 
interconnectedness perspective propel cooperation and are chosen as global 
priorities. This became clear in the context of global health, more specifically 
in the context of the global response against AIDS and the global effort to 
eradicate polio. These two initiatives were able to harness support from a 
range of civil society groups and governments.  
During the 2010 World Economic Forum (WEF), in a panel moderated by 
Fareed Zakaria, the president of Mexico, Felipe Calderón opened the rounds of 
debate concerning the Global Redesign Initiative. One of the main reasons for 
the Initiative, as well as for the panel which brought together heads of State 
from the North and the South as well as high-level officials, was the rising 
number of global risks. President Calderón illustrated his perception of 
interconnectedness by using a systemic risks approach. He compared the globe 
to an aircraft, where we are all seated, and of which the pilot has suffered a 
heart attack. With this metaphor, President Calderón not only implies that 
certain risks do not recognise borders and affect us all (like epidemics), but 
especially that what encourages us to work together is the fact that the airplane 
is falling. The President adopts the language of interconnectedness and shared 
fate in the context of a threat. In order to lift the plane back up and keep it 
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going, President Calderón called for new mechanisms for a new era: a new 
heart for the pilot; or a new pilot all together.
50
   
The discourse about threats and risks is used in global social governance to 
refer to the need to jointly control epidemics. Global health has been advanced 
by securitist discourses because they deal with society’s sense of shared fate 
and collective vulnerability. It is quite obvious that microbes travelling borders 
present a threat to pretty much every country in the world; as it is quite 
obvious today that melting poles and droughts also have a bearing on life 
beyond borders. There are other vital areas which do not share the same 
obvious interconnectedness and therefore they have not received the same time 
of attention. Within global health this difference is clear.  
High-profile epidemics are those that: do not have a cure yet; that are new and 
that affect both rich and poor countries; and that are similar to the 2003 
outbreak of SARS, which was controlled in five month. High-profile 
epidemics like SARS have been able to rapidly mobilise key players around 
governance frameworks. The need to contain the threat that diseases like 
SARS represent has surpassed political, cultural and economic hurdles. On the 
contrary, diseases like diarrhoea have been neglected for years even if one of 
the major causes of death in the Global South.
51
 But diarrheal diseases are not 
obviously global; they do not travel in the same way; they are not life-
threatening for a significant amount of people thus not benefiting from the 
same types of quick policy responses. Interconnectedness from a different, 
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broader perspective explains why diarrheal diseases, and other health 
challenges, should deserve the same attention. It also explains why other social 
challenges should also be treated as interconnected challenges.  
While, the WEF’s panel considered environmental challenges as pushing all 
nations to take a seat in the falling plane and take collective action, it touched 
upon social struggles that are generally underrated. The South African 
President H.E. Zuma critiqued global risk approaches because they have been 
reduced to a theory of selective threats, especially threats that affect the 
economy and the environment. Yet the evidence gathered here reinforces the 
argument that eminent threats and security language help to gauge support for 
global governance to be used to design and deliver public services.  
The South-African president emphasized that it is much easier to talk about 
global solutions to problems that configure, prima facie, systemic risks, like 
climate change and pandemics than to find global solutions to matters that 
seem to be less threatening, especially to Western countries. With this in mind, 
President Zuma argued that it is important to visualise as systemic risk the 
plight of the poor, who make up the great majority of the world population. 
Accordingly, he calls for a critical assessment of the universalities of the 
threats we are most concerned with. He argues that, in terms of social, 
systemic threats, national solutions are still the rule, rather than global 
solutions. He agrees with Calderón that reform is urgently needed at the UN, 
with the creation of new methodologies of decision-making.
52
 Nevertheless, he 
reads the theory of systemic threats from a social justice perspective. He 
supports the argument that effective global governance may use systemic risks 
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theory for providing services, but should include the services that lack to the 
poor in most nations, such as quality public education and reducing the 
incidence of diarrheal diseases.  
The theory of global interconnections and global risks can be used to help 
society understand in two different ways why the services that lack to the poor 
should concern us all.  They help us see how bad policy choices travel and 
impact beyond borders (as exposed by President Zuma above); and they may 
also help us see how poverty is a global risk for us all. Global risk theory is a 
narrower perspective on interconnections, which was present in President 
Calderon’s speech.   
Global risks theory draws on theories of inter-dependencies and externalities. 
While externalities occur when a State, a firm, or an individual “takes an 
action but does not bear all the costs (negative externality) or all the 
benefits,”53systemic risks are threats of “breakdowns in an entire system, as 
opposed to breakdowns in individual parts or components.”54 According to the 
Global Redesign Initiative Report on “Mapping and Mitigating Global Risks”, 
there are global threats of different intensities and effects: macroshock, shock 
diffusion, and common shock.
55
 The language of “threat” or “shock” or 
“catastrophic risk” undermines the chances of social problems to be 
considered global risks. Social problems are not generally considered acute 
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and surprising like the language of threat, shocks and catastrophes suggests. 
They are generally considered long-lasting, chronic problems.  
The case-study in global health demonstrates that traditional systemic-risk 
justifications for global governance reside on acute threats (as the metaphor of 
the pilot’s heart attack and the falling plane demonstrates.)  Nevertheless, a 
socially-driven read of interconnectedness could make use of the chronic 
disease metaphor (for example, referring to the State of public education 
systems around the world) as justification for global health action. Chronic 
diseases do not kill, but impair and create morbity; they are not contagious 
person to person but they will create conditions for epidemiological microbes 
to develop and travel far; they do not change habits overnight but create less 
healthier cities that are now occupied by international students, migrant 
workers, and travellers from around the globe; and so on.  Consequently, 
chronic diseases are as important global risks as epidemiological threats. They 
require different approaches, but not less attention.   
The damages caused by chronic maladies (including diarrheal diseases, lack of 
primary education, lack of potable water) can reach beyond borders even if 
they do not present an eminent, acute threat. When interpreted from a broader 
perspective on risks as one type of global interconnection, chronic maladies 
help us see that our wellbeing as a global society is compromised by chronic 
problems as well as by acute ones.  
Social problems such as lack of food, drinking water, adequate education and 
health care have been normalised. This normalisation of social, global 
problems prevents the type of collective mobilisation that is needed from 
happening. Exposure of many types of interconnections can assist vital welfare 
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areas to receive more political attention, in light of what happens in 
communicable diseases. 
 In any event, a narrower global risks approach to social governance should be 
seen more as a strategy to harness political support, rather than the ideal 
justification for global social governance.
56
 Global social governance actors 
should not lose sight of the necessity to embrace the moral argument. In this 
regard, the language of risks should be used only strategically: as an element 
of maturity used to promote conversations not only about shared fate, but also 
about bad, travelling policy choices and the need to embrace the moral 
argument to construe a long-lasting, ideal political context for global social 
governance.  
4.1.5 Global Intelligibility  
Global intelligibility refers to access to information about transnational social 
needs, which require global solutions. Transnational social needs should 
constitute the content of a global public sector. Thus asking for global 
intelligibility is not the same as asking for more and better information 
generally.
 57
 Global intelligibility requires more information of a specific kind: 
the kind of information that let us know which social needs are truly 
transnational. This kind of information  is currently unavailable and, arguably, 
is vital for better global social policy-making.  
In the last decades new ways of measuring societal progress and, 
consequently, assessing their needs have gone beyond traditional metrics. For 
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example, specialists have insisted that Gross Domestic Product (GDP), for 
instance, should not be the only reference measurement to assess success. Yet 
countries strive to grow economically, and GDP growth rate is still used to 
determine the powerful and the weak in global relations.
58
 As a new mentality 
starts to emerge, new metrics are sought after. The country of Buthan, for 




The GNH Index is meant to orient the people and the nation towards 
happiness, primarily by improving the conditions of not-yet-happy 
people. We can break apart the GNH Index to see where unhappiness 
is arising from and for whom.(…) Not-yet-happy people in rural 
Bhutan tend to be those who attain less in education, living standards 
and balanced use of time. In urban Bhutan, not-yet-happy people are 
insufficient in non-material domains such as community vitality and 
culture and psychological well-being. In Thimphu, the capital, for 
example, the biggest insufficiencies are in community vitality. 
The use of GNH to guide social policy-making would be unthinkable years 
ago. Recently, the UN´s GA accepted to consider Bhutan’s proposal of 
including happiness, as measured by the GNH, as a 9
th
 MDG.60 In addition, 
leaders from Bhutan have voiced their suggestion of substituting GDP for 
GNH as the standard measure to determine national performance. The UN GA 
reflected this concern by recognizing “that the gross domestic product 
indicator by nature was not designed to and does not adequately reflect the 
happiness and well-being of people in a country.” 
61
 Despite the fact that the 
proposal from Bhutan will likely not be effectuated in the next few decades, 
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the inclusion of these types of innovative metrics into the GA agenda  points 
towards the necessity of creating new types of understandings about global 
welfare.  
Another tool is the more traditional Human Development Index (HDI), which 
is under the auspices of the UN. The HDI is a pioneer, in regards to more 
holistically measuring people´s welfare, assessing what some have called the 
real types of wealth, and serving as a guide to public policy within countries.
62
 
Yet these very important measures, while they configure one part of what we 
are calling global intelligibility, they are still confined within national borders. 
Indeed, they bring new content to help us access the effectiveness of social 
policy today and the need for new policy, but they limit their scope to 
comparative, country-to-country data. The problem is that we count with 
bordered indexes to measure wealth and welfare, or poverty and illnesses, that 
have become globalised. Global intelligibility is a call to solve this mismatch.    
One index that is, somehow, venturing beyond borders is the Happy Planet 
Index (HPI).
63
 HPI is an index that shows how environmental law and policy 
contribute to people´s welfare. It is an index of both welfare and 
environmental impact.  
The HPI does not indicate which is the happiest planet on earth, but it 
demonstrates the correlation between green policies and practices and higher 
levels of welfare. HPI uses three separate indicators: ecological footprint; life 
expectancy and general satisfaction to determine which places on Earth are 
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good places to live. It looks within countries and within regions, like Central 
America and South East Asia.  
The HPI works very differently from the GDP and points out to, for instance, 
Cuba and Vietnam as very happy places, while the USA ranks outside of the 
top 100. The HPI is a type of index that comes to help us care for global public 
goods, such as the environment and a global population that lives longer. 
However, while the HPI refers in its name to the geographical space of the 
“planet”, it is still not a planetary index, but a comparative one, where 
countries are the main units of analyses. With the HPI,  there is also a 
territorial limitation. It advances global intelligibility, but it is not enough.   
Global intelligibility requires that indicators be assessed not only as they 
perform inside countries, but as they perform inside of transnational 
communities.  It is important, for instance, to see whether African descendents 
are receiving good primary health care and are breathing clean air when 
compared to non-Africans, regardless of their nationality; how Indigenous 
women receive pre-natal care regardless of their nationality; how poor urban 
communities access fresh food and potable water, regardless of their 
nationality. While countries can be used as a means of organising data 
collection, they should not be the defining unit of analysis. The reason for this 
is simple: nationality is generally not the key explanatory factor for 
disproportional lack of vital basic services to certain communities, like 
communities of colour and Indigenous women. These are transnational lacks 





 These transnational needs also help to explain how global 




Transnational needs, and global social challenges, require new thinking about 
statistics. Transnational data, for instance, lacks in the field of globalising 
education. It could help to assess how groups, other than those divided into 
countries, are able to perform better or worse in international education 
assessments that are designed as universal. It is possible that tests are not 
catering well for girls in comparison to boys; for children of colour in 
comparison to white children, regardless of where they take these tests.  
If transnational indicators were made available, a deeper type of knowledge 
about global needs, differences and commonalities could be built. This type of 
knowledge promotes global intelligibility. Global intelligibility refers not only 
to collecting more quality comparative cross-country data about welfare, but 
also to collecting data about public services that do not use countries as main 
units of analysis. For example, one inquiry to be undertaken in the name of 
global intelligibility could be the measuring of the effectiveness of the Global 
Campaign to Eradicate Polio among women when compared to men, or among 
people of colour when compared to whites.
66
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To improve intelligibility means to improve quality and quantity of global 
data. Qualitatively, data should be able to reliably assess how public services 
are provided to different groups of people (like women or indigenous peoples 
or African descents or the elderly) regardless of their nationality. Another 
qualitative aspect of global intelligibility is how easily one can access global 
data. Global intelligibility represents the capacity of the transnational data to 
be available, recognised, understood, and used widely to promote effective 
global governance. Therefore, intelligibility has to do with gathering, 
disseminating, and utilising a specific set of data to promote knowledge about 
the global public domain and, more specifically, about the categories that 
matter for a global public sector.    
As of now, data used to facilitate global governance, such as the HPI, is 
collected comparatively. In the course of the case-studies, the data available 
for analysis was cross-country data. In terms of public services, data generally 
compares the State of a public service (education, health, housing...) on a 
country-to-country basis, with data collected and provided by national 
bureaus. Comparative analysis of official data is frequently conducted by the 
official bureaus of IGOs.
67
 This sequence of events may undermine the 
collection of information that recognises the fragmentation of the global level 
and the variety of the people and subject-matters involved.  Consequently, 
international and global policies in public services are overlooked. Besides, 
social categories that enrol global publics (such as race, gender, and sexual 
orientation) have not been included in quantitative studies. It would be 
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worthwhile, for instance, to know more about how global social policy affects 
a range of communities, regardless of their nationality.  
Producing better social indicators within transnational groups (and not 
necessarily within states) requires significant changes in how global actors 
collect, perceive, and deploy data.
68
 Collection of this kind of transnational 
social data has political implications. It provokes new thinking about the 
public domain; it reinforces the global level as another valid space for social 
claims to develop and challenges the nation-state as an exclusive arena to host 
social claims. Therefore, global intelligibility does not only have an 
educational meaning, but also a political meaning. In both its informative and 
political meanings, global intelligibility is very much a work-in-progress 
today. If nurtured, it may contribute to revealing transnational claims that need 
to be better known and more widely talked about. Consequently, it may help 
society to hold important discussions about the content of global publicness 
and a global public sector. Availability of transnational evidence may turn 
global publicness into something less vague and more concrete, less 
misunderstood, and more legible.  
It is argued that national statistics have made nations “legible”.69 Similarly, 
global statistics can also make social phenomena in the world clearer, 
exposing differences and similarities across transnational groups. They may 
trigger points of convergence for political action that goes beyond the nation-
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state. This engagement with broader forms of comparative literacy is seldom 
discussed by the sectoral literature (in this case, the sectoral literature 
investigated refers to globalising education and global health governance).
70
  
The literature on education governance demonstrates that the collection of data 
alone does not configure an act of global governance but becomes an 
important part of it. The type of global data that is lacking in education and 
other fields, and that can positively influence global governance, uses 
nationality as one more explanatory variable to measure how transnational 
groups perform or receive social services.  As global intelligibility may create 
a more concrete, evidence-based outlook of what problems global social 
policies should tackle, it helps to develop content for global publicness, and 
develops maturity for global social governance in specific fields.  
According to Rizvi and Lingard, who write on global education policy, “the 
collection of data, statistical information, … and educational indicators … is 
central to the project of making the globe legible, central to the global aspect 
of educational governance;”  they also argue that: 71  
While the creation of national systems of statistical collection 
eradicated localized systems of measurement, the emergence of the 
globe as a commensurable space of measurement has not obliterated 
national data collection systems, but is now an aspect of the 
governance of education, globally and within nations. 
The challenge of enhancing global intelligibility as an element of maturity 
resides on the question of how and for what purposes statistics become an 
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important aspect in the search for better forms of global governance. 
Addressing this question includes:  
 better understanding the impact of statistics upon global social policy-
making;  
 recognising the limitations of traditional comparative studies to guide 
global social policy-making, even when they flag some innovation as 
in the case of happiness indexes, as mentioned above;  
 recognising the limitations of UN bureaus to analyse statistics for the 
purposes of global social-policy making;  
 and assessing the underuse or the overuse of scientific data to justify 
and report upon international social governance, as in the case of the 
MDGs.  
For instance, Harvard Professor Christopher Murray wrote in the prestigious 
health magazine The Lancet that:
72
  
Health statistics are at the centre of an increasing number of 
worldwide health controversies. Several factors are sharpening the 
tension between the supply and demand for high quality health 
information, and the health-related Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) provide a high-profile example. With thousands of 
indicators recommended but few measured well, the worldwide 
health community needs to focus its efforts on improving 
measurement of a small set of priority areas. Priority indicators 
should be selected on the basis of public-health significance and 
several dimensions of measurability.  
He further explains that there are five main factors responsible for the 
controversies around MDG-related health statistics. These seem to be affecting 
not only the health sector, but many public sectors that are now heavily 
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influenced by global social policy. Murray explains the five factors throughout 
his article. In fact, these factors are applicable to the reality of the UN and 
global education. Paraphrasing Murray, the prejudicial factors are:
73
 
 Higher demand for accountability and transparency from governments 
and IGOs; given that civil society groups, donors, scientists, and the 
general public “want to benchmark progress and performance of public 
health and medicine.”  
 There is a general scepticism, including from the media, about both 
statistical and scientific arguments. 
 International information has expanded to cover “descriptive 
epidemiology about health to dimensions of public health and 
medicine such as quality, efficiency, and equity.” 
 Leaders involved with global-health programmes and public-private 
global health initiatives find it necessary to produce more information 
and make it available to general consumption. 
 Demand for health information grew, but primary data collection 
platforms in developing countries did not.  
Murray’s study of health statistics reinforces the argument for global 
intelligibility, given that  even in global health, arguably a more mature  sector 
for global governance, there is a lack of adequate indicators, which take into 
consideration the global publicness of the policy response. Besides, Murray’s 
study is a good example of how and why a preoccupation with global 
intelligibility is valid across sectors. There is an incredible demand for 
information, and the traditional moves to satisfy that include: benchmarking 
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progress and performance of public services from the supranational level, 
demanding from and relying upon under-resourced national bureaus, and 
providing information to fulfil a need for transparency without a proper 
concern with the depth and the quality of data provided. These, instead of 
clarifying and providing evidence, create confusion. The controversies around 
these practices reinforce the claim for global intelligibility as an important aid 
for establishing which issues are common and which is the right content for 
global social policies.   
With the expansion of global social policy partially fuelled by the MDGs, new 
interactions create an enormous demand for indicators, such as the HDI, the 
GNH and the HPI. This demand has been met without strategies to bring these 
measurements to the transnational level and also to the mainstream of global 
politics. They are also working outside of the MDG strategy; in general, 
knowledge about the extension of MDG benefits is still very poor.  
Murray himself devises a way to assess, for example, the public-health 
significance of official MDG indicators. The results on the public importance 
of official MDGs indicators are not encouraging.
74
 As of now, the role of 
statistics in the MDG project, and in global social governance more generally, 
has been assessed as poor, and has generated controversy. One of the main 
triggers of controversy is the lack of public significance of the indicators 
currently used for measuring social policy effectiveness. This fact reinforces 
the argument for harnessing better global intelligibility as it also connects 
better intelligibility with high levels of publicness.  
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Only when more complex types of measurements, and non-traditional spaces 
of equivalences (in this case, transnational arenas) be identified and explored 
in the field of statistics, the global public domain will be better understood, 
and global governance, especially the activities that influence public services, 
be more effective. Although this is a simple proposition, these types of 
transnational, social indicators are difficult, if not impossible, to find in data 
studies conducted today.
75
 Meanwhile, if measures such as the HDI, the GNH, 
and HPI started to be taken as seriously as the GDP, as guides to frame global 
social policies, these would likely be more effective than what they are today. 
Therefore, a relatively easy way of maturing for global governance is to start 
looking for innovative ways of measuring people´s welfare, beyond the GDP, 
whenever a new global policy framework is at stake.  
In short, despite some advancement in scope, which is represented by attempts 
to measure planetary happiness and human development, the world is not yet 
legible.  
Global public services, in particular, especially how they perform 
transnationally, are yet not legible because we lack data and the right vision to 
collect data outside the country-to-country model. There is a need to campaign 
for transnational social indicators for the sake of knowing our global public 
domain better, understanding its priority needs, and acting upon them with a 
long-term focus, as required by a scenario that needs to mature for global 
social governance.  
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V Final Considerations 
I started my doctoral research because I was intrigued with the great number 
of public services coming from the global level, especially after the 
establishment of MDGs. After researching current practices in global 
governance in public services, I was curious about how considerations of 
publicness in global public services have been so timidly addressed; how they 
got lost amidst a 20th century belief that public services are what the State 
provides or enables.  
After researching how global governance in public services takes place, or is 
said to take place, I was also intrigued by questions about how the theory 
translated in practice without one of its major components, self-steering. It 
happens that self-steering holds a close connection to new forms of publicness. 
Ignoring self-steering can be associated with global scholars and practitioners 
ignoring considerations of  publicness when performing acts of social 
governance.  
Both the current reality of global social governance and its future development 
require new considerations of publicness. In the last twenty years, the global 
level has had a great impact on public services. This impact can no longer be 
accepted as– and hidden under a label of– second-best policy option. 76 Since 
the global level has engaged  with staple public services from worldwide 
vaccination to worldwide student evaluation schemes (as this thesis 
endeavoured to demonstrate), it rather be transformed into an adequate, first-
option arena to develop specific global social policies.  
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As of now, the public nature of public services, which have been relocated to 
the global level, has been ignored. With this thesis, I attempted to provide 
evidence and initiate a debate about what publicness within global governance 
looks like, and what it should look like.  
Arguably, global social governance with enhanced levels of publicness needs  
to be able to rank which social demands are transnational and it needs to be 
able to address these demands through higher-levels of self-steering. These 
two abilities depend on a global political context that is more advanced than 
what we currently can foster. 
With a maturity approach, I attempted to provide a frame of thinking and 
action that make the proposal of constructing this challenging, ideal global 
political context less overwhelming. The construction of global publicness, 
and consequently publicness within global governance, is indeed hard work. It 
requires cultural and political changes that many of us, from individuals, to 
corporations, to IGOs, are not prepared to undertake. It requires that 
individuals, for instance, become aware that a portion of their health care, of 
the education of their children, of the provision of their water is not – and 
should not – be the responsibility of their governments, but of transnational 
and international organisations that decide to pick up that tab. It requires that 
global actors, including corporations engaged with public private partnerships, 
see their roles as generating public responsibilities, and as intertwined with 
steering roles that organisations at the grassroots levels are exercising. It 
requires that IGOs, transnational NGOs, multinational corporations agree upon 
mechanisms of visibility and public scrutiny for the services that are relocated 
to the global level. It requires mechanisms of transnational deliberation to rank 
priorities to be relocated to the global level …The list of the novel things that 
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global publicness requires goes on and on. These changes are not going to 
happen overnight. They will take time and many discussions, public education 
campaigns, policy debates, etc. They will also require leaders with a different 
view of world inequalities; of why we need a global public domain in the first 
place; and of why the state alone is no longer able to run all things public. A 
maturity approach acknowledges the complexity of these changes and 
recognises small victories towards them as positive, necessary steps in the 
process of maturing for global governance.  
A maturity approach addresses questions like “how do you promote more 
effective global social governance when the moral argument is not working?” , 
or like “how do you make fair universal policies when there is no practical 
mechanism of global deliberation in place” by not offering strategic answers 
(like adopting the enlightened self-interested argument) or not devising 
practical mechanisms (like increasing NGO participation at the IGO level), or 
not setting goals like the MDGs. A maturity perspective will give answers that 
are not going to yield immediate outcomes; and I am at ease about it.  
Outcomes and strategies matter, but they will be addressed by approaches 
other than the maturity approach. A maturity approach aims at promoting 
wider conversations about the context for outcomes and strategies to be 
successful. For instance, it will address the question about what to do if the 
moral argument is not working by asking back: what are the cultural and 
behavioural changes we have to nurture for it to work? The maturity approach 
wants to promote a genuine debate about this and other fundamental questions 
that can no longer be ignored. The maturity perspective can serve as analytical 
tool and should always accompany pragmatic attempts of global partnerships 
to design and provide public services. 
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The maturity approach believes that change-of-mentality exercises are, at a 
minimum, as important as thinking about practical mechanisms to deliver aid 
to attend to the immediate demands of those who are sick, without food, 
without education, without shelter, etc.  
The maturity approach also draws attention to the fact that because structural 
questions are so daunting, they have been ignored and, often, regarded as 
utopian or unimportant. Beyond practical devices and how-to frameworks, 
attention needs to be paid to changing fundamental structures of social and 
political relations today, even if it will take time. This is a simple and 
overstated argument, yet it has not been taken seriously enough in the new 
moves towards globalising public services and establishing a large number of 
public private partnerships. If this simple argument had been better cared for, 
global public services would likely have been devised in a more public way 
than is currently the case.
 77
          
While this thesis aimed at providing evidence that global governance in public 
services is a well-consolidated trend in specific policy-fields, it has also 
endeavoured to point out that innovative global social policy generally does 
not include much-needed considerations of publicness, much less of global 
publicness. 
78
 It is hoped that these arguments have been made well enough to 
provoke new questions and research interests about social policy made at the 
                                                 
77The term “conditions of possibility” for effective, global cooperation was deployed to mean 
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global level, and about how effective they are as potential triggers of public 
service provision beyond the State.  
Lastly, I believe that students who decide to engage with this new arena, filled 
with exciting opportunities for public private partnerships to develop, will 
understand the need for a maturity approach. They will be able to envision the 
long road ahead: the abyss that still exists between the current disruption of 
public services as traditionally understood and the construction of an effective 
public sector at the global level. A maturity approach will likely attract 
attention because it provides a way forward in a difficult context: a global 
domain that is poorly understood and extremely active at the same time. No 
matter how challenging it might be, the reality of making global social policy 
is upon us, and might as well be used as an opportunity to produce effective 
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